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ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using the 
alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EEK (Estonian kroon)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia LVL (Latvian lats)
LT Lithuania LTL (Lithuanian litas)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIAF Association of Securities Dealers
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce
CCR Central Credit Register
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIPOS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CEMLA Center for Latin American Monetary Studies
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research
CIIs Collective Investment Institutions
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
DGSFP Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Defi cit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Offi cial Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 79 European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
ESA 95 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Offi ce of the European Communities
FAFA Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FISIM Financial intermediation services indirectly measured
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Programs
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fi xed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
ICO Offi cial Credit Institute
ICT Information and communications technology
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IGAE National Audit Offi ce
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
INEM National Public Employment Service
LTROs Longer-term refi nancing operations
MFIs Monetary fi nancial institutions
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
MROs Main refi nancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAIRU Non-accelerating-infl ation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NPISHs Non-profi t institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SCLV Securities Clearing and Settlement Service
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement
Express Transfer system
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
TFP Total factor productivity
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organisation
XBRL Extensible Business Reporting Language
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignifi cance
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the fi nal digit shown in the series.
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Overview
In 2008 the world economy underwent momentous changes which brought to an end the 
longest uninterrupted growth period since the 1960s. The turmoil on international financial 
markets present since the summer of 2007 turned in the closing months of the year into a 
deep global financial crisis, giving rise to an economic recession that has now extended to all 
the main economies.
The ratcheting up of the financial crisis in September 2008 heightened the process of delever-
aging in which the financial system was immersed, while exacerbating its effects on real activ-
ity. The crisis spread to the emerging economies – which had until then shown signs of some 
resilience – and led some countries to post very negative GDP growth rates in 2008 Q4 and 
2009 Q1.
The paralysis of demand prompted a drastic turnaround in inflation worldwide during the year. 
Until the summer, inflation had been running very high as a result of the notable rises in oil, food 
and other non-energy commodity prices. However, as the growing weakness of the world 
economy contracted the demand for oil and commodities, their prices moved sharply down 
and affected both actual inflation rates and inflation expectations, which fell notably against a 
recessionary global background.
The economic authorities reacted forcefully to this combination of adverse factors with the aim 
of supporting the financial system, safeguarding its workings and stimulating the economy. 
Governments devised financial system support plans and adopted relatively ambitious fiscal 
impulse packages. Central banks, for their part, altered the stance and operational framework 
of their monetary policies during the year to adapt them to the change in the global scenario. 
Following the heightening and globalisation of the financial crisis, monetary policy responses 
became more uniformly expansionary. Sizeable cuts were made to official rates, which fell in 
some cases to all-time lows, while policies geared to the abundant provision of liquidity took 
on a key role.
In the Spanish economy, the shocks induced by the serious global economic and finan-
cial crisis superimposed themselves on the process of domestic adjustment which had 
begun previously (as a result of the imbalances built up during the previous long, in-
tense expansion), and which was being driven, above all, by the correction of the ex-
cesses in the real estate sector and of the high levels of private-sector debt. The com-
bination of both made for a severe increase in uncertainty, a precipitous decline in 
confidence, a notable tightening of the conditions of access to financing and a consid-
erable erosion of private-sector wealth. The contractionary forces behind this process 
pushed the Spanish economy into a sharp recession, in parallel with the global reces-
sionary trends. Despite the change in monetary policy stance and the expansionary 
measures adopted, the Spanish economy showed a continuous loss of momentum, 
which became more accentuated in the second half of the year when, for the first time 
since 1993, two consecutive quarters of falls in GDP were recorded. As a result, the year 
closed with a 0.7% year-on-year decline in output. This recessionary pattern became 
more visible in 2009 Q1, with a 3% fall in GDP compared with the same period a year 
earlier according to the data released as this Report was going to press. The information 
available for Q2 appears to point to less intense contractionary trends, as is proving the 
case worldwide.
1 Introduction
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The inflationary outlook changed drastically during the year, in line with worldwide develop-
ments and with the sudden weakening of demand. After having increased significantly in the 
first half of the year, the CPI growth rate declined rapidly, reflecting the effect of the correction 
of oil and other commodity prices, and of the diminished momentum of spending, which led 
the inflation differential with the euro area to turn negative from December, for the first time 
since the euro area was created. The external deficit also turned around and began to narrow 
fairly sharply. The processes brought on by the strong adjustment of domestic spending are 
thus prompting a relatively swift re-absorption of some of the imbalances pending correction, 
although they are doing so by means of bringing activity grinding sharply to a halt, with high 
costs in terms – above all – of falling employment and rising unemployment.
This chapter analyses the current situation of the Spanish economy against the backdrop of 
the global economic and financial crisis. It sets out the economic policy challenges posed and 
the steps needed to mitigate the contractionary forces and forge a prompt recovery on bal-
anced and sustainable foundations. Chapter 2, from a more analytical and selective perspec-
tive, details some of the aspects of the impact of the global crisis on the adjustment of the 
Spanish economy, paying particular attention to the implications for the determinants of job 
creation.
Undoubtedly, 2008 was a year of momentous changes for the world economy. The risks iden-
tified in 2007 materialised, full-blown, and the longest uninterrupted period of growth since the 
1960s was cut short. The financial turmoil accompanying us since summer 2007 turned in the 
closing months of last year into a deep-seated and global financial crisis, entailing an eco-
nomic recession which has now extended practically to all the main economies, including the 
euro area. Faced with this combination of adverse factors, economic authorities reacted force-
fully, practically simultaneously and, to some extent, concertedly, with the aim of supporting 
the financial system, safeguarding the flow of credit to the economy, restoring confidence and 
sustaining aggregate demand. However, the feedback loop between financial and real-sector 
recessionary forces have shaped an economic and financial situation of extreme fragility and 
one auguring a very negative outlook for 2009.
In 2008 the international financial system underwent its most difficult time in several genera-
tions. The benign and relatively unvolatile macroeconomic context marking the world economy 
in the years immediately prior to the start of the crisis in August 2007 had given rise to a situ-
ation of underpricing of risk. And, driven by low real interest rates in historical terms and ex-
traordinarily dynamic credit, real and financial asset prices stood at historically high levels. The 
degree of leverage obtained by the financial system was also high, as was the private-sector 
non-financial debt in some countries.
In these circumstances, the change in the real estate cycle in the United States, around whose 
mortgage market a web of complex mechanisms for transferring risks from loan-originating 
institutions to other agents had been woven, paved the way in the opening months of 2007 for 
an increase in subprime mortgage defaults, which would ultimately act as the trigger for the 
current global financial crisis. The scope for contagion of the financial turmoil that began in the 
summer of 2007 was soon apparent, despite its relatively local source. The sharp reassess-
ment of risk against a background of high leverage triggered a drastic reduction in liquidity on 
money markets, amplified by the complexity of some of the instruments at the epicentre of the 
turmoil (structured products) and by the opacity with which risks were distributed through the 
so-called originate-to-distribute model, the expansion of which had spurred the extraordinary 
buoyancy of credit in the previous years. However, few could then have predicted the range of 
institutions, assets, markets and economies which would ultimately be affected.
2 The world economy 
amid the international 
financial crisis
A year of momentous change 
for the world economy, in which 
the longest period of 
uninterrupted growth since
the 1960s was cut short.
2.1 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS
The international financial 
system underwent its most 
difficult time in several 
generations
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In the first half of 2008, the financial market turmoil and dysfunctions persisted and spread, 
compromising the solvency of some systemic institutions. During this period, central banks 
increased the supply of liquidity on interbank markets and governments conducted selective 
bail-outs of ailing systemic institutions. Such was the case of the investment bank Bear Stearns 
which, thanks to the support of the Federal Reserve, was purchased by JP Morgan Chase in 
March. In September, following the placing under control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 
(agencies which play a key role in the US mortgage market), the bankruptcy of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers and the bail-out of the insurer AIG, the financial markets entered a 
global crisis which placed the system on the verge of collapse and which impacted with force 
the European banks directly involved in the distribution of risks originating in the United 
States.
The heightening of the financial crisis in September gave rise to a period marked by the 
quickening of the deleveraging process which the financial system is undergoing and which 
entails the risk of a sharp contraction in credit. The great uncertainty and volatility over-
shadowing markets (see Chart 1.1) were most visibly reflected on stock markets, which 
from mid-September 2008 to March 2009 fell by around 30% in the main economies, and 
on certain foreign exchange markets. Further, there was a marked increase in credit risk 
premia and, despite the easing of monetary policies, a notable tightening of credit stand-
ards.
Many factors contributed to the spread and heightening of the crisis. The loss of confidence in 
the pricing of the assets initially affected (some of great complexity) and the opacity of the re-
sulting losses promptly turned into uncertainty over the financial position of those financial in-
stitutions that were holding such assets on their balance sheets or which were exposed 
through credit lines to off-balance sheet vehicles, giving rise to a significant increase in coun-
terparty risk. With access to the wholesale funding markets closed except for the very short-
dated terms, and with financial institutions obliged to increase their solvency ratios in a setting 
of high risk aversion which was far from conducive to the raising of private capital, banks were 
caught up in a disorderly process of deleveraging through asset liquidation. In turn, the mas-
sive sale of assets at bargain prices on relatively illiquid markets led to fresh losses and 
prompted negative externalities for other financial institutions not initially exposed to the assets 
affected at the outset; but such institutions also entered a vicious circle of losses due to the 
depreciation of assets on their balance sheets, worsening solvency ratios and asset liquida-
tion.
These trends called into question the long-term viability of business models which, supported 
in some cases by looser regulations, had shown great dynamism in recent years and had 
developed a web of complex interconnections in the financial sector. Firstly, the vulnerability 
of those banks (the major investment banks in particular) that had depended excessively on 
the capital markets to fund with short-term debt the – often aggressive – expansion of their 
balance sheets was highlighted. Also, the losses incurred by the monoline insurance compa-
nies, which had backed in recent years the issues of some of the instruments at the heart of 
the credit problem, called into question their solvency, undermining the very basis on which 
their business was founded. Finally, hedge funds, whose high returns were based on the pos-
sibility of making investments financed largely through resort to credit, experienced signifi-
cant disinvestment. In any event, set against the high integration of and complex intercon-
nections between financial institutions, the initial turmoil progressively fed through to other 
assets, markets and economies – including the emerging countries, which initially showed 
some resilience – to become what is today a global financial crisis without parallel in the past 
70 years.
In the first half of the year the 
financial turmoil spread, 
compromising the solvency
of some systemically important 
institutions
The heightening of the crisis
in September accelerated the 
deleveraging of the financial 
system and increased the risks 
of a severe contraction in credit
The initial turmoil progressively 
fed through to other assets, 
markets and economies, 
becoming what is currently
a global financial crisis
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In late 2008 and early 2009, the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy have been 
patent, giving rise to a recession which has now reached practically all the main economies. 
This has meant that the focus has shifted towards a new feedback loop, this time from the real 
to the financial sector.
The loss of momentum in world growth dating back to mid-2007 continued in 2008. For the 
year as a whole, GDP grew by around 3%, down from 5.2% a year earlier. The economic situ-
ation deteriorated progressively throughout the year, and was reflected in successive down-
ward revisions of growth and inflation forecasts by public and private organisations. Nonethe-
less, from Q3 the slowdown intensified sharply and some countries posted very negative 
growth rates in Q4 and in 2009 Q1 (see Chart 1.2). The latest information, however, suggests 
the intensity of the contraction is easing.
In the first half of the year, activity in the developed countries began to be affected by the 
impact of the high commodity prices prevailing and by the financial turmoil passing through 
to aggregate demand via various channels. Firstly, household and corporate spending 
decisions progressively adapted to the much more restrictive financial conditions in place, 
The effects of the crisis on the 
real economy have become 
patent in the situation of global 
economic recession
2.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
The economic situation 
deteriorated progressively 
throughout the year
In the first half of the year, 
activity in the developed 
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reflected in both higher interest rates and risk premia, and in the lesser availability of 
credit. Further, the reduction in the price of financial and real estate assets generated a 
significant negative wealth effect which, along with the fall in confidence (which prompted 
a deferral of consumption and investment decisions), entailed a clear slowdown in aggre-
gate demand during the year. The emerging countries, however, continued to post high 
growth rates, which sustained to some extent the external demand of the advanced econ-
omies and curbed the intensity of the adjustment of activity to the new macroeconomic 
scenario.
Towards the autumn, however, the persistence and worsening of the financial problems meant 
that the world economy was already showing unequivocal signs of intense and widespread 
weakness, across both industries and regions. These signs were most patent in the marked 
deterioration in the global trade indicators. The relative resilience which, to differing degrees, 
the emerging economies had shown came to an end, and most – including China – underwent 
a sharp deceleration, though they still maintained positive growth rates. The correction was 
also evident in the financial indicators, and the economic outlook turned markedly gloomy. 
Some of the emerging countries with greater vulnerabilities went into crisis, requiring the acti-
vation of multilateral resolution mechanisms.
Inflation also underwent a significant turnaround during the year. Until the summer, as a result 
of the notable increases in oil, food and other non-energy commodity prices, very high figures 
were recorded. However, as the growing weakness of the world economy reduced the de-
mand for oil and commodities, their prices moved sharply downwards and affected both ac-
tual inflation rates and inflation expectations, which fell notably.
Despite a relatively favourable starting situation, the euro area did not remain immune to 
global developments and to the decline in external demand. Although the real effects of the 
financial turmoil were perceived with some delay, they were quite clear in the second half 
of the year. As a result, 2008 ended with the euro area economy in deep recession, with 
the level of GDP in Q4 1.5% down on the same period a year earlier. Inflation, which was 
running at around 4% in mid-2008, slowed markedly in the closing months of the year and 
early 2009, owing largely to the fall in commodity prices but also to the notable weakening 
of domestic demand. The sharp change in outlook after the summer dispelled all fears that 
had arisen in the previous months over inflation expectations becoming unanchored, in a 
setting in which inflation had posted rates unknown since the start of EMU and in which 
wage demands, after several years of containment, had risen owing to labour market tight-
ness.
During the year central banks progressively adapted their monetary policy stance to the chang-
ing global scenario, which became increasingly complex. The heterogeneity of monetary poli-
cy responses in the first half of 2008 was the outcome of discrepancies in the cyclical position 
and outlook of each economy, and of structural differences in transmission mechanisms. 
These factors meant that differing assessments were made of the balance of risks to attaining 
objectives. The Federal Reserve continued during these months on the road on which it had 
embarked on 2007, aggressively cutting interest rates, while many of the emerging economies 
tightened their monetary policy. In the euro area, the ECB Governing Council faced a particu-
larly complex situation in which some change in the dynamism of demand was discernible, but 
with the indicators of capacity utilisation not falling back and with wages growing at a very high 
rate. Accordingly, the ECB decided in July to raise its key rate by 0.25 pp, with the aim of 
preventing the risks identified to the goal of maintaining price stability in the medium term from 
materialising.
The persistence and spread of 
the financial problems meant 
that towards the end of the 
summer the world economy 
was already showing 
unequivocal signs of intense 
and widespread weakness
There was also a drastic 
turnaround in inflation during 
the year
The euro area was intensely 
affected by global 
developments and the decline 
in external demand
During the year central banks 
modified the stance and 
operational framework of their 
monetary policies to adapt 
them to the change in global 
scenario
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The radical change in economic outlook following the intensification and globalisation of the 
financial crisis in September tended to make for uniformity in the direction of monetary policy 
responses. With inflationary risks dispelled from the policy-relevant horizon, central banks co-
incided in giving priority to preventing the process of disinflation into which developed econo-
mies were moving from translating into inflation rates persistently below target, or in some ar-
eas into deflation. This was against a background in which the sharp contraction of aggregate 
demand and the marked deterioration in economic prospects threatened to feed back into the 
financial crisis. In a practically unprecedented and concerted move, the central banks of the 
main world economies cut interest rates by 50 bp in early October, and followed this up with 
fresh cuts in the final months of 2008 and in early 2009. In the case of the euro area, the total 
reduction in interest rates amounted to 325 bp, placing the main refinancing operations rate at 
1% in May 2009, a level not seen since the start of EMU. These reductions saw, in several 
cases, the room for manoeuvre available under conventional monetary policy measures ex-
hausted. And in a setting in which distortions in significant segments of the transmission 
mechanism persisted, this led to a shift in emphasis towards broadening the range of meas-
ures aimed at reinforcing the pass-through of the cut in interest rates to agents’ financial costs 
and to making agents’ access to financing easier, through the expansion of the central bank 
balance sheet or the change in the composition of its assets.
Central bank liquidity provision policies have also become exceptionally prominent since the 
outbreak of the financial tension in August 2007. The unfolding of the crisis during 2008 – 
whose effects, once again, were felt with particular virulence on the interbank markets, which 
ceased to function as efficient liquidity distribution mechanisms – posed major challenges to 
which the central banks responded in an innovative fashion, increasing the supply of liquidity 
in order to meet the system’s gross needs directly. On the basis of the respective operational 
frameworks in place, innovations entailed an increase in the number of institutions with access 
to central bank financing, the broadening of the range of acceptable collateral for monetary 
policy operations and the lengthening of the terms at which liquidity was supplied to the mar-
ket.
Governments also responded forcefully to the intensification of the financial crisis. In the first 
half of the year, measures had focused on the selective bail-out of ailing systemic banks, sup-
plementing the actions of central banks to prevent liquidity problems in the banking sector 
from becoming solvency problems. However, the risks of financial collapse and the increas-
ingly evident and heightened prospect of global recession led from September to the wide-
spread approval of plans to support the financial sector and to boost aggregate demand via 
fiscal stimulus. The breadth of the measures adopted and the volume of resources mobilised 
were on an unprecedented scale, although they evidenced a wide variety of approaches de-
rived from differences in starting positions and in the various ways in which real and financial 
tensions were manifest. Box 1.1 sets out in a detailed though summarised fashion the main 
economic policy guidelines adopted to combat the crisis in the main regions.
The economic outlook for 2009 points to a contraction of the world economy and a deep-
seated recession in the developed economies, in a setting in which the downside risks remain 
considerable. The latest IMF forecasts suggest world growth in 2009 will fall in annual average 
terms to a slightly negative rate, a situation not seen since the Second World War, and that this 
rate will be very negative in the case of the developed economies, including the euro area. It is 
likely in the developed world that the rate of inflation, reflecting cheaper commodities, will fall 
back to very moderate or even negative levels during the year and that the unfavourable eco-
nomic situation will translate into downside risks to inflation and, in those cases in which me-
dium-term expectations are insufficiently anchored, to the emergence of deflation risks. The 
The change in economic 
outlook further to the worsening 
of the financial crisis in 
September made for greater 
uniformity in monetary policy 
responses
Liquidity provision by central 
banks reached extraordinary 
volumes
Governments, too, responded 
forcefully to the intensification
of the financial crisis
2.3 OUTLOOK AND 
CHALLENGES
The envisaged horizon for 2009 
points to a contraction of the 
world economy, with a deep-
seated recession in the 
developed economies
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ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES TO COMBAT THE CRISIS BOX 1.1
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in the summer of 2007, 
major economic policy interventions have been necessary. At first, 
efforts focused on alleviating the liquidity problems facing the financial 
system and on bailing out institutions whose collapse could signify 
systemic risk. Nevertheless, the rapid deterioration of the financial 
situation and its impact on economic activity as from September 
2008 led to a redoubling of economic policy responses. The govern-
ments of the main economies approved ambitious financial support 
programmes and discretionary fiscal packages, and central banks 
deployed broader measures. Refuelling and heightening the prob-
lems were the uncertainty over the volume and distribution of the high 
losses expected on banks’ balance sheets, the restrictions on fund-
ing markets and the spread and intensification of the economic slow-
down. This situation, which is not yet over, has required successive 
and ever-greater public intervention measures worldwide. In turn, the 
high degree of interconnectedness of the world’s economies, and the 
global nature of the crisis, were conducive to a certain degree of in-
ternational coordination, especially in the financial sphere.
The monetary authorities, who met the high demand for short-term 
funding from mid-2007, continued to extend their liquidity provision 
mechanisms in 2008 and, in some cases, to cut interest rates. But 
the events of September 2008 triggered a ratcheting up of the mon-
etary policy response: central banks made substantial interest rate 
cuts and took unprecedented concerted measures (relating to rate 
cuts and to the extension of foreign currency funding agreements), 
they increased the flexibility of the ordinary framework for liquidity 
provision and they started to use non-conventional tools. Thus, many 
central banks introduced specific facilities for the purchase and ex-
change of assets, with a broad range of objectives: to provide institu-
tions with quality collateral, to bolster financial markets facing difficul-
ties and to encourage the flow of credit to certain sectors. All these 
operations led to substantial growth in central bank balance sheets 
(see Panels 1 and 2).
In light of the serious refinancing and recapitalisation problems 
emerging in the banking system from October 2008, governments 
designed a rapid-response strategy to support the financial sys-
tem under a framework of common principles agreed by the 
Heads of State and of Governments in the case of the EU, and, on 
a global scale, within the G20. The key aim behind these plans 
was to restore confidence. Accordingly, the limits on deposit guar-
antee systems were raised, to halt the threat of declining confi-
dence among deposit-holders, and bank debt issues were backed 
by State guarantees, to safeguard financial institutions’ funding 
(with public funds also provided through loans and purchases of 
high-quality assets). Moreover, to shore up their balance sheets, in 
various countries banks received injections of public capital (to the 
extent that some banks were effectively nationalised), whilst in 
others the authorities purchased low-quality assets from the 
banks. In addition to raising the creditworthiness of the institutions 
concerned, these asset purchases should help limit the uncer-
tainty surrounding their value which has been a key aspect of the 
present crisis. Indeed, more recently a second raft of measures 
has included various asset protection schemes for financial insti-
tutions.
Against the backdrop of these support programmes – which remain 
in force – bail-outs of institutions that might signify systemic risk have 
continued, especially in the United States and in Europe. Work has 
also continued on the reform of the global financial system, fostered 
at the international level by the Financial Stability Forum and the G20, 
and within the EU by the ECOFIN. 
The financial support packages have been particularly significant in 
the developed countries (see Panel 3). In terms of maximum alloca-
tions, the funds earmarked for capital injections represent more than 
5% of GDP in the United States, and approximately 3% of GDP in the 
euro area, with a higher relative weight – 4%-6% of GDP – in some of 
the smaller European countries (for example, Austria, Belgium, Ire-
land and the Netherlands). The highest bank debt guarantees are to 
be found in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, in all cases in excess of 30% of GDP, and in Ireland, 
where the exceptional circumstances seen in September 2008 
obliged the government to guarantee the liabilities of the country’s six 
largest banks, signifying more than 200% of GDP. The measures in-
volving the purchase and exchange of assets and direct financing 
represent more than 10% of GDP in the United Kingdom and in 
France, in the latter via a new, partly State-held agency funded by 
means of State-backed issues. In Spain, the urgent economic and 
fiscal measures approved in October 2008 envisage a maximum al-
location of approximately 5% of GDP for purchase of high-quality 
assets on financial institutions’ balance sheets and guarantees for 
debt issues equivalent to 9% of GDP.
The spread and intensification of the crisis also warranted the 
adoption of a wide range of discretionary economic stimulus poli-
cies, especially measures to increase public expenditure and, in 
particular, public investment. In addition, most countries launched 
aid packages for the groups and sectors hardest hit by the crisis, 
including small and medium-sized enterprises, the construction 
and automobile industries, and the export industry in the case of 
the emerging economies. Overall, the IMF estimates that fiscal 
stimulus measures in the biggest economies will amount to more 
than 4% of GDP between 2008 and 20101, albeit with significant 
differences from country to country. The stimulus packages an-
nounced in the United States since February 2008 and the more 
recent initiatives launched in Japan are noteworthy, each at a cost 
of approximately 5% of GDP up to 2010. In China, where the econ-
omy is more shielded from the direct impact of the financial turmoil 
but more exposed to the decline in world trade, additional expend-
iture of approximately 6% of GDP has been earmarked in the pe-
riod 2009-2010. In the EU, fiscal incentives were established in the 
European Economic Recovery Plan approved in December 2008, 
with an overall impact of 1.5% of GDP. In the euro area, discretion-
ary measures amount to 2% of GDP in the period 2008-2010, with 
lower figures for France and Italy and higher figures (more than 3% 
of GDP) for Spain and Germany. Lastly the emerging G20 econo-
mies have also made significant fiscal efforts, on a similar scale to 
those of the developed countries.
1. See “Update on fiscal stimulus and financial sector measures”, April 2009.
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ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES TO COMBAT THE CRISIS (cont´d)
A simulation exercise2 shows that these measures would have an 
impact of 0.3 pp – 0.5 pp on GDP growth in the euro area, with a 
slightly higher impact in Spain. In the United States the impact would 
be much higher (around 2 pp). In any case, the effect of the discre-
tionary measures should be assessed jointly with the fiscal impulse 
deriving from the automatic stabilisers, which is higher in the Euro-
pean economies owing to the greater progressivity of their tax sys-
tems and the size of their social protection systems.
The present economic and financial crisis poses a challenge to 
economic authorities worldwide. In 2008, unprecedented changes 
were made in economic policy conduct to halt the dramatic dete-
rioration in the financial system and in economic activity. How ef-
fective these policies prove will hinge largely on their impact on 
agents’ confidence and on the financial system, and on maintaining 
a certain degree of concerted action worldwide. Moreover, although 
many of the measures are temporary and, in the case of those di-
rected at the financial sector, the sums provided are still short of 
the total funds committed and are, in many cases, return-bearing 
investments, they will have a considerable impact on public financ-
es, particularly in the developed countries. Accordingly, continued 
confidence in budgetary stability in the medium term will be essen-
tial, to minimise the risk that higher interest rates and prospective 
tax increases may detract from the efficiency of the economic ex-
pansion measures.
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BOX 1.1
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forecasts available also point to a central scenario in which activity would begin to recover 
gradually towards late 2009 or in 2010, according to the region involved, assisted by the reso-
lute monetary and fiscal policy action and the financial sector support measures, and, in some 
economies, by the restoring to health of the starting position. However, the current economic 
situation is the outcome of intense and global shocks, of a financial origin, that have exposed 
serious vulnerabilities in the balance sheets of financial institutions, companies and, in some 
cases, households, the absorption of which may prove slower than these central scenarios 
currently envisage.
In any event, the prospects of recovery hinge enormously on the effectiveness of the respons-
es adopted by governments and central banks. The exceptional measures urgently applied in 
all economic policy areas have been intended to resolve the most pressing challenges of the 
financial crisis and to prevent the deterioration in activity from feeding back into the crisis. The 
fact that these policies are moving into uncharted territory means the significant uncertainty 
over their ultimate effectiveness has not abated.
Gauging public intervention correctly is essential, but its calibration and its necessary insertion 
in a medium-term outlook that recognises the exceptionality of the circumstances and envis-
ages a path of return to a situation of greater normality both prove exceptionally complicated. 
In terms of government financial sector support measures and fiscal policies, the need for ac-
tion that helps resolve the still-latent uncertainty over the long-term solvency of financial institu-
tions and to appropriately stimulate aggregate demand may clash at some point with the need 
to ensure the sustainability of public finances in the medium term. The solvency problems in 
some segments of the financial sector must not feed through and become a problem in the 
form of a build-up in risks in the public sector that ultimately raises long-term interest rates. In 
the euro area, this is a relevant concern in some cases in light of the developments in sover-
eign spreads. Also, the global nature of the shocks affecting the economy require cross-coun-
try cooperation and some coordination – particularly at EU level – not only in the responses to 
the crisis, but also in exit strategies once normality begins to return to the economy.
To properly bound the perimeter of public intervention is another difficult task. Support meas-
ures to certain financial sector segments, and fiscal support in some cases to specific eco-
nomic sectors particularly afflicted by the crisis, pose the problem of their potential effect on 
the areas that remain outside the realm of public intervention. For example, guarantees ex-
tended to debt issued by certain banks have had the desired effect of reducing the risk of such 
banks, but in turn they have a bearing on the financing of other banks and non-financial cor-
porations, which see their borrowing costs rise. Further, public injections of capital and the 
extension of backing to the financial systems of some countries expose the financial systems 
of those others (e.g. the emerging economies) that have less leeway as regards the credibility 
of their public finances. On designing measures in the various economic policy areas, it is vital 
to try and avoid unwanted collateral effects, in particular on competition.
Above all, it is vital not to succumb to the temptations of protectionism. The financial sector 
support programmes are of a national scope and designed with the aim of restoring the flow 
of credit to national agents. This poses a whole series of challenges for financial market inte-
gration – in Europe in particular – and the future of international banking, as is the case of 
countries with a banking system comprising subsidiaries and branches of foreign parents. 
Likewise, there are incentives for national fiscal plans to prevent, in some cases with adminis-
trative measures, the leakage of fiscal impulses abroad and to protect certain economic sec-
tors from international competition. This is an extraordinarily complex matter. But history has 
taught us that protectionist measures are a sure-fire recipe for disaster. Here, too, some coor-
The effectiveness of economic 
policy responses will determine 
the prospects of recovery
Correctly calibrating public 
intervention is exceptionally 
complicated...
... but it is crucial for 
intervention not to distort 
competition...
... and for governments not to 
succumb to the temptations
of protectionism
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dination of responses both at the international level and, in particular, at the level of the EU is 
needed, owing to the potential consequences for the single market.
It now seems clear that the prolonged period of stable and non-inflationary growth in the glo-
bal economy in recent years led important lessons from the past to be forgotten. The financial 
crisis that began in the summer of 2007 and the deep-seated economic recession it has en-
tailed are a powerful reminder of the enormous costs that financial instability inflicts on society 
and of the fact that the vulnerabilities that lead to this arise precisely in boom periods, charac-
terised by excessive optimism. As well as boldly facing up to the most immediate challenges, 
it is vital that the pertinent reforms in the area of macrofinancial policies should be tackled in 
parallel with the dual aim of restoring confidence and rebuilding sounder foundations with 
which to underpin the recovery. Appropriate regulation and supervision are the first and main 
line of defence against financial instability, as has been particularly stressed in the agreements 
reached at the G20 meeting on 2 April in London. Regulation and supervision need to be re-
inforced with a view to limiting the intrinsic procyclicality of the financial system and to increas-
ing resilience in the face of systemic risks, while preserving the benefits of innovation. Reforms 
in this area should most particularly include the extension of the regulation perimeter to sys-
temic institutions that have been left outside the regulatory framework, and the review of the 
incentives for financial institutions and investors. But recent experience also casts greater light 
on the link between financial stability and macroeconomic policies – particularly monetary 
policy – and strengthens the argument that such policies should act pre-emptively in the face 
of medium- and long-term risks associated with the emergence of imbalances, frequently con-
nected to excessive debt and to unsustainable asset price dynamics.
Developments in the Spanish economy during 2008 were governed by the worsening of the 
international financial crisis and the progressive weakening of the world economy. Both shocks 
superimposed themselves on the domestic adjustment that had begun previously, driven by 
the correction of the real estate sector and the high level of private-sector debt, and both have 
ultimately taken a leading role in the unfolding of the crisis. Although the channels through 
which the financial and real crisis spread were similar to those described in the previous sec-
tion at the international level (tightening of financing conditions, crisis of confidence, fall in 
wealth, decline in trade flows), the pass-through to the Spanish economy of the shocks evi-
denced specific differences. In its initial stages, the virtually non-existent direct and indirect 
exposure of Spanish credit institutions to US subprime mortgages, along with Spanish banks’ 
favourable financial situation, lessened the impact of the shocks on their balance sheet posi-
tion. Also contributing to this was the long average life of outstanding debt, which meant that 
short-term funding requirements were moderate. However, the clogging up of wholesale fund-
ing markets increasingly affected Spanish intermediaries owing to their high dependence on 
external saving, and they had to react by replacing long-term securities issues with short-term 
instruments and by raising funds on interbank markets, including resort to the Eurosystem.
The resort to these temporary solutions in the face of the closure of wholesale markets was 
limited. In turn, the growing feedback loop between the financial tensions and the weakness 
of the real economy gave rise to further impacts on banks, the effects of which were much 
more difficult to avoid. In particular, perception of the risk associated with credit operations 
increased substantially, in a setting in which default ratios, which had started from very low 
levels, were growing rapidly. Indeed, in the other resident sectors segment (households, com-
panies and financial institutions other than those of the credit system) this ratio stood at 3.4% 
at the end of 2008, compared with 0.9% one year earlier. In step with the habitual procyclical 
behaviour of credit supply, intermediaries progressively tightened credit standards in light of 
the deterioration in the macroeconomic outlook in general and in the outlook for certain indus-
Beyond the most immediate 
challenges, it is vital to tackle 
the appropriate reforms in the 
area of macrofinancial policies
3 Developments in the 
Spanish economy in an 
international context of 
crisis
3.1 THE EXTERNAL 
DETERMINANTS OF THE 
ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH 
ECONOMY
The international financial crisis, 
which superimposed itself on 
the adjustment that the Spanish 
economy had begun, ...
led to a tightening of financing 
conditions, ...
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a. The National Accounts data are calculated on the basis of base year 2000.
b. Volume indices. Rates of change.
c. Rates of change, except the unemployment rate, which is presented as a level.
d. Employed labour force (16-64).
e. Levels as percentages of GDP. 
f. Includes net capital transfers received.
g. Annual average levels for the Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for financial assets and liabilities.
h. 1999 Q1 = 100.
i. 1999 Q1 = 100.
j. Includes cash equivalents, other bank liabilities and money-market funds.
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tries (such as the real estate sector) in particular. Also contributing to this were market de-
mands concerning the capital ratios required of banks and the greater difficulties in obtaining 
funds on international markets, although according to what may be inferred from the replies to 
the Bank Lending Survey, these last two factors played a less significant role.
The tightening of financing conditions also operated through the dearer cost of funds, since 
the notable increase in interbank rates fed through to lending interest rates (see Chart 1.3). 
Further, in some cases (as, in particular, in lending to SMEs and to households for purposes 
other than house purchase), the spreads over interbank yields widened. The cost of compa-
nies’ own funds also increased. The remaining credit conditions other than price also became 
more rigorous. The average term of transactions shortened and the guarantees required in-
creased. However, in the second half of the year, the significant cuts in intervention rates be-
gan to feed through to the costs of private-sector financing, a trend which became more 
pronounced during the opening months of 2009.
The financial crisis and its impact on the real economy have also given rise to a progressive 
and generalised deterioration in agents’ confidence and a notable increase in uncertainty over 
the economic outlook. While this is a global phenomenon, it was initially somewhat more acute 
in countries such as Spain, whose business cycle is more closely linked to the real estate sec-
tor and is more dependent on external financing. The confidence crisis and uncertainty con-
tributed to discouraging spending by agents beyond what might be warranted by the domes-
tic adjustment or the rebalancing of private-sector balance sheet positions. Generally, the loss 
in confidence has proven one of the facets of the crisis that is posing the biggest challenges 
to economic policy.
The international financial crisis has unfavourably impacted Spanish household wealth. The 
value of financial assets fell by around 12%, essentially as a result of the decline in stock mar-
ket prices.
... a deterioration in agents’ 
confidence
... a decline in household 
wealth, prompting a slowdown 
in credit and a fall-off
in domestic demand,...
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As regards the real estate component, although the indicators habitually used to measure 
it showed that it scarcely altered in 2008 in nominal terms, since the decline in property 
prices (3.2%, on data from the Spanish Ministry of Housing) was more or less offset by a 
similar increase in the stock of housing, it is very likely that these figures underestimate 
the decline during this period. Set against low activity in the real estate market, the stock 
of housing held by households may have grown less than what the information on hous-
ing starts infers, while under the current conditions the statistic published by the Ministry 
of Housing foreseeably reflects with some delay the actual course of changes in valua-
tions. Under these circumstances, the INE price indicator on second-hand housing, which 
shows a decline of 10.7% over the past year, may be more representative. Considering 
both factors, the loss in real estate wealth recorded last year might be somewhat more 
than 8%.
Overall, the declines in the value of the household financial position generated a wealth effect 
that contributed to the contraction in consumption and in investment in housing. The increase 
in borrowing costs and the deterioration in expectations of future income and of appreciation 
of real estate and financial assets checked corporate and household demand for borrowed 
funds. This development, along with the decline in the supply of funds, translated into a strong 
slowdown in credit to these sectors, with the year-on-year growth rate falling from 16% to 
somewhat less than 6%. However, this figure was still above the nominal increase in GDP at 
the close of the year. In 2009 to date, the pace of bank financing has continued to moderate, 
reaching a year-on-year rate of expansion of around 3% in April, according to the figures re-
leased as this Report was going to press.
As is occurring in most countries, one propagation channel which has been increasing in 
significance as the financial crisis has become more pronounced and as its effects pass 
through to activity is the one through which trade flows run. In this respect, the progressive 
weakening in world economic activity over the course of 2008 affected the foreign demand 
for Spanish products, more sharply so as the year unfolded, although the high import con-
tent of exports and of the other components of final demand softened this effect on 
growth.
In sum, the scale and persistence of the global financial crisis and its impact on the world 
economy have radically transformed the environment in which households and firms 
make and commit their spending plans. Compared with the previous long expansionary 
phase, lending standards tightened notably, sizeable declines in private-sector wealth 
built up, there was a considerable weakening in the external environment, and all this 
against a backdrop of diminished confidence and growing uncertainty. The combination 
of all these factors on an economy which had already initiated a process of adjustment, 
in response to the imbalances that had built up, intensified the ongoing weakening in 
activity and activated the aforementioned feedback loops between the financial and real 
sectors.
The Spanish economy showed an ongoing loss in momentum which became accentuated in 
the second half of the year, when GDP posted a decline in its quarter-on-quarter growth rate 
for two consecutive quarters (for the first time since 1993), as a result of which it ended the 
year with a fall of 0.7% in terms of its year-on-year rate. This recessionary pattern became 
more visible in 2009 Q1, with a year-on-year decline of 3% in GDP according to the data re-
leased as this Report was going to press. The information available for Q2 points to a contrac-
tion in activity, albeit at a less sharp rate.
... and the disappearance
of the external supports which, 
under other circumstances, 
would have cushioned the 
decline in domestic spending
3.2 FROM ADJUSTMENT TO 
RECESSION
These contractionary forces 
compounded the severity of the 
adjustment and led to a 
recession in the second half of 
2008 ...
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A CHARACTERISATION OF THE CURRENT RECESSION IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY BOX 1.2
In 2007, activity in the Spanish economy began to slow, leading to 
negative year-on-year rates of expansion in output being recorded 
from 2008 Q4. This box compares the current recession in Spain 
with that occurring in other economic regions and with other similar 
episodes in the Spanish economy in the period from 1970 to the 
present day.
The identification of business cycles is not exempt from ambiguity, 
and several alternative methods can be used. For the identification of 
recessionary cycles, this box uses a procedure based on deviations 
by GDP in respect of its trend. The periods in which the positive de-
viation attains its highest value are the cyclical peaks (which do not 
necessarily match the moment in the cycle in which the year-on-year 
rate reaches its highest value). Under this procedure, the peak of the 
current cycle was in 2008 Q1, both in Spain and in the euro area and 
in the United States, which gives some idea of the high cyclical syn-
chrony between the three economies.1 Chart 1 depicts the year-on-
year growth rates for GDP in the quarters subsequent to the peak in 
Spain, the euro area and the United States, where the figures ob-
served have been lengthened in the first case with the projections 
path plotted by the Banco de España for its March 2009 Spanish 
economic projections report, and, in the remaining two cases, with 
the Consensus Forecasts projections for the same month. According 
to these projections, the trough for the year-on-year rate is expected 
to be reached in 2009 Q2 in the euro area and in the United States, 
and in Q3 in Spain. Thus, according to the Projections Report, six 
quarters would pass by from the peak of the current cycle to the 
minimum year-on-year growth rate. Given that the year-on-year rates 
reflect with something of a lag the changes in the quarter-on-quarter 
rates, the troughs in terms of the latter would be reached somewhat 
earlier. Furthermore, the recovery of the Spanish economy is expect-
ed to be less intense, particularly when compared with the United 
States.
In addition to the current recessionary cycle, the Spanish economy 
has recorded two others since 1970 whose previous peaks are 
dated in 1974 Q1 and in 1991 Q4 (see Chart 2). As can be seen, the 
trough of the year-on-year growth rates in the two previous reces-
sionary cycles was reached, as is projected for the current cycle, six 
quarters after the peak, i.e. in 1975 Q3 and in 1993 Q2, respec-
tively. Among the three episodes considered, that most distant in 
time was characterised by GDP growth rates that were substan-
tially higher throughout the deceleration phase, meaning that GDP 
scarcely contracted.
Compared with the recession in the 1990s, the current recession 
departs from a year-on-year growth rate that is similar in respect 
of the cyclical peak. However, in the three subsequent quarters 
for which there are figures, the slowdown has been more pro-
nounced in the current episode, with this difference set to inten-
sify – according to the Banco de España projections – in the com-
ing quarters, meaning the trough would be lower and the subse-
quent recovery milder. All the components of private national 
demand help explain the greater intensity of the slowdown in out-
put in the current cycle in the three quarters observed since the 
peak. Nonetheless, mention may be made of the more unfavour-
able behaviour of private consumption, and especially of residen-
tial investment, immersed in a far-reaching period of adjustment 
following its prolonged boom (see Chart 3). As a result, it is 
household – as opposed to business – spending that would ac-
count for a greater extent for the fact that the current recession is 
proving more severe. The worse behaviour of household spend-
ing compared with the previous cycle is closely related, among 
other factors, to the adverse impact of the greater intensity of job 
destruction on household incomes and on their future expecta-
tions (see Chart 4).
Following the initial, relative resilience of exports (see Charts 5 
and 6), the current cycle is being characterised by a much more 
pronounced deterioration in this demand component, as a result 
of the strong fall-off in world trade. Thus, while between 1991 and 
1993 the growth rate of Spain’s export markets fell by 4 pp, the 
related decline between 2007 and 2009 is expected to be almost 
15 pp. Further, in the previous cycle the contribution of exports in 
helping exit the recession was very high, owing to the gain in 
competitiveness arising from the devaluations of the peseta. On 
this occasion, since Spain’s euro area membership will not allow 
for gains in competitiveness of a similar magnitude and speed, the 
pick-up in exports will have to reside on the recovery of our for-
eign markets and on containment of the growth of costs and mar-
gins. In any event, since imports, in step with the greater sluggish-
ness of final demand, are slipping in the current cycle at notably 
higher rates than those previously observed, the external sector is 
making a considerably higher net contribution to sustaining activ-
ity.
1. In the United States, where cycles are officially dated, the start of the reces-
sion is set at December 2007.
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A CHARACTERISATION OF THE CURRENT RECESSION IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont´d) BOX 1.2
SOURCES: INE, Consensus Forecasts and Banco de España.
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The average increase in output over the course of 2008 – which amounted to 1.2%, against 
3.7% in 2007 – marked a path of rapid deceleration and a deepening of the change in the role 
played by national demand and net external demand in spending, initiated in the second half 
of 2006. In this respect, national demand contracted during the year, posting a 2.8% decline 
in its year-on-year rate in Q4, while net external demand showed a pronounced increase, with 
a contribution of 2.3 pp to GDP growth in the same quarter, thereby softening the contraction-
ary effect of national demand on GDP. Significantly, set against the progressive weakening in 
the world economy, the improvement in the contribution of the external sector was due to the 
notable slowdown in imports.
... as a result of the weakening 
in national demand, since the 
contribution of external demand 
was positive
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On the supply side, the collapse in activity bore most unfavourably on employment, which in-
creased moderately in the first half of the year and fell in the second half (for the first time since 
1994). This was as the process of job destruction in the construction industry stepped up and 
progressively spread to other productive branches, to the point of recording a 3% decline in 
Q4.
In response to these circumstances, household expenditure underwent a very severe adjust-
ment. Affecting it were the aforementioned contractionary factors, compounded by a particu-
larly determinant factor in the form of the decline in employment (Box 1.2 offers more detailed 
information on the differential nature of this cycle in Spain). Household consumption was 
abruptly curtailed during the year, as a result of which it was the domestic demand component 
that most contributed to the slowdown in GDP in 2008. And this despite the fact that house-
hold disposable income rose, reflecting the expansionary impact of the fiscal measures adopt-
ed, which are described elsewhere in this report, and the marked fall in inflation in the second 
half of the year. Conversely, the tightening of financing conditions and the worsening in the 
labour market tended to lessen the contribution of these sources of income, and the loss of 
value in wealth acted in the same direction. The deterioration in consumer confidence and 
work prospects played a key role in the weakening in household consumption, as corrobo-
rated by the sharp recovery in the saving ratio, which rose to 13% of disposable income, fol-
lowing five years of consecutive falls.
Residential investment showed a marked reduction, which gained in intensity over the course 
of the year, posting a decline of 20% in Q4. Real estate supply reacted sharply to the fall in 
residential demand, the expression of which was a substantial cut in the number of housing 
starts, which was 40% less on average than in 2007. Despite the intensity of this correction, 
the stock of unsold property continued to increase, since the houses started at the height of 
the expansion in the residential sector, around 2006, were progressively completed during 
the course of 2008. The surplus supply accumulated contributed to intensifying the slowing 
course of house prices, which began to fall in the second half of the year, after having in-
creased strongly in prior years. That generated further expectations of declines and inhibited 
residential demand. Under these circumstances, the real estate sector embarked on a far-
reaching restructuring process during 2008, contributing decisively to the collapse in activity 
and employment, which generated very powerful contractionary effects on the rest of the 
economy.
The rise in the saving ratio and the reduction in residential investment led to a strong decline in 
household net borrowing, meaning that over the year as a whole households generated net 
lending for an amount equivalent to 0.6% of GDP. The slowdown in household debt steepened 
in the wake of the tightening of bank lending conditions and began to be reflected in a slight 
reduction in the debt ratio, as from the final quarter. However, this did not translate into a de-
cline in the associated interest burden, owing to the increase in the average cost of liabilities 
over the year as a whole.
Business investment was more resilient in the first half of the year, but collapsed in the final 
months owing to the unfavourable course of demand, the sharp deterioration in expecta-
tions and heightening financial tension. This latter factor is adversely affecting the financ-
ing conditions for new investment projects, as bank lending standards have tightened and 
there are difficulties in raising resources through this channel, especially following the 
events in financial markets in the last quarter. The decline in productive investment led to 
a sharp reduction in net borrowing. In step with this, borrowing by businesses slowed 
notably in 2008 across the board but particularly sharply in real estate services and con-
The collapse in spending had 
very negative repercussions for 
activity and employment, which 
began to fall for the first time 
since 1994
Household spending underwent 
a very severe adjustment. The 
sharp check in consumption 
and the recovery in the saving 
ratio were a reflection of the 
strong deterioration in 
confidence
Residential investment fell 
markedly and the adjustment of 
housing prices and of the real 
estate sector became sharper
Households’ net borrowing 
declined substantially and their 
debt ratio began to turn down 
as from October
Business investment collapsed 
in the closing months of the 
year...
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struction. As a result, the pace of the debt ratio slowed, although the rise in the average 
cost of outstanding debt meant that the interest burden ratio continued rising, checking 
the increase in corporate earnings. The ratio of profits to productive capital continued to 
decline. 
As indicated, the external sector cushioned the adjustment of domestic demand, against a 
background in which the contribution of external demand contributed positively to sustaining 
activity with growing intensity over the year, despite the fall-off in exports.
Against this, a correction of the nation’s net borrowing began in the second half of 2008, un-
derpinned by the narrowing of the deficit on goods and services. The reduction in the trade 
imbalance was particularly sharp in the closing months of the year, when the decline in the 
non-energy balance steepened and the energy balance began to fall, reflecting the decline in 
oil prices initiated during the summer (see Chart 1.4). As a result, and on Balance of Payments 
data, the economy’s net borrowing declined in 2008, for the first time since 2002, to a ratio of 
7.9% of GDP in Q4, 1.5 pp down on the same period in 2007 (for the year as a whole, the 
decline was smaller, at 0.6 pp, to 9.1% of GDP). The correction in the nation’s net borrowing 
... and the external sector 
contributed to sustaining 
activity...
... and the nation’s net 
borrowing fell during 2008
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has become more marked in 2009 to date, evidencing the depth of the contraction in domes-
tic demand.
From the viewpoint of saving and investment decisions, the improvements in net borrowing 
reveals a reduction in the weight of investment in GDP that is higher than that recorded by 
the saving ratio. From the standpoint of the sectors’ net debt, the reason lay in the signifi-
cant correction in the net borrowing of non-financial corporations and households, in the 
latter case reaching a surplus position for the first time since 2002. Conversely, there was 
a drastic change in the public sector surplus position of recent years; it moved from a situ-
ation of net lending of 2.2% of GDP in 2007 to net borrowing of 3.8% in 2008, a reversal of 
6 pp of GDP in only one year. The significance and scope of this reversal will be discussed 
later.
On the supply side, the weakening in activity fed through to all the productive branches, al-
though particularly sharply to construction and industry, which both showed declines in value 
added, earlier and more acutely in the former case. Market services showed greater resilience 
in the first half of the year, but could not remain immune to the widespread climate of deterio-
ration; accordingly, at the end of the year they were running at a positive but very moderate 
rate of increase. Indeed, only non-market services sustained levels of activity similar to previ-
ous years.
As a result, the process of employment generation came to a halt after the summer (fol-
lowing 14 years of uninterrupted job creation), giving way to a marked decline in employ-
ment in the closing months which has run into the opening months of 2009 (employment, 
on EPA figures, fell at a year-on-year rate of 6.4% in 2009 Q1). Overall, the adjustment in 
employment was greater than that in value added, whereby apparent labour productivity 
recovered, once again showing a countercyclical pattern of behaviour, unlike the pattern 
prevailing in most economies. Yet this behaviour reflects significant composition effects 
and scant genuine gains in efficiency. By productive branch, the decline in employment in 
construction had already begun in 2007, while it started in the industrial branches in the 
second half of 2008. At the same time, employment weakened progressively in market 
services.
As had occurred in previous downturns, the adjustment in employment fell mainly on tempo-
rary workers (prompting a 3 pp decline in the ratio of temporary to total employees to 25.4% 
in 2009 Q1), the young and the least skilled. The labour market deterioration is thus one of the 
most powerful channels through which the contractionary impulses besetting the economy are 
spreading.
Despite the cyclical downturn, the labour supply continued increasing in 2008, at a similar 
rate of intensity to that observed during the boom years. Supply was driven by the increase 
in female participation, although the growth rate of the population began to slacken after a 
decade of continuous rises, since a significant slowdown was seen in the pace of migrant 
inflows. The far-reaching deterioration of the labour market, both in terms of speed of adjust-
ment and of scale, against this background of dynamic working population growth, had a 
most adverse impact on unemployment. Consequently, the unemployment rate rose most 
significantly to a level of 17.4% in 2009 Q1, compared with the historical low of 8% in the 
summer of 2007 (see Chart 1.5). Joblessness affected above all the young and the less 
skilled, the unemployment rate for whom exceeded 20%. Long-term unemployment also 
began to rise in this period and, should it continue, it might ultimately affect the structural 
component of unemployment.
The weakening in activity 
spread to all productive 
branches...
... and resulted in net job 
destruction as from the summer
Despite the labour market 
deterioration, the labour supply 
continued increasing, meaning 
the unemployment rate climbed 
rapidly...
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Despite the weakening in activity, labour costs showed considerable inertia. Wage settlements 
under collective bargaining agreements stood at 3.6%, 0.5 pp up on 2007, in response to the 
poorer performance of inflation in the first half of the year. This greater wage pressure was 
amplified by the effect of the wage indexation clauses, the activation of which in 2008 marked 
an increase of somewhat over 1 pp on collectively bargained wage rates. Both compensation 
per employee (5.3%) and unit labour costs (3.3%) showed growth higher than in previous 
years and above that of our trading partners.
Inflation underwent a sharp turnaround during the year. For the year as a whole, the CPI stood 
at 4.1%, peaking at 5.3% in July, in the face of the sharp increase in oil and other commodity 
prices (see Chart 1.6). Thereafter, however, its growth rate fell swiftly, reaching a negative rate 
of -0.8% in May, according to the HICP flash estimate, which was released as this Report was 
going to press. This reflected the effect of the correction in oil and other commodity prices, but 
also the sluggishness of demand, as shown by the decline in the prices of non-energy indus-
trial goods and the slowdown in services price increases, departing from their historical path, 
which had indicated their scant sensitivity to changes in cycle. The reduction in inflation was 
sharper in Spain than in the euro area in the closing months of 2008, whereby the inflation dif-
ferential in terms of the HICP turned negative from December. This development is indicative 
of the severity of the contraction, although it may also reflect greater price flexibility that would 
help activate the improvements in competitiveness needed to underpin the recovery. The 
strong reduction in inflation provides, in any event, a reference that should be conducive to a 
substantial easing in negotiated wage rates in the direction required by the cost adjustments 
needed to promote job creation.
Economic policies progressively adapted to the change in cyclical position during the year. On 
the fiscal policy front, the State Budget for 2008 had been designed with a markedly expan-
sionary bias, as detailed in chapter 5 of this Annual Report. This was reinforced with the adop-
tion in April of a series of fiscal stimulus measures, essentially tax-based and general in nature, 
and designed in the main to remain in place. The abrupt halt in activity also activated the au-
tomatic stabilisers, which exerted their effects throughout the year through the usual channels 
... and labour costs rose 
significantly, showing scant 
sensitivity to the worse cyclical 
conditions
Inflation posted successive falls 
from the summer onwards, 
evidencing negative differentials 
with the euro area from 
December, which had not 
occurred since the start of EMU
4 Economic policies, 
outlook and challenges
Economic policies progressively 
adapted to the change in cyclical 
position during the year...
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(an increase in unemployment benefits and a decline in tax revenue), lessening the impact of 
the progressive weakening of growth on household disposable income.
Subsequently, given the exacerbation of financial tensions in the closing months of 2008 and the 
rapid deterioration in activity, the government likewise adopted policies geared to stimulating 
demand and supporting the financial system that were along the lines of those implemented at 
the international level. In the financial arena, and within the common framework of coordinated 
action at the European level, measures were implemented to restore confidence, to offer means 
of providing liquidity at maturities longer than those envisaged in monetary policy operations and 
to restore funding channels on the wholesale markets. To this end, the limit of the deposit guar-
antee fund was raised in October, a fund for the acquisition of financial assets funded by the 
Treasury was created and the granting of public guarantees to banks’ bond issues was approved. 
The possibility was also considered that the State might acquire equity securities, if it were judged 
necessary at some point to resort to this instrument to capitalise banks.
Another batch of measures was aimed at smoothing access to credit for specific sectors or 
agents that are particularly vulnerable to the financial tensions, such as SMEs, and to soften 
the impact of the crisis on indebted households in particularly difficult circumstances, through 
... and received a further 
impulse in the closing months 
of the year, with policies geared 
to stimulating demand and 
supporting the financial system
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the deferral of a portion of their loan instalment payments. These measures have been carried 
out through the extension and creation of new ICO credit lines.
Approval was also given in November to the creation of a State Fund for Local Investment and 
of a Special State Fund for the Reinvigoration of the Economy and Employment, for a cumula-
tive amount equivalent to 1% of GDP. In line with the guidelines of the European Economic 
Recovery Plan, what is involved here is a transitory fiscal measure aimed at boosting public 
investment at the municipal level and in strategic industries.
The raft of measures available is, therefore, very extensive, and the resulting expansionary ef-
fects will foreseeably unfold over the course of this year. The sizable cuts in interest rates by 
the ECB since October – the transmission of which is being reinforced by the changes intro-
duced in its operational framework (see Box 4.2) – will act along these same lines, and have 
been reflected in subsequent reductions in the 12-month EURIBOR of somewhat more than 
3 pp. The lower interest rates have already begun to feed through to private-sector borrowing 
costs and to the average cost of outstanding loans. Foreseeably, too, as a result of the preva-
lence of floating-rate loans, this feed-through will take place relatively swiftly, freeing up private-
sector resources that will bolster the impulse stemming from the reduction in oil prices and 
from the decline in inflation.
The macroeconomic projections available, though subject to an exceptionally high degree of 
uncertainty, point to a deepening of the recession in Spain in 2009, which might lead GDP to 
contract by around 3%. Foreseeably, however, the intensity of the contractionary effects will 
progressively diminish during the year, being gradually offset by the impact of the economic 
stimulus policies implemented and by the plans to provide public backing to the financial sys-
tem, whereby the contraction should have slackened by 2010.
To restore the appropriate foundations for recovering confidence and rekindling spending 
plans, the imbalances built up during the long expansionary phase must be redressed and 
reabsorbed. To do this, soundness must be restored to the private-sector financial position 
and there must be an effective improvement in competitiveness and in labour market condi-
tions. The financial system, for its part, must face the challenges to its stability and efficiency 
posed by the new scenario brought about by the financial crisis and the deterioration in the 
macroeconomic conditions in which it has to operate.
The stability of the financial system is a vital asset for ensuring credit flows and embarking on 
a recovery, and it must be preserved and strengthened. The financial sector performs a cru-
cially important transversal task for market economies in terms of the selection of productive 
projects and of the redistribution of risks among the individuals best able to bear them. And 
here the experience, reputation and confidence of intermediaries are fundamental factors. Ac-
cordingly, when the crisis turning point is reached, the momentum of the economy will depend 
greatly on the soundness and efficiency of the financial system, which will provide the capac-
ity for effective intermediation and provide the credit flows that underpin household and cor-
porate spending decisions.
In the current circumstances, the scale of the global recession and the unfavourable outlook 
concerning its duration warrant the implementation of expansionary demand-side policies, 
monetary and fiscal alike. However, their effectiveness hinges crucially on their being designed 
appropriately. In the fiscal policy realm, the magnitude of the impulses should bear in mind the 
starting position of public finances and, above all, their sustainability in the medium term. 
Hence, the expansionary policies applied must be temporary and medium-term-oriented, en-
Foreseeably, the effects of the 
measures will unfold over the 
course of this year...
...although the macroeconomic 
projections available point to a 
deepening of the current 
recession in 2009, with 
significant depressive effects on 
the inflation rate
To restore confidence and for 
spending plans to be 
reactivated, the imbalances 
built up must be reabsorbed
The soundness of the financial 
system is an advantage that 
must be preserved
The effectiveness of demand-
side policies depends on their 
design being appropriate
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visaging a return to stability once the economy moves on to a normal footing. Likewise, it is 
important that the measures are geared to the agents most affected by the crisis, to those on 
whose income the expansionary impact may be greater, and that they contribute to improving 
the quality of public finances and the economy’s efficiency (for greater details on the pros and 
cons of discretionary fiscal policy in times of crisis, see Box 1.3).
Bearing in mind the foregoing, it is essential to take into account the scale of the fiscal drive 
made, along with its budgetary impact. It should be noted that when the adjustment began, 
the Spanish economy was starting from a relatively healthy budgetary position, which gave 
fiscal policy some leeway to act in a countercyclical fashion without endangering budgetary 
stability. During 2008, however, the impact of the automatic stabilisers – of a much greater 
magnitude than initially foreseen given the greater severity of the crisis – was compounded by 
the loss of tax revenue-raising capacity, prompted by the substantial correction in the real 
estate sector, and by the numerous discretionary measures adopted. The outcome was a 
significant deterioration in the fiscal position, with a deficit standing at 3.8% of GDP compared 
with a surplus of 2.2% of GDP the previous year, and an increase in the public debt ratio to 
39.4% of GDP, triggering an excessive deficit procedure in keeping with the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. Having regard to the macroeconomic projections published by 
the Banco de España in early April, this deterioration in the fiscal position will run throughout 
2009 and 2010, with a further increase in the deficit, which might rise to over 8% of GDP in 
both years, under the assumption of the measures already agreed being implemented without 
changes. Against this background, it is foreseen that the public debt ratio will increase very 
rapidly, whereby it might be at a level close to 60% in 2010, more than 20 pp above the low 
reached in 2007.
This highlights the limits on the room for manoeuvre of fiscal policy – above all if the measures 
adopted need time for their effects to unfold – and the importance of holding to a path of 
budgetary consolidation in the medium term. That way, when more favourable macroeco-
nomic conditions begin to settle, the position of public finances is not a drag on the recovery.
It is therefore necessary to avoid measures that may call into question the commitment to 
budgetary stability in the medium term, which might have adverse repercussions in terms of 
the cost of raising resources, of confidence and of generating expectations of tax rises that 
might ultimately sterilise the expansionary effects of the measures adopted. While the relative 
level of public debt is still below the EU average, the high increase foreseen in the coming 
years is worrying for three reasons: the difficulty its reversal would entail; the influence it may 
exert on the costs of financing the economy (since risk premia appear to have become more 
sensitive, among other factors, to the perception of the sustainability of public finances); and, 
in sum, because maintaining low public debt ratios is crucial for being better placed to with-
stand the future increase in pension spending, projected to be one of the highest in the EU.
In this connection, the framework of the Stability Pact and the budgetary stability laws re-
main appropriate, and stemming from this are substantial consolidation requirements which 
stave off the risk of the budget deficit running out of control and which mark the path for its 
future reduction. Against this backdrop, it is a priority to define a credible strategy for en-
suring compliance with the requirements laid down by the laws on budgetary stability and 
the medium-term limits and objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this respect, 
when an excessive deficit was reported in Spain, the European Council recommended its 
correction following a schedule that would allow it to be reduced to 3% in 2012. Lastly, the 
collaboration of regional and local government continues to be crucial. Accordingly, the 
regional government financing arrangements that arise following the review currently under 
In Spain, the fiscal position is 
strongly governed by the scale 
of the fiscal impulse already 
under way and by its high 
budgetary impact...
... which highlights the limits on 
the room for manoeuvre of 
fiscal policy and the need to 
avoid measures that may 
endanger budgetary stability in 
the medium term
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As a stabilisation tool in the face of economic crisis, discretionary fis-
cal policy has acquired significant importance in the past year. Practi-
cally all the EU countries and the main OECD economies have sub-
mitted more or less ambitious fiscal packages to stimulate demand 
over the 2008-2010 period. The characteristics of the packages differ 
greatly in terms of their composition, incorporating measures on the 
revenue side through cuts in the rates of specific taxes or through tax 
incentives, and/or increases in current spending and in public invest-
ment. Furthermore, their budgetary cost also varies greatly; it is rela-
tively low in some cases, such as in France and Italy, and very high in 
others, such as in Spain and the United States (see Box 1.1). Beyond 
a description of the fiscal package is adopted, it is crucial to analyse 
the role that expansionary fiscal policy discretionary measures may 
play in the current economic circumstances. In this respect, a review 
of the specialist literature suggests various aspects to bear in mind 
when assessing the timeliness, design and effectiveness of discre-
tionary fiscal policies.
The timeliness of discretionary policy measures should be analysed in 
conjunction with the countercyclical impacts that fiscal policy auto-
matically provides in the economy, i.e. with the role of the automatic 
stabilisers. The transfer of income from the public sector to the rest of 
the economy through this channel is not in response to any discre-
tionary action by governments and, therefore, is not affected by the 
lags in the implementation of fiscal policy which affect discretionary 
policies. In this respect, the fiscal stimulus provided by the automatic 
stabilisers is higher in the EU than in the United States, given the 
more progressive tax systems and the social protection policies in 
place. The automatic flow of income from the public sector towards 
households and firms caused by a deterioration of 1% in the growth 
rate of GDP is estimated at 0.5 pp of GDP in the case of the euro area 
aggregate, at 0.43 in the case of Spain, and at between 0.25 and 
0.34 pp in the case of the United States.1
While there is some consensus that discretionary fiscal policy, if im-
plemented without significant delays, may exert positive effects on 
the economy in the short term2, it is also pointed out that the greater 
or lesser effectiveness of discretionary policies depends on a series 
of factors. One fundamental aspect is the composition of the fiscal 
impulse, given that, despite the enormous heterogeneity present in 
the findings of empirical studies, there appears to be evidence that, 
in the very short term, increases in public spending in the form of, for 
example, temporary purchases of goods and services show greater 
multipliers than tax cuts, since a significant portion of the latter tends 
to be saved. However, if the aim were to affect economic growth in 
the medium term, tax cuts and productive public investment – with 
their added effects on productivity – would provide better tools than 
an increase in spending (either current or capital) geared merely to 
the short term. Hence, the mix of short and medium-term tools 
should take into account the expected duration of the situation of 
economic weakness.
It should further be stressed that the findings described referred to 
normal periods, while in the current situation marked by loss of finan-
cial wealth and high uncertainty, even the short-term multipliers might 
be below their average historical values. Along these same lines, an-
other important factor for the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus meas-
ures is that they are aimed at groups who are in fact more likely to 
spend. In the current situation, the loss of disposable income due to 
the rise in unemployment and the prevailing degree of financial re-
striction have raised the proportion of households and firms facing 
difficulty in financing themselves in the credit markets.3 Accordingly, 
the discretionary measures aimed at these groups would be more 
likely to be effective, whether implemented through direct income 
transfers or whether involving the bearing of risks by the public sec-
tor, in the form of credit backing and guarantees for households and 
firms. Nonetheless, the measures aimed at specific groups should be 
designed with care, given that they have the potential to distort free 
market mechanisms and the optimal allocation of productive resourc-
es among alternative economic activities.
The academic literature also points out that the effectiveness of dis-
cretionary measures depends on how they are communicated to the 
public and, therefore, how they affect expectations. If fiscal packages 
are announced clearly an incredibly, and include a medium-term con-
solidation strategy, they can increase their effectiveness. If, on the 
other hand, they consist of series of one-off measures or ones that 
are difficult for the public to understand, they may contribute to rais-
ing overall uncertainty in the economy and to ultimately exerting ad-
verse effects on activity.4
Fiscal policy effectiveness further depends on the monetary and fi-
nancial conditions in place. In this respect, in a low-inflation, low-
growth environment in which monetary policy has an expansionary 
stance consistent with maintaining expectations of price stability, the 
potential upward effects that fiscal policy may exert on interest rates 
prove more limited, with the subsequent crowding out of private-sec-
tor activity.
In any event, it cannot be ruled out that expansionary fiscal policy 
may prompt an increase in sovereign risk premia, thereby hampering 
the financing of private investment. The risks concerning premia are 
related to the perception that economic agents have of the sustain-
ability of public finances in the medium term. There is evidence that 
for levels of public debt that are high, or that are deteriorating rapidly, 
the values of the fiscal multipliers are low, and may even be negative 
if economic agents raise their savings rates to cushion themselves 
from the medium-term risks that may be posed by potential problems 
of solvency or sharp hikes in taxes in the future to balance public fi-
nances. These mechanisms may operate with great virulence in small 
1. See N. Girouard and C. André (2005), Measuring Cyclically-Adjusted Budg-
et Balances for OECD Countries, OECD Working Paper no. 434. 2. A repre-
sentative paper here is that of R. Perotti (2007), In search of the transmission 
mechanism of fiscal policy, NBER Working Paper 13143.
3. See A. Tagkalakis (2008), The effects of fiscal policy on consumption in re-
cessions and expansions, in Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, pp. 1486-
1508. 4. For an illustration of this, see T.H. Hoon and E.S. Phelps (2008), 
Future fiscal and budgetary shocks, Journal of Economic Theory, 143, pp. 
499-518.
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and very open economies that are sensitive to potential spillover ef-
fects between economies, particularly in cases in which the level of 
foreign debt is high. In this respect, government-co-ordinated fiscal 
policy action would be more effective. Furthermore, many of the pa-
pers available on the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy tend 
to find more significant effects of temporary as opposed to perma-
nent measures on economic activity, especially as regards public 
spending, given that such measures do not affect the medium-term 
fiscal position.
Given the diversity of measures included in the different countries’ 
fiscal stimulus packages (see Box 1.2), it is difficult to make a broad 
assessment of their potential impact, in light of the determinants 
discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. In any event, there appears 
to be a general tendency, as the crisis unfolds, to improve the qual-
ity of the measures relative to their effectiveness, e.g. in terms of 
their temporary nature and of their bias towards items with theoreti-
cally higher multipliers, such as public investment. Nonetheless, it 
should be borne in mind that the fact that a certain discretionary 
response may be appropriate at one point in time does not mean 
that discretionary fiscal impulses may be unlimited, since the room 
for manoeuvre available may be running out owing to the large scale 
of the funds committed, both in the strictly fiscal area and in the fi-
nancial realm.
discussion should set the appropriate incentives for the disciplined behaviour of these gov-
ernments.
Beyond the major challenges posed by addressing and resolving the economic and financial 
situation, it should be borne in mind that the intensity of the recovery and the capacity for long-
term growth are conditional upon the necessary adjustments being made. That raises signifi-
cant challenges for economic policy, in a situation in which it is not possible to resort to ex-
change rate adjustments to restore competitiveness and in which there is a risk that 
contractionary trends may ultimately diminish the possibility of expanding output potential.
The risks that the lesser use of productive factors during the adjustment phase may ultimately 
generate permanent effects on output potential stem from various sources. On one hand, it will 
prove difficult for productive investment to offset the sharp correction residential investment is 
undergoing, a correction which is in any event necessary after the excesses accumulated over 
the past decade. On the other, there is a risk that the sharp increase in joblessness will instil a 
high degree of persistence in unemployment, as occurred in the past. If this were the case, 
there would be a notable reduction in labour utilisation, while the labour supply would foresee-
ably tend to slow, as the impulses derived from women joining the labour market and from 
migrant inflows eased, which might have durable effects on growth potential. Compounding 
this are the difficulties of boosting the pick-up in total factor productivity.
To avert these risks, demand-side policies are insufficient. What are needed are structural re-
forms aimed at containing the intensity and persistence of the employment adjustment, in-
creasing productivity and promoting the channelling of investment towards more productive 
sectors with greater potential for growth. In the labour market, the scale of the reaction by 
employment to the change in cyclical conditions highlights the presence of rigidities which 
emerge with intensity in downturns and intensify contractionary trends. To correct these fea-
tures, there is a pressing need for reforms that allow wages to react to a greater extent to 
changes in cyclical conditions and that prevent the cyclical adjustment from resting exces-
sively on employment. As is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 2, that requires a change in 
collective bargaining arrangements and in employment protection legislation, providing for 
new hires in this contractionary phase and allowing, once demand picks up, the resumption of 
an employment generation path on sounder foundations that is consistent with more intensive 
and efficient labour utilisation.
All told, the intensity of the 
recovery and of long-term 
growth are conditional upon the 
necessary adjustments being 
made to sustain growth 
potential...
...which requires the adoption 
of structural reforms aimed at 
containing the employment 
adjustment, increasing 
productivity and promoting the 
channelling of investment 
towards more productive 
sectors
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At the same time, efforts should be made to prevent the strong increase in unemployment 
from leading to situations of persistence that might hamper recovery. In this connection, it is 
essential to continue improving active employment policies – in terms both of job-search sys-
tems and of matching the training of the unemployed to the job skills in demand – and to 
strengthen their coordination with the unemployment benefits system. In this respect, public 
employment services must be improved, in particular concerning market intermediation serv-
ices, involving private placement agencies and ensuring greater coordination among the re-
gional governments. That would allow for a more widespread sharing of information on vacan-
cies and job offers, it would improve the mechanisms for monitoring the degree of activism in 
job-search and it would enable training plans to be designed on bases better tailored to ac-
tual demand.
Further, guidance and training for the unemployed should be improved, in particular for those 
groups that are at particular risk of being excluded from the labour market. This is because the 
rise in unemployment is most acutely affecting the lesser-skilled and workers in construction, 
a branch that is scarcely likely to regain the employment levels of recent years.
Another constraint on placing the unemployed is the limited regional mobility of workers, moti-
vated in part by the scant wage differentials across regions, though also by the under-devel-
oped rental market. Here, a reform of the rental market might prove appropriate in the current 
circumstances, in that it would provide an outlet for the stock of unsold housing, facilitating the 
demand for lodgement at a time when housing affordability is difficult and, moreover, it will 
promote regional mobility of workers. In this respect, two aspects of the current legislation 
merit particular attention. First, the effectiveness of the various measures that have been adopt-
ed to improve legal security for owners should be guaranteed. Further, certain aspects of the 
current legislation should be made more flexible, such as those relating to contract duration. In 
addition, the funds assigned to public programmes for owner-occupied subsidised housing 
should be redirected to developing a sufficiently extensive stock of rental housing. Headway 
also needs to be made towards a more neutral and balanced tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing, in which connection possible future measures have recently been announced.
Also, however, as indicated earlier, the change in productive pattern needed to resume high 
potential growth rates requires investment be encouraged in sectors other than construction 
and an increase in productivity. To do this, human and technological capital should be en-
hanced, competition increased and the environment in which companies pursue their activity 
improved.
In the case of human capital, the increase in the labour force’s level of educational attainment 
in the second half of the 20th century has been checked over the past decade, meaning that 
the proportion of youths who have not attained an advanced secondary level of education has 
stagnated at a very high level (close to 40%, compared with 26% in the euro area), with ad-
verse repercussions in terms of the lower increases in aggregate productivity.
Other factors have tended to lessen advances in the quality of human capital. First, as a result 
of the pattern of specialisation followed by the Spanish economy in the recent period, the 
demand for skilled labour has grown less than the supply thereof, prompting a mismatch that 
has tended to reduce the individual incentive to continue studying. In this respect, support 
must be given to the innovation drive needed to boost the demand for skilled labour and to 
adapt study programmes at the most advanced levels to business demands. Also, the effect 
that the collective bargaining system may have had on the rigidity of relative wages should not 
be underestimated, as should neither the fact that the recent minimum wage increases may 
Persistent unemployment must 
be avoided through 
improvements to market 
intermediation services and 
training systems for the 
unemployed...
... and regional mobility for the 
unemployed must be provided 
for, which may partly be done 
through a reform of the rental 
market
Also, however, the quality
of human capital and of 
technological capital should be 
enhanced...
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have led to an artificial wage squeeze. While these policies may respond to social goals in the 
public interest, the cost entailed in terms of fewer incentives to attain greater levels of educa-
tional attainment should be assessed. Nor does labour market segmentation encourage 
youths to extend their training, since too often this effort culminates in their joining the labour 
market as a temporary hire. The headroom for improving continuous training is also most 
considerable.
Turning to technological capital, the level of expenditure on both R + D and on information and 
communications technologies (ICT) remains significantly lower in Spain than in other EU coun-
tries. While in recent years considerable effort has been expended by the public sector in this 
area, drawing the private sector in its wake to some extent, significant favourable effects have 
not yet been perceived. Moreover, in Spain’s case the bulk of private investment in R + D con-
tinues to be concentrated in few industries, although the problem of low investment is exten-
sive to all sectors.
To improve competition and sectoral liberalisation, priority attention should be focused on the 
services sector, as it accounts for a very high percentage of value added and employment in 
the economy, albeit still lower than that observed in more developed economies. Further, the 
sector encompasses the most dynamic activities, those that lead the employment generation 
process and in which the new forms of labour relations can best be found. The growing inter-
action between industry and services has tended to raise the influence of the latter on interna-
tional competitiveness and on trading results.
In this respect, the transposition of the Services Directive should play a crucial role in the liber-
alisation of the sector. The approval by the Council of Ministers of the laws now in the initial 
stages of transposition should help reduce the administrative burden on companies, lowering 
their costs and enhancing their competitiveness. As the Spanish productive structure is char-
acterised by the small size of its firms, the impact of this measure will be greater than in the 
rest of the euro area. This should likewise contribute to significantly lowering the obstacles to 
business start-ups imposed by the current legislation and the overlapping of State, regional 
and local government rules. Deeper liberalisation is also called for in the case of professional 
services, which are characterised by their high value added and which, in some cases, also 
have very high export potential.
Within the services industry, retail trade plays a crucial role given that its activity involves plac-
ing a large part of consumer goods at the disposal of consumers. This sector is characterised 
in Spain by very extensive regional government regulation, with evidence that the heavier 
regulation in some regions has been associated with higher inflation and with lower employ-
ment in the sector. In particular, the entry barriers in place may be particularly inhibiting com-
petition.
Although liberalisation of the network industries has been relatively deep in recent years, some 
shortcomings persist. Evidence of this has been the still-low growth of productivity in some of 
these branches. In the energy sector, the rise in oil prices in the first half of 2008 had particu-
larly adverse consequences for the Spanish economy, owing to its greater dependence on this 
energy source and to the greater intensity in its use in productive processes. That calls for 
these biases to be corrected, in line with the progress other industrialised countries have made 
in this area. Turning to the electricity sector, prices remain distorted, while international inter-
connections continue to be insufficient. In the telecommunications market, the market share 
of the former monopoly is still very high, both in fixed telephony and, above all, in Internet ac-
cess, which might be restricting the degree of actual competition.
... and the competitive 
environment in which 
companies take their decisions 
improved, through the 
liberalisation of the services 
sector...
... and of the network industries
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The impact of the financial crisis on the Spanish economy
The international financial crisis and its consequences for the global economy have radically 
altered the scenario for the Spanish economy. The crisis, whose source and development are 
analysed in detail in other chapters in this Annual Report, has entailed a series of financial and 
macroeconomic shocks which have superimposed themselves on the process of adjustment 
that had already begun domestically to correct the main imbalances that had built up during 
the 1995-2006 expansion. The correction of these imbalances, which essentially turn on a 
high concentration of financial and real resources in the real estate sector and excess indebt-
edness, remains a crucial condition for exiting the crisis. The strong contraction in domestic 
demand is causing a rapid reduction in the external deficit and in the weight of the construc-
tion sector, but at a very high cost in terms of economic activity and employment. This form of 
adjustment evidences the patent need to substantially improve productivity levels and the 
working of the markets for goods, services and production factors so as to increase competi-
tiveness in the Spanish economy, particularly in view of the far-reaching deterioration of the 
external environment, and to thus lay once again the foundations for sustained economic 
growth.
This chapter delves deeper into the analysis of the main channels through which the interna-
tional economic and financial crisis is affecting the adjustment that began in the Spanish econ-
omy in late 2006. In this regard, the first section briefly reviews the nature of the imbalances 
that triggered the adjustment and the dynamics arising from the correction of the imbalances, 
initially in the absence of external shocks. The following section addresses the main additional 
contractionary impulses induced by the crisis: a reduction in wealth, stemming from the loss 
of value of household financial and real estate assets; revised disposable income growth ex-
pectations, which are now less favourable; and tighter credit conditions, as a result both of the 
increase in the costs of financing spending decisions and of greater difficulties in obtaining 
funds with which to finance such decisions. Finally, the main transmission mechanisms of the 
shocks are characterised, focusing on those which involve the behaviour of consumption and 
employment, as it is developments in these variables which, at the end of the day, will foresee-
ably most influence the scale of the crisis beleaguering the Spanish economy. The role these 
mechanisms play is very important for properly understanding the challenges that economic 
agents and economic policy will face in such adverse circumstances.
During the expansion of the Spanish economy, a series of interdependent imbalances built up, 
which may essentially be condensed into two categories: burgeoning household and corpo-
rate debt which, as it was not sufficiently offset by greater public-sector saving, translated into 
sizeable recourse to foreign saving; and the excessive weight of the real estate sector, in terms 
of the concentration of productive resources in this sector (much higher than that observed in 
other countries) and of the substantial materialisation of household wealth in real estate as-
sets.
Throughout the 1999-2006 period, demand in the Spanish economy showed forceful momen-
tum: domestic demand grew at an average annual rate of 4.7%, with respective increases in 
consumption, investment in capital goods and investment in construction of 4.2%, 5.5% and 
6.7%. Set against this growth in spending, supply also increased significantly, but at a lesser 
pace: output expanded at an average annual rate of 3.8%, driven by intense job creation un-
derpinned by the dynamism of immigration and the rise in the participation rate of female na-
tionals. Conversely, there were scant gains in productivity during this period.
1 Background: the 
imbalances and their 
correction
The financial crisis affected the 
Spanish economy when a 
process of adjustment was 
beginning, following a long 
expansion...
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This imbalance between spending and output growth gave rise, first, to growing external debt 
and, further, to pressure on prices that contributed to maintaining the positive inflation differ-
ential with the euro area countries and, therefore, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and a loss in the competitiveness of Spanish goods.
Unlike in other previous expansions, the resort to financing was not chiefly by the public sector, 
which reduced its debt throughout the period. It was rather Spanish households and firms that 
swiftly increased their rates of debt, taking advantage of the ready access to credit in a setting 
marked by very low risk premia and accommodating monetary conditions, with nominal – and, 
no doubt, real – interest rates below what demand conditions in Spain would have warranted.1
In turn, the expansion entailed strong growth in the employment rate, which improved expec-
tations of higher growth disposable income and, therefore, further boosted the demand for 
credit. This was likewise propelled by the growing dynamism of the real estate market and the 
surge in house prices.
As a result the Spanish economy, which needed virtually no foreign funding in 1996 (net finan-
cial transactions with the rest of the world actually registered a surplus of 0.8% of GDP at the 
end of the year), recorded net borrowing of 9.7% of GDP (11.1% for non-financial corporations 
and 2.7% of households), despite the fact that general government net lending stood at 2.2% 
of GDP. In 2008, total net borrowing from the rest of the world stood at 9.1% of GDP.
The rate of increase of Spanish household and corporate debt was excessive, even in such a 
favourable setting as that described. From both an individual and overall perspective, the in-
crease in debt is warranted if the future growth in income allows payments to be met without 
it being necessary to subsequently adjust the planned path of spending. In this respect, the 
results available drawing on the simulations of various versions of intertemporal substitution 
models of consumption especially designed to identify debt determinants suggest that, for this 
condition to hold, the increase in liabilities observed during the period 1995-2005 would re-
quire Spanish per capita income to grow at a rate of over 2% over the next ten years.2 The 
simple extrapolation of the interest rates and income growth rates observed over the past 
decade would give an increase in the Spanish economy’s rate of indebtedness (the external 
debt/GDP ratio) some 8 pp below that actually recorded.3
By its very nature, the real estate sector is particularly sensitive to financial conditions. House-
building involves a lengthy production process and is usually carried out through property 
developments encompassing a large number of units, which is why it is greatly influenced by 
the availability of financing. As housing is a durable good with a considerable weight in the 
household budget, the usual means of access to a house is through taking out a mortgage 
loan. This means that changes in lending standards directly affect both supply (developers, 
builders) and demand (households, in the main) in the real estate market, causing considerable 
variations in the number of transactions and in prices.
Most new household debt was thus directed at house purchases, in the same way that a 
significant portion of credit to companies was earmarked for real estate development. The 
number of real estate transactions grew exponentially (to 955,000 in 2006), while the con-
... driven by an increase in 
spending fuelled by growing 
household and corporate 
debt...
... which is not compatible with 
“realistic” paths for borrowing 
costs and economic growth
The looseness of financial 
conditions also prompted an 
excessive concentration of 
productive resources in the real 
estate sector...
1. See J. Andrés, S. Hurtado, E. Ortega and C. Thomas, Spain in the Euro: a General Equilibrium Analysis, Working 
Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming. 2. See Annual Report, 2006, Box 2.2. 3. See Á. Estrada, J. F. Jimeno and 
J. L. Malo de Molina (2009), The Spanish economy in EMU: the first ten years, Occasional Papers, no. 0901, Banco de 
España.
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struction of new houses rose substantially, meaning that the stock of housing increased at an 
average annual rate of 2.7% between 1995 and 2007 (from 18.3 to 25.1 million), encouraged 
too by the rising trend of prices and by expectations of property appreciation. Between 1990-
1998 and 1999-2007, the weight of residential investment in GDP increased by almost 2 pp 
from 5% to 6.8%, it rose in the United States from 4.4% to 4.8%, and it held steady in the euro 
area as a whole at around 5.5%. The increase in the weight of the construction sector was also 
notable in terms of employment: in 2007 it accounted for 13.2% of total employment, 2.7 pp 
up on the 1999 figure. In the United States this percentage edged up from 7.1% to 8% over 
the same period. Significantly, however, at play in Spain are idiosyncratic factors such as de-
mographic dynamics, the country’s attractiveness as a tourist destination and a greater need 
to improve our infrastructures, as befits an economy immersed in a convergence process.
The buoyancy of activity was accompanied by a rapid increase in house prices, which climbed 
from an average rate of 1% between 1995 and 1997 to 18% between 2003 and 2004. The 
average annual increase between 1995 and 2007 stood at 10%. Consequently, the ratio of 
house prices to gross household income almost doubled in this period from 3.8 to 7. As early 
as 2003, some studies were already warning that this growth in real estate prices was exces-
sive. For example, Ayuso and Restoy (2003) indicated that the overvaluation of house prices 
might, at end-2002, be standing at between 20% and 30%. More recent estimates drawn 
from stylised macroeconomic models broaden this range somewhat, reducing the lower limit 
and increasing the upper one.4
The strong investment in housing and the prolonged and sharp growth of real estate prices 
also led real estate wealth to increase significantly. On EFF (Spanish Survey of Household Fi-
nances) data, in just three years, from 2002 to 2005, the increase was at an average annual 
rate of 18% in real terms. Of these 18 points, around 15 were the result of the increase in 
house prices, while the remainder resulted from the accumulation of new properties. Around 
40% of households who owned properties in 2002 saw their value increase by over 75% in 
real terms. 23% of those who did not own properties other than their main dwelling in 2002 did 
so by 2005, meaning that the proportion of households with other properties, apart from the 
main dwelling, rose from 30.1% to 34.5%, while that of owner-occupiers in the principal resi-
dence held approximately stable (81.9% in 2002 and 81.3% in 2005).5 In 2002, 61% of house-
holds owning a second residence used it for vacation or other purposes. This percentage had 
fallen to 55.9% in 2005, suggesting that the motive behind a significant portion of real estate 
transactions during this period was not the direct use of housing as a durable consumer 
good.
In sum, real estate wealth as a proportion of total Spanish household wealth increased from 
78.7% to 80% between 2002 and 2005. On estimates based on aggregate data, this ratio 
might have increased even more (by around 3 pp) over the last three years. In any event, Span-
ish households’ concentration of wealth in real estate assets is high compared with other 
countries. Taking as a reference countries with data comparable to those of the EFF, Italy’s 
ratio can be seen to be around 75%, while in the United States it rose from 36.7% to 43.4% 
between 2001 and 2004.6
... and rapid growth in house 
prices, which was not 
sustainable
Also, the weight of real estate 
assets in household wealth rose 
to very high levels
4. See J. Ayuso and F. Restoy (2003), House prices and rents: an equilibrium asset pricing approach, Working Paper no. 
0304, Banco de España; IMF (2008), Economic Outlook, April, and Á. Estrada, J. F. Jimeno and J. L. Malo de Molina 
(2009), The Spanish economy in EMU: the first ten years, Occasional Papers, no. 0901, Banco de España. 5. See O. 
Bover, The dynamics of household income and wealth: results from the panel of the Spanish Survey of Household Fi-
nances (EFF) 2002-2005, Occasional Papers no. 0810, Banco de España. 6. See O. Bover, C. Martínez-Carrascal and 
P. Velilla (2005), “The wealth of Spanish households: a microeconomic comparison with the United States, Italy and the 
United Kingdom”, Economic Bulletin, July, Banco de España.
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Efforts to contain and redress these imbalances were not sufficiently intense as to prevent their 
excessive build-up. First, interest rates, set by the single monetary policy on the basis of the 
needs of the euro area as a whole, proved lower than what the Spanish economy, given its 
inflation and the intensity of growth in spending, would have needed. Further, fiscal policy, 
though it enabled surpluses to be attained which led to a rapid reduction in debt, did not suf-
ficiently offset the increase in private-sector indebtedness and did not anticipate in full the 
consequences that the adjustment of the economy might have on the State budget. Moreover, 
from a medium and long-term perspective, the public finances position was not a comfortable 
one once spending arising from population ageing, which will begin to be more evident within 
a decade, was taken into account. The regulation of land-use and of real estate development 
policies coupled with the insufficient correction of the favourable tax treatment of owner-oc-
cupied housing did not help either in redressing the sizeable build-up of productive resources 
in the construction sector and of wealth in real estate assets. Finally, the measures aimed at 
boosting productivity gains and greater labour mobility, so that the necessary reallocation of 
employment from the construction sector towards other industries might be less costly, were 
adopted belatedly when the cycle was already maturing.
The lowering of the debt rates of households and non-financial corporations and the real es-
tate adjustment are taking the form of a sharp reduction in demand, which is translating into a 
rapid improvement in the inflation differential with the euro area and in the external deficit, and 
into acute job destruction, particularly in the construction sector. Such rapid reabsorption of 
the imbalances should not however be interpreted as a durable correction thereof; this will only 
be achieved once a competitive position is successfully entrenched which provides for a great-
er contribution of the external sector to GDP growth in normal cyclical conditions, and for job 
creation in other sectors that absorb the surplus labour that built up in real estate activities. 
Should this not come about, the Spanish economy would end up simply replacing its external 
deficit with a domestic imbalance characterised by an excessively high unemployment rate 
and a level of GDP below potential.
The adjustments the Spanish economy must make to set more balanced foundations in place 
and to resume sustainable growth against the background of euro area stability requirements 
thus remain necessary. Euro area membership offers significant protection, without which all 
adjustments would have been deeper and more painful. But within the euro area, productivity 
and the response of production costs to the conditions prevailing in the markets are decisive 
factors for attaining and maintaining a competitive position. Accordingly, the intensity of the 
adjustment turns basically on the ability to reverse the losses on competitiveness through 
growth in productivity, on the moderation of business margins and of labour costs, and on the 
flexibility of the labour market in being able to absorb the sectoral reallocation of employment.
However, improving productivity and containing margins and costs entails major difficulties. As 
regards productivity, the measures to permanently raise its growth rates need, in order to be 
fully effective, a long period of time. As to containing costs and margins, it will be difficult to 
make significant progress unless the structural problems in the working of certain markets, 
derived from regulations that do not sufficiently promote competition and flexibility, are tackled 
more forcefully.
Turning to the real estate adjustment, an oversized sector is always costly to redress, as a 
reallocation of productive resources is needed. In this case, given the intensive use of labour 
in the production of real estate, the costs of the adjustment will also depend crucially on the 
capacity of the labour market flexibly to accommodate this reallocation process and thus avert 
excessive and lasting growth in the unemployment rate.
The mechanisms for redressing 
these imbalances were 
insufficient...
and the adjustment is taking the 
form of a sharp decline in 
activity... 
...meaning that the challenges 
posed by the correction of the 
imbalances are still present...
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In the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008, the soundness of the Spanish financial 
system and the Eurosystem’s rapid response to the liquidity tensions allowed the effects of the 
first wave of the crisis to be cushioned, so that the path of deceleration on which Spanish 
economic activity had already embarked did not steepen significantly. The average GDP 
growth rate in the four quarters following mid-2007 was 1 pp down on the related average for 
the 1999-2007 period (2.8% against 3.8%), while in the case of household consumption and 
of gross fixed capital formation, the differences were 1.8 pp and 3.6 pp, respectively. Only in 
the construction sector, where the slowdown had already begun in 2006 Q4, was the growth 
differential between both periods particularly marked (almost 6 pp). Chart 2.1 offers estimates 
of the year-on-year growth rate of GDP provided by a real-time forecasting model of the Span-
ish economy over the course of 2008. This illustrates that the conjunctural indicators did not 
begin to anticipate until late March the strong slowdown that would ultimately take place, more 
clearly so from late June.7
To properly assess the slowdown seen until mid-2008, it should be borne in mind that, aside 
from the start of the financial crisis, interest rates had held on an upward course since late 
2005, although they still remained at moderate levels. The strong increase in oil and commod-
ity prices should also be recalled, as it only turned around from 2008 Q3, although the effect 
of these increases on activity in Western economies was generally less than in previous epi-
sodes of strong rises.8 In short, the slowdown under way to mid-2008 did not appear to de-
part from a path of relative gradualism.
From September 2008, the international financial crisis worsened. The serious solvency 
problems of international financial institutions spread, having appeared in previous months 
to be concentrated, with few exceptions, in US investment banks and in commercial banks 
excessively geared to highly complex securitisation formulas via special vehicles. The bank-
2 The consequences of 
the financial crisis
During the first phase of the 
international financial crisis, the 
economic slowdown was 
moderate...
...but amplification mechanisms 
have been set in train as it has 
heightened...
7. This real-time forecasting model of the Spanish economy is designed in a similar fashion to the EUROSTING. See M. 
Camacho and G. Pérez-Quirós, Introducing the EURO-STING: Short-Term INdicator of Euro Area Growth, Working Pa-
per no. 0807, Banco de España. 8. See A. Nakov (2008), “Una modelización de equilibrio general de las fluctuaciones 
del precio del petróleo”, Boletín Económico, January, Banco de España.
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ruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the AIG debacle seriously exacerbated the situation of 
uncertainty and the crisis in confidence. As Chart 1.1 shows, stock market prices fell 
sharply and their volatility increased substantially, far exceeding the figures hitherto at-
tained. Risk premia on corporate bonds also grew strongly, and the information from vari-
ous available surveys shows that credit standards tightened further. Against this back-
ground of turmoil on capital markets, there was an across-the-board increase in financial 
intermediation costs. This in itself has an adverse effect on activity, similar to those stem-
ming from a decline in productivity, since as the user cost of capital increases, productive 
investment falls.
One of the main consequences of these extraordinary events has been the loss in wealth. On 
one hand, financial asset prices have fallen considerably. And on the other, the tightening of 
credit standards has exerted further pressure in favour of a swifter correction of real estate 
asset prices which, in normal conditions, would usually follow a relatively slow pattern of ad-
justment.
The effects of this fall in wealth on activity are amplified in situations such as the present, in 
which uncertainty hinders asset valuation and the lack of confidence about agents’ solvency 
becomes widespread. These conditions lead households to increase precautionary saving, 
and firms to maintain their working capital and to postpone new investment projects. And, in 
turn, the reduction in the value of the collateral that households and firms can offer to obtain 
credit with which to finance their decisions leads banks to demand greater guarantees in ex-
change for the risks they assume. Spending, therefore, is further constrained and financial 
conditions thus become an amplifying mechanism of the original shock that caused the initial 
decline in wealth. This phenomenon is what is known as the “financial accelerator” in the lit-
erature on the propagation of economic fluctuations. Indeed, according to the empirical evi-
dence available in this field, shocks with a financial origin and the above-mentioned financial 
acceleration mechanism explain a significant portion of past fluctuations in GDP, inflation, con-
sumption and investment, both in the euro area and in the United States. In particular, it has 
played an especially important role in amplifying monetary shocks, which move prices and 
output in the same direction.9
The crisis has not only altered agents’ expectations about the future returns on their finan-
cial and real estate assets; it has also affected their outlook in respect of future earnings. 
Chart 2.2 shows that the economic sentiment indicators fell back fairly markedly from mid-
2007, a trend which intensified during 2008. This decline came about in a similar fashion in 
Spain and in the euro area as a whole. Thus, between June 2007 and December 2008, the 
economic sentiment indicator posted a fall of 35.1 points in Spain (42.1 points in the euro 
area). The pattern was very similar in the other confidence indicators, except that for the 
construction sector. That said, consumer confidence fell somewhat more in Spain in this 
period (by 33 points, compared with 28 points in the euro area as a whole). In the construc-
tion sector, where the confidence indicator trended more unevenly (owing to Germany in 
particular), the decline in confidence has also been higher in Spain than in the other coun-
tries. This slump in confidence reflects lesser expectations of household disposable income 
growth associated with the adverse behaviour of employment and, perhaps, with the poten-
tial repercussions of the tax costs of the crisis. However, there might also be a component 
of temporary overreaction to the spate of bad news stemming from the international finan-
cial crisis.
... prompting a perceived loss in 
wealth...
... a drastic change in 
household and business 
expectations...
9. See L. Christiano, R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2008), Financial Factors in Business Cycles, mimeo.
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Household credit, which was growing at a rate of over 20% during the final quarters of 
the expansion, fell to a year-on-year rate of around 5% in late 2008. The slowdown was 
even sharper at non-financial corporations, especially in the case of construction and 
real estate activities. In addition, the indicator of bank financing to companies, which 
takes into account the volume of funds available through open credit lines along with 
the credit on balance sheets, was less buoyant. Less favourable expectations about 
growth in the medium and long run, diminished prospects of an appreciation in real 
estate wealth (the principal collateral of households and of certain firms when it comes 
to requesting a loan), the turnaround in interest rates at the end of 2005 and the levels 
of debt reached have made for a progressive tempering of private agents’ demand for 
credit.
But the behaviour of credit has also been affected by cyclical factors on the supply side. 
Hence, given the current and foreseeable weakening in economic activity, financial interme-
diaries have lowered their estimates of borrowers’ ability to pay and they have reassessed 
upwards the risks associated with funded projects, which has translated into a tightening of 
their credit standards. Compounding this negative cyclical impulse to the supply of credit in 
the current setting have been other impulses more directly linked to the financial crisis, such 
as the across-the-board re-pricing of risk, the diminished international availability of funds 
and market pressures on financial institutions’ capital ratios in an environment of growing 
mistrust.
Chart 2.3 shows that the key cyclical determinants of the behaviour of credit (interest rates, 
wealth, the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate), which influence both the demand 
for and supply of credit, provide for a reasonable explanation of the course of this variable dur-
ing 2008. As Box 2.1 illustrates, information from surveys of financial institutions, which allow 
for a more in-depth analysis of the role played by the various supply and demand factors un-
derlying the observed course of credit, also tends to confirm the importance of these cyclical 
factors. In particular, the information indicates that it is financial institutions’ expectations about 
economic developments, and not so much potential problems concerning the availability of 
funds or the level of capitalisation, that best explain the contraction in the supply of credit over 
the past year.
... with significant effects on the 
demand for credit...
... and on supply, affected also 
by other factors related to the 
crisis... 
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The international financial and economic crisis has drastically curtailed the possibility of exter-
nal demand playing a compensatory role in the necessary containment of domestic demand, 
and it has brought further contractionary impulses to bear which have intensified the decline 
in activity and job destruction. These additional negative impulses have been operative through 
a reduction in wealth and a tightening of credit access conditions, which have depressed the 
demand for consumption and investment, adding severity to the loss of dynamism in activity. 
In a few short months, there has been a shift from a scenario of deceleration based on a 
gradual correction of spending and of house prices, which had some degree of support in 
fiscal policy and in external demand, to another scenario marked by: a grave deterioration in 
agents’ confidence and a tightening of credit conditions which are more severely weighing on 
spending decisions; a global recession, which limits the capacity of external demand to offset, 
at least in part, lower domestic demand; and a substantial change in the public-sector budg-
etary position, as a result of the increased spending the crisis entails and of a proportionately 
greater moderation in public revenue than in GDP as a consequence of a significant fall-off in 
direct and indirect taxes, in particular those associated with real estate activity, which had 
during the 1998-2006 period led to a cumulative increase in revenue of around 2 pp of 
GDP.10
The recession also has effects on productivity that run in both directions. On one hand, the 
destruction of less productive jobs and the sectoral reallocation of employment tend to 
generate productivity gains in the short run. On the other, it cannot be ruled out that, in the 
medium and long term, the economic crisis will have an adverse effect. This is because 
companies and the general government sector may be forced to cut R + D spending to a 
greater extent than other current expenditure, while the increase in risk premia and the 
tightening of credit standards may check those investment projects potentially more benefi-
cial to productivity growth, which are in general those that have most risk associated with 
them.
... shaping a scenario in which 
the adjustment of debt and of 
the real estate expansion must 
be made under particularly 
difficult conditions
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10. See F. De Castro, Á. Estrada, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (2008), “Una aproximación al componente transitorio 
del saldo público en España”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España, pp. 71-81.
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EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF RECENT CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN BOX 2.1
Credit granted by financial institutions to households and firms has 
slowed rapidly over the past year, and has therefore continued on the 
moderating slope on which it embarked in late 2006 (see Panel 1). 
Specifically, the year-on-year growth rate of bank lending to house-
holds declined from end-2007 to December 2008 by 8 pp to 4%, 
while lending to companies did so by 13 pp, to somewhat less than 
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EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF RECENT CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN (cont´d) BOX 2.1
7%. The indicator of bank financing to companies obtained by add-
ing to balance sheet loans the volume of funds drawable through 
open credit lines, which better proxies developments in the supply of 
credit to this sector, evidenced a lesser pace of increase (below 2%) 
at the close of last year.1 In 2009 to date, the pattern of diminished 
buoyancy of borrowed funds raised by the private sector has contin-
ued.
For a proper assessment of these developments, it should be borne 
in mind that credit is highly procyclical. In particular, during the upturn 
it tends to increase rapidly, since both those demanding and supply-
ing funds usually form optimistic expectations about the generation 
of future income by demanders, while the opposite occurs in reces-
sionary phases. Suppliers and demanders alike tend to be more lax 
in their assessment of the risks associated with this future income. 
When, as at present, the downside of the cycle begins, these same 
forces act in the opposite direction, meaning that the growth of bank 
financing is checked.
To set the latest credit developments in context, it is worth recalling 
their notable dynamism between 1996 and 2005. In that period the 
credit-to-GDP ratio, which started in 1995 from a low value com-
pared with other developed economies, exceeded average euro 
area levels, although it did not match the figures in economies such 
as the United Kingdom (see Panel 2). The high growth rates of loans 
during this stage should be understood as a temporary phase of 
adaptation of the Spanish economy to the new environment of 
greater macroeconomic stability and of low interest rates as a result 
of Spanish euro area membership. That said, the accommodating 
financing conditions on international financial markets during this 
period were also a contributing factor. Subsequently, the progressive 
rise in the cost of private-sector debt following the change in mon-
etary policy stance initiated in late 2005 and lower expectations of 
house price appreciation had tended to reduce private-sector de-
mand for borrowed funds, and a period of diminished momentum in 
this variable began. More recently, the Spanish economy’s cyclical 
position and the international financial crisis have accentuated the 
slowing profile of credit, affecting both the supply of and demand for 
funds.
To make a correct diagnosis of the factors behind the latest credit 
developments, a distinction should be drawn between supply-side 
and demand-side elements, though this is a highly complex exercise. 
A useful tool to this end is the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), which is 
conducted in coordination with the euro area countries. Quarterly, the 
survey asks participating banks (10 in Spain’s case) directly about 
changes in the demand for and supply of financing during the refer-
ence period and about the explanatory factors behind these develop-
ments.2 Although the replies to the questionnaire are qualitative, they 
may prove very useful for identifying certain trends.
The results of the BLS conducted in 2008 confirm that the sharp 
slowdown in loans to households and firms last year could be ex-
plained both by demand-side and supply-side factors (see Panels 3 
to 6). The diminished dynamism of the demand for financing would 
be linked both to lower expectations about income growth, further to 
the turnaround in the business cycle, and to changes in the prospect 
of certain assets appreciating (real estate, in particular, the price of 
which fell by 3.2% in 2008 according to figures from the Spanish 
Ministry of Housing). Also, the rise in the cost of financing for much of 
the year would have contributed to checking applications for funds.
According to the BLS, the tightening of the criteria used by banks to 
approve new loans was due mainly to the progressive deterioration of 
banks’ expectations about economic developments in general and 
the housing market in particular. It was also due to banks’ perception 
of borrowers’ diminished solvency (see Panels 4 to 6). In this respect, 
it should be recalled that the doubtful assets ratio of other resident 
sectors (which includes, in addition to households and firms, financial 
institutions other than those of the system) rose from 0.9% in 2007 to 
3.4% at the end of 2008.
Credit institutions’ problems in gaining access to international funding 
markets, to which they had resorted to fund part of the growth of their 
assets, would also have contributed – along with the attendant high 
costs – to reducing the supply of loans, albeit to a lesser extent than 
the foregoing factors, according to the BLS. The relative weight of 
factors relating to banks’ capitalisation levels would also have been 
comparatively less.
The latest BLS (April 2009) reveals that both the pace at which cred-
it standards were tightening and at which applications for funds were 
declining began to be checked in 2009 Q1, although both the supply 
of and demand for credit had continued falling. According to banks’ 
expectations, these same trends should continue over the following 
quarter.
In short, the results of the BLS suggest that the factors linked to the 
deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook played a substantial role 
in the decline of both the supply of and demand for bank financing 
during 2008. The international financial crisis coupled with high pri-
vate-sector debt have undoubtedly contributed to the ongoing inten-
sity of the adjustment of both variables to the change in the business 
cycle.
2. For more details on the content of this Survey, see J. Martínez and 
L. Á. Maza (2003), “Resultados de la Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en 
España”, Boletín Económico, May, Banco de España; and for the latest data, 
J. Martínez (2009), “Resultados de la Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en 
España: abril 2009”, Boletín Económico, April, Banco de España.
1. For more details, see Box 6 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish econo-
my”, Economic Bulletin, January 2009, Banco de España.
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The real estate adjustment, which began in mid-2006, quickened during 2008. Housing starts, 
which peaked at a total of 760,000 in 2006, fell to 360,000, with open-market housing ac-
counting for this reduction almost in its entirety. As regards transactions, these fell from 
955,000 in 2006 to 565,000 in 2008. As a result, investment in housing dipped from 9.4% of 
GDP in 2006 to 7.2% in 2008 Q4, while total investment in construction fell by a similar amount 
(2.4 pp), declining from 18% of GDP in 2006 to 15.6% of GDP.11
House prices, too, have embarked on a phase of correction of the strong rises previously ac-
cumulated: the price index compiled by the Spanish Ministry of Housing posted a year-on-year 
reduction of 3.2% for open-market housing at end-2008. The new INE statistic, which offers a 
more refined estimate of these prices, gave a figure of 5.4% for this contraction. Significantly, 
both statistical sources tend to record the changes in prices with some delay. In the case of 
the INE statistic, which is based on information provided by the public deeds of transactions, 
second-hand house prices are likely to reflect the changes more promptly, as there is a lesser 
interval in this case between the time of the transaction and that of the signing of the related 
deed. At end-2008, the year-on-year decline in second-hand property prices was, according 
to this source, 10.7%.
Household wealth encompasses, on one hand, the value of financial and real estate assets 
accumulated at each moment in time. In mid-2007, before the initial episodes of the interna-
tional crisis broke, the respective ratios of real estate assets, financial assets and debt to 
Spanish household gross disposable income were 8.45, 2.90 and 1.38, giving financial and 
real estate wealth (net of debt) of 9.96 times such income. Only one year later, these ratios had 
fallen in 2008 Q3 to 8.17 (real estate wealth), 2.45 (financial wealth) 1.37 (debt) and 9.3 (total 
wealth net of debt).
However, as regards the value of real estate wealth, the estimates indicated are based on the 
statistics available on the real estate market, with which it is difficult to accurately estimate the 
decline during 2008, and it is likely that the indicators habitually used are underestimating it. 
Firstly, the stock of owner-occupied housing may be growing less than what the information 
available on housing starts would indicate. If the historical relationship between both variables 
holds, the stock of housing may be expected to have increased by approximately 3% during 
2008, reflecting the high number of housing starts in 2006; but it is likely that, in a scenario 
marked by low activity in the real estate market, the lead time for the production of housing will 
have lengthened, raising the proportion of starts that have not yet become household prop-
erty. Taking as a reference the reduction (practically 33%) in the number of real estate transac-
tions, the quantity effect might have boosted household real estate wealth by 2%. Secondly, 
as previously indicated, the overall indices of house prices, owing to the way in which they are 
constructed and given the current sluggish conditions in the housing market, capture actual 
developments with something of a lag. Against this background, the fall in second-hand hous-
ing prices might be more representative of the loss in value of household-owned real estate 
assets. Thus, taking the reduction in the foregoing prices at 10.7%, according to INE, the es-
timated loss in real estate wealth recorded during 2008 would be 8.7%. As regards financial 
wealth, which poses fewer estimation problems, the related decrease would be 12.1%, re-
flecting above all the decline in the value of stock market assets.
Wealth also comprises the expected present value of the income flows household foresee 
having in the future, which is known as “human wealth”. Accordingly, changes in expectations 
3 Crisis transmission 
mechanisms: the impact 
on consumption and 
employment
The acceleration in the 
adjustment of the real estate 
market...
... has adversely affected 
household wealth
11. These ratios to GDP are in current prices.
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about these flows have a direct impact on total household wealth, which is all the greater the 
lower the discount rate applied to these future flows and the longer the related life cycle for 
saving-related decision-making.
The effects of the changes in wealth and consumption depend on several factors, such as the 
interest rate, risk aversion and individuals’ life horizon, the type of wealth in question and its 
distribution among different population groups, and the source of the change in its value. A 
particularly interesting case in this connection is that of real estate wealth, since real estate 
assets, contrary to financial assets, have an intrinsic user value. Consequently, a fall in house 
prices brings about, on one hand, a decline in household wealth, but, on the other, it also re-
duces the cost of the residential or accommodation services provided by the dwelling, where-
by the end effect on consumption is not in principle evident.
There are, however, other mechanisms through which the fall in house prices might lead to the 
containment of consumption. Firstly, if a portion of households’ precautionary saving were to 
be deposited in real estate assets, a fall in house prices might lead households to have to 
offset the related loss of capital by increasing their saving, especially in a setting of high uncer-
tainty as at present, which is conducive to higher saving for this reason. This effect will be all 
the greater the higher the proportion of the population that owns real estate assets. Secondly, 
the frequent use of real estate assets as collateral in credit transactions establishes a further 
link between real estate wealth and household spending. In this connection, the characteris-
tics of the debt associated with real estate wealth also exert their own influence, since the 
higher the percentage of mortgage loans granted with variable interest rates (more than 90% 
in Spain’s case), the greater the effect on households’ gross disposable income of the chang-
es in interest rates that may arise.12 Finally, since housing is a complementary good to other 
durable goods (furniture, household electrical appliances, etc.), a decline in the number of real 
estate transactions, irrespective of how prices behave, feeds through to the consumption of 
these goods.
The net effect on consumption of all these channels of transmission for changes in house 
prices is difficult to estimate, especially when the degree of uncertainty and credit standards 
are in flux. In Spain’s case, and on the latest EFF findings, the households with most real estate 
wealth are those whose head is between 45 and 64 years of age and who is, therefore, in the 
“saving” stage of his/her life cycle. And, although the value of real estate wealth grows com-
mensurately with total levels of wealth and income as is to be expected, the population with 
lower income levels (and, therefore, with a greater marginal propensity to consume) also has 
real estate assets for a high-value (see Chart 2.4). Accordingly, the conditions are, at least 
potentially, in place so that a change in real estate wealth may impact consumption to some 
degree.
According to estimates drawing on microeconomic data, the change in Spanish household 
consumption induced by a change in real estate wealth (the marginal propensity to consume 
based on wealth) is approximately 3%, while changes in financial wealth do not cause signifi-
cant changes in consumption, given the scant weight of financial wealth in Spanish house-
holds’ asset portfolio.13 Nonetheless, these effects vary considerably depending on the type of 
household. For instance, for those in which the household head is younger than 35 or older 
The reduction in real estate 
wealth feeds through to 
consumption through various 
channels...
...the importance of which 
depends on the distribution of 
wealth
12. See M. Rubio (2009), Fixed and Variable-Rate Mortgages, Business Cycles and Monetary Policy, Working Paper no. 
0903, Banco de España. 13. See O. Bover (2005), Wealth effects on consumption: microeconometric estimates from 
the Spanish Survey of Household Finances, Working Paper no. 0522, Banco de España. The figure corresponds to a 
long time horizon, of sufficient length so that spending decisions have adjusted in full to the new conditions.
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than 74, changes in real estate wealth do not bring about appreciable changes in consump-
tion. Yet for households whose head is aged between 35 and 44, the estimates available indi-
cate that the wealth effect is double that estimated for the population as a whole. Further, 
estimates based on macroeconomic models – e.g. the Banco de España Quarterly Model 
(MTBDE) – tend to reduce the marginal propensity to consume based on real estate wealth to 
around 1.5%, and to raise slightly that relating to financial wealth to 1%.
In nominal terms, consumption grew by 7.2% in 2007 and by only 3.5% in 2008 (3.7 pp 
down). Taking the aforementioned estimates of the reduction in wealth recorded during the 
year (8.7% for real estate wealth and 12.1% for financial wealth) and an intermediate value 
between the microeconomic and macroeconomic estimates available for the marginal propen-
sities to consume (2.25% for real estate wealth and 0.5% for financial wealth), the resulting 
decline in consumption stemming from the loss of wealth would be around 1.8 pp (1.7 pp for 
real estate wealth and 0.1 pp for financial wealth), which might account for around 50% of the 
decline in the growth rate of consumption observed in 2008.
On EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) figures, numbers employed have fallen since 2007 Q2 
at an annual average rate of 1.7%. Job destruction has been uneven across the economic 
sectors. Initially, it originated in the construction sector, where employment declined by 8% 
between 2007 Q2 and 2008 Q2, and by 14.5% in the second half of 2008, while in industry 
and employment it held more or less stable in the first half of the year and decreased by 6.5% 
in the final six months. Conversely, the services sector showed an increase in employment of 
2.1% from mid-2007 to mid-2008, and of 0.2% thereafter.
The excessive concentration of resources in the construction sector helps explain the acute 
job destruction in the Spanish economy in the past year. As Chart 2.5 shows, the decline in 
employment has been greater in those regions in which the weight of the construction sector 
in employment was greater, meaning that this factor alone explains 25% of the regional varia-
bility in this variable.
The wealth effect might have 
contributed to the slowdown in 
consumption during the year
Employment also fell, and not 
only in the construction sector...
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The strong job destruction under way highlights once again one of the particular characteris-
tics of the cyclical behaviour of the Spanish economy, namely the high variability of employ-
ment. The scale of net job destruction in Spain during 2008 is partly due to the size of the 
decline in output over the same period. However, in other euro area countries in which the fall 
in GDP has been comparable, such a sharp contraction in employment has not been seen 
(Chart 2.6). Whereas in Spain, in the period from 2006 Q1 to 2008 Q4, the 4.4 pp reduction in 
the rate of change of GDP (from 3.5% to –0.8%) was accompanied by a 5.2 pp decline in 
employment growth, a very similar economic growth performance (–3.5 pp) in Italy and France 
entailed a slowdown in employment of only 1.7 pp. In Germany, economic activity varied less 
(–3.1 pp), but the fall in employment growth (0.6 pp) was proportionately much smaller: the 
ratios of the decline in employment growth to that in GDP were 0.2, 0.5 and 1.2, respectively, 
in Germany, France and Spain.
This greater relative amplitude of the employment response in Spain is not a particular phe-
nomenon of this episode of crisis; rather, it reflects a historical pattern. Table 2.1 offers some 
cyclical indicators of GDP and of employment in the four major euro area countries, for the 
period 1992 Q1-2008 Q3. As can be seen, the volatility of employment relative to that of GDP 
(measured by the ratio of standard deviations) is much greater in Spain than in the other large 
euro area countries. Indeed, Spain is the only one of the four countries where employment 
fluctuates more than GDP, while in Germany and France the opposite is the case and in Italy 
both variables display approximately the same volatility. Likewise, the correlation between 
employment and GDP is also stronger in Spain than in the other countries. In sum, over the 
past two decades the same fluctuations in GDP increases have prompted employment 
growth responses in Spain that are proportionately greater than in the other large euro area 
countries.
Behind this high response of employment to cyclical conditions are certain institutional 
characteristics of the Spanish labour market. Indeed, faced with a contraction in de-
mand, which may lead companies in many cases to downsize their workforce, the actual 
adjustment of manpower will depend on several factors, such as the perceived duration 
... confirming, once again, its 
high cyclical variability in 
Spain...
... which is due to certain 
institutional characteristics of 
the labour market
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of the shock, employment adjustment costs, the possibility of organising production dif-
ferently and production costs (inter alia, labour costs). In Spain, the structure and content 
of collective bargaining agreements mean that it is difficult for firms to adjust labour costs 
when demand falls. The differentiation in adjustment costs brought about by the exist-
ence of two types of employment contract (permanent and temporary) leads to the con-
traction in employment falling in the main on temporary workers. As can be seen in Chart 2.7, 
which shows labour flow figures from employment (by type of contract) and from unem-
ployment, in the current recession there has been a significant increase in the exit rate 
from employment to unemployment in the case of temporary workers (from 6% to 14% 
of employees with this type of contract), which differs greatly from that observed in the 
case of employees with a permanent contract (whose exit rate edged up from 1% to 
2%). As usually also occurs in downturns, exit rates from employment to inactivity have 
increased, and exit rates from unemployment to employment and inactivity have de-
clined.
To assess the extent to which these institutional characteristics of the Spanish labour market 
contribute to exacerbating employment volatility, Box 2.2 performs some simulations with a 
general macroeconomic model with a labour market subject to several types of frictions and 
calibrated to reproduce the characteristics of the Spanish economy. The results show that the 
response of employment in the short and medium run to fluctuations in demand is greater in a 
labour market with two types of contract (temporary and permanent) than in a market with a 
single type of contract and similar adjustment costs.
Turning to the cyclical behaviour of wages, attention has often focused on the high iner-
tia arising from the wage bargaining model and, in particular, from the presence of in-
dexation clauses, which bring positive but not negative deviations in inflation to bear on 
the wage increases agreed under collective bargaining.14 Given the speed and intensity 
with which the current recession has come about and the sharp decline in inflation, this 
wage inertia is having particularly adverse effects. During the second half of 2007 and 
the first six months of 2008, wages continued to grow, driven by optimistic expectations 
about economic activity and by the indexation of wages applying the inflation deviations 
of the previous year, prompting a wage rise concurrently with the decline in demand (see 
Box 2.3).
Germany France Italy Spain
VOLATILITY (%)
Employment (1) 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.3
GDP (2) 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.8
Ratio (1) / (2) 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3
CORRELATION
GDP-Employment 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8
SOURCE: ECB.
a. Quarterly GDP and employment series; year-on-year growth rates.
EMPLOYMENT AND GDP VOLATILITY AND THEIR CORRELATION. 1992-2008 (a) TABLE 2.1
14. See Annual Report, 2007, Box 2.2.
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In short, the employment and wage-determining mechanisms derived from the institutional 
configuration of the Spanish labour market are tending to amplify the impact of the adverse 
demand shock associated with the crisis. In these circumstances, measures aimed at check-
ing job destruction and encouraging job creation are needed. To date, however, these meas-
ures have focused on increasing hiring subsidies and on extending unemployment protection, 
without amending the institutional mechanisms that are distorting the incentives to hire and 
eroding job stability.
Indeed, exiting the crisis will require restoring the confidence of households about their future 
work income, and that of companies about the profitability of their new investment projects. In 
both cases, two factors will prove pivotal: first, the conditions under which new labour hires 
may be made; and second, productivity, which, in the medium and long term, will be what al-
lows higher growth in real wages and in business profits. To achieve a more favourable sce-
nario for new hires and productivity growth, changes in labour legislation are needed that will 
allow job stability to be squared with companies’ capacity to organise their labour resources 
efficiently.
In Spain there is a wide range of employment contracts. Alongside permanent contracts, 
where firing costs are based on the causes behind contract termination and on the result of 
Exiting the crisis will require 
labour regulations more 
favourable to new hires and to 
the recovery of productivity in 
the medium and long run...
... in particular, legislation on 
employment contracts...
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HETEROGENEITY OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS AND EMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY BOX 2.2
The recent economic literature has highlighted wage rigidity and em-
ployment adjustment costs as the main determinants of the response 
of labour market flows – and, therefore, of fluctuations in employment 
– to economic shocks.1 If wages responded flexibly to changes in 
productivity, then economic fluctuations would cause high wage vol-
atility, but would leave the level of employment relatively unaffected. 
Conversely, if wages do not adjust readily to changes in productivity, 
then there will be notable changes in hiring and firing and, therefore, 
employment will fluctuate more over the cycle. Evidently, employment 
adjustment costs reduce employment volatility; higher adjustment 
costs reduce both new hires and dismissals, with an ambiguous im-
pact, in principle, on the mean level of employment.2 However, when 
employment adjustment costs differ for different population groups, 
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1. See R. Shimer (2005), “The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment 
and vacancies”, American Economic Review, 95 (1), pp. 25-49, and R. Hall 
(2005), Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness, American 
Economic Review, 95 (1), pp. 50-65.
2. See S. Bentolila and G. Bertola (1990), “Firing costs and labour demand: 
How bad is Eurosclerosis?”, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), pp 381-402, 
and A. Cabrales and H. A. Hopenhayn (1997), Labour market flexibility and ag-
gregate employment volatility, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, 46, 
pp. 189-228.
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HETEROGENEITY OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS AND EMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY (cont´d)
as is the case in Spain, the attendant fluctuations may be greater 
than in a homogeneous market with equivalent adjustment costs.3
To quantify the impact that wage rigidity and adjustment costs have 
on employment volatility, several simulation exercises have been per-
formed in a macroeconomic model calibrated to reflect the behaviour 
of the Spanish labour market. The main ingredients of this model are 
as follows: i) there are two types of employment contract, permanent 
and temporary, which give rise to two different dismissal rates; ii) 
newly hired employees join the firm with no specific experience in 
their job; iii) in each quarter, an inexperienced employee has a certain 
probability of gaining experience, thereby increasing his/her produc-
tivity in the firm; iv) the cost of hiring depends negatively on the unem-
ployment rate and positively on the number of hires; v) the marginal 
cost of dismissals is increasing, and is much greater for permanent 
than for temporary contracts, and vi) wages are determined by bar-
gaining, with greater rigidity and bargaining power in the case of per-
manent workers.
Under these assumptions, a firm whose employees mostly have per-
manent contracts will save on hiring costs, and will have a workforce 
with a greater average productivity. Alternatively, a firm might con-
sider it more advisable to avoid a high proportion of permanent em-
ployees in its workforce, either to reduce wage costs, given the rela-
tively high wages of permanent employees, or in anticipation of pos-
sible future reductions in demand that would lead it to shed 
employment and, therefore, to incur high adjustment costs.
Panel 1 shows the response of employment, depicted in its aggre-
gate, temporary and permanent components, to a persistent reduc-
tion in productivity, under different scenarios: i) a dual labour market 
calibrated to the behaviour of the Spanish labour market (base sce-
nario); ii) a market equivalent to the previous one, except that the 
wage rigidity of permanent contracts is lower, equalling to that of 
temporary employees in the base scenario (flexible scenario), and iii) 
a labour market in which all duality has been stripped out, replacing 
the two types of contract with a single contract that implies aggre-
gate adjustment costs similar to those of the dual labour market of 
the base scenario and in which wage rigidity equals the average of 
that of temporary and permanent employment in the base scenario 
(elimination of duality scenario). The productivity shock, whose scale 
is such that it causes a 1% decline in output in the first quarter of the 
base scenario, causes a fall in total employment of around 0.55% 
over the course of the first year, broken down into a 0.49 pp decline 
in temporary employment and a 0.06 pp decline in permanent em-
ployment, whereas if the wages of temporary and permanent em-
ployees were equally flexible, employment among the latter would fall 
less (by 0.01% of total employment) and that among the former by 
slightly more (by 0.58% of total employment). However, in the labour 
market with a single contract, the reduction in total employment is 
0.19%, approximately one-third of the fall in the base scenario, which 
is essentially due to the fact that higher dismissal costs for permanent 
employees in the base scenario prompt a very high turnover of tem-
porary employees which tends to exacerbate flows into and out of 
unemployment, shortening employment spells and thereby inhibiting 
growth in workers’ productivity. With regard to wages, the decline in 
productivity brings about a reduction of 0.06% and 0.24% in the 
base and flexible scenarios, respectively, and of 0.27% in the case of 
a market with a single contract. Given that real wages have a certain 
degree of rigidity in all three scenarios, the decline does not prevent 
unit labour costs (the ratio of wages to labour productivity) from un-
dergoing increases of 0.21%, 0.07% and 0.18%, respectively.
In sum, according to these simulations, reducing heterogeneity of ad-
justment costs would significantly reduce the volatility of employment 
and of output, without much increase in that of wages. Accordingly, 
the volatility of disposable income would be lower (approximately by 
half), and so too, possibly, would that of consumption.
BOX 2.2
3. See J.J. Dolado, M. Jansen and J.F. Jimeno (2007), A positive analysis of 
targeted employment protection legislation, B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 
(Topics), vol. 7, no. 1, art. 14, and C. Alonso-Borrego, J. Fernández-Villaverde 
and J.E. Galdón-Sánchez (2004), Evaluating labour market reforms: a general 
equilibrium approach, IZA Discussion Paper, no. 1129.
legal or administrative control (in the case of collective dismissals), there are a welter of tem-
porary contracts, which have lower firing costs and, by their very nature, may be terminated 
without legal and/or administrative sanctioning. Temporary contracts can be entered into un-
der specific circumstances, provided the duration of the job is of a fixed term (causality princi-
ple). The excessive incidence of temporary hiring (duality), the scant conversion of temporary 
into permanent contracts (employment segmentation) and intense job turnover involving one 
sub-group of workers (the concentration of the employment adjustment in temporary workers) 
are the consequences of this excessively complex hiring model. In practice, this model means 
that companies use employment as the main source of adjustment in the face of economic 
fluctuations. There is also empirical evidence upholding the fact that the unfavourable trend of 
productivity over the past decade is due in no mean part to the scant incentives temporary 
workers and their employers have to invest in training and, in the case of the latter, to innovate 
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WAGES AND CYCLICAL CONDITIONS BOX 2.3
Despite the marked deterioration in the labour market during the year, 
wage developments in 2008 entailed a rise in labour costs, in both 
nominal and real terms, which largely came about due to the exten-
sive indexation present in the collective bargaining mechanism. The 
automatic adjustment of wages to the inflation outturn at the end of 
2007 by means of the activation of the indexation clauses gave rise 
to an increase in wage rates in the first half of the year. In the closing 
months of the year, when the deterioration of the labour market was 
already most acute and inflation had begun to fall, the sensitivity of 
collectively bargained wages to cyclical conditions in the labour mar-
ket was limited. Thus, whereas for the year as a whole the revisions 
of pluriannual agreements signed in previous years included a 3.5% 
wage increase, newly signed agreements showed an even higher rise 
(of 3.8%) in those recorded to December, with a very slight modera-
tion in the final stretch of the year, registering an increase of 3.5% in 
the final quarter. The figures available for 2009 show this behaviour 
has continued, since agreements registered to February (mostly revi-
sions of pluriannual agreements entered into in previous years) incor-
porate wage growth of 2.7%, which is a marked rise in real terms in 
light of recent inflation developments.
This wage behaviour does not differ greatly from that observed in 
the Spanish economy in previous periods. Firstly, the degree of 
nominal indexation present in collective bargaining is very high 
and wage increases are predominantly determined, with some 
lag, by the course of inflation. Panel 1 shows agreed wage in-
creases and inflation in December each year from 1990 to 2008. 
There is a very close relationship between wage increases and 
past inflation, which is reinforced by the impact of the indexation 
clauses, present in most agreements, which automatically pass 
through any increase in inflation to wages. Significantly, however, 
the relationship to inflation is not symmetrical in view of the char-
acteristics of the indexation clauses. And, indeed, as Panel 1 
shows, periods in which a decline in inflation is seen, such as 
1998 or, more recently, 2001, 2003 and 2006, are usually accom-
panied by increases in wages in real terms, as occurred in 
2008.1
1  IMPACT OF INFLATION AND CYCLICAL CONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASES (a)
Dependent variable:
Negotiated wage increase
Explanatory variables
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
8.84131.16.80129,0.1-ttanoitalfniybnoitaivedevitisoP
5.4-43.0-3.3-12.0-1-ttanoitalfniybnoitaivedevitageN
7.43-42.0-5.220.01-ttaetartnemyolpmenuniegnahC
Constant 2.66 30.8 2.45 -27.1
Observations
Adjusted determination coefficient 0.3
Revised
agreements
Newly signed
agreements
016,25735,93
0.3
SOURCE: Database of collective agreements recorded between 1990 and 2008, Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración. 
a. The regressions include dummy variables of the sector of activity (NACE-93 two-digit level), bargaining level and presence of indexation clause.
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1. Overall, from 1980 to 2008, the correlation between the change in inflation 
and the increase in real wages is –0.6.
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WAGES AND CYCLICAL CONDITIONS (cont´d) BOX 2.3
As regards the impact of the cyclical position of the labour market on 
collectively bargained wage increases, the accompanying table 
shows the results of several regressions in which the agreed wage 
increases in each of the collective bargaining agreements signed 
since 1990 is related to inflation and the change in the unemployment 
rate at the regional level, controlling for other characteristics of the 
agreement, such as type (newly signed, revisions of pluriannual 
agreements entered into previously), bargaining scope (firm-level or 
wider) and the sector of activity of the firms affected by the agree-
ment. In each year, only around one-third of the agreements with 
economic effects were negotiated the same year, given that most 
agreements are pluriannual2, for which less contemporaneous sensi-
tivity to cyclical factors is to be expected.
In relation to inflation, the estimates shown in the accompanying table 
reflect the impact of expected inflation on wage increases with the 
constant term of the regression, and they attempt to capture the po-
tential asymmetrical relationship of wage increases to this variable, 
allowing the coefficient to vary depending on whether inflation ended 
the previous year above or below 2%. The results clearly show 
marked asymmetry in the wage determination mechanism, since 
positive deviations by inflation pass through with a coefficient close to 
unity to wage increases, whereas, given the asymmetry caused by 
the indexation clauses, this pass-through does not take place when 
inflation falls below the 2% benchmark.3
Turning to the impact of the unemployment rate, the accompanying 
table shows that only in newly signed agreements is some sensitivity 
to the labour market situation detected. In particular, in these agree-
ments a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate would reduce the 
agreed wage increases in newly signed agreements by around 
0.2 pp. Conversely, no negative relationship between the unemploy-
ment rate and wages in revised agreements is observed.
Overall, therefore, the characteristics of the collective bargaining sys-
tem shape a labour market in which wage increases are strongly de-
termined by inflation, although the existence of downside asym-
metries in wages limits the pass-through of reductions in inflation. As 
to wage sensitivity to labour market conditions, a reduced response 
is detected which, moreover, entails a lagged adjustment of wages 
and only in newly signed agreements in the year, which account for 
around one-third of total agreements with economic effects in each 
year.
2. Average duration has been progressively increasing from somewhat over 
two years in the early 90s to somewhat over three years since 2004.
3. In fact, the negative coefficient means that inflation deviations below 2% give 
rise to wage increases.
by adopting new forms of organising work.15 To promote job stability and to help companies 
better organise their workforces, it is vital in the current circumstances to introduce and en-
courage forms of permanent hiring that can be used broadly and whose termination does not 
entail such high redundancy payments as those associated with the permanent contracts cur-
rently in force.
The means by which the determination of wages and employment conditions is responding to 
the crisis also highlights the dysfunctions generated by the collective bargaining model. The 
wage settlement arrangements on which this model is based, as laid down in the agreements 
entered into by employers’ associations and the main trade unions from 2001 [wage growth 
resulting from adding to the ECB inflation target ceiling (2%) a percentage point attributed 
generally and uniformly to productivity gains, along with indexation clauses that add wage in-
crements if inflation exceeds this ceiling], have led to great inertia in the growth of labour costs. 
The upshot of this behaviour has seen high wage increases coinciding in time with a strong 
reduction in activity and employment, which is indicative of the economy’s difficulties in restor-
ing competitiveness and the depreciation of the real exchange rate needed to redress the 
external imbalance without incurring sharp increases in unemployment. As regards other em-
ployment conditions, while companies with their own collective bargaining agreements are 
able to face the crisis by resorting to combinations of wage adjustments and other measures 
... and also collective 
bargaining...
15. See J. J. Dolado and R. Stucchi (2008), Do temporary contracts affect TFP? Evidence from the Spanish manufactur-
ing firms, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 7055, and IZA Discussion Paper no. 3832.
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aimed at maintaining employment, those that are subject to industry-wide, regional or nation-
wide agreements are much more constrained here.
Looking ahead, there are other reasons to conclude that wage-setting arrangements in recent 
years have not been the best framework for promoting the adjustments needed in circum-
stances such as the present. On one hand, the necessary depreciation of the real exchange 
rate requires the Spanish economy to achieve a GDP deflator growth rate that is lower than 
that of its trading partners for some period of time. Moreover, the necessary sectoral realloca-
tion of employment will call for relative wage adjustments. Given the low inflation rates being 
posted, in Spain and internationally, both adjustments are particularly constrained by the high 
downward nominal rigidity of wages imposed by the centralised and little-coordinated collec-
tive bargaining system that currently prevails.
The design of a far-reaching labour reform, which substantially redresses problems relating to 
employment contracts and collective bargaining and which is liable to enjoy broad-based so-
cial consensus, may need some time before coming to fruition and procedures that cannot be 
activated immediately. However, job destruction is proving most intense and, if this dynamic is 
not halted, the surge in the unemployment rate might have lasting effects on the Spanish 
economy’s capacity to generate new employment opportunities. To avert such effects, it might 
be desirable while specific reforms are being designed and implemented and until some con-
sensus is reached on them to resort to temporary measures, such as the introduction of new 
hiring arrangements and the prevalence of company-level agreements over industry-wide, 
regional or nationwide agreements. This type of measure would be immediately effective and 
would increase the beneficial effects of others introduced in recent months, such as hiring in-
centives, government support to sustaining employment and extended protection for the un-
employed.
... with temporary measures 
needed, while this reform 
proceeds, to reduce job 
destruction 
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The external environment of the euro area
The world economy is undergoing its most difficult period in recent decades. 2008 was marked 
by the gestation and subsequent eruption of a financial crisis, a corollary of the turbulence first 
seen in the summer of 2007. The crisis acquired global proportions, undermining agents’ 
confidence and resulting in a worldwide economic downturn. The data available for the first 
half of 2009 signal an unfavourable outlook for the year, despite the intense economic policy 
response. The depth and scope of the crisis have brought about major changes, not only in 
how economies work but also in economic priorities and in the framework in which the au-
thorities may act, raising uncertainties about how agents may respond and the effectiveness 
of economic policy. In short, the economic and financial situation has deteriorated significantly, 
with serious consequences that will make it difficult to return to a period of high sustained 
growth like that which was so abruptly interrupted in 2007. And not only because the present 
crisis has very probably lowered economic growth potential worldwide for a considerable time, 
but also because the bases for this renewed growth will necessarily be different from those 
that supported the last growth phase, which ultimately proved unsustainable.
The extent of the financial difficulties facing the developed economies acted as a growing re-
straint on real and financial activity in 2008, eventually spreading to the emerging economies. 
In this respect the year divides into two distinct parts, separated by the financial stress wit-
nessed in September (see Chart 3.1). Until then, the financial turmoil first seen in the summer 
of 2007 when the subprime crisis broke had gradually eroded (with varying degrees of inten-
sity) the solvency of a growing number of financial institutions, fomenting a process of gener-
alised deleveraging, making it impossible for some markets to function and gradually reducing 
the international financial system’s intermediation capacity. As from September, these devel-
opments evolved into a global financial crisis, marked by extreme market instability, the fall of 
systemic financial institutions, a credit market freeze and the collapse of agents’ confidence, 
significantly heightening the interplay between the difficulties facing the financial sector and the 
real economy. Economic activity, whose slowdown had intensified and spread geographically 
up to the summer, contracted sharply on a global scale in 2008 Q4. The developed economies 
fell deeper into a recession that in many cases had already begun, as the signs of financial 
weakness multiplied, while the emerging economies, far from remaining immune to the adjust-
ment process, were hit by the combined impact of a halt in external demand and in capital 
inflows towards these economies.
Nevertheless, the global economy still managed to grow by 3.2% in 2008, a relatively high 
figure, albeit considerably lower than the average of 4.9% of the previous four years (see 
Table 3.1). But average growth in 2008 masks the significant decline in the year-on-year rate 
(from 4.8% at end-2007 to 0.2% in 2008 Q4) and the low growth in the developed economies 
in the year overall (0.9%, in comparison with 2.7% in 2007). The emerging economies posted 
economic growth of 6.1% for the year, in comparison with 8.3% for 2007. The inflationary ten-
sions that had peaked mid-year (when inflation in the industrialised economies reached 4.5%, 
the highest figure recorded since July 1991) disappeared in Q4, as economic activity collapsed 
and commodities prices, which had started to decline in the summer, rapidly corrected.
As from September 2008, this combination of circumstances prompted an emphatic, gen-
eralised and, to a certain extent, coordinated response by economic authorities worldwide, 
but most especially in the developed economies. As the lower half of Chart 3.1 shows, the 
economic response covered all fronts: monetary policy (in many cases including the adop-
1 The world economy in 
2008
1.1 INTRODUCTION
A global financial crisis broke in 
2008 and the world economy 
entered a recession whose 
scope, duration and 
consequences are difficult to 
predict
After progressive deterioration, 
the financial system teetered on 
the brink of collapse in 
September, prompting a 
contraction in activity worldwide
The economic authorities’ 
response was emphatic, 
generalised and, to a certain 
extent, coordinated,…
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tion of unconventional measures), financial sector support policies and fiscal policies. The 
steps taken were designed to uphold liquidity and keep credit flowing, to strengthen finan-
cial institutions’ solvency and to sustain activity, aiming to restore agents’ confidence and 
break the increasingly powerful negative spiral between economic and financial deteriora-
tion.
The scale of the response, which has involved committing a very substantial volume of public 
funds, halted the collapse that threatened some of the world’s key financial systems. However, 
the global outlook remains highly uncertain, in light of the persistent financial fragility (espe-
cially due to the lack of sufficient progress in financial system restructuring) and extreme eco-
nomic weakness, all of which means that it may be some time before confidence returns and 
the outlook stabilises.
… but it failed to lift the 
uncertainty overshadowing the 
global economy
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Far from abating, the financial turmoil first seen in 2007 gained in strength in 2008, setting the 
scene for what would become a global financial crisis. One of the underlying elements of this 
crisis, in addition to ample global liquidity and highly accommodating financial conditions, was 
the complex web of risk transfer from credit originators to investors worldwide, via complex 
financial products which, in turn, helped increase leveraging opportunities even further. The 
serious implications that these risk transfer mechanisms held for financial stability were re-
vealed when the subprime mortgage crisis broke in the United States. Many mortgage credit 
risks – which had supposedly been passed on – returned to the banks’ balance sheets via the 
liquidity commitments assumed when the loans were refinanced. Throughout 2008, as the 
losses associated with these complex products emerged and mistrust between banks grew in 
light of the lack of transparency and the lack of data on exposure to these products, risks were 
reappraised and stress in the money and credit markets heightened. All this gradually under-
mined credit institutions’ solvency, and tensions spread to a growing number of financial 
agents and market segments. In September, the situation evolved into a global financial crisis 
whose depth and duration remain far from certain.
Up to mid-September, against a backdrop of high market volatility, the deteriorating financial 
climate gradually eroded agents’ confidence and effective credit conditions for firms and house-
holds in the main developed economies tightened, meaning that the financial difficulties began 
to pass through to the real economy. This progressive deterioration of the economic outlook 
was accompanied by further house price declines in the United States, which heightened the 
underlying mortgage securitisation problems, prolonging the uncertainty over the value of 
troubled assets in individuals’ and financial institutions’ investment portfolios and fuelling distrust 
between institutions. The growing losses recorded by financial institutions deriving from their 
more traditional portfolio assets and from some assets with a high credit rating which, in origin, 
appeared to represent no risk, added to these difficulties. All these factors blocked market re-
covery, and a growing number of firms went into liquidation or faced State intervention.
This phase was thus marked by the problems seen at a number of systemic institutions, such 
as the investment bank Bear Stearns, which was acquired by JP Morgan in mid-March, and 
the government-sponsored enterprises Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. More generally, the high 
losses emerging at various financial institutions in the United States and Europe, and the 
credit rating downgrades seen at the main monoline bond insurers in June, contributed to a 
further deterioration of the financial situation. In particular, these credit rating downgrades trig-
gered uncertainty about possible valuation problems relating to the insured instruments and 
gave rise to large-scale sales of a wide range of assets.
Liquidity had been in short supply at banks since the beginning of the financial turmoil and 
remained so throughout this period, obliging central banks to maintain extensive liquidity provi-
sion. Nevertheless, as the LIBOR/OIS spread shows (see Chart 3.2), the interbank markets 
failed to return to normal, as counterparty credit risk continued to rise. On the stock markets, 
the bearish trend that began in 2007 continued, in light of the poor corporate earnings per-
formance and the lower economic growth outlook, while on the foreign exchange markets the 
dollar depreciated, to stand at almost $1.60/euro in mid-July.
The emerging economies’ financial markets coped relatively well with the financial turbulence 
in this period, although market sentiment gradually deteriorated as the economic situation 
worsened. Sovereign spreads widened moderately and, in general, the stock markets outper-
formed those of the developed economies, while currencies appreciated in the first half of the 
year. But the emerging markets began to deteriorate over the summer, in a scenario domi-
nated by inflationary pressures.
1.2 THE FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
FROM TURMOIL TO CRISIS
The financial turmoil first seen in 
2007 intensified throughout 
2008, posing a serious threat to 
global financial stability
Up to mid-September, high 
financial volatility and the 
deteriorating economic outlook 
compounded the pressure on 
financial institutions…
… and some systemic 
institutions experienced severe 
difficulties,…
… while liquidity remained in 
short supply
The emerging economies’ 
markets coped relatively well in 
the first half of the year,…
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In mid-September 2008, following the takeover by the US administration of Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, the collapse of Lehman Brothers – the first large firm not to be bailed out – marked 
a radical change in events in the financial system. The failure of this major US investment bank 
revealed its systemic nature, given the volume of securities issued and of the derivatives con-
tracts in which it acted as counterparty, significantly raising the counterparty risk in the clearing 
and settlement of these contracts. The fall of Lehman Brothers further reduced confidence 
and paralysed the credit and money markets, placing the entire financial system on the brink 
of collapse.
A series of highly adverse developments followed, prompting large-scale State intervention: 
the bail-out of the insurance firm AIG; significant corporate consolidation moves in the United 
States, with the takeover of Merrill Lynch, another investment bank, and other commercial 
banks (Washington Mutual and Wachovia); and support for other smaller institutions, in Europe 
also.
Stress spread rapidly to the different financial market segments and the flight to quality drove 
down the prices of all but the most liquid and safest assets which acted as a safe haven. The 
world’s stock markets recorded the highest losses since the crash of 1929, and volatility 
soared in all markets; the VIX index, for example, which measures the implied volatility of the 
S&P 500, hit new all-time highs. Lower credit-rating corporate and sovereign credit spreads 
widened dramatically and, in general, the cost of non-bank lending to firms, irrespective of 
their credit rating, rose significantly. Moreover, higher counterparty risk gave rise to a sharp 
rebound in credit default swaps (see Chart 3.2).
Government debt – especially US government debt – came to act more and more as a safe 
haven, accentuating the downward trend in long rates in the United States in this part of the 
year. This was also due, albeit to a lesser extent, to the poorer economic outlook and the 
lower inflationary pressures in the long term. Subsequently, as the flight to quality abated and 
the authorities’ fiscal and financial efforts revealed the need for larger debt issues in the future, 
government debt yields rebounded somewhat, while at the shorter end of the yield curve rates 
fell, in step with the successive interest rate cuts seen in numerous countries as the eco-
nomic and financial situation deteriorated.
As from September, the foreign exchange markets became extremely volatile. The dollar acted 
as a safe-haven currency, appreciating against most other currencies (see Chart 3.3) to stand 
at around $1.25/euro. The yen also appreciated significantly against the main currencies as a 
result of growing risk aversion and unwinding of carry-trade positions (in which investors bor-
row currencies with low interest rates to invest in others, mainly in emerging economies, with 
high interest rates). Sterling fell to all-time lows against the dollar and the euro, due to the se-
vere deterioration of the UK economy and the difficulties facing the financial system.
The relative resilience exhibited by the emerging markets since the start of the financial tur-
moil crumbled in mid-September, as external credit conditions deteriorated and investor con-
fidence collapsed. The extensive deleveraging and reduction in capital flows from the devel-
oped markets – specifically in portfolio and banking flows – had a profound and sudden 
impact on the emerging markets. The initial effect was indiscriminate, despite the reduced 
vulnerability and relatively widespread improvement in the fundamentals of some of the 
emerging economies, especially in Latin America, in recent years. The external origin of the 
financial crisis explains why, at first, it was precisely the economies with more liquid and 
deeper capital markets that were most affected by the lack of external credit. This explains 
the sharp stock market falls and the currency depreciations seen in Brazil, Mexico and South 
… but everything changed in 
mid-September as the financial 
situation deteriorated further
Stress spread rapidly, driving 
down the prices of all but the 
safest and most liquid assets
The foreign exchange markets 
were extremely volatile in the 
period
The relative resilience displayed 
by the emerging economies’ 
markets up to September 
subsequently crumbled and 
capital inflows fell sharply
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Korea. Gradually, however, these effects passed through to countries or regions with higher 
financial vulnerability, including, in particular, the countries of eastern Europe and, within this 
region, some of the new EU Member States. These countries rely on external credit flows in 
foreign currency, and a growing number of them have needed external financial support. 
Reflecting the general deterioration of the emerging economies’ markets, sovereign spreads, 
measured by the EMBI+, widened considerably and stock markets recorded losses (higher, 
in many cases, than in the developed economies, especially in eastern Europe and commod-
ity exporting countries). Moreover, on the foreign exchange markets, the deterioration in the 
financial situation and the need for dollar liquidity meant that the local currencies depreciated 
against the dollar.
Net private capital inflows to the emerging economies fell dramatically in 2008, interrupting the 
upward trend seen since the start of the decade. The decline from the all-time high recorded 
in 2007 ($93 billion, in comparison with $638 billion) was due to the combination of lower 
capital inflows and high capital outflows, affecting mainly portfolio investments and interna-
tional bank loans.
Once the financial crisis broke in September, a wide range of measures was quickly taken, 
aiming to stabilise the financial systems of the developed economies. In addition to the supply 
of unlimited liquidity by the central banks, these measures initially took the form of State guar-
antees for bank deposits, up to a certain limit, public capital injections to restore the solvency 
of the main financial institutions and State guarantees for bank debt issues. Subsequently, 
other measures were introduced, aimed at restructuring bank balance sheets and managing 
assets that had become impaired as a result of the crisis (see Box 3.1 and section 1.3 below). 
In the emerging markets, where the problems related mainly to foreign currency funding, 
measures were adopted to alleviate the pressure on exchange rates and facilitate foreign cur-
rency borrowing, through domestic credit swap facilities with the main central banks and 
multilateral organisations.
A wide range of measures was 
quickly taken to shore up the 
financial system,…
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LINES OF ACTION IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESCUE PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM
BOX 3.1
Numerous initiatives designed to provide support to financial institu-
tions in difficulties were instigated throughout 2008 and early 2009. 
These rescue plans were implemented fundamentally at a national 
level, although with a certain degree of international coordination, and 
grew in number as the financial crisis worsened. To date, the au-
thorities’ response has prevented a collapse of the financial system, 
although the situation is still far from normal. Moreover, the global 
nature of the crisis, the urgency in the rescue of some systemic insti-
tutions, the scale of the losses seen and the uncertainty surrounding 
the final extent of these losses have resulted in some improvisation 
and emulation in the different countries’ responses. This box offers a 
brief summary of the key financial rescue initiatives launched interna-
tionally, focusing particularly on the United States and the United 
Kingdom, classifying these initiatives and endeavouring to explain the 
reasons behind them at each different stage1.
Up to September 2008, the authorities had responded to financial 
institutions in difficulties on an ad hoc basis, providing support to 
those that were considered systemic2 and intervening in the others3. 
However, as the year progressed, the number of institutions in diffi-
culties increased, as did the size of the losses receiving public sector 
backing. This trend heightened sharply in the wake of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September, following the breakdown of ne-
gotiations to find a private-sector solution for the investment bank. 
This bankruptcy raised global instability levels significantly, revealing 
the complexity and interconnectedness of the international financial 
system.
From then on, the authorities’ rescue plans began to target the entire 
financial system, which was facing a serious risk of collapse, rather 
than specific financial institutions. The type of measures adopted 
gradually changed, as the crisis heightened and amplified and as cri-
sis management became more and more difficult. On 3 October the 
US Congress approved the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
originally designed to alleviate institutions’ financing pressures and 
restore price formation mechanisms for illiquid assets, via Treasury 
purchases of troubled assets. However, these measures proved dif-
ficult to implement in the short term, and this, together with the 
heightening of the crisis and the emergence of other initiatives in 
other countries, meant that this strategy was abandoned before it 
was implemented.
In this setting, on 8 October a financial sector rescue plan was an-
nounced in the UK, aimed at helping credit institutions win depos-
its. The plan envisaged capital injections in the form of preference 
shares, subject to fulfilment of certain conditions, and State guar-
antees for bank debt. Soon several countries – including many in 
Europe – were introducing similar plans. Moreover, on 14 October, 
just 11 days after approval of the TARP, the US Treasury announced 
a change in this programme, to permit capital injections. It also 
established a programme to guarantee bank debt, backed by the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund. Although these measures proved effec-
tive in halting the rapid and serious deterioration of the financial 
situation, they failed to bring market operations back onto a normal 
footing and restore agents’ confidence, not only because of the 
new losses that began to emerge, linked to complex assets, but 
also because of the significant deterioration in activity as from the 
end of 2008. At the same time, signs of restrictions in credit avail-
able to the private sector began to appear, even though one of the 
objectives of the rescue plans was to preserve the availability of 
credit for households and firms, thus increasing the risk of a feed-
back loop between the deterioration of the financial and the eco-
nomic situation.
Thus, between the end of 2008 and early 2009, the financial rescue 
plans entered a new more ambitious phase, with higher volumes of 
funds committed and a broader scope. Several countries included a 
series of public sector initiatives, aimed at directly encouraging pri-
vate sector credit, and measures were approved to limit losses and 
to remove impaired assets from banks’ balance sheets, with a view 
to restoring confidence in these institutions. Nevertheless, these 
measures were not uniformly implemented. Thus, in the United King-
dom, an asset protection scheme was announced, establishing a 
system for distribution of portfolio losses between banks and the 
public sector. Meanwhile, in the United States, the new administra-
tion announced a new rescue plan, including, inter alia, the creation 
of several funds for the purchase of troubled assets, permitting their 
removal from banks’ balance sheets. These funds will be managed 
by the private sector but will be primarily funded by the public sector, 
which will also assume the bulk of the risks assumed by the funds. 
Initially, these funds will be able to purchase assets (loans and finan-
cial assets) worth up to $500 billion, extendable up to $1 trillion if and 
when necessary.
Recently, government influence on the decisions adopted by the in-
stitutions that have received a significant volume of funds has in-
creased, as the number of conditions included in these programmes 
has increased, without this implying any transfer of management to 
the public sector. In this respect, in some cases the authorities have 
replaced the preference shares they held in banks’ capital with ordi-
nary shares, granting them, in principle, enhanced voting rights in 
these institutions.
1. The box focuses exclusively on the financial rescue measures seen in the 
period, thus excluding, inter alia, the unconventional monetary policy measures 
implemented by some central banks. A summary of these initiatives may be 
found in the Banco de España’s Financial Stability Report of May 2009. 2. Up 
to mid-September, the public authorities backed rescue operations coordinat-
ed with the private sector in institutions such as Bear Stearns, Countrywide, 
Merrill Lynch and AIG; they also provided credit facilities and injected public 
capital into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 3. The takeovers of Northern Rock 
and IndyMac, in addition to interventions in some small banks, stand out.
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Although the financial system has by no means normalised, the relative market stability seen 
from mid-October to the time of this report going to press is, above all, a reflection of the wide 
range of extraordinary measures that prevented an even greater loss of confidence. Neverthe-
less, this extensive State support has not prevented the deterioration in the financial situation 
from passing through to the real economy: the markets have become dominated by the pros-
pect of recession and the scale and effective implementation of the financial policies an-
nounced is still shrouded in uncertainty. This explains the continued tensions on the money 
and credit markets, the lack of clear signs of recovery on the stock markets, the high volatility 
levels and the continuing deterioration of indicators in some emerging markets, all of which 
signify that the financial system is still in a very delicate position. However, as State support 
gradually restores confidence among investors and the financial institutions, the first signs of 
recovery should start to emerge.
The financial stress of mid-September marked the turning point between a gradual slow-
down, albeit intense in the more developed economies, and a severe and generalised slump 
in global activity. The global economy decelerated considerably in 2008, growing by 2 pp less 
than in 2007, although it still managed to record positive growth (3.2%). The negative quar-
terly growth rates seen in a rising number of developed economies over the year reflect the 
intensity of the adjustment; in fact, by year-end, many of these economies were in recession 
(see Chart 3.4). The emerging countries were, once again, the main growth drivers, posting 
growth of 6.1%, in comparison with 8.3% in 2007. China, in particular, with growth of 9%, 
contributed 1 pp to world growth, while the rest of emerging Asia contributed 0.6 pp and 
Latin America 0.4 pp. The industrialised economies, where the rate of growth was very low in 
2008 (0.9%, in comparison with 2.7% in 2007), contributed just 0.5 pp to global GDP growth. 
In the United States, growth fell from 2% in 2007 to 1.1% in 2008, due to the severe adjust-
ment in residential investment and private consumption. In the United Kingdom, the decline in 
investment, especially residential investment, was a key factor in the significant deceleration 
in activity (from 3% to 0.7%), while the generalised contraction in Japan, where the growth 
rate fell from 2.4% to –0.6%, was due to the structural fragility of the Japanese economy 
since the 1990s.
Activity gradually weakened in the industrialised economies in the first three quarters of 2008, 
bearing the brunt of the significant financial deterioration and its effect on the determinants of 
private sector demand. In particular, the deepening of the adjustment in the real estate sector 
in some countries fuelled the negative spiral between the decline in house prices, the deterio-
ration of the quality of collateral held by financial institutions, the tight credit supply and the 
economic slowdown, although the impact of the financial deterioration on the real economy 
also intensified in other areas. Effective credit conditions tightened, even though official interest 
rates remained relatively stable, and were even cut in the United States. Consumer confidence 
fell as the economic outlook deteriorated, unemployment rose and consumer wealth dimin-
ished, against a backdrop of high household indebtedness in many countries. Business con-
fidence also declined, as the demand and profit outlook deteriorated. All this weakened private 
sector demand in the industrialised economies (see Chart 3.4) and led to a gradual adjustment 
in activity. As a result, the year-on-year rate of growth went from 2.4% in 2007 Q4 to 0.6% in 
2008 Q3 and a number of countries went into recession.
By contrast, in the emerging economies the relative strength of domestic demand, together 
in some cases with high commodities prices, helped sustain the pace of activity. Neverthe-
less, there was some deceleration, as these economies were not completely immune to the 
fall in external demand or the decline in consumer purchasing power as a result of rising 
inflation.
… bringing temporary relief to 
the markets, but normalisation 
remains a distant prospect 
1.3 THE SHARP ADJUSTMENT IN 
THE WORLD ECONOMY
In 2008 the world economy 
grew by 3.2%, 2 pp less than in 
2007, fundamentally due to the 
contribution of the emerging 
markets
To September, activity in the 
industrialised countries 
gradually weakened, through 
various channels, while the 
emerging economies saw a 
moderate slowdown,…
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As from September, the situation of extreme financial instability saw household and business 
confidence collapse. This, together with even tighter credit conditions, the sharp decline in 
wealth due to the intense stock market correction and job destruction, led to a collapse in 
private sector demand and a generalised contraction in economic activity of an intensity and 
scale unprecedented in recent decades. Against this backdrop, the main industrialised econo-
mies moved further into recession, recording year-on-year growth rates verging on –1.7% at 
end-2008. The crisis quickly spread to the emerging economies, as a result of the collapse in 
global demand, which contributed to a notable decrease in international trade flows, and the 
significant decline in capital flows, in light of the heightened financial stress, all of which added 
to the sharp drop in commodities prices first seen in the summer, with most impact on the 
economies that were in most need of external financing and most dependent on external de-
mand. Thus, in 2008 Q4, global GDP contracted by 1.5% in comparison with the previous 
quarter and only a few countries – including China – managed to continue to post positive 
growth rates in the period. On the data available as at the date of this report going to press, 
global GDP growth is estimated to have contracted by a further 1.5% in quarter-on-quarter 
terms, also on a generalised basis, in 2009 Q1.
As indicated above, international trade was particularly dented by the slump in demand and 
the financial crisis (see Chart 3.4). The volume of trade fell dramatically between October and 
February: by some 15% in the developed economies and 19% in the emerging economies. 
This collapse in trade (see the analysis in Box 3.2), which has been much more intense than 
would normally be warranted by the decline in global activity, could have been fuelled, to a 
certain extent, by the scarcity and the rising cost of trade credit, especially in the emerging 
economies, caused by the funding difficulties on the wholesale markets. In 2008 as a whole, 
the volume of world trade decelerated to 3.3%, almost 4 pp less than in 2007; in February 
2009 it recorded a year-on-year contraction of 15%. Accordingly, world trade could well de-
cline in 2009, for the first time since 1982.
Inflation rates reflected the rise and subsequent fall in commodities prices and the deteriorat-
ing global demand conditions. In fact, the developments on the commodities markets largely 
mirrored the change in the demand outlook, although supply disruptions and the dollar ex-
change rate also played an important part. Prices continued to climb in 2008 H1, in light of 
persistently high demand prospects for the emerging economies and a number of factors 
conditioning supply. In particular, the price of Brent oil rose by 54%, in dollar terms, between 
January and June (in euro terms, by a slightly lower 44%) to over $145/barrel, an all-time high 
in both nominal and real terms. In the same period, metal prices rose by 19% and food prices 
by 34%. In July, however, commodities prices turned sharply downward, coinciding with a 
general deterioration in global growth expectations, which intensified when the financial crisis 
broke in September. Thus, despite successive production cuts, the price of oil fell by 66% in 
dollar terms, to around $50/barrel at end-April 2009. Dollar appreciation against the euro 
halted the drop in price in euro terms, which amounted to 58% in the same period. Prices of 
metal commodities also fell substantially (by 38% between July 2008 and April 2009, in dollar 
terms), as did food prices and prices of agricultural commodities, reflecting not only demand 
factors but also good harvests. Lastly, prices of precious metals, such as gold, rose as from 
September, in light of their role as a safe haven. In any case, since the start of 2009 Q2, the 
main commodities prices have picked up.
Against this backdrop, since early 2008 global inflation has fluctuated between record highs 
for the last decade, seen in the summer, and record lows since March 2004 (2.5%), seen in 
February 2009 (see Chart 3.4). In the first half of the year, inflationary pressures heightened 
considerably, as oil and food prices rose, although in the industrialised economies these pres-
… but from then on, activity 
contracted on a global scale
International trade was 
particularly affected by the fall-
off in demand and the credit 
freeze
Commodities prices reflected 
the decline in demand and the 
global growth outlook…
… and were largely behind the 
major fluctuations in inflation 
rates
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THE DECLINE IN TRADE AND THE TRADE FINANCE DROUGHT BOX 3.2
International trade has undergone a sharp correction since 2008 Q4: 
the volume of trade fell by some 6% in monthly terms in November 
and December 2008 and in January 2009 (see Chart 3.4). This de-
cline in trade, although generalised, has been most intense in Asia 
(see Panels 1 and 2), where it is comparable with the decline seen in 
the 1998 crisis. Accordingly, the volume of world trade growth in 
2008 was significantly lower than the average of the last 20 years 
(3.3% against 7%) and the main international organisations are fore-
casting a contraction of around 10% in 2009, which would be the first 
since 1982 and much more intense than the figure recorded in that 
year.
Much of the collapse in international trade is a direct result of the 
sharp decline in global economic activity as from 2008 Q4 (estimated 
at 5.9% in annualised quarterly terms). Nevertheless, although trade 
tends to be more volatile than activity, Panel 3 shows that the decline 
in the volume of trade in 2008 Q4 was significantly greater than that 
which was to be expected on the basis of the historical relationship 
between trade and global GDP growth. The high level of outsourcing 
and segmentation of production processes across countries, as a 
result of the integration of global production chains seen in recent 
decades, may explain why the decline in demand has had a greater 
impact on trade than in the past. Moreover, the fact that this decline 
in demand has been most severe in durable goods, especially auto-
mobiles, whose production chains tend to be more internationally 
fragmented, may also explain the extraordinary decline in trade in 
relation to activity. However, even bearing in mind these considera-
tions, this decline continues to seem disproportionate.
A further factor that may have contributed to the sharp contraction in 
trade flows in 2008 Q4 is the drought in trade finance stemming from 
the problems on the financial markets, which intensified thereafter. 
Trade finance, through direct or indirect finance, insurance or guaran-
tees, is behind 80% to 90% of the approximately $14 trillion worth of 
goods exported every year and is recognised as a fundamental factor 
in the growth of trade in recent decades, especially for the emerging 
countries which face more restrictions on financing. The most usual 
forms of trade finance are documentary credit (especially letters of 
credit), trade credit and, increasingly, syndicated loans (especially for 
commodities) and structured financing through securitisations (for-
faiting and forwarding). In addition to providing finance for import and 
export transactions, these products facilitate hedging of risks (com-
mercial, exchange rate or political-institutional risks) and supply of 
working capital.
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THE DECLINE IN TRADE AND THE TRADE FINANCE DROUGHT (cont´d)
Trade finance is primarily short term, it requires high collateral and 
extensive documentation and it is normally low risk. All these factors 
probably explain why this market weathered the financial turmoil of 
the closing months of 2007 and the first half of 2008 relatively well, 
despite warnings by the World Trade Organization during this period 
of rising costs and liquidity restrictions for some countries. Neverthe-
less, there is some evidence that the heightening of the financial crisis 
as from September 2008 has had a particularly harsh impact on this 
market, which continues to face serious difficulties. Since September 
it has become more difficult to obtain letters of credit, especially in 
Asia, and the few firms that have managed to do so have seen how 
these letters of credit have been rejected owing to mistrust of the is-
suing banks: Panel 4 depicts the sharp decline since October in let-
ters of credit issued in Taiwan (for imports and exports) and Korea 
(exports only) and in documentary credit issued in Spain. Lastly, it 
seems likely that unintermediated finance (direct credit between firms) 
will also have been severely hit, judging by recent trade credit pat-
terns in most countries. 
Although this fragmented evidence points to a decline in trade fi-
nance as from 2008 Q4, it does not indicate how much is due to a 
decline in supply and how much to a decline in demand. Recent 
surveys conducted among the main finance providers in the banking 
sector1 point to restrictions in the supply of trade finance. These re-
strictions would appear to be most severe in the emerging econo-
mies (especially in Asia, which would be consistent with the sharp 
contraction seen in trade flows in this region in comparison with oth-
ers), and as yet non-existent in the developing countries. The surveys 
also reflect the notable rise in the cost of trade finance, from an aver-
age of 10 to 20 bp over LIBOR to 250 to 300 bp. Moreover, the 
banks surveyed expect these costs to continue to climb throughout 
2009.
Trade finance is in short supply for the same reasons as other types 
of credit, but its very nature may hinder its recovery. First because, as 
they have deleveraged, credit suppliers have tended to withdraw 
funds from these markets, which involve mostly short-term credit, 
having committed these funds to other more long-term credit seg-
ments. Second, because the trade finance sector is highly concen-
trated and many players are among those most affected by the finan-
cial crisis, meaning that they have withdrawn from this market seg-
ment or have disappeared altogether. And third, because the financial 
sector support plans launched have focused on keeping domestic 
credit flowing, to the relative detriment of trade credit.
All in all, although to date there is no clear evidence of the extent of 
the contribution of the trade finance drought to the decline in interna-
tional trade, if it fails to recover it could hamper global economic re-
covery in the short and long term. In the short term, restrictions on 
the supply of trade finance could hinder a return to normal for global 
production chains and trade flows. The first stage of many of these 
production processes is in Asia, where the shortage of trade finance 
appears to have been most acute. In the medium term, if the restric-
tions continue, international production chains may tend to relocate 
to their home territories, or to countries which, although not the most 
efficient in production terms, offer a competitive edge in terms of ac-
cess to finance. This would signify a considerable efficiency loss in 
the utilisation of global resources and a step backward in globalisa-
tion. The recent G20 agreement to earmark $250 billion to reactivate 
trade finance is an acknowledgement of the importance of these con-
siderations for recovery from the crisis (see Box 3.3).
BOX 3.2
1. The first survey was conducted jointly by the International Monetary Fund 
and the Bankers Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT). The subsequent 
survey carried out by the International Chamber of Commerce reinforces the 
idea that there are supply-side problems in trade finance.
sures were barely passed through to core inflation. In July, the global inflation rate stood at 
6.1% year-on-year, 1.4 pp more than at the start of the year. In the emerging economies, in-
flationary pressures were even higher (the year-on-year rate stood at 8.3% in July), due to the 
greater weight of prices in the consumption basket, the higher relative contribution of com-
modities to products’ final prices and, in some countries, domestic demand pressures, and 
these were passed through in part to core inflation, prompting monetary policy tightening, in 
contrast to the situation in most of the developed countries.
In the second half of the year, as commodities prices corrected and demand collapsed, infla-
tion fell rapidly to very low rates, undershooting monetary policy targets in some of the devel-
oped economies. At the end of 2008, average global inflation stood at 3.1%, substantially 
below the figure one year earlier and close to zero in the United States and in Japan. Inflation 
rates have remained very low in the opening months of 2009, helped by the favourable base 
effect stemming from the increases seen in commodities prices in early 2008, and have turned 
negative in some developed countries. Nevertheless, in the main industrialised economies, 
long-term inflation expectations remained well-anchored throughout the year.
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Global imbalances, measured in terms of external balances, remain significant, but there were 
some signs of a correction as from the second half of 2008. The global current account sur-
plus amounted to $1.3 trillion in 2008, unchanged at 2.1% of world GDP (see Chart 3.5). In the 
second half of the year, weakening domestic demand in the United States and the lower en-
ergy bill prompted a decline in the US trade and current account deficits, while the decelera-
tion in world trade and falling commodities prices reduced surpluses in some regions (Latin 
America, emerging Asia – excluding China – and the oil exporting countries). The most striking 
exception is China, whose current account surplus continued to grow, albeit at a lower rate 
than in previous years.
Thus, the correction in real effective exchange rates between January 2008 and March 2009 
was not, in many cases, consistent with the correction in global imbalances (see Chart 3.3). 
Albeit with significant fluctuations in the period considered, the US dollar appreciated, while 
Global imbalances lessened 
slightly in the second half of 
2008 and accumulation of 
external assets by the emerging 
economies slowed
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the emerging market currencies generally depreciated, with the exception of the Chinese ren-
minbi. The intense process of accumulation of reserves and assets in sovereign wealth funds 
by some of the emerging economies concluded in 2008, as oil prices fell sharply in the second 
half of the year and some countries delved into their international reserves to maintain ex-
change rates or limit exchange rate volatility in Q4.
The economic policy response has grown in size, strength and geographical scope, with a 
qualitative and quantitative leap as from September 2008. Initially, following the onset of the 
financial turmoil in 2007, the authorities in the developed economies responded by supplying 
liquidity to banks, to alleviate the shortage in the interbank markets, cutting interest rates in 
some cases and sporadically bailing out financial institutions. However, as from 2008 Q4, the 
economic policy response stepped up a gear, as a wide range of complementary and inter-
connected financial, monetary and fiscal measures were introduced in many more countries, 
aimed at stabilising the financial markets and halting the collapse in aggregate demand, to 
restore private agents’ confidence and sever the interplay between the problems facing the 
financial sector and the real economy.
As regards monetary policy, official interest rates were conditioned by price developments 
throughout 2008. During the first half of the year, the generalised rise in inflation posed difficul-
ties for most monetary authorities in the developed economies, which were facing growing 
inflationary pressures on the one hand and the risk of economic slowdown and financial insta-
bility on the other. The initial response varied from country to country. The United States cut its 
official interest rates quickly and substantially as from the end of 2007, with a brief pause in 
mid-2008, against a backdrop of severe financial market instability. By contrast, official interest 
rate moves were less intense in other industrialised economies, and some countries even 
raised rates. In the emerging economies in general the monetary policy stance tightened.
The rapid decline in commodities prices as from July, and the heightening of the financial crisis 
in September, altered the scenario facing the monetary authorities dramatically, as the risks to 
financial stability loomed larger, amidst clear signs of economic slowdown and even recession. 
This prompted substantial interest rate cuts, including an unprecedented coordinated 50 bp 
rate cut by the main central banks – with the exception of the Bank of Japan – in October 2008 
(see Chart 3.6). Most of the emerging economies also cut their official interest rates, although 
this monetary easing came in differing degrees of pace and intensity and was, in some cases, 
initially limited by the risks of exacerbating exchange rate depreciation and encouraging capital 
outflows. However, the rate cuts had only a limited impact on financing conditions: the gener-
alised decline in inflation offset the impact on real interest rates, which nonetheless remained 
substantially below the levels seen before the start of the financial turmoil in 2007; and the 
pass-through of these lower rates ran counter to the tight credit conditions that continued to 
be applied to firms and households.
These dramatic rate cuts brought official interest rates very close to zero in most industrialised 
economies, meaning that the monetary authorities were obliged to use other less conven-
tional measures to ensure that monetary easing passed through to agents’ effective credit 
conditions. Thus, in addition to continuing to provide almost unlimited liquidity to financial in-
stitutions, the main non-euro area central banks began to intervene directly to support the 
credit markets, purchasing private assets and granting credit and guarantees to intermediaries 
in certain markets. They also began to purchase government bonds, aiming to drive down 
long rates. As a result, the central banks’ balance sheets, which were stable in terms of size 
up to September, even though their asset composition may have changed, expanded signifi-
cantly (see Chart 3.6). In the United States, other measures directly associated with support 
1.4 THE ECONOMIC POLICY 
RESPONSE
The economic policy response 
has grown in scope and 
strength as the economic 
situation has deteriorated
Official interest rates were 
conditioned by inflation 
developments
The sharp decline in inflation 
brought rates close to zero in 
most industrialised economies, 
giving rise to the use of 
unconventional instruments and 
increasing the size of central 
banks’ balance sheets
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for certain financial institutions also added to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Accord-
ingly, by early 2009, the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England had 
more than doubled since September, and although in recent months they have declined slight-
ly, the measures approved in March could double them once again. This package of measures 
underlines the key role that the central banks are playing in support of the financial sector and 
the erosion of the dividing lines between monetary and financial policy. Thanks to the direct 
support received by certain credit market segments, yield spreads have corrected somewhat 
from the levels seen at the beginning of 2008 Q4.
The financial sector support measures first introduced when the financial turmoil erupted in 
mid-2007 continued through the first half of 2008. The central banks continued to inject liquid-
ity into the system, against a backdrop of considerable mistrust between financial institutions, 
to alleviate the credit freeze, while a number of firms facing particular difficulties were bailed 
The financial sector support 
measures are wide-ranging and 
include guarantees, capital 
injections and asset purchases 
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out, either by State intervention (Northern Rock in the United Kingdom) or by State support for 
private-sector transactions (Bear Stearns and Countrywide in the United States).
Once the financial crisis broke in September, the authorities’ response became more em-
phatic, more generalised and more coordinated, encompassing a wide range of measures, 
including extended State guarantees for bank deposits, injections of public capital and pur-
chase or guarantee of assets, it being assumed, in the last two cases, that the public sector 
would bear the bulk of any losses (see Box 3.1). Moreover, considering how difficult it was, in 
these circumstances, for the financial sector to play its role of financial intermediary satisfacto-
rily, the authorities also took direct measures to stimulate credit in certain strategic sectors, 
such as the automobile industry and SMEs. Two aspects of the economic policy response are 
particularly noteworthy: the huge volume of funds involved in the financial support plans; and 
the appearance of certain mechanisms coordinating the national authorities’ response, in light 
of the global nature of the problems faced. In this respect, the emergence of the G20 as a 
crisis-response discussion and coordination forum, not only at a financial level but also in 
terms of economic policy in general (see Box 3.3), should be highlighted.
With the notable exception of the United States, until 2008 Q4 no country had introduced 
discretionary fiscal stimulus measures in response to the worsening economic and financial 
situation. However, as a result of the economic slowdown (with the consequent activation of 
the automatic stabilisers) and the difficulties facing the financial sector, together with the real 
estate sector adjustments seen in some countries (reducing tax revenue, as real and financial 
asset values diminished), fiscal positions gradually deteriorated from the start of the year in 
most of the developed economies. Once the crisis broke in September, fiscal expansion be-
came one of the most potentially effective economic policy instruments to stimulate activity 
and staunch private agents’ loss of confidence, considering, in addition, the scant or non-
existent upward pressure that fiscal expansion would exert on interest rates in the short term in 
the present circumstances. Accordingly, fiscal stimulus plans, of very different sizes, were in-
troduced in numerous countries in the last quarter of 2008 and in early 2009. The overall fiscal 
stimulus in the developed economies is estimated at around 0.6% of their GDP in 2008, rising 
to 1.5% in 2009 and to 1.7% in 2010 (see Chart 3.1), with the United States playing a leading 
role.
In some emerging economies, rising commodities prices and their social impact inspired con-
sumer support measures which had an adverse effect on fiscal balances in the first half of the 
year. The decline in commodities prices as from the summer halted revenue growth for com-
modities exporters. Although the fiscal impulse was introduced later than in the industrialised 
economies, it is expected to be more intense in the emerging economies in 2009, and similar 
in 2010, with China, Russia and Saudi Arabia leading the way. Specifically for the G20 member 
countries, the fiscal impulse should amount to 0.4% of their GDP in 2008, 2.3% in 2009 and 
1.6% in 2010. The initial caution may have been due, in part, to possible difficulties funding 
these fiscal plans, in light of the abrupt decline in external financial flows.
Fiscal plans have leant heavily on public spending measures, especially infrastructure. On the 
revenue side, tax cuts have targeted personal and, to a lesser extent, corporate income tax, 
while indirect tax cuts have been only symbolic. This bias towards public spending measures 
is due to the private sector’s lower marginal propensity to consume and invest, against a 
backdrop of economic and financial fragility and an adverse economic outlook, thus making 
tax cuts, in general, less effective. Nevertheless, delays in implementing spending plans, at a 
time when urgent demand momentum is needed, may limit their effectiveness in the short 
term.
Fiscal policy has generally been 
the last tool to be used, and to 
a different extent from country 
to country
In the emerging economies the 
fiscal impulse has also been 
considerable, although it was 
introduced rather more 
belatedly
The fiscal impulse has leant 
heavily on public spending 
measures, especially 
infrastructure
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THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
BOX 3.3
The international crisis is having a profound impact on the global eco-
nomic and financial system, giving rise to a review of the three key 
pillars of the international financial architecture: the coordination of 
economic policy decisions, granting the G20 a key role; the suprana-
tional aspects of the financial regulatory and supervisory framework; 
and the international financial institutions. This box analyses the main 
elements of this review and the role played by Spain in this process.
One initial element of the reform process is the key role assumed by 
the G20. The global nature of the crisis and the extent to and speed 
at which it has spread across national boundaries have revealed the 
limitations of the G7 as a decision-making forum and the need for 
greater international concertation, to include not only the developed 
economies, but also the emerging countries, in decision making. The 
G20’s new leading role became evident at the first summit of Heads 
of State and Government of the G20 countries held on 15 November 
2008, and was reaffirmed at the second summit, held on 2 April 
2009, both preceded by meetings between ministers and central 
bank governors. These sessions directly approached the subject of 
coordination of macroeconomic and financial policies, designed to 
facilitate recovery from the crisis, with special emphasis on establish-
ing a coordinated fiscal effort and financial sector support plans, to 
bring the market situation back to normal and restore credit flows.
The guidelines for reforms in financial regulation and the international 
financial system were also set at these summits and meetings. In this 
respect, detailed work programmes were established and four work-
ing groups were created within the G20, on regulation, international 
cooperation and integrity in financial markets, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and development banks. Each working group has 
been co-chaired by two officials, one from an emerging market and 
one from a developed economy, and has involved international finan-
cial institutions in their work. Each group has progressed in the de-
sign of reforms and responses to the global crisis and has taken the 
technical discussions directly to the G20, parallel to the executive 
bodies of the international financial institutions.
Spain is not a G20 member but it was invited to take part in the sum-
mits of Heads of State and Government, in recognition of its eco-
nomic weight and financial system, which place it among the world’s 
ten leading economies. In addition to participating in the summits, 
Spain has made a notable contribution in various European and inter-
national fora, working to achieve convergence on common positions 
for the reform process. In this respect, in addition to taking part in the 
European Council sessions and ECOFIN meetings, Spain also played 
an important role in the meeting of European leaders held in Berlin on 
22 February and in the meeting of Ibero-American ministers held in 
Oporto on 2 March, and, on a more technical level, in the work con-
ducted from the chairs of the ECB’s International Relations Commit-
tee and the Economic and Financial Committee’s Working Group on 
Procyclicality.
As regards the changes in the financial regulatory and supervisory 
framework, it is commonly agreed that they should envisage the 
higher degree of interconnectedness between the different national 
economic and financial systems. The G20 is promoting multiple re-
forms in this field, to meet this aim and to strengthen international 
coordination. In general, the challenge these reforms face is to strike 
a correct balance between preventing excessive regulation, a diffi-
culty parallel to determining the limits of the fiscal impulse or of public 
sector intervention in the financial system, and securing effective im-
plementation of the measures proposed, which requires a high de-
gree of international coordination to standardise guidelines and basic 
rules and ensure monitoring and control of the measures adopted.
   
In this respect, the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to 
succeed the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is one pillar of the reform. 
The FSB was founded with expanded membership to include the 
G20 countries that were not FSF members1, Spain and the European 
Commission. It is the reference forum in international financial regula-
tion, to the extent that it has been described by some authoritative 
voices as the fourth institution of the international financial system, 
together with those established at Bretton Woods (the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO). The FSB aligns the reality of a global and highly 
interconnected financial system with a more coordinated and inclu-
sive regulatory framework, updating obsolete structures that excluded 
the emerging economies. Once again, Spain’s membership of the FSB 
is the recognition of its weight in the international financial system. 
The areas of review of financial regulation and supervision include: (i) 
enhancing market transparency and extending the scope of the regu-
latory and supervisory framework to all institutions and markets that 
are relevant for the stability of the financial system (understood in a 
wide sense, this includes the various initiatives to strengthen or include 
in the regulatory framework tax havens, credit rating agencies and 
hedge funds, or the need for transparency in exposure to off-balance-
sheet products); (ii) reducing the procyclicality of the financial system 
and solvency standards, to ensure that capital requirements and ac-
counting standards help safeguard the solvency of the financial system 
instead of amplifying the effects of crises (in this area, with special pri-
ority given to the dynamic provisioning system of the Banco de Es-
paña); (iii) introducing a macro-prudential approach in supervision, to 
ensure that an institution’s potential systemic risk is taken into account 
in addition to its accounting and financial position; (iv) strengthening 
international coordination of supervision and surveillance of the finan-
cial system, including the introduction of colleges of supervisors for 
transnational banking groups and creation, jointly by the IMF and the 
FSB, of an early warning system for financial risks; and (v) adopting 
principles for executive remuneration schemes in financial institutions, 
to bring them more in line with the time horizon of the risks assumed.
Regarding reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs), the 
G20 has promoted a significant increase of up to $1.1 trillion in their 
funds: an additional $500 billion for the IMF, as described in detail 
below, as well as a $250 billion SDR allocation by this institution; an 
extra $100 billion in development bank loans; and $250 billion to bol-
ster international trade finance. It has also promoted a policy over-
1. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
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BOX 3.3
haul, to enable the IFIs to face up to the new challenges posed by the 
crisis with more guarantees. The rapid response from the IFIs reflects 
the recognition of the need for a multilateral approach to what is a 
global crisis and the need to provide financial support to the emerg-
ing and developing economies, which are bearing the brunt of a crisis 
that originated in the developed world. In this respect, the proposals 
to adapt governance of the IFIs to better reflect the economic weight 
of the different countries and raise the weight of the emerging and 
developing economies (changing representational criteria determined 
by past inertia), represent another common element of reform.
In connection with the IMF, three key reforms stand out: increased 
funding, review of lending policies and enhanced surveillance.
The international community has resolved to triple the resources for 
IMF loans, granting $250 billion immediately (via bilateral contribu-
tions) and up to a further $250 billion in the short term via extension 
of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). Moreover, the option re-
mains for the IMF to assume debt on the open market. As regards the 
bilateral contributions, Japan took the first step, contributing $100 
billion in February 2009; it was followed by the European Union, after 
approval by the European Council on 19 and 20 March of voluntary 
contributions by the Member States totalling €75 billion (the Spanish 
contribution is estimated at €4.1 billion).
As regards lending policies, the IMF, adapting its lending framework, 
is widening access limits and reviewing the conditionality of its pro-
grammes, strengthening the principle of ownership and reducing the 
number of performance criteria, focusing on those that are critical for 
crisis resolution. The IMF has also approved a new lending facility, the 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL), with preventive nature, which enables rapid 
access to a large volume of funds, with ex-ante conditionality, grant-
ing countries access to IMF funds in accordance with pre-set qualifi-
cation criteria, based on the implementation of sound economic 
policies and the existence of solid fundamentals.
Lastly, on surveillance, the IMF has progressed in including financial 
supervision in countries’ Article IV, in fomenting analysis of the links 
between the real economy and the financial sector and in early detec-
tion of risks, through activation of a new early warning system in co-
ordination with the FSB. It is also considering making the Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) more regular, undertaking to 
conduct them at least in all the G20 countries, and using them for 
peer reviews within the FSB.
This fiscal activism and the economic slowdown have pared down present and future fiscal 
balances. Moreover, the financial support plans, and even some aspects of the unconven-
tional monetary policy measures, also entail a high level of commitment of public funds, 
amounting to more than 50% of GDP in the industrialised economies (see Chart 3.6). Although 
only some of these funds will require disbursement at the time of use (9% of GDP in this group 
of countries), and much of the total invested is expected to be recovered, these measures may 
raise the public debt/GDP ratio by more than 20 pp in 2010. They could also result in substan-
tial losses, due to guarantees or purchases of assets whose value at maturity is far from cer-
tain.
In any case, these wide-ranging economic policy measures, which brought the global financial 
system back from the brink of collapse at the end of 2008, are still a long way from achieving 
their aim to stabilise the situation on the financial markets, restore agents’ confidence and 
improve the global economic outlook.
Throughout 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, growth forecasts for 2009 for the developed and the 
emerging economies were revised down dramatically (see Chart 3.7). This reflects the intense 
adjustment in activity seen in 2008 Q4, which has had a significant impact on average growth 
in 2009, and the weak economic situation at the start of the year, as a result of the continued 
adverse interplay between the deterioration of the financial sector and the real economy. Thus, 
according to the leading international organisations’ growth forecasts, world GDP will shrink 
by some 1.3% in 2009, the largest decline, at least, since the Second World War. This contrac-
tion is expected to be most profound in the developed economies, where it is estimated that 
GDP will fall by more than 3.5%, to be only partially offset by some of the emerging Asian 
economies (especially China and India), which should continue to post positive growth rates, 
The automatic stabilisers and 
the fiscal stimulus and financial 
bail-out plans have led to a 
significant and generalised 
deterioration of public finances 
Despite the efforts made, a 
return to normal is still a long 
way off
2 Outlook and risk 
factors
The outlook for 2009 points to 
a sharp decline in activity in the 
developed economies and to 
an abrupt slowdown in the 
emerging economies, followed 
by a very gradual recovery 
towards the end of the year...
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albeit well short of those seen in 2008. The developed economies should start to see a timid 
recovery in activity by the end of 2009 or early 2010, recording positive quarter-on-quarter 
growth rates marking the start of a gradual recovery from the crisis. Nevertheless, these fore-
casts are shrouded in uncertainty and many risks remain.
This outlook points to a gradual recovery in business and household confidence in financial 
institutions and to a severing of the interplay between the deterioration of the financial sector 
and the real economy. For this to happen, two conditions would seem necessary. First, that as 
a result of the financial sector support measures, progress is made in the reshaping, resizing 
and restructuring of financial institutions, and market stability enhanced. A sustainable recov-
ery is most unlikely if no decisive steps are taken to reorganise the financial system on a solid 
base. Moreover, to trigger a recovery in activity, credit conditions will have to gradually improve 
and real estate market adjustment processes will have to be completed (in the United States, 
the real estate market adjustment was at the source of the deterioration of the bank balance 
sheets which began now more than three years ago). The second condition is that the eco-
nomic stimulus measures taken be effective in sustaining demand and activity.
In any case, given the harm inflicted on the economy and the financial system, the recovery in 
growth is likely to be a very gradual process. This is generally the case when recessions are ac-
companied by a financial crisis, exacerbated, in this case, by the virtually global scale of the 
downturn. Moreover, the adverse effect of the crisis on growth potential worldwide is likely to be 
felt for a considerable time, not only because credit conditions will foreseeably be tighter than in 
the past, but also because of the possible decline in production capacity and productivity, as a 
result of the prolonged decline in investment and the long-term unemployment situation.
In short, the main risks to economic recovery in the developed countries in the short term are, 
first, that the above-mentioned negative spiral between the financial system, the real estate 
sector and the real economy becomes more acute again; and second, that the effectiveness 
of the support measures is impaired, due to adverse collateral effects on effective financing 
costs or market mechanisms, or if their impact on confidence ultimately disappears as they 
absorb more and more public funds.
… as the financial markets 
stabilise and private sector 
demand recovers
If the negative spiral between 
the financial sector and the real 
economy were to intensify, or 
the policy response were to 
prove less effective than 
expected, the outlook for 
recovery would be jeopardised
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In the case of the emerging economies, there is a risk of a higher-than-expected decline in 
capital inflows, due to higher public sector borrowing in the industrialised countries (as a 
result of the bail-out plans and fiscal impulse measures), along with the generalised delev-
eraging process and the increase in home bias among investors. This risk is especially high 
in the economies that are most reliant on external financing, which have high external defi-
cits and whose financial or corporate sectors have high borrowing requirements, as it 
would exacerbate the effects of the adjustment already under way in many of these coun-
tries.
More globally, the main risk is that the economic and financial adjustment, and in particular the 
measures taken from the different national perspectives, result in greater segmentation of the 
product and financial markets, marking a step backward in the process of economic and fi-
nancial globalisation seen in recent decades. In this respect, it is important to reaffirm and put 
into practice the commitments assumed at the G20 summit meetings, to adopt a concerted 
approach to the crisis and to recovery from the crisis and to continue along the free trade road 
under the Doha round (see Box 3.3).
Global capital flows pose a further risk, since although global imbalances are diminishing, 
many countries still need to borrow extensively, and they may find it difficult to meet these 
needs against a backdrop of higher volatility on the financial markets and tighter credit 
conditions than in the past. This could affect not only the emerging economies but also the 
United States, where borrowing requirements are high, investors have suffered very sub-
stantial capital losses and the net international investment position has deteriorated sig-
nificantly.
Lastly, as commodities prices and capacity utilisation decline, there is a possibility that some 
industrialised economies may post negative inflation rates in 2009. Nevertheless, this would 
not imply deflation, even if economic activity were to continue to contract for some time, pro-
vided that it was temporary and that medium- and long-term inflation expectations remained 
anchored around central bank targets, as has been the case up to the date of this report going 
to press.
The scale of the economic and financial policies adopted may have undesirable consequences 
when the world economy recovers from the crisis. Accordingly, the implementation and sub-
sequent withdrawal of the significant monetary impulse, which has helped limit the recession 
and sustain the financial markets, must be carefully calibrated, to prevent the risk of it being 
passed through to future inflation rates, undermining the anti-inflationary credibility of the cen-
tral banks, or to real and financial asset prices, sowing the seeds for a new cycle of future fi-
nancial excesses.
In addition, the substantial rise in public sector borrowing underlines the need to make 
fiscal discipline a priority in the medium term. In the short term, the fact that govern-
ment bonds act as a safe haven in times of high uncertainty, the decline in wealth and 
the increase in the propensity to save in the private sector have meant that the growing 
fiscal imbalances are being funded at relatively low cost. But the huge increase in pub-
lic debt depicted in Chart 3.6 generates concern as regards its sustainability, espe-
cially in economies with high debt ratios and whose public finances are under pressure 
due to population ageing. As the financial situation returns to normal, the increase in 
debt will eventually drive up long rates, thus adding to the pressure on the debt posi-
tion.
In the case of the emerging 
economies, the recovery will 
hinge on a return to normal 
access to external financing
More protectionism and fewer 
capital inflows are additional 
risk factors
But there is no imminent risk of 
deflation
The policies implemented to 
combat the crisis could have 
adverse effects in the medium 
term, if the monetary impulse is 
not withdrawn in time…
… or if public sector 
indebtedness proves 
unsustainable in the medium 
term
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Growing State involvement, largely driven by the circumstances, in economic activity and in 
the financial sector also entails risks. In the medium term, State involvement beyond its tradi-
tional role could lead to efficiency losses in the allocation of resources. Moreover, public sup-
port for sectors in crisis may delay or even prevent necessary restructuring and resizing. Ac-
cordingly, when it comes to withdrawing public support, the economic policy response must 
be equally rapid, timely and decisive. Clearly the scale of the monetary stimulus measures will 
hinder their withdrawal, as will the difficulty in establishing precisely the right time for this with-
drawal, in a situation in which potential growth rates may have declined, making it more diffi-
cult to assess the cyclical position, and in which the policy transmission mechanisms have 
changed significantly. The withdrawal may also be hindered by considerations unrelated to the 
economy, which means that it is important to design an exit strategy well in advance. In any 
case, the withdrawal of the current stimulus measures cannot signify a return to the situation 
prior to the crisis, as one of the essential lessons to be learnt from this crisis is that there must 
be much closer monitoring of financial imbalances – both national and global – and that the 
perimeter and scope of financial regulation and supervision must be extended and en-
hanced.
The US economy has deteriorated significantly since the end of 2007 (according to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, it officially went into recession in December that 
year), despite recording positive quarter-on-quarter growth rates in 2008 Q1 (see Chart 3.8). 
Growth in 2008 overall amounted to 1.1% (the lowest annual rate of growth since 2001), 
down from 2% in 2007. The real estate sector adjustment, which has proved deeper 
and longer-lasting than was first expected, heightened the adverse interplay between 
house prices, financial asset quality and economic activity. In addition, consumer con-
fidence and, consequently, private consumption have deteriorated in the face of declin-
ing consumer wealth and the weakening labour market (a net total of three million jobs 
were destroyed in 2008, half of these in Q4 alone, followed by two million more in 2009 
Q1).
Growing State involvement in 
the functioning of some sectors 
may affect efficiency in the 
allocation of resources; this 
support should be withdrawn 
as and when circumstances 
permit
3 The main industrialised 
countries
3.1 UNITED STATES
The US economy went into 
recession as a result of the 
profound adjustment in both 
the financial sector and the real 
economy
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The signs of weakness became increasingly evident in 2008 H1, although the impact of 
the first fiscal stimulus plan – launched in February – and external demand support helped 
foster seemingly robust growth in this period. In 2008 Q3, however, GDP declined in 
quarter-on-quarter terms, before contracting sharply in 2008 Q4 (–6.3% in annualised 
terms) and in 2009 Q1 (–6.1% in annualised terms, on the preliminary estimate), as the 
deterioration of both the real economy and the financial sector heightened. While resi-
dential investment contracted throughout the year, consumption and non-residential in-
vestment weakened in 2008 H1, before collapsing in 2008 H2. External demand offset 
the fall in domestic demand up to the third quarter, but was subsequently dragged down 
by the sharp slump in international trade. As a result, the trade deficit narrowed to 4.8% 
of GDP in 2008 and the current account deficit closed the year at 4.7%, 0.6 pp less than 
in 2007.
Consumer prices rose by 3.8% in 2008 overall, in comparison with 2.9% in 2007, but the 
breakdown for the year reflects two very distinct halves. Thus, inflation rose gradually up to 
July, to peak at 5.6%, driven by energy and food prices, before declining sharply thereafter, as 
commodities prices collapsed, to negatives rates in March 2009. Core inflation remained rela-
tively stable in 2008, at 2%-2.5% year-on-year, although it declined slightly at the beginning of 
2009.
The economic policy measures adopted to halt the serious deterioration of the financial sys-
tem and of economic activity were increasingly determined and decisive and were closely 
coordinated between the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury, especially following the events 
of September. The Federal Reserve gradually eased its monetary policy stance, cutting the 
target federal funds rate from 4.25% at the beginning of the year to 2% in April, when it paused 
in light of the inflationary pressures. It then made further rate cuts in response to the severe 
financial crisis, down to a target range of 0%-0.25% in December 2008. Moreover, throughout 
the year the Federal Reserve gradually extended its liquidity-providing measures to a growing 
number of financial institutions. As from September, it began to use the asset side of its bal-
ance sheet to keep credit flowing in the economy and to keep the financial markets, including 
the money, commercial paper and mortgage securitisation markets, functioning. And in March 
2009, in line with the new monetary policy approach, it began to purchase Treasury bonds to 
help reduce long-term borrowing costs.
The Treasury responded decisively to the deteriorating situation in the financial system. At 
the beginning of September, it took control of the government-sponsored enterprises Fred-
die Mac and Fannie Mae, recapitalising them. And then in October, faced with the risk of fi-
nancial system collapse, it secured approval for the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Pro-
gram (TARP), originally designed to purchase toxic assets but whose funds were 
subsequently earmarked for recapitalisation and bail-out of financial institutions. This was 
followed, in 2009, by an integral plan to guarantee assets, recapitalise institutions and re-
structure banks’ balance sheets, via a public-private initiative for purchase of problem loans 
and assets (see Box 3.1). State support targeted not only the financial sector, but also other 
economic sectors, fundamentally automobile manufacturing. Initiatives were also taken to 
facilitate the renegotiation of doubtful and impaired mortgage loans and the supply of mort-
gage credit. Lastly, in early 2009, a $787 billion fiscal stimulus package was approved (rep-
resenting 5.5% of GDP, of which 1.3% will be disbursed in 2009). As a result of the measures 
taken and of the deterioration in economic activity, the fiscal position worsened significantly 
in 2008: the budget deficit reached 6.1% of GDP in the year, against 2.9% in 2007, and 
gross public sector debt amounted to 70.5% of GDP, an increase of 7.4 pp on the previous 
year.
Inflation decelerated 
considerably in the second half 
of the year, posting negative 
rates by March 2009
The economic policy measures 
adopted to halt the serious 
deterioration of the financial 
system and of economic activity 
were increasingly determined 
and decisive
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The economic outlook for 2009 has worsened significantly due to the severe deterioration of 
the real economy, presaging not only a profound contraction but also a slow recovery that is 
not expected to start until H2. As at the date of this report going to press, the main interna-
tional organisations expect GDP to shrink by more than 2.5% in 2009. A return to growth 
would need to be preceded by stabilisation of the real estate market and by a partial recovery 
in the functioning of the financial markets, although there is uncertainty regarding the effective-
ness of the policies implemented. The risks remain on the downside, given the possibility of 
further difficulties in the financial system, or of a deeper adjustment in the residential sector or 
the labour market.
The UK economy decelerated considerably in 2008, growing at a rate of 0.7%, in comparison 
with 3% a year earlier. Following low growth in Q1, activity contracted sharply as from Q2 (see 
Chart 3.9), to fall by 6.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms in Q4 and, on the preliminary 
estimate, by 7.4% in annualised terms in 2009 Q1. There was a sharp deceleration in domes-
tic demand, with a notable decline in gross capital formation and inventories. Private con-
sumption was also weak, against a backdrop of credit market restrictions and falling property 
and financial asset prices. The intensity of the financial crisis in the United Kingdom, and the 
weight of this sector in the UK economy overall, also had an adverse impact on activity. By 
contrast, the contribution of external demand improved, as sterling depreciated and imports 
declined. As a result, the current account deficit fell back from 2.9% of GDP in 2007 to 1.7% 
in 2008. 
Inflation rose for much of the year, to peak at 5.2% year-on-year in September, and subse-
quently evidenced considerable downward stickiness due, inter alia, to the depreciation of 
sterling. During the first half of the year, the rise in inflation conditioned official interest rates. 
However, as financial stress heightened as from September, the Bank of England launched 
a series of successive and far-reaching rate cuts which brought the base rate down from 
5% to 0.5% – an all-time low – by March 2009. It also decided to pursue monetary expan-
sion through higher liquidity provision and purchases of private financial instruments and 
Treasury bonds. Moreover, since October 2008, the UK government has introduced vari-
The economic outlook for 2009 
has worsened significantly; 
recovery would need to be 
preceded by stabilisation of the 
real estate market and recovery 
on the financial markets 
3.2 UNITED KINGDOM
The UK economy decelerated 
considerably in 2008, weighed 
down by domestic demand
Inflation rose for much of the 
year, and subsequently 
evidenced considerable 
downward stickiness, which 
conditioned the monetary policy 
response
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ous rescue measures for the banking sector, via guarantees for debt issues and bank as-
sets, asset purchases by the Bank of England and recapitalisations of credit institutions 
facing grave solvency problems (see Box 3.1). As a result, the State has gained control 
over most of the capital of a growing number of banks. As regards fiscal policy, the 2009-
2010 budget contained a fiscal stimulus package for households and SMEs worth 1.4% of 
GDP. This included a VAT rate cut, distinguishing it from the packages announced in other 
countries.
The outlook for 2009 points to a sharp contraction in GDP (around 4%), reflecting continued 
deterioration of domestic demand and the external economic climate. As regards policy meas-
ures, there is little room for manoeuvre, as the budget deficit will already be high in 2009 and 
further base rate cuts are virtually impossible. The main risks are on the downside, if the finan-
cial crisis proves deeper and longer-lasting than initially expected.
The Japanese economy contracted by 0.6% in 2008, after growing by 2.4% in 2007, reflecting 
the sharp drop in private investment, sluggish private consumption and growing external de-
mand weakness. Activity recorded negative rates of growth in quarter-on-quarter terms in 
2008 Q2 and declined abruptly to 12.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms in Q4 (see 
Chart 3.9), the sharpest fall in any of the developed economies. The progressive deterioration 
in financial conditions was particularly intense towards the end of the year, as the stock mar-
kets slumped, the yen appreciated and credit restrictions heightened. That prompted a loss of 
confidence and a sharp fall in expectations, which had an adverse impact on domestic de-
mand. Moreover, by 2008 Q4 the sharp deceleration in the export sector had become an in-
tense contraction and, as a result, the current account surplus declined to 3.2% of GDP in 
2008, 1.6 pp lower than in 2007.
Inflation fluctuated in line with commodities and food prices and with developments in 
domestic demand. In July 2008, inflation peaked at 2.3% year-on-year; by March 2009 it 
had fallen to -0.3%. The GDP deflator and core CPI displayed latent deflationary tensions 
throughout the year. Up to September, the Bank of Japan held its interest rates un-
changed at 0.5%, and monetary policy was marked by the dilemma between inflationary 
pressures in the overall index and the decline in activity. When the financial crisis intensi-
fied, spreading quickly to the real economy, the central bank made two rate cuts as from 
October, so that by December 2008 the official interest rate stood at 0.1%. At the same 
time, the Bank of Japan introduced measures to increase liquidity in domestic and for-
eign currency in the money markets, followed by initiatives designed to facilitate corpo-
rate financing, including purchases of debt and shares by the central bank. As regards 
fiscal policy, the economic and financial crisis put an end to the correction of the fiscal 
imbalance and the path of adjustment of public debt, which stood at –5.6% and 196.3% 
of GDP, respectively, at end-2008. Since September, the Japanese government has an-
nounced various economic stimulus plans, including mainly initiatives to support financial 
institutions and supply credit to SMEs, as well as smaller-scale fiscal measures (repre-
senting some 2.5% of GDP) designed to sustain household income and promote public 
investment and employment.
The outlook for 2009 points to a profound contraction of around 6% in GDP. Considering the 
sharp deceleration in world trade, the high weight of the external sector hinders recovery, 
while the loss of confidence and the weak labour market make a recovery in investment and 
private consumption more difficult. The risks to this central scenario are on the downside, if 
the global slowdown were to intensify and, in particular, if it were to have a knock-on effect 
on China.
Activity is expected to contract 
notably in 2009
3.3 JAPAN
GDP contracted in Japan in 
2008, dragged down by all its 
components and by the 
growing financial difficulties 
The outlook for 2009 points to 
a notable contraction in activity
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The pace of economic growth decelerated to 7.7% in emerging Asia in 2008, in comparison 
with 10.6% in 2007, with a relatively strong performance in particular from China and India.
China’s GDP grew by 9% in 2008, in comparison with 13% in 2007. Activity decelerated 
slightly in the first half of the year and then sharply in the second half, bringing year-on-
year growth in 2009 Q1 to 6.1% (see Chart 3.10). This was attributable to sluggish do-
mestic demand that was due, in turn, to the real estate sector adjustment and the effects 
of the deterioration in world trade. Nevertheless, external demand made a direct positive 
contribution to growth in 2008 (albeit smaller than in 2007), and the current account sur-
plus rose to $426 billion (9.8% of GDP), as imports adjusted to a greater extent than 
exports.
4 The emerging 
economies
4.1 CHINA AND THE REST OF 
ASIA
China proved relatively resilient 
in the face of the crisis, despite 
the deterioration in international 
trade and the real estate sector 
adjustment
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The other main Asian economies recorded growth of 4.8% on average in 2008, in comparison 
with 7.2% in 2007. After a very strong Q1, economic growth decelerated gradually in Q2 and 
Q3, before slowing abruptly to a rate of 1.1% in Q4. The adjustment was especially intense in 
South Korea and in the more open and smaller economies, which went into recession as a 
result both of external and domestic demand (especially investment and private consumption), 
in a setting of weak employment and declining consumer and business confidence. This situ-
ation was exacerbated in 2008 Q4 by the sharp correction in trade flows (to which this region 
is particularly vulnerable as it is highly export-geared), the collapse in confidence and tighten-
ing credit conditions.
Monetary policy in the region tightened up to the summer to combat the growing inflationary 
pressures stemming from the rise in food and energy prices. As from September, the deterio-
ration in activity and the decline in inflation – which was especially notable in China – prompted 
significant and generalised official interest rate cuts. Some countries, such as China, also re-
duced the bank reserve requirement and eliminated credit controls. Among the unconven-
tional measures taken, some central banks introduced liquidity-providing instruments in local 
currency and dollars (in the case of South Korea and Singapore, with the backing of the Fed-
eral Reserve). As regards exchange rate policy, in July the Chinese authorities tacitly sus-
pended the policy of sustained renminbi appreciation against the dollar, in light of the more 
unfavourable external demand outlook. In other countries, as repatriation of investments by 
non-residents in the closing months of 2008 and scant dollar liquidity prompted significant 
currency depreciation, a number of central banks intervened on the foreign exchange markets. 
Fiscal policies became expansive in 2008 H2, and were strengthened with support measures 
for the financial sector, albeit with varying degrees of scope and intensity from country to coun-
try. The Chinese and South Korean plans are the most extensive, representing an estimated 
5.8% and 5.1%, respectively, of GDP in the period 2009-2010.
The outlook for 2009 envisages a contraction in many of the region’s economies, especially in 
those that are most reliant on trade, with closer financial links and in most need of funds. 
China, which is expected to post growth in the order of 6.5%, and to a lesser extent India, 
could put up more resistance if the authorities manage to sustain domestic demand momen-
tum. China’s capacity to isolate itself from the external conditions will be key in the global 
scenario.
In Latin America, aggregate GDP rose by 4.2% in 2008, in comparison with 5.7% in 2007. 
After three quarters of very strong and even higher-than-expected growth, activity decelerated 
sharply in Q4, placing some economies on the brink of recession. This was due, in part, to 
commodities prices – which continued to provide strong support for activity up to the summer, 
before subsequently heading downwards – and, as from September 2008, to the slump in 
external financing and global demand. In this setting, the trade surplus decreased considera-
bly, initially as a result of strong imports and subsequently due to lower export prices, resulting 
in a current account deficit of 0.3% of GDP.
On average, consumer prices in the region accelerated up to October 2008, rising well above 
central bank targets, save in Brazil, so that inflation expectations eventually deteriorated. The 
monetary policy response was marked by significant interest rate hikes, in some cases in the 
wake of alternative measures taken to mitigate currency appreciation pressures. Inflation 
peaked at 8.9% in October, and began to decline gradually in the closing months of 2008, 
prompting most of the region’s central banks to make successive sharp interest rate cuts 
– rather belatedly in comparison with the rest of the world – between December 2008 and 
April 2009. As from September the central banks were quick to react, providing dollar liquidity 
The rate of growth moderated 
in the other Asian economies, 
especially in those most reliant 
on external demand and 
international borrowing
Monetary policy responded to 
the sharp fluctuation in inflation, 
before being oriented, as from 
September, towards sustaining 
activity and mitigating the 
impact of the financial tensions
The outlook for 2009 envisages 
a sharp deceleration in growth
4.2 LATIN AMERICA
Activity also decelerated in Latin 
America as from the summer; 
the turnaround in commodities 
prices was an added 
adjustment factor
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to bring the money and foreign exchange markets back onto a normal footing and prevent the 
risk of a credit freeze. This response was possible, in many cases, due to the volume of inter-
national reserves built up in recent years, in addition to the dollar credit facilities granted to a 
number of countries by the Federal Reserve in October and subsequently by the IMF. In this 
setting, most of the region’s economies tried to introduce counter-cyclical fiscal policies, al-
though these varied from country to country and were generally quite small in scale. The de-
cline in State revenue as a result of the correction in commodities prices and external financing 
conditions limited the fiscal room for manoeuvre.
The outlook for 2009 points to a contraction in activity of around 1.5% throughout the region. 
In the present circumstances, the difficulties in covering net borrowing, which will grow due to 
the prospect of a higher current account deficit, may act as a constraint on economic 
growth.
In the new EU Member States, GDP decelerated sharply in 2008. On average it grew by 4.1%, 
in comparison with 5.9% in 2007, as a result of the adverse impact of the global financial crisis 
on the availability and the cost of financing. This was especially the case in these countries and 
in some of their neighbours, such as Russia and Ukraine, due to their high exposure to exter-
nal financing in foreign currency. That led to a significant adjustment in domestic demand, just 
as external demand – especially from the euro area – was also deteriorating. In 2008 the Baltic 
States and Hungary went into recession, while the rest of the region’s economies slowed more 
gradually. On average, the current account deficit declined slightly, to 7.9% of GDP, with a 
particularly significant adjustment in the Baltic States.
Inflation rose to 6.5% on average in 2008, in comparison with 4.4% in 2007, but it declined 
across the board as from July, as a result of the drop in commodities prices and the eco-
nomic slowdown, prompting gradual monetary easing throughout the region. In the fiscal 
sphere, public finances deteriorated – save in Bulgaria and Hungary – due to the impact of the 
slowdown, while the budget deficit for the region overall rose from 1.9% of GDP in 2007 to 
3.3% in 2008.
In response to the financial crisis, the authorities adopted a series of support measures for the 
banking sector, including extended deposit guarantees and, in some cases, recapitalisations 
and guarantees for bank debt. Moreover, in light of their foreign currency liquidity problems, 
Hungary, Poland and Latvia had to apply to other central banks for help (via swap facilities with 
the Swiss National Bank and the Swedish and Danish central banks, and repo transactions 
with the ECB), while some of the countries in greater need of external financing had to apply 
for financial aid packages – conditional upon fiscal adjustment and financial sector restructur-
ing plans – from the international financial organisations and the European Union.
Slovakia joined the euro area on 1 January 2009. Within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 
II), the Latvian lats underwent intense depreciation pressure, especially as from September, 
trading at the lower limit of its fluctuation band of ±1%. Exchange rates in Lithuania and Esto-
nia, both with pegs to the euro, remained stable, despite the financial tensions. The currencies 
not participating in ERM II depreciated considerably against the euro in 2008 H2 and, more 
intensely so, in the opening months of 2009.
The outlook for 2009 has deteriorated substantially and the region faces particularly high risks 
associated with possible financing difficulties. GDP will foreseeably decline significantly in the 
Baltic States and in Hungary, while activity in the other economies is expected to slow consid-
erably.
The outlook for 2009 points to 
a contraction in activity 
throughout the region
4.3 THE NEW EU MEMBER 
STATES
The impact of the global 
financial crisis was particularly 
intense in the new EU Member 
States, due to their high 
exposure to external financing
The policy response was 
constrained by external 
financing restrictions and some 
countries resorted to 
international financial aid 
packages 
The outlook points to a decline 
in activity and high risks in the 
financial sphere
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The euro area and the common monetary policy
Economic developments in the euro area in 2008 continued to be influenced by the interna-
tional financial instability. The further tightening of financial conditions and the considerable 
weakening in the external environment, in a climate of diminishing confidence and growing 
uncertainty, brought about a recessionary situation which was exacerbated in late 2008 and 
early 2009 following the heightening of the global financial crisis in the autumn. The notable 
deterioration in the situation during the year was reflected in public and private agencies’ fore-
casts, which successively and substantially revised expected growth for 2009 downwards and 
set back the prospects of recovery, as analysed in Box 4.1.
Inflation in the euro area also turned around considerably in the course of the year. In mid-2008 
prices were posting growth close to 4%, an unprecedented rate since the start of EMU and 
the result of dearer oil, food and other non-energy commodities. However, the weakness of 
global economic activity in the second half of the year contracted the demand for commodities 
and prompted a downturn in their prices. This, combined with the change in the economy’s 
cyclical position, gave rise in the closing months of 2008 and early months of 2009 to a 
marked reduction in inflation and to a substantial downward revision of medium-term inflation-
ary expectations.
This radical change in economic outlook was reflected in monetary policy measures, which 
focused from the autumn on preventing the disinflationary process in which the euro area was 
immersed from translating into inflation rates persistently below the medium-term price stabil-
ity target. Thus, the ECB Governing Council decided from October on successive cuts to its 
official interest rate, taking it to 1% in May 2009. In parallel, the ECB made its liquidity provision 
policy more flexible in response to the heightening of the financial crisis, as detailed in Box 4.2.
The remaining strands of economic policy also adapted during the year to the change in cycli-
cal conditions, and unprecedented measures were implemented in the closing months in all 
areas and, in some cases, as part of an internationally concerted move. Faced with worsening 
financial tensions, the euro area governments, in addition to bailing out certain systemic insti-
tutions, designed comprehensive plans to support the financial system. At the same time, and 
given the recessionary economic outlook, governments approved an ambitious economic re-
covery plan in December to ensure financial stability and counter the risks of a feedback loop 
between the worsening real economy and the financial tensions. The plans encompassed fis-
cal stimulus measures, structural reform and improved credit supply for the most vulnerable 
groups. At present, it is extraordinarily difficult to assess the effectiveness of these plans in 
stimulating demand in the short run. In any event, the strong impact the crisis is exerting on 
the euro area countries’ public finances, combined with the commitments associated with 
population ageing and the increase in contingent liabilities derived from the financial bail-out 
plans, poses the need to ensure that the sustainability of public finances is not called into 
question. That will require firm budgetary consolidation commitments that allow a return to 
compliance with medium-term objectives once the current situation is overcome.
Despite all these measures, the prospects for growth are very unfavourable. On the latest es-
timates from public- and private-sector agencies, a sharp contraction in GDP for 2009 and a 
very gradual recovery in activity during the following year are projected, based largely on these 
economic policy initiatives. The scenario of recovery will be subject to downside risks arising 
essentially from the difficulties of containing the feedback loop between economic activity and 
1 Economic conditions 
in the euro area
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REVISION OF THE GROWTH OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA DURING 2008 BOX 4.1
During 2008 and, especially from the autumn, the international finan-
cial crisis worsened considerably and became a global one. The real 
effects of the turmoil were felt in Europe with some delay, but they 
became evident in the second half of 2008. The year ended with the 
euro area economy deep in recession, and the level of GDP in Q4 
was more than 1% below that a year earlier. The deterioration in the 
economic situation over the course of the year, and the way it intensi-
fied in the final stretch of 2008, were reflected in the successive 
downward revisions of growth expectations by public and private 
agencies.
As Panel 1 shows, in the first half of 2008 the projections of the main 
international organisations and of private analysts for 2009 were only 
moderately down (by 0.5 pp) to around 1.5%, while for 2010 an in-
crease of close to 2% was envisaged. Underpinning this relatively 
favourable outlook was the expectation that the international financial 
crisis would not be of such a size as to deeply affect an economy 
such as that of the euro area, which had solid fundamentals thanks 
to the soundness of households’ and companies’ finances, the vir-
tual non-existence of the subprime segment in its mortgage market 
and the greater weight of trade with regions which at that point 
seemed less exposed.
During the summer months, the build-up of unfavourable conjunc-
tural data generated some doubts about the true scale of the turmoil 
and the capacity of the euro area to withstand it, which led to further, 
moderately downward revisions of projections for the whole forecast-
ing horizon. However, the escalation of the financial crisis in Septem-
ber demonstrated its depth and global nature, and the potential of 
contagion to the real economy, which entailed a significant change in 
growth expectations. In November and December, the estimate for 
2009 turned clearly negative, although it was still expected that the 
recovery would take place in the second half of that year. Finally, fol-
lowing the collapse of all conjunctural indicators in early 2009, the 
projections for that year sank and recovery was put back to late 
2010.
To illustrate how the progressive deterioration in the economic situa-
tion during 2008 affected the revision of the growth outlook, Panel 2 
shows the changes in the real-time forecasting of growth in euro area 
SOURCES: Consensus, European Commission, Eurobarometer, IMF, OECD and SPF.
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activity by the EUROSTING model.1 This model predicts euro area 
GDP on the basis of nine indicators, four of which are survey-based, 
while the other five refer to quantitative variables. The projection is 
made up to six weeks ahead of the publication of the National Ac-
counts figure. More specifically, Panel 2 shows the (almost) daily 
changes in the EUROSTING projections for each quarter of the year 
2008. Each point of these lines reflects the projection of the GDP 
flash estimate for the quarter in question with all the information avail-
able up to that day.
According to this model, the economic situation in the euro area 
during the first half of 2008 was relatively favourable, with an esti-
mated increase for Q1 close to potential, and somewhat less for 
Q2 and Q3. The first sign of deterioration in the economic situation 
came about in late July, when the first indicators available for Q3 
reduced the projection for this period to below –0.2%. This more 
unfavourable perception was confirmed with the release on 14 Au-
gust of a decline in GDP of –0.2% for Q2, which was a negative 
surprise since both the model and most analysts had estimated 
slightly positive growth. This fall in activity, combined with that ex-
pected by the model for Q3, placed the euro area in a virtual situa-
tion of technical recession. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in late September and, above all, as the indicators relating 
to the closing three months of the year came to light, the model 
affirmed the sheer depth and scale of the recession in the euro 
area. The estimation of growth for Q4 progressively collapsed with 
each new figure, from values close to zero in late September to 
below –1% in mid-November. At that time EUROSTING was one of 
the models offering a more unfavourable view, but it was however 
outdone by the figure released by EUROSTAT.
REVISION OF THE GROWTH OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA DURING 2008 (cont´d) BOX 4.1
1. M. Camacho and G. Pérez-Quirós (2008), Introducing the EURO-STING: 
Short-Term INdicator of euro area Growth, Working Paper no. 0807, Banco de 
España.
the behaviour of the financial markets. Against this background, inflation would hold at a very 
low level over a long period of time.
Set against the international financial instability and the progressive weakening of the world 
economy, euro area GDP showed a continuous loss of momentum during 2008 which intensi-
fied late in the year and ran into the opening months of 2009. Output posted negative rates of 
change from Q2 and ended the year with a quarter-on-quarter decline of –1.6%, a rate not 
seen since the 70s (see Table 4.1). This translated into growth of 0.7% in annual average 
terms, almost 2 pp down on the 2007 figure.
The financial crisis affected economic activity through various channels. As explained in sec-
tion 3, the strong rise in credit premia raised the cost of financing through loans, securities 
and debt issues. Banks adjusted their lending standards to the new economic environment, 
which meant these standards duly tightened. Further, the crisis caused a loss in household 
real and financial wealth and prompted a decline in corporate earnings, a strong increase in 
uncertainty and a deterioration in expectations about future activity and employment. All 
these developments eroded business and consumer confidence, causing private productive 
investment and private consumption decisions to be deferred and saving to rise, which nota-
bly weakened internal demand (see Chart 4.1). Households also held back their spending on 
residential investment, which compounded the real estate adjustment process that certain 
countries in the area had embarked upon and led to a slowdown in credit for house pur-
chases.
Another propagation channel whose significance grew as the financial crisis became more 
pronounced and global was the trade channel, with trade flows showing a gradual deteriora-
tion. That gave rise to a stagnation of euro area exports in mid-2008, to which the appreciation 
of the euro in the first half of the year also contributed, and to a sharp subsequent fall (see 
Table 4.1). In turn, the moderation of internal demand led imports to trend similarly, albeit with 
a less marked decline, which prompted a deterioration in the contribution of the net external 
balance to GDP growth.
1.1 ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT
Economic developments in the 
euro area were determined by 
the worsening of the financial 
crisis...
... which, through various 
channels, affected both euro 
area internal demand...
... and external demand
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Action by the general government sector and the ECB contributed to sustaining expenditure. 
In the case of the former, this was through an increase in government consumption and public 
investment, the activation of the automatic stabilisers and the adoption of a broad raft of 
measures in the second half of the year; and in the case of the ECB, through a rapid and sub-
stantial cut in interest rates from October.
On the supply side, the weakening in activity passed through to all the productive branches, with the 
sole exception of non-market services. Declines in value added were sooner and sharper in the 
construction and manufacturing industries, and only late in the year did they reach market services.
Action by the general 
government sector and the 
ECB mitigated the deterioration 
in activity
The recession spread to most 
productive branches...
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After two years of very high growth, the employment generation process was interrupted in the 
second half of the year, making way for a decline in employment in Q3 and Q4 which contin-
ued into the opening months of 2009. That made for a substantial rise in the unemployment 
rate, from 7.3% in January 2008 to 8.9% in March 2009. Overall, the adjustment in employ-
ment was less than that in value added, whereby apparent labour productivity progressively 
slowed, to the point of posting negative rates of change and evidencing procyclical behaviour 
(see Chart 4.3).
From Q2, almost all the euro area Member States experienced a significant decline in activity, 
although there were significant differences in terms both of the scale of the decline and its 
composition. The biggest reductions in output were in Germany and Italy, essentially as a re-
sult of the performance of the German net external balance and of Italian domestic demand. 
In the countries with the sharpest contractions in domestic demand and employment, mainly 
Spain and Ireland, the strong adjustment in imports prompted a more moderate decline in 
GDP.
... and adversely affected 
employment and productivity
Virtually all the euro area 
countries felt the impact of the 
recession
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The global, synchronised and deep-seated nature of the crisis augurs a prolongation of the 
recession in the euro area for some quarters more, followed by a gradual recovery in activity 
underpinned by several factors: the favourable effects of the financial system support plans 
on financing conditions; the sharp easing in monetary policy in the euro area and in the rest 
of the world; and the strongly expansionary nature of the fiscal authorities’ aggregate de-
mand stimulus plans, coupled with the effect of the automatic stabilisers. Further, the down-
ward effect on consumer prices of the notable decline in commodities prices acts as an im-
pulse to real household income. The effect of all these factors should enable the deterioration 
in confidence, demand and production to be contained, and later be propitious, into 2010, to 
a gradual economic recovery in the euro area. Nonetheless, this recovery scenario is subject 
to a high degree of uncertainty and the risks are on the downside, owing to the difficulty of 
stopping the feedback loop between the financial markets and real activity. Additional risk 
factors relate to the introduction of protectionist measures and to the possibility that the very 
duration of the uncertainty may force changes in economic agents’ decision-making that 
entail not only the deferral of spending, but also a downward change in its permanent com-
ponent.
Inflation changed substantially during 2008. Over the year as a whole, the growth of the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) stood at 3.3%, peaking at 4% in July (the 
highest rate since the start of EMU) owing to the effect on its energy and food compo-
nents of the rise in commodities prices on international markets. Thereafter, by con-
trast, the weakening of global activity began to have a negative bearing on commodi-
ties prices, which translated into a sharp reduction in inflation. However, the rate of 
change of the prices of the less volatile components of the HICP – non-energy indus-
trial goods and services – held relatively stable in 2008 and in the opening months of 
2009.
During 2008 and to date in 2009, the year-on-year rate of change of the HICP moved on 
a similar trend in all countries in the euro area, although marked differences were seen in 
the intensity of the acceleration and subsequent slowdown in inflation. That resulted in an 
initial increase in the dispersion of inflation rates within the area, followed by a decrease 
(see Chart 4.2). Essentially, this was a consequence of the different response of energy 
goods prices to dearer oil and other fuels, owing to the differing degree of energy de-
pendence and to the welter of indirect taxation and price-setting arrangements for these 
goods.
Wages accelerated substantially, as a result of the application of wage settlements reached at 
the end of the previous upturn, characterised by the high degree of labour utilisation (as at-
tested by the historically low unemployment rate), which brought to an end the wage restraint 
prevailing in previous years. The growth of real wages outpaced labour productivity, giving rise 
to an increase in the wage share in total income, following a long period of progressive reduc-
tion (see Chart 4.3). Further, the loss of momentum in apparent labour productivity, combined 
with the increase in compensation per employee, led to a rise in unit labour costs. The decline 
in business margins – which, in annual average terms, had not been seen since 1997 – ena-
bled the effect of wage costs on final prices (proxied by the GDP deflator) to be cushioned. 
Initially, the reduction in margins may have been attributable to the relative decrease in the 
demand for goods whose consumption is of a more discretionary nature, given the increase in 
spending on staple consumer products (food and energy goods), caused by the increase in 
the prices and the low price elasticity that characterises the demand for them. The subsequent 
steepening of the decline in margins may be explained by the generalised weakening in de-
mand.
The short-term outlook is 
negative, while in the medium 
term economic policy conduct 
is expected to be conducive to 
a progressive recovery in 
activity
1.2 PRICES AND COSTS
Commodities prices influenced 
the behaviour of consumer 
prices
Wages accelerated and 
business margins contracted, 
interrupting the trend observed 
in previous years
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Current forecasts point to inflation holding at a low level into 2010, which might turn 
negative around mid-2009, as a result of several factors: the decline in the cost of com-
modities; diminished wage pressures, linked in turn to the lower growth of consumer 
prices and to the weakness of the labour market; and greater competition, associated 
with the fall in demand and with overcapacity. That inflation expectations continue to be 
anchored at levels compatible with price stability reduces the risk of more unfavourable 
and extreme scenarios materialising, although marked uncertainty persists over the fu-
ture course of activity, feeding through logically to that of prices. On one hand, a sharper-
than-expected fall-off in demand would raise the present low risks of deflation. But on the 
other, a swifter-than-expected recovery in aggregate spending, set against the foresee-
able reduction in the economy’s growth potential – linked to the decline in investment and 
in employment – and the pursuit of expansionary policies, might lead to a rise in infla-
tion.
Inflation is expected to hold at a 
low – and even slightly negative – 
level, although there are both 
downside and upside risks to 
these expectations
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Fiscal policy in the euro area was influenced by the change in macroeconomic conditions 
observed in the second half of the year, which led the economic authorities to adopt excep-
tional measures aimed at stabilising financial markets, easing the rapid deterioration in activity 
and restoring confidence.
Most euro area countries introduced demand-stimulating discretionary measures from the 
autumn, in line with the objectives of the European Plan for Economic Recovery approved at 
the European Council summit on 12 December 2008. The plans unveiled to date amount 
overall to the equivalent of 1.1% of the area’s GDP in 2009 (and 0.8% in 2010), with significant 
differences from country to country regarding both the scale and the composition of the re-
sponse. Generally, the scale of the measures has been commensurate with the margin for 
manoeuvre available in each case, with such measures proving more ambitious in Germany 
2 Economic policies
2.1 FISCAL POLICY
The financial crisis is strongly 
impacting euro area countries’ 
public finances
As part of the European Plan for 
Economic Recovery, demand-
stimulating discretionary fiscal 
measures were adopted...
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and relatively moderate in France and Italy. As to the instruments involved, the programmes 
combine tax cuts and, above all, increases in public spending that tend to concentrate their 
effects on the groups and sectors most affected by the crisis. Finally, most of these measures 
have a temporary impact on public finances, although permanent rebates have been intro-
duced into social security contributions and personal income tax in some countries. In any 
event, the exceptional situation that the euro area and the global economies face means that 
it is very difficult to assess the ultimate effectiveness of the fiscal impulse adopted (see Box 1.3).
The seriousness of the crisis also advised adopting sizeable financial system support plans, to 
avert the risk of certain systemic banks collapsing and to prevent an excessive adjustment of 
credit supply (see Box 1.1). From the standpoint of public finances, the public capital injections 
and asset purchases by governments in the period to April 2009 have had a limited impact on 
the deficit, but they could account for approximately 3 pp of public debt. The risks associated 
with guarantees of debt issues, which have notably increased general government “contin-
gent” liabilities (by an amount close to 18% of GDP), must also be added to this.
Further adding to the foregoing was the activation of the automatic stabilisers. In Europe, and 
unlike in the United States, these are relatively powerful and are prompting an increase in 
spending on social benefits and a decline in tax revenue.
As a result of these developments, and on European Commission estimates, the euro area budg-
et deficit stood at 1.9% of GDP in 2008, more than 1 pp up on the previous year. It is expected 
to rise to 5.3% of GDP in 2009, the highest level seen since 1996. The impact of the business 
cycle would account for 0.3 pp of the increase in the deficit seen in 2008, and for 2.4 pp in 2009, 
although these estimates may be subject to significant revisions since the uncertainty over the 
scale of the output gap and over the sensitivity of certain items to the business cycle is now ex-
traordinarily high. Of particular note is the disappearance of revenue linked to the real estate 
market boom and to the rise in the value of financial assets, which in recent years contributed 
decisively to the budgetary improvements in various countries. Public debt rose to 69.3% of GDP 
in 2008 (3.3 pp up on the previous year) and might draw close to 78% in 2009 (see Chart 4.4).
... along with financial system 
support plans, which are having 
a high budgetary impact
Activation of the automatic 
stabilisers
Consequently, in 2008 and 
2009 there will have been a 
very sharp deterioration in fiscal 
balances and in public debt...
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Most euro area countries in 2008 posted a deterioration in their budgetary balances compared 
with their estimates in the end-2007 stability programmes, which were framed in a much more 
favourable macroeconomic scenario than at present. The latest projections for 2009 suggest 
that this year 13 Member States will run a deficit of more than 3%, exceeding 6% in the cases 
of Spain, France, Ireland and Portugal.
In this setting, the European Commission decided in February 2009 to initiate the excessive 
deficit procedure envisaged in the so-called “dissuasive arm” of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) for those countries whose deficit exceeded 3% of GDP in 2008: France, Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Malta. The European Council reaffirmed that the Pact continues to provide an ap-
propriate regulatory framework for the coordination of EU countries’ budgetary policies and 
that it would apply the margins of flexibility introduced by the 2005 reform in respect of the 
periods laid down to correct excessive deficits and of the possibility of avoiding sanctions in 
exceptional circumstances. Indeed, France and Spain have until 2012, and Ireland until 2013, 
to bring their deficits below 3%.
The magnitude of the crisis warranted adopting far-reaching measures to stabilise the financial 
system and stimulate demand, as agreed by the governments of the G20. But the budgetary 
impact of these measures is proving high, against a background in which the commitments 
arising from population ageing are compounded by the strong repercussions that the decline 
in asset prices is exerting on private pension schemes and public pension reserves. This 
poses new challenges and needs.
Accordingly, one of the main challenges the economic authorities currently face is to maintain 
confidence in the sustainability of public finances, so as to avert possible increases in long-
term interest rates that would ultimately lessen the effectiveness of fiscal responses. In this 
connection it is necessary to lay down firm budgetary consolidation commitments and to 
resume compliance with the medium-term objectives established in the SGP as soon as pos-
sible. Further, these efforts must be consistent with maintaining the quality of public finances, 
preventing spending cuts from affecting those items which have most influence on long-term 
growth (such as spending on R&D and on education). Finally, it is essential to increase the 
degree of policy coordination and not to succumb to protectionist temptations, so that the 
measures adopted should not distort competition conditions and the functioning of the single 
European market.
The consequences of the financial crisis, by inhibiting business investment and the participa-
tion in the labour market of certain groups, may continue for some time and affect the econ-
omy’s growth potential in the medium term. Accordingly, although the economic policy re-
sponse has focused on action aimed at averting the risks of financial collapse and at 
alleviating the recession, it is essential to increase the flexibility and efficiency of the euro area 
in order to pave the way for new investment opportunities and to retain the incentives for ac-
tive job search.
With this rationale, the European Plan for Economic Recovery, along with the aforementioned fiscal 
stimulus measures, emphasised the need to make further headway with reforms in order to attain 
the medium and long-term targets set in the Lisbon strategy. In particular, it is vital in the current 
circumstances to make labour markets more flexible so as to contain the employment adjustment, 
without forsaking the social protection of the groups most affected by the crisis; to promote entre-
preneurial initiative and improve access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 
to foment innovation and knowledge with a view to redirecting productive activity towards sectors 
with higher value added; and, ultimately, to foster competition, especially in services.
... across the board
The European Commission has 
opened an excessive deficit 
procedure in the case of several 
countries, applying the margins 
of flexibility laid down in the 
SGP
There is a need to ensure the 
sustainability of public finances 
in the medium and long term
2.2 STRUCTURAL POLICIES
To ensure a rapid and sustained 
recovery, progress on the 
structural reform of the 
economy must continue
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The pace of job creation was drastically corrected in late 2008 and the European Commission’s 
projections suggest that the unemployment rate might exceed 11% in 2010. The employment 
rate held virtually stable (at around 66%) in 2008, far from the level of 70% set as a target in the 
Lisbon Agenda for 2010. This marked the interruption of a period of continuous advances in the 
use of the labour factor, to which the favourable economic conditions had proved conducive, 
as had too the labour market reforms tackled by most Member States in recent years centred 
on the strategy of “flexicurity”, which concurrently promotes labour market flexibility, the protec-
tion of unemployed workers and active employment policies (see Chart 4.5).
Along these lines, practically all national economic recovery plans included employment-promot-
ing measures. Most countries increased the funds for improving public services geared to assist-
ing in job-search and training for the unemployed. Some governments also expedited their plans 
to reduce the “tax wedge” – the difference between the gross wage cost borne by the employer 
and the net wage received by the employee – by means of cuts to the social security contribu-
tions paid by workers and employers and to income tax, generally targeting the lowest-paid 
population segments. To the fore, however, were the initiatives allowing working hours to be more 
flexible while the crisis persisted, without terminating the contractual relationship. Overall, all 
these measures contrasted with those in the past, which sought to alleviate the employment 
adjustment by resorting to early retirements or to an increase in public-sector employment, and 
which ultimately exerted an unwanted effect on participation rates and public finances.
At the European level, there were efforts to increase worker mobility, with the approval of the 
European Qualifications Framework in April 2008, which provides for the comparison of stu-
dent and worker levels of qualification in the different Member States, although there are still 
considerable restrictions as far as pension and welfare benefit transfers are concerned.
The progress in flexicurity has placed the euro area as a whole in a better position to face the 
crisis. But generally, few countries have embarked on reforms to employment protection leg-
islation, which regulates the hiring and firing of workers. Accordingly, the weight of the adjust-
ment is likely to fall mainly on workers with a temporary contract and on those groups with 
greater difficulties finding a job when the market is less dynamic (such as youths and elderly 
Most euro area countries 
introduced measures to ease 
the adjustment of labour 
markets
And headway was made in 
lifting barriers to worker mobility
It is essential to eliminate the 
barriers to hiring so as to avoid a 
deterioration in the incentives to 
participate in the labour market and 
a rise in structural unemployment
EURO AREA PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT CHART 4.5
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
 UNITED STATES
 EURO AREA MAXIMUM (BELGIUM)
 EURO AREA MINIMUM (IRELAND)
 EURO AREA AVERAGE
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
(Euro 2000 per unit of production factor)
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
 UNITED STATES
 EURO AREA
EMPLOYMENT RATE
(Employed/Working-age population)
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 4. THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
workers). At present, then, it is all the more necessary to further the reform of labour markets 
through the lowering of barriers to new hires and through boosting training and labour re-inser-
tion policies in order to increase economies’ adjustment capacity and to smooth the transition 
of workers to new jobs that arise after the crisis. The overriding challenge is that the social 
protection mechanisms being activated should not weaken the incentive to participate ac-
tively in the labour market. It is also important to eliminate rigidities in wage bargaining systems 
that prevent wages from adapting more rapidly to companies’ situation, as reflected by the 
fact that, in 2008 Q4, wage settlements increased by 3.6% in the euro area as a whole, the 
highest rate seen since 1995.
The increase in labour utilisation in recent years has not been accompanied, however, by a 
substantial improvement in the economy’s degree of efficiency. This is depicted in Chart 4.5, 
which shows total factor productivity for the euro area and for the United States. This illustrates 
the need for greater efforts in creating a sufficiently competitive business environment and for 
incorporating technological advances into productive processes.
The insufficiency of the effort made is particularly notable in the case of innovation and 
knowledge. Specifically, the latest indicators show advances in the spread of the informa-
tion society to households and in the availability of sources of funding for innovation (ven-
ture capital funds) (see Table 4.2). Nonetheless, research and development expenditure by 
the economy as a whole has yet to take off and remains rooted at 1.9% of GDP, far from 
the target of 3% set in the Lisbon strategy for 2010. Of particular significance is the lag vis-
à-vis the United States in the effort in R&D conducted and financed by companies, the re-
flection of which is limited weight in the technology-intensive sectors with greater expansion 
potential. During 2008, the Commission set in train several initiatives in an attempt to move 
towards the creation of the European Research Space, promoting the international mobility 
of researchers, the reform of higher education to improve university performance and great-
er co-operation among research centres, universities and companies. But greater efforts 
are still needed by the Member States to eliminate the barriers to innovation, to smooth the 
passage of funding to innovative companies and to improve intellectual property regula-
tions.
In the case of education, although the proportion of the population with higher studies has 
increased in recent years, rising to 21.3% of the working-age population in 2008 (5 pp up on 
the 2000 figure), the early school leavers rate remains high, and the quality and attractiveness 
of vocational training systems are insufficient.
In contrast to the foregoing, the progress made in promoting entrepreneurship and in improv-
ing the business environment are proving notable. During 2008 most Member States and the 
European Commission undertook projects geared to identifying and reducing the administra-
tive and regulatory burdens that block the creation and expansion of companies. Moreover, 
bearing in mind the importance of SMEs (they account for 99% of total EU companies and for 
70% of employment), the European Parliament approved the so-called “Small Business Act” 
in December 2008, establishing maximum periods for the creation of companies (one week, 
compared with the current 16 days) and for obtaining business permits and licences. Propos-
als are also included to foment the entrepreneurial spirit of SMEs, and to improve their innova-
tion drive and openness to international markets. However, greater effort is still needed in 
simplifying accounting requirements and, especially, in improving SMEs’ access to funding 
sources; after administrative barriers, the lack of financing is the obstacle most frequently 
mentioned by companies among the factors restricting their expansion, even in the period 
prior to the financial crisis breaking. Boosting the development of specialised institutions, such 
The euro area’s degree of 
efficiency has scarcely improved 
in recent years
Headway in incorporating 
technological progress and 
knowledge into productive 
processes has been limited
The lowering of administrative 
barriers continues at a sound 
pace
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as venture capital companies and other individual investors (business angels), will contribute 
to lessening this limitation.
As regards promoting competition and strengthening the single market, one of the key features of the 
current recession is the downward stickiness being shown by services inflation in the euro area, despite 
the slowdown in the demand for services. Accordingly, the full implementation of the Services Directive 
envisaged for December 2009 is one of the cornerstones of the European reform strategy. To date, the 
Member States have conducted an exhaustive analysis of the national and territorial legislation that 
must be amended to eliminate the barriers to the international provision of services and to freedom of 
establishment. Progress can also be seen in the establishment of single windows, whose aim is to 
simplify companies’ administrative formalities. But at present it is difficult to determine whether the 
transposition of the Directive is moving at the appropriate pace, since the most demanding phase must 
be implemented in the course of 2009. Moreover, there are some professional services for which the 
regulation is restrictive, and these have been left outside the scope of the Directive. It should further be 
said that there is still room to reinforce competition in certain network industries, such as electricity and 
gas, where progress must be made towards the effective segregation of production and distribution 
and where price regulation must be eliminated, and also in railway transport and in retail trade.
The implementation of the 
Services Directive might entail 
new employment opportunities 
and diminish the persistence of 
inflation in these activities
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Turning to the financial markets, the current circumstances have highlighted numerous short-
comings in financial regulation and supervisory arrangements. To palliate these deficiencies, 
European institutions are developing a series of plans and measures consistent with the guide-
lines agreed internationally (Financial Stability Forum and G20), the ultimate aims of which are 
to increase the transparency of financial reporting systems so as to raise supervisory capacity 
and improve risk assessment and investor protection. Also under discussion are reforms to 
reduce the procyclicality of the financial system, an increase in capital requirements, and 
changes in the regulation of risk rating agencies and of hedge funds (see Box 3.3).
The high commodities prices prevailing until mid-2008 and the emergence of discrete prob-
lems in energy supply highlighted the importance of promoting energy efficiency and diversify-
ing supply sources, as envisaged in European energy policy objectives. Along these lines, on 
17 December the European Parliament approved the “Climate Change and Energy” package, 
which makes a commitment to lowering greenhouse gas emissions, along with a series of 
measures aimed at reducing energy consumption and at promoting the use of renewable en-
ergies. To attain these objectives, it will be necessary to develop interconnection infrastruc-
tures with energy-producing countries, to improve the functioning of the emission rights ex-
change system and, above all, to prevent the most environmentally respectful European 
companies facing competitive disadvantages. In that connection, headway must be made in 
the international coordination of policies to combat climate change at the Copenhagen summit 
in December 2009.
During the first half of 2008 the outlook for monetary policy was particularly complex: on one 
side there were notable inflationary pressures derived from the cumulative increase in oil pric-
es, and, on the other, contractionary risks stemming from the continuing strains on financial 
markets. As regards prices, the HICP grew at a year-on-year rate of over 3% from the start of 
the year and the analyses available projected a persistent deviation of above 2%. Further, the 
capacity utilisation indicators did not ease off and wages were increasing at a high rate. Against 
this background it was essential to ensure that medium and long-term inflation expectations 
remained at levels compatible with the price stability objective and that second-round effects 
did not emerge. In turn, the continuing financial tensions shaped more restrictive financing 
conditions than the level inferred by official rates, which exerted a contractionary effect on 
expenditure. Despite the fact that the high risk premia on markets were sustaining rising bank 
rates and that the Bank Lending Survey pointed to a progressive contraction in supply, the 
credit aggregates remained relatively robust. Moreover, as elsewhere indicated in this Report 
(see Box 4.1), the indicators of activity did not reflect until after the summer that the economy 
was moving into a sluggish phase as is today evident.
In these circumstances, the ECB Governing Council held its official interest rate at 4% until 
mid-2008 (see Chart 4.6). In July, when the risks to inflation became more perceptible, it raised 
its intervention rate by 25 bp in order to ensure that medium and long-term inflation expecta-
tions remained anchored. These decisions combined with the continuation of a sufficiently 
accommodating liquidity injection policy which, as explained in Box 4.2, allowed euro area 
credit institutions’ greater needs to be met and sought to ease the tensions prompted by the 
market dysfunctions.
From September, the deterioration in the growth scenario and the disappearance of the upside 
risks to price stability led to a full turnaround in the monetary policy stance. Hence, in October, 
a rapid process of easing began, starting with a cut in rates of 50 bp as part of a concerted 
and unprecedented action by the main central banks of the more developed economies. This 
decision was followed by further cuts, some of which on a sizeable scale (75 bp in December), 
Far-reaching regulatory 
changes are needed in financial 
markets
A plan was approved in 2008 to 
increase energy efficiency and 
combat climate change
3 The common monetary 
policy and monetary and 
financial conditions in the 
euro area
3.1 MONETARY POLICY 
DECISIONS
The outlook for monetary policy 
in the first half of 2008 was 
particularly complex
In July the ECB decided to raise 
its official rate by 25 bp while 
continuing to apply a policy of 
ample liquidity provision
From September, the change in the 
economic and price scenarios gave 
rise to a rapid easing in monetary 
policy and to added flexibility in the 
operational framework
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which took the main refinancing operations rate to 1% in May 2009, a level not seen since the 
ECB was created. Also, as explained in detail in Box 4.2, the seriousness of the crisis required 
that the flexibility of the ECB’s operational framework be harnessed to expand the supply of 
liquidity.
Financial conditions in the euro area became more restricted during 2008, as a result of the 
rise in the cost of financing, stricter credit standards and the loss in value of assets. Capital and 
foreign exchange markets also showed very high volatility, particularly in the last quarter of the 
year.
The worsening of tensions in the international financial system towards the end of the summer 
swiftly spread to the euro area, to the extent that several systemic institutions – such as Dexia, 
3.2 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE EURO AREA
Financial conditions tightened 
and some markets showed very 
high volatility
The worsening of the financial 
crisis in September
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CHANGES IN THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
The international financial crisis that broke in the summer of 2007 
had one of its most visible and immediate effects in the interbank 
markets. The change in the perception of credit risk in the banking 
sector and greater liquidity needs attributable to the precautionary 
motive were reflected in a substantial increase in the risk premia 
incorporated into EURIBOR-EUREPO spreads, and in a drastic re-
duction in activity in non-collateralised forward transactions. As 
Panels 1 and 2 show, these difficulties persisted in 2008 and 2009, 
and such a lengthy period of malfunctioning interbank markets is 
proving unprecedented. Moreover, the intensity of events height-
ened during specific high-tension episodes, such as the close of 
the year 2007, the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and, 
most notably and persistently, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in September.
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CHANGES IN THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK (cont´d) BOX 4.2
The importance of the interbank market in monetary policy transmis-
sion meant that further flexibility had to be added to the liquidity provi-
sion policy during 2008. To September, the measures introduced in 
2007 were extended and reinforced without having to modify the op-
erational framework. Firstly, banks’ preference to satisfy reserve re-
quirements in advance continued to be catered for, this being re-
flected in a greater supply of liquidity at the start of maintenance pe-
riods. Secondly, the number of supplementary three-month injection 
operations was increased, and additional six-month operations were 
added, further stretching out the maturity of the funding granted. 
Lastly, to meet banks’ dollar requirements, the provision of funds in 
this currency was broadened by means of TAF (term auction facility) 
operations, extending the agreement with the US Federal Reserve.
The worsening of the crisis in September 2008 meant that the 12-
month EURIBOR-EUREPO spread – which is a measure of the risk 
premium incorporated into the EURIBOR – surged to over 200 bp. 
This affirmation of the fact that the interbank market had ceased to 
function as an efficient interbank liquidity distribution mechanism led 
the ECB to take far-reaching measures, satisfying the gross liquidity 
requirements of the system and introducing modifications into its op-
erational framework that would substantially increase the size of its 
balance sheet.
In particular, the traditional variable-rate auction system was replaced 
by a fixed-rate, full allotment procedure, which entailed giving up control 
of quantities. The change was applied to regular auctions, both weekly 
and LTRO (longer-term refinancing operations), effective at least until 
after the close of 2009, and also to forward operations in dollars. Also, 
the spread between the deposit facility and the marginal lending facility 
interest rates was narrowed to 100 bp. Furthermore, longer-term fi-
nancing continued to be reinforced, by means of the rollover of the 
LTROs that were maturing and the introduction of new ones, so that at 
end-2008 LTROs accounted for more than 75% of the total funds lent 
in euro (see Panel 3). Adding to these measures were new liquidity-in-
jection operations in dollars, with seven-day auctions supplementing 
the existing 28- and 84-day auctions, and the possibility of conducting 
currency swaps. Likewise, following an agreement with the Swiss cen-
tral bank, liquidity in Swiss francs was provided, via swaps, initially at 
seven days and subsequently at 84 days, too. Finally, in the event of a 
shortage of collateral to resort to such a broad supply of liquidity, the 
ECB increased the list of eligible instruments, adding lower-graded se-
curities (up to BBB– excluding asset-backed bonds), bond issues by 
credit institutions including certificates of deposit, negotiable subordi-
nated debt and foreign-currency-denominated assets provided that 
they are issued and settled in the euro area.
Reflecting the situation of abundant liquidity was the tendency of the 
EONIA to stand systematically below the weekly tender rate, at a 
much greater distance as from January, when the spread between 
the marginal facility rates was restored to 200 bp (see Panel 4). In 
fact, from October the full allotment of applications in the weekly ten-
ders came to replace the role of the credit facility, which has effec-
tively shifted the ceiling for the EONIA rate.
As a result of these decisions, the ECB balance sheet increased con-
siderably. Relative to the situation as at mid-2007, the ECB’s assets 
grew by around 70%, accounting for around €800 billion or 8% of 
euro area GDP (see Panel 5). However, the net provision of liquidity 
was lower because surplus funds were not placed in the market; 
rather, banks made use of the deposit facility (see Panel 6). Encour-
aging this drainage mechanism was the reduction in the spread be-
tween this facility and the main refinancing operations. To restrict this 
practice, the facilities corridor was restored in January, which has 
contributed to the contraction of the balance sheet since mid-Febru-
ary (along with lower demand for refinancing in dollars).
In sum, the worsening of the international financial crisis in 2008 re-
quired, as in other parts of the world, an unprecedented adaptation of 
liquidity provision systems. The ECB’s interventions contributed to al-
leviating the financial strains derived from the drying up of wholesale 
funding markets. However, these support measures, while necessary, 
have an inherently limited capacity to resolve the fundamental prob-
lems of confidence and attitude towards risk that continue to stifle the 
sound functioning of markets. Accordingly, interbank spreads and the 
indicators of credit risk in the banking sector have held at relatively 
high levels, despite falling gradually from their October highs.
At the ECB Governing Council meeting on 7 May 2009, when it cut 
its main refinancing operations rate to 1%, it also narrowed the cor-
ridor between the marginal lending facility and deposit facility rates 
from 200 bp to 150 bp and held the interest rate of the latter facility 
at 0.25%. In parallel, it announced the introduction of three new li-
quidity-injecting operations at as term of twelve months, and the 
broadening of non-standard measures to encompass the purchase 
of covered bonds issued by euro area banks. 
Fortis and Hypo Real Estate – had to be bailed out, and the ensuing alarm became manifest 
in large-scale demand for cash. These episodes and the high uncertainty over the strength of 
financial institutions’ balance sheets prompted, as in other parts of the world, sharp downward 
reactions in asset prices and a heightening of financing problems. Action by the ECB and the 
launching of ambitious national support plans averted any far-reaching consequences, but 
high risk premia and tighter lending standards remained in place even in early 2009, despite 
the fact that banks gradually passed through official interest-rate cuts to their customers. The 
national financial system support plans, referred to in other sections of this Report, had 
necessitated extraordinary 
action by the ECB and by 
governments, which launched 
financial system support plans 
within an agreed framework of 
common principles
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amounts equivalent to more than 20% of euro area GDP assigned to them. Moreover, they 
were to some extent coordinated by the framework of common principles agreed by the Eu-
rogroup on 12 October, with the aim of contributing to the greater effectiveness of the meas-
ures and avoiding potential distortions to competition. To maintain the flow of loans to the 
economy, some countries – including Germany, France, Spain and Ireland – made their meas-
ures conditional upon banks’ expanding their supply of credit. This initiative was comple-
mented in December with the European Commission’s adoption of a framework of temporary 
measures (to 2010) to directly stimulate credit as part of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan.
Capital market dysfunctions were most apparent in the interbank market, where there was an 
enormous reduction in activity, particularly in non-collateralised longer-dated operations. Re-
flecting this situation, EURIBOR rates throughout the year contained very high risk premia 
which rose at the times of the greatest financial instability, exceeding 200 bp at their peak in 
October. Thereafter, risk premia gradually declined, falling to levels similar to those prevailing 
before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This reduction and, above all, the sharp easing in 
monetary policy resulted in a notable decline in the three-month EURIBOR, which fell below 
1.5% in April, down from over 5% in October 2008.
Sovereign bonds acted as a safe-haven asset during the greatest bouts of financial turmoil, 
giving rise to wide fluctuations in their returns. Over the year as a whole, 10-year rates in the 
euro area declined moderately to close to 4%, which entailed a widening of the negative 
spread relative to US rates, where a sharper fall was observed. As the year unfolded, the pros-
pect of lower growth in the economy and in prices coupled with the easing of monetary policy 
exerted downward pressure on long-term rates, while the foreseeable deterioration in public 
finances stemming from the fiscal stimulus and financial support packages tended to raise the 
cost of public debt issues. Indeed, sovereign bond spreads in the euro area over the German 
benchmark bond widened substantially and remain at a high level, which reflects the increase 
in credit risk premia and also a greater preference for liquidity (see Box 6.2).
Funding conditions also tightened on private debt markets, where there were extraordinary 
increases in yield spreads, particularly in 2008 Q4, for financial and non-financial corporations 
alike (see Chart 4.7). Against this background, primary markets performed unevenly in respect 
of their various instruments. Low-grade bond issues declined substantially, as did covered 
bonds (which offer very high credit quality). However, financial institutions made sizeable secu-
ritisations, which they retained on their balance sheets in order to have collateral and thus the 
potential to gain access to Eurosystem financing. As from November, the State-backed issues 
envisaged in government support schemes also began to proliferate.
In the market for bank loans, interest rates also moved on a rising trend for most of the year, 
in line with the EURIBOR. This trajectory was interrupted in November when the cost of bank 
financing began to fall substantially as part of the more accommodating monetary policy 
transmission process. Nonetheless, the Bank Lending Survey continued to show a progres-
sive tightening of supply conditions, reflecting above all the substantial deterioration in eco-
nomic activity and in real estate markets in some of the Member States, and which took the 
form of greater requirements in respect of collateral, maturity and other non-price condi-
tions.
Against this backdrop, credit to the private sector progressively lost momentum, more 
sharply so as from mid-2008 (see Chart 4.8). Loans to the private sector slowed by almost 
5 pp to a growth rate of around 7% in 2008 in securitisation-adjusted terms, a trajectory 
The interbank market was 
particularly affected by the 
crisis, with the EURIBOR 
containing high risk premia that 
peaked in October
Public debt continued to be a 
safe haven and the spreads 
between sovereign bonds 
widened
Risk premia increased on 
private debt markets and 
financial institutions made 
sizeable securitisations which 
they retained on their balance 
sheets
The supply of bank loans 
became more restrictive and 
credit to the private sector 
slowed, more markedly so in 
the final quarter
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that has become more accentuated in the opening months of 2009. In the case of house-
holds, both consumer loans and house-purchase loans were slacker. Their growth on bank 
balance sheets did not exceed 2% in 2008, compared with 6% in 2007, a reduction that 
has continued in 2009 to date. As a result, households’ debt/gross disposable income 
ratio held stable, following six years of continuous growth. Loans to non-financial corpora-
tions also slowed, although they retained a higher growth rate (9%) over the year as a 
whole, entailing a further increase in the sector’s debt ratio. Loans over €1 million were 
particularly dynamic, revealing that the slowdown particularly affected small and medium-
sized enterprises, for which declines in year-on-year terms have been recorded since spring 
2008.
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Stock market prices began to fall from the start of the year and volatility was very high. As the 
financial crisis worsened and its impact on economic activity became apparent, the fall in eq-
uity prices gathered pace and spread to all sectors. In 2008 as a whole, the EUROSTOXX 50 
index fell by almost 45%, with declines of over 60% in the value of the bank sector. This be-
haviour continued into early 2009, but they began to be corrected as from March, when Euro-
pean stock markets, like other international equity markets, welcomed specific new measures 
from governments and central banks, particularly in the United States and the United King-
dom.
The exchange rate of the euro was also highly influenced by the instability of the international 
financial system and economic developments. In 2008 as a whole, the real effective rate of the 
euro appreciated by almost 3%, albeit with very marked upward and downward fluctuations 
and evidencing heterogeneous behaviour in relation to various currencies (see Chart 4.9). Over 
the course of 2008, the euro depreciated by 5% against the dollar and by 23% against the 
yen. By contrast, it appreciated by over 28% against sterling. In 2009 the euro has remained 
Stock market prices plummeted 
while evidencing high volatility
The euro appreciated in 
effective terms and showed 
high volatility
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volatile and on a rising trend as from March, particularly against the currencies of those coun-
tries that most aggressively eased their monetary policies.
Finally, the dynamism of the monetary aggregates was substantially contained in 2008 and 
early 2009. However, investment flows towards time deposits held up strongly for most of the 
year, owing to the attractive return involved, though this behaviour was interrupted in 2009. By 
contrast, the most liquid assets – M1, which includes cash and sight deposits – slowed nota-
bly, although at the height of the financial turmoil (in September and October) there was great 
demand for these instruments.
There was an easing in the 
growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates, particularly the 
most liquid measures
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The Spanish economy
In 2008, the slowdown that had already begun in the Spanish economy gave way to a sharp ad-
justment, with a decline in activity in the second half of the year, so that by end-2008 the economy 
was immersed in a deep recession. The factors that determined this performance have been de-
scribed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2: domestic factors, linked in particular to the adjustment proc-
ess in the real estate sector; and external factors, especially the international financial crisis and its 
implications for the world economy. GDP continued to grow in Spain in 2008 (1.2%), but it de-
clined by 0.7% in year-on-year terms in 2008 Q4, and deteriorated further (–3%) in 2009 Q1. A 
breakdown of GDP in the period shows that it was marked by growing weakness of the main 
components of national demand, while net external demand made a positive contribution to GDP 
growth for the first time in several years, as exports recorded a good performance in the first half 
of the year and imports declined. The deterioration in the economic climate had a virulent impact 
on employment, which fell by 0.6% in the year as a whole but by more than 3% year-on-year in 
Q4. Moreover, there was no sign of any change in wage bargaining trends, with labour costs rising 
in excess of 5%. Despite this adverse economic climate, the labour force continued to grow at a 
strong pace (3%) and this, combined with job destruction, prompted a sharp increase in the un-
employment rate, to 13.9% in 2008 Q4, almost 6 pp higher than in mid-2007. The authorities 
launched expansive fiscal measures in an endeavour to offset the economic weakness; together 
with the abrupt decline in activity, this brought the budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP, an increase of 
6 pp on the 2007 budget surplus. The nation’s net borrowing fell moderately in 2008, to 9.1% of 
GDP, although, as in the other indicators, the correction in the second half of the year was more 
significant, as imports declined rapidly and the price of oil returned to more moderate levels. 
Energy prices were one of the key factors behind the sharp fluctuations in inflation over the 
year. After peaking in the summer of 2008, the CPI has decelerated very quickly, recording 
negative rates in the spring of 2009, partly as a result of these fluctuations in the price of oil but 
also due to the impact of the recession on price setting. As a result, the inflation differential with 
the euro area has been increasingly negative since December 2008.
Household and corporate financing conditions continued to tighten in 2008 (see Chart 5.1). 
Interest rates on loans rose throughout the first nine months of the year, in line with the in-
crease in interbank market yields that was basically due to the prevailing financial tension, and 
the cost of corporate debt and equity issues also rose, as risk premiums rebounded. In addi-
tion, credit standards applied by the banks became more restrictive.
Nevertheless, interbank market rates headed down during the closing months of the year, as 
official interest rates were cut, interest rate expectations were revised down and risk premiums 
declined, and this began to be passed through to new bank loans and, albeit more slowly, to 
the average cost of outstanding debt, given the high proportion of floating-rate loans.
The cost of issuing public debt also declined in the year as a whole. Thus, at end-2008 the 
yield on Spanish twelve-month Treasury bills stood at 2.1%, 1.9 pp less than a year earlier, 
while that on ten-year bonds stood at 3.9%, down from 4.3%. As in the case of most euro 
area sovereign debt, this decline was smaller than that in the German bund, so that the spread 
between them widened, to around 80 bp at December 2008 and more than 120 bp in Febru-
ary 2009. However this spread then narrowed again, to around 70 bp in early May. The effec-
tive nominal exchange rate appreciated by 2.7 pp in cumulative annual terms, having a slight-
ly contractive effect on monetary conditions.
1 Monetary and financial 
conditions
Monetary and financial 
conditions tightened in 2008, …
... although the cost of debt fell 
towards the end of the year
The cost of issuing public
debt declined and the effective 
exchange rate appreciated
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The international financial crisis had an adverse impact on the value of households’ financial 
and real estate assets: the IBEX 35 closed 2008 down almost 40% and house prices fell by 
3.4% in real terms in the year. Thus, net household wealth declined, with the consequent ad-
verse impact on consumption and residential investment. Stock market losses also discour-
aged business investment.
Tightening credit conditions, along with declining household confidence and diminishing 
wealth, meant that the rate of growth of household liabilities continued to slow (see Chart 5.1). 
In the year as a whole, the rate of growth of borrowing fell by 8 pp year-on-year, down to 4% 
at end-2008. Accordingly, the debt ratio fell slightly, but as yet with no decline in the associ-
ated debt burden, due to the increase in the average cost of outstanding debt.
Net household wealth declined 
in real terms
Household and corporate 
indebtedness ceased to grow,
but the debt burden rose
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CHART 5.1
SOURCES: Datastream, MSCI Blue Book and Banco de España.
a. The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b. The interest rate on long-term fixed income is calculated as the sum of the 5-year euro swap rate
and the weighted average of the credit risk insurance premia of Spanish non-financial corporations
at that same term.
c. Securitisation is included in the total series, but not in the different sectors, since there is no
information to assign it to the latter.
d. Excluding construction.
ISSUES (b)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 5 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The rate of growth of corporate financing fell more sharply (by more than 10 pp), to around 7% 
at year-end. The rate of growth of credit, which is the main component, moderated in all areas 
of activity, but most especially in real estate services and construction (where growth rates fell 
by some 20 pp and 15 pp, respectively). The corporate debt ratio remained virtually un-
changed, as the increase in debt was similar to the increase in revenue, but this, together with 
the rise in the average cost of borrowing, drove up the debt burden ratio once again. Lastly, as 
a consequence of the worsening of the fiscal balance of the general government, borrowing 
by this sector rose significantly in 2008, posting year-on-year growth of almost 16% at year-
end, in contrast to the negative rate of change seen a year earlier.
In the wake of a fiscal surplus amounting to 2.2% of GDP at end-2007, and ahead of an ex-
pected gradual slowdown in activity, the fiscal policy envisaged in the State budget for 2008 
included hardly any significant regulatory changes. Nevertheless, revenue would be affected 
by a number of measures taken in previous years, including, inter alia, the residual impact on 
tax payable of the reduction in personal income tax and the corporate income tax rate cuts. 
On the spending side, the growth rate budgeted for non-financial State expenditure in 2008 
was 9%, if compared with the outturn for 2007, significantly higher than the nominal GDP 
growth forecast. The regional (autonomous) governments’ budgets were drawn up along sim-
ilar lines, projecting an increase in non-financial expenditure in excess of 8% when compared 
with the initial figures for 2007. So all in all, an expansionary fiscal policy. 
As economic slowdown accelerated, new fiscal measures were approved in the year. To-
gether with the budget measures, these represented a strong fiscal impulse and a significant 
budget cost, estimated as 1.6 pp of GDP (see Table 5.1 which lists and quantifies the stimulus 
measures adopted in 2008 and 2009, distinguishing between permanent and temporary 
measures; see also Box 5.1). The key new measure, in terms of its impact on revenue, was the 
personal income tax rebate of up to €400, via lower withholdings on earned income, which 
was approved in April 2008 and came into force in the year. In addition, in November two new 
funds were created, endowed with total resources amounting to 1% of GDP, to foment local 
investment and investment in strategic sectors in 2009 (the State Fund for Local Investment 
and the Special State Fund to Invigorate the Economy and Employment). The impact on activ-
ity of the measures introduced in 2008 may have been lessened by the climate of uncertainty, 
the situation of private-sector saving at the start of the year and the decline in expenditure.
The economic slowdown, and in particular the deceleration in national demand, led to a sharp 
decline in tax revenue, confirming that the increase in revenue seen in the expansionary phase 
included a significant temporary component, linked above all to the strength of the real estate 
sector. Accordingly, the sharp adjustment in this sector quickly passed through to revenue. At 
the same time, the automatic stabilisers were activated, prompting a significant increase in 
unemployment benefits, which rose by 0.4 pp as a percentage of GDP.
As the extraordinary revenue linked to the property boom of recent years disappeared, and in 
light of the automatic stabilisers’ responsiveness to the business cycle, the new measures in-
troduced and the continued dynamism of public expenditure, the budgetary situation deterio-
rated significantly. Thus, by end-2008, the surplus recorded in 2007 had been transformed 
into a general government deficit of 3.8% of GDP (see Box 5.1).
By sub-sector, only Social Security continued to post a surplus (0.8% of GDP), although short of 
that seen in 2007. Central government (the State and its autonomous bodies) recorded a deficit of 
2.7% of GDP, as opposed to a surplus of 1.3% of GDP in 2007, while territorial government deficits 
widened somewhat, to 1.4% of GDP in the case of the regional (autonomous) governments, and 
2 Economic policies
2.1 FISCAL POLICY
An expansive fiscal policy was 
designed for 2008, ahead of an 
expected slowdown in growth
As economic slowdown 
accelerated, new fiscal 
measures were approved in the 
year, leading to greater fiscal 
expansion, ...
... a sharp decline in revenue 
and a significant increase in 
unemployment benefits 
As a result, by end-2008 the 
surplus recorded in 2007 had 
been transformed into a 
sizeable budget deficit 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 6 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
FISCAL MEASURES 2008 2009 2010
TOTAL IMPACT (I - II) -18,121 -22,577 -1,075
I Non-financial revenue -17,940 -14,377 -75
I.a  PERMANENT IMPACT -14,640 -8,002
2% deflation of tax rates, personal and family allowances and earned income allowance under personal 
income tax
-1,030
004,2-mroferxatemocnilanosrep7002fotcapmidetcepxE
090,1-nerdlihcfonoitpodarohtribrofxatemocnilanosreprednufeilerxaT
009,1-001,4-xatemocnilanosreprednuemocnidenraenoetaberxat004€
Tax relief for tenants under personal income tax -350
254,3-025,5-)8002-7002(mroferxatemocnietaroprocfotcapmidetcepxE
Freeze on excise duties -500
Elimination of wealth tax -2,300
I.b  TEMPORARY IMPACT -3,300 -6,375 -75
Inclusion of tax credit on home ownership (main residence) in calculation of personal income tax 
withholdings
-1,200
51-51-stnuoccasgnivasesahcrup-emohfonoitasilaerrofdoirepfonoisnetxE
Corporate income tax: income delayed due to lack of application of new chart of accounts in prepayments 
in 2008
2,600
005-005-xatemocnietaroprocrednustnediser-nonybdlehtbedcilbupnotseretnirofnoitpmexexaT
Incentives for temporary hires -1,200
008,2-spuorgetaroprocnisnruterTAVfonoitadilosnoC
Monthly VAT refunds brought forward -6,000
Temporary partial moratorium on mortage repayments -60 -60
ANANtnemtsevnieroteudnoitpmexefosesopruprofecnediserniamfoelasrofdoirepraey-owtfonoisnetxE
ANANxatemocnietaroprocrednustessawenfonoitasitromaronoitaicerpeddetcirtsernU
II Non-financial expenses 181 8,200 1,000
II.a PERMANENT IMPACT 181 -1,500 -1,000
Reduction in expenses (a) -20 -1,500 -1,000
102nalpnoitargetnidnagniniart,ecnadiuglanoitacovyranidroartxE
II.b  TEMPORARY IMPACT 9,700 2,000
Unemployment benefits (b) 700
State Fund for Local Investment 6,000 2,000
000,3tnemyolpmEdnaymonocEehtetarogivnIotdnuFetatSlaicepS
166,02933,9)ecnalabnotcapmion(tbedcilbupnotcapmihtiWIII
166,02933,9)nb03€mumixam(stessAlaicnaniFfonoitisiuqcAehtrofdnuF
OTHER MEASURES Entry into force Funding
I ICO (Official Credit Institute) credit facilities
Total funding 49,100
000,39002.40.62deyolpme-flesehtdnasmrifotstbed'snoitaroproclacoleetnaraugotytilicaftidercOCI
000,018002.21.32)c(deyolpme-flesehtdnasEMSrofytilicafytidiuqilOCI
000,69002hcraM)d()c(seinapmocdezis-muidemrofytilicafytidiuqilOCI
ICO corporate support facilities 2009 2009 10,900
New ICO moratorium facility for SMEs (e) 2009
000,39002hcraMdetcepxE)seinapmocdezis-muidemrofstcejorptnemtsevni(ytilicaftidercDEMNIORP-OCI
000,60102-9002)sEMSrofsEPSnoitasitiruces(ytillicafEMYPTFyrusaerTfonoisnetxE
000,39002)ecnediserniam(gnisuohlatnerrofdesugnisuohdetelpmocrofsnaol:ytilicaftidercgnisuohOCI
Extension of ICO guarantee for asset-backed securities linked to government-subsidised housing 
(FTVPO facility)
2009 5,000
000,19002)emmargorpnoitasinredomyrtsudnimsiruot(omsiruTevoneRnalP
Plan VIVE (vehicle renewal programme) 2008-2011 1,200
II Other support measures
State subsidies for car purchases (€500 per unit) 100
8002.40.22sraeyowtroftsocontasdoireptnemyaperegagtromfonoisnetxE
9002snoitubirtnocytiruceSlaicoSf otnemyapfolarrefedrofsnoitidnoclaicepS
2009-2010
MAIN STIMULUS MEASURES APPLIED IN 2008-2010 TABLE 5.1
NA: No quantitative estimate is available.
a. The estimate does not include the impact of the reductions in headcount or executive pay.
b. The estimate does not include the impact of the new treatment of redundancy programmes.
c. The ICO contributes 50% and the banks the other 50%.
d. Supplementary to the ICO Liquidity facility, but for larger corporations.
e. Amount deferred: €5 bn.
€m
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FACTORS BEHIND THE DETERIORATION IN THE BUDGET BALANCE IN 2008 AND THAT EXPECTED IN 2009 BOX 5.1
One of the key features of the development of the Spanish economy 
in 2008 was the extent of the budgetary deterioration, as by end-
2008 the general government surplus of 2.2% of GDP in 2007 had 
been transformed into a deficit of 3.8%.
This deterioration in public finances (6 pp of GDP) in 2008 was pri-
marily due to three factors: cyclical deterioration, the effects of the 
discretionary fiscal measures applied, and the disappearance of a 
certain amount of temporary revenue associated with the develop-
ments on the real estate and financial markets (see accompanying 
table). First, the cyclical deterioration, which drove down the general 
government balance by some 0.7 pp of GDP in comparison with the 
previous year, largely due to the increase in unemployment benefits 
as the jobless total rose. Second, the discretionary measures, which 
had a negative impact of slightly more than 1.5 pp of GDP, and in 
particular the new package of measures announced in April 2008 
that included, inter alia, a cost of 0.5 pp of GDP in the form of the 
€400 personal income tax rebate. Moreover, the impact of other dis-
cretionary measures that were known at the beginning of 2008 
proved greater than was initially expected. Thus, the impact of the 
CUNA Programme and of the personal and corporate income tax 
reforms warranted a decline in revenue of almost 0.8 pp of GDP in 
2008, while the impact of the new VAT system on consolidated 
groups also detracted from revenue to the tune of some 0.3 pp of 
GDP.
The rest of the budgetary deterioration, more than 3.5 pp of GDP, is 
chiefly due to two factors. First, the tax revenue losses over and 
above those warranted by the development of the theoretical bases 
used to predict the behaviour of the different tax headings and their 
respective elasticities. These revenue deviations are thought to be 
largely connected to the decline in the extraordinary revenue that was 
obtained during the economic growth phase from the boom on the 
real estate and financial markets. According to a Banco de España 
study,1 this extraordinary revenue accounted for more than 2 pp of 
GDP in cumulative terms up to 2007. And second, the growth in 
public expenditure that is not directly linked to economic perform-
ance, which is estimated to have risen substantially above trend GDP. 
Thus the ratio of primary expenditure adjusted for cyclical effects (the 
latter, basically connected to unemployment benefits) to trend GDP 
would have risen by approximately 1.5 pp in 2008, with a significant 
contribution from compensation per employee. 
Public finances will foreseeably deteriorate again in 2009; according to 
the latest Banco de España projections report, the deficit forecast for 
2009 will amount to 8.3% of GDP, an increase of 4.5 pp on 2008, funda-
mentally as a result of the increase of 4.3 pp in the expenditure ratio.
There are three key factors behind the expected growth in the budget 
deficit in 2009: the marked cyclical deterioration, the impact of the 
discretionary measures, and the change in trend in public debt ser-
vicing payments. First, the macroeconomic climate is expected to 
worsen significantly in 2009, prompting further deterioration of 
2.5 pp of GDP in the general government balance connected to the 
economic cycle. It should be noted, in this respect, that when tax 
figures are analysed in terms of ratios to GDP, the automatic stabilis-
ers have most impact on public expenditure, as government receipts 
as a whole have elasticity close to one relative to GDP. Specifically, 
more than 0.5 pp of the increase in the expenditure ratio are directly 
due to unemployment benefits. Second, the bundle of discretionary 
measures with effect in 2009 will have an adverse impact on the 
2008 2009
5.4-0.6-ecnalabtnemnrevoglarenegehtniegnahC
5.2-7.0-)a(noitisoplacilcycehtniegnahcehtoteuD
8.1-6.1-serusaemyranoitercsidehtfotcapmiehtoteuD
Due to debt servicing 0.1 -0.2
Remainder -3.8 -0.0
Change in total resources -4.4 -0.2
Change in total uses 1.6 4.3
FACTORS BEHIND THE CHANGES IN THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE
Changes in variables over the previous year, expressed as a % of GDP
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The cyclical impact on the budgetary balance is obtained by applying an elasticity of 0.43 to the output gap calculated using the Phillips 
curve.
1. F. de Castro, A. Estrada, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (2008), “Una 
aproximación al componente transitorio del saldo público en España”, Boletín 
Económico, June, Banco de España, pp. 71-81. And on the same lines, the 
European Commission Economic Paper by C. Martínez-Mongay, L. A. Maza 
and J. Yánez (2007), “Asset Booms and Tax Receipts: The Case of Spain 1995-
2006”, European Economy Economic Papers, nº 293.
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FACTORS BEHIND THE DETERIORATION IN THE BUDGET BALANCE IN 2008 AND THAT EXPECTED IN 2009 (cont´d) BOX 5.1
deficit, estimated as 1.8 pp of GDP, considering that certain tempo-
rary measures that had an impact in 2008 should be reversed in 
2009. The measures for 2009 include, in particular, earlier-than-usu-
al VAT refunds, which will add 0.6 pp of GDP to the deficit, the elim-
ination of wealth tax, with a cost of approximately 0.2 pp of GDP, 
and approval of the State Fund for Local Investment and the Special 
State Fund to Invigorate the Economy and Employment, which rep-
resent 0.6 pp and 0.3 pp of GDP, respectively. And third, debt serv-
icing payments are expected to add to budgetary deterioration by 
0.2 pp of GDP more than in 2008, as public debt expands.
In short, all the above shows that, although part of the deterioration 
in public finances seen in 2008 and forecast for 2009 is due to cycli-
cal deterioration, much of this deterioration is structural and that, in 
consequence, a return to healthier public finances will necessarily re-
quire considerable budgetary adjustment.
0.4% of GDP in that of local governments. Thus, after declining as a percentage of GDP since 1997, 
public debt rose by 3.3 pp on a year earlier, standing at 39.4% of GDP at end-2008. 
One of the main reasons behind the deterioration in public finances in 2008 is the decrease of 
slightly more than 4 pp in the tax burden (tax revenue relative to GDP), which contrasts with the 
increase of more than 5 pp in this variable between 1995 and 2007 (see Table 5.2). Revenue from 
direct and indirect taxes declined, while social security contributions remained unchanged as a 
percentage of GDP. Against the backdrop of contraction in activity, the decline in revenue was 
concentrated on taxes linked to corporate profits, the real estate sector and consumption: spe-
cifically, corporate income tax revenue fell by almost 2 pp of GDP, VAT revenue by almost 1 pp 
and revenue from stamp and registration duties by 0.7 pp of GDP. By contrast, personal income 
tax revenue fell only marginally, despite the impact of the new tax rebate and the employment 
adjustment, sustained by tax withholdings on capital gains and, to a lesser extent, on earned in-
come which continued to post positive rates of change due to the strong growth in wages.
Public spending rose by 1.7 pp as a percentage of GDP to 41%. This growth was due almost 
exclusively to primary current spending, in a setting in which interest payments held steady as 
a percentage of GDP for the third consecutive year. As in previous years, final public consump-
tion grew significantly. In this respect, the high inertia in health and education spending, which 
represent a very significant proportion of public consumption, is particularly noteworthy, as is 
the growth in the public-sector wage bill which, on the back of high wage drift in recent years, 
amounted to 9% in 2008. Social benefits rose by 0.7 pp as a percentage of GDP, primarily as 
a result of the growing volume of unemployment benefits, but also due to the increase in con-
tributory pensions associated with the acceleration in the average number of pensions and the 
new benefits for birth and adoption of children. Lastly, capital expenditure decelerated in 2008, 
as the rate of growth of investment fell to 2.4% (from 10.3% en 2007), although it continued to 
represent 3.8% of GDP, in line with the pattern seen in previous electoral cycles of more mod-
erate capital expenditure growth in post-election years.
Fiscal policy in 2009 will remain clearly expansionary, as a result of the measures that have 
come into force in the year, in particular the State Fund for Local Investment, mentioned ear-
lier, and the decision to bring forward monthly VAT refunds. These are mainly temporary mea-
sures, directed at specific sectors and targets, so they may have a more expansionary impact 
on activity. On Banco de España estimates, the State Fund for Local Investment could add 
0.3 pp to GDP growth on average in 2009 and 2010.
All in all, considering the high budget deficit recorded in 2008, the various steps taken and the 
contraction in activity could lead to a budget deficit in excess of 8% in 2009 and 2010. This would 
also entail a rapid increase in the public debt to GDP ratio, which could approach 60% in 2010.
By component, fiscal pressure 
declined considerably …
... and public spending grew as 
a percentage of GDP, driven by 
government consumption and 
social benefits
The introduction of new 
economic stimulus measures and 
the impact of the unfavourable 
macroeconomic climate point to 
a budget deficit in excess of 8% 
in 2009 and 2010, ...
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In terms of fiscal policy, all this severely constrains the room for manoeuvre, making a return to 
budgetary stability a key priority in the medium term. In particular, it is vital that the deterioration 
of the fiscal position is not seen as a persistent deviation, as risk premiums on government debt 
seem to have become more sensitive to the perceived sustainability of public finances, inter 
alia. Although, in relative terms, government debt is still lower than the average in the euro area, 
the speed of its growth could make a subsequent reversal more difficult and could drive up 
borrowing costs. Moreover, it is essential that government debt ratios remain moderate, to 
provide favourable conditions for the future increase in spending on pensions.
In 2008, Spain’s central and territorial (regional and local) governments ran budget deficits in excess of 
the limits established in the budgetary stability regulations. In April 2009, the European Council deter-
mined that Spain was running an excessive deficit1 and recommended that this situation be corrected 
by 2012 at the latest, requiring annual average fiscal adjustment of at least 1.25% of GDP, to start in 
2010. In the end, the Council set 27 October 2009 as a deadline for the corrective action to be taken.
... which will necessitate 
development of a consolidation 
strategy in the medium-term 
The consolidation strategy must 
be consistent with the 
commitments acquired within 
the framework of the European 
Union
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 NON-FINANCIAL RESOURCES 38.5 38.9 39.8 40.9 41.5 37.1
0.730.142.041.931.838.73secruosertnerruC
— Taxes on products and imports 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.4 11.7 9.8
— Taxes on income and wealth 10.1 10.2 10.9 11.7 12.9 10.7
0.310.319.219.210.310.31snoitubirtnoclaicoS—
— Other current resources (a) 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4
1.04.07.08.09.07.0secruoserlatipaC
2 NON-FINANCIAL USES (b) 38.7 39.3 38.9 38.9 39.3 41.0
7.530.438.330.430.439.33)b(sesutnerruC
1.913.811.810.818.714.71noitpmusnoclaniF—
11.7 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.3
1.11.10.10.10.10.1seidisbuS—
6.16.16.18.10.23.2)b(tseretnI—
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6
3.52.51.59.42.58.4sesulatipaC
8.38.37.36.34.36.3noitamroflatipacssorG—
5.14.14.14.19.13.1)c(sesulatipacrehtO—
3
-0.2 -0.3 1.0 2.0 2.2 -3.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
3.2-8.37.38.27.11.2sulprusyramirP
5.932.636.930.342.647.84)b(tbedssorG
NET LENDING (+) OR NET
BORROWING (–) (b) (3=1-2)
— Social benefits other than social transfers
in kind
— Other transfers
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
a. Includes gross operating surplus.
b. According to the Excessive Deficit Procedure methodology.
c. Includes net acquisitions of non-financial non-produced assets.
% of GDP
MAIN GENERAL GOVERNMENT NON-FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TABLE 5.2
1. Considering that the 2008 budget deficit had exceeded the 3% reference value set in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), and that this situation could not be qualified as temporary or as having been reached in exceptional circumstances, 
both factors that could have prevented the launch of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) under the SGP. In effect, the 
Council considered that the economic circumstances of 2008 could not be qualified as exceptional, as both the estimated 
output gap and real GDP growth for that year were positive. Moreover, the divergence from the deficit target could not be 
considered temporary, as the fiscal projections presented by the European Commission and contained in the Spanish 
Stability Programme in January 2009 envisaged that the budget deficit would exceed 3% in 2009 and in 2010.
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The main aim behind all other economic policies was to alleviate the impact of the eco-
nomic crisis. A first set of measures was designed to help certain sectors and agents gain 
access to credit, while others aimed to support activity in the productive sectors most af-
fected by the collapse in demand, such as residential building, tourism and, in 2009, the 
automobile industry.
Through the ICO (Official Credit Institute) the government launched a series of extraordinary 
credit facilities for the groups most affected by the liquidity problems on the financial markets. 
As is customary, these measures were instrumented in collaboration with the private banking 
sector, which selected the borrowers and assumed the majority of the default risk. In the case 
of households, a credit facility was created to allow mortgage holders who had lost their jobs 
to defer part of their mortgage repayments, while for SMEs funds were earmarked to finance 
cash flows. The bulk of these measures will come into force in 2009 (see Table 5.1), meaning 
that so far the impact has been limited.
In January 2008, the 2005-2008 Housing Plan was amended and, in December 2008, the 
new 2009-2012 National Housing Plan was approved, in an endeavour to adapt to the sharp 
slowdown in the sector. To this end, more emphasis was placed on rental housing, with the 
introduction, inter alia, of rentals with purchase options and enhanced tax treatment for home 
refurbishment. The Plan also calls for a large volume of subsidised housing to be built in com-
ing years. In the case of the tourism industry, the ICO launched a €1 billion credit facility to help 
the industry modernise its infrastructure. Lastly, in 2009 a comprehensive plan for the automo-
bile industry was approved, affecting both the demand and the supply side; this was subse-
quently extended to include direct subsidies for new car purchases.
On the labour market, a new Inter-Confederal Collective Bargaining Agreement (AINC) was 
signed in 2008, similar to those signed in previous years, and the minimum wage rose by 5.3% 
to €600 per month. In any case, wages were marked by activation of the indexation clauses 
which, together with the rebound in wage rates, helped drive wages up by more than 5%, the 
highest rate of growth in the last 15 years, despite the considerable cyclical weakness.
Two of the fundamental features of the present collective bargaining system, namely its high 
nominal inertia and its lack of responsiveness to changes in the economy’s cyclical situation, 
together with the high degree of labour market segmentation, made this market more vulner-
able to the decline in economic activity, prompting a sharp rise in unemployment in the second 
half of 2008 which has continued in the opening months of 2009. In this respect, reform of the 
wage-setting mechanism, establishing a closer link between wages and productivity and, in 
general, between wage rises and the position of specific firms or industries, would present a 
more appropriate basis for economic recovery. In addition, in the short term, a strong commit-
ment to wage moderation by the social agents would help contain job losses (see Chapters 1 
and 2 above).
On the goods and services markets, the focus was on making progress in the transposition of 
the Services Directive, culminating in March of this year when the legislation required to start 
this process was approved. This legislation establishes free access to and exercise of service 
activities, with no need for prior authorisation, it removes the barriers to the free development 
of services by providers without an establishment in Spanish territory and it simplifies the ad-
ministrative procedures. These aspects of the draft legislation are positive and should help 
liberalise the services sector and lessen the administrative burden for firms, in line with the 
government’s commitment to reduce this burden by 30% by 2012. Once it has been passed 
by Parliament, the success of the reform will depend, however, on its correct implementation 
2.2 OTHER ECONOMIC POLICIES
The emergence and the scale of 
the economic crisis conditioned 
all other economic policies
Thus the Official Credit Institute 
extended and launched new 
credit lines for households and 
firms ...
... and various measures were 
adopted in connection with 
housing and modernisation of 
the tourist industry
By contrast, there was little 
significant change in the labour 
framework
The reforms in the goods and 
services markets focused on 
promoting transposition of the 
Services Directive
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(in particular in key sectors such as professional services and retail trade) and on strict con-
trol of the exceptions permitted by law, nationally and at regional (autonomous) government 
level.
In the case of technology, in 2008 the public sector maintained the level of investment in R&D 
seen in previous years. Several measures were announced, including reorganisation of the 
public research bodies, entry into force of the Avanza2 Plan, which aims to give a new boost 
to the introduction of information and communication technologies (ICT), and a new Science 
and Technology Law to establish the guidelines for future government policy in this area. The 
Ingenio Programme continued on the scale of previous years, although investment in R&D 
grew by barely 0.1 pp in 2007, to 1.3% of GDP, still far from the levels seen in the main devel-
oped economies, due to lower business investment (which fell, once again, as a percentage 
of total R&D spend to 45.5%). There were no signs of significant progress in human capital 
indicators; in fact, in some indicators, such as the early school leaving rate, there was a step 
backwards.
In short, the severity of the crisis, which in 2008 prompted, for the first time since 1993, a slight 
decrease in income per capita, reveals the need, beyond the short-term measures, for struc-
tural reforms in the product and factor markets and for improvements in human and techno-
logical capital stock, to ensure that the present adverse economic situation does not detract 
from future economic growth potential.
The slowdown in national demand heightened as the year progressed: all private spending 
components lost momentum, but especially household spending, as both private consump-
tion and residential investment fell sharply (see Chart 5.2). Private productive investment also 
moderated significantly, most particularly in 2008 Q4, and in fact only government spending 
on current goods and services posted higher growth than a year earlier. The persistent finan-
cial tension, which heightened in the last four months of the year, was a major contributing 
factor to this weak private demand, and this on top of the adjustment that had already begun 
in the Spanish economy in 2007. The financial crisis affected national demand through its 
adverse impact on credit availability and credit conditions and on agents’ confidence, which 
was also hit by the speed and extent of the deterioration in the labour market. Job losses, 
along with their direct impact on income, were probably the key factor behind the decrease in 
spending, especially in household spending.
Growth in private consumption stagnated in 2008: the year began with year-on-year growth of 
2%, but by Q4 this had gradually been transformed into a negative rate of change of –2.2%. 
All consumer spending components showed signs of lost momentum, but most particularly 
durable goods purchases, affected not only by the above-mentioned causes but also by the 
decline in other factors that had boosted demand for these goods in the past, such as the 
property boom and the number of immigrants becoming established in Spain (see Table 5.3). 
Car purchases by individuals fell by 30% in the year, with the sharpest rates of decline seen 
after the summer (–46% year-on-year in 2008 Q4, followed by –37% in 2009 Q1). The rate of 
growth of purchases of non-durable goods and services proved more resilient, although it also 
declined significantly on previous years.
Despite the progressive deterioration in the macroeconomic climate, real disposable income 
rose by 3.8%, due, above all, to the considerable expansionary effect of the public sector sup-
port measures on household finances (see Chart 5.3). By contrast, the rebound in compensa-
tion per employee did not lead to an increase in the wage bill, given the extent of job losses. Net 
interest payments continued to detract from household income, although less so than in the 
Investment in R&D rose slightly, 
but there were no improve-
ments in human capital 
indicators
The severity of the crisis reveals 
the need for further structural 
reforms
3 Demand
3.1 NATIONAL DEMAND
Weakness in national demand, 
and especially in household 
spending, heightened in 2008 
Private consumption was  the 
key contributing factor to the 
slowdown in GDP in 2008, with 
durable goods recording the 
sharpest contraction
Real household income grew at 
a relatively strong pace in 2008, 
…
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previous year, an effect that was particularly noticeable towards the end of 2008 and in the 
opening months of 2009, following the extensive interest rate cuts on the money markets. 
Lastly, the significant rise in the price of oil up to the summer of 2008, and its impact on con-
sumer prices, eroded the purchasing power of households’ current revenue and this also drove 
down confidence. Nevertheless, the inflation outlook changed dramatically as from July, when 
the rates of change of consumer prices began to gradually decline, and by March 2009 prices 
were falling in year-on-year terms, facilitating some recovery in households’ purchasing power.
Although income growth was higher than a year earlier, all other consumption determinants 
performed less well than in 2007, helping to explain the sharp adjustment in household spend-
ing in 2008. Thus, real interest rates (proxied ex-post, deflating interest rates with develop-
ments in consumer prices) rose, and all other credit conditions tightened. At the same time, 
household financial wealth diminished considerably, as the stock markets and residential prop-
erty values fell. Rising unemployment and, towards the end of the year, the heightened finan-
cial crisis, added to these factors, driving household confidence down to all-time lows. The 
fall-off in consumption was particularly intense considering the continued strong population 
growth; consumption per capita contracted in 2008 as a whole.
... but tighter credit conditions, 
diminishing household wealth 
and the sharp rise in 
unemployment took their toll on 
household confidence, 
prompting a decline in 
consumption ...
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As spending moderated sharply and disposable income grew, household saving rates rose 
significantly, by almost 3 pp to 13%, after falling gradually for several years. In this respect, the 
considerable uncertainty surrounding households’ investment decisions has meant that part 
of the increase in disposable income resulting from the budgetary measures has been saved 
rather than spent.
The adjustment in residential investment, first seen at the end of 2006, intensified in 2008, as 
expectations regarding property values worsened, in light of house price developments, and 
credit conditions tightened. For much of the year, the affordability indicators deteriorated sig-
nificantly, as a result of interest rate moves and the reduction in typical terms to maturity and 
in the maximum loan-to-value ratio of mortgage loans, discouraging residential investment, 
which contracted sharply in 2008, falling by 11% over the year as a whole, but by almost 20% in 
Q4 (see Chart 5.4). The number of property market transactions also declined sharply: second-
hand housing sales, which tend to reflect the market position more accurately and may serve 
as a leading indicator for future demand for new housing, fell by more than 40% in 2008, while 
sales of new housing, which could in part reflect purchasing decisions taken in the past, also 
fell, albeit more moderately (–20%), but with an increasingly negative rate of change as the 
year progressed.
... and a sharp rebound in 
household saving rates
The change in expectations 
regarding house prices, along 
with tighter credit conditions, 
drove down residential 
investment in 2008, ...
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GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Final consumption expenditure 17.2 19.1 4.8 6.3 5.5 4.6 4.9 5.3
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CONSUMPTION AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR TABLE 5.3
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a. National Accounts, base 2000, current prices.
b. National Accounts, base 2000, rates of change of volume indices.
c. Includes investment by sole proprietors.
d. This investment includes real estate, legal, accounting, consultancy and software services, among others. 
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This intense adjustment in demand was accompanied by a sharp reduction in the number of 
housing starts: 360,000 in 2008, approximately half the annual average in the period 2004-
2007. Nevertheless, the supply of unsold housing grew considerably in the year, as develop-
ments begun in the previous growth years were completed. This drove down house prices and 
may have deterred potential homebuyers, encouraging them to wait until prices stabilise.
The number of housing starts is likely to remain low in the near future, until the stock of unsold 
properties begins to be absorbed. Accordingly, the decline in residential investment expected 
in this adjustment phase will be more severe than that seen in other economic cycles in Spain 
(see Box 1.2). Until the factors that weighed on household spending in 2008 disappear, rapid 
take-up of the excess supply is unlikely, although there are also several factors that would act 
in favour, once this occurs. The affordability indicators began to improve significantly at the end 
of 2008, as both interest rates and house prices fell. Moreover, some of the demographic fac-
tors behind the creation of new households in the expansionary phase, which could serve as 
... resulting in excess supply ... 
... that will gradually be 
absorbed going forward
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a basis for future potential housing demand, remain present, such as the smaller average size 
of households, the coming of age of the latest generation of baby boomers and, although to a 
lesser extent than in the past, the influx of immigrants.
As a result of the decline in residential investment and the increase in the saving rate, house-
holds returned to a position of net lending in 2008 (0.6% of GDP), having recorded growing net 
borrowing since 2003.
General government demand remained highly dynamic in 2008, on the back of strong public 
consumption which rose by 5.3%, almost 0.5 pp higher than in 2007. This rebound was due to 
the increase in net purchases of goods and services, while compensation per employee con-
tinued to grow significantly, at a similar pace to the previous year. By contrast, general govern-
ment investment in real terms was virtually flat in 2008, for the reasons indicated earlier.
General government made a 
positive contribution to the 
growth in demand
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Business investment was markedly less dynamic in 2008, posting average growth, in real 
terms, of 0.5%, as opposed to almost 6% in 2007. Weak (national and external) demand, the 
increasingly unfavourable economic outlook and harsher external financing conditions for 
firms were all behind this sluggish performance. On the one hand, as indicated above, the 
banks began to apply increasingly stricter criteria for approval of new loans, at the same time 
as the user cost of capital rose in real terms. And on the other, internal financing became 
more difficult to come by, as the stock market fell and earnings expectations were revised 
down. The slowdown in investment was particularly significant in 2008 Q4, with a contraction 
of some 6% on the 2007 close, and it will probably intensify in 2009 since the factors that led 
to weak business investment in the final stretch of 2008 have remained unchanged to date in 
2009.
After demonstrating greater 
resilience in the first half of the 
year, business investment 
decelerated sharply towards the 
end of 2008, ...
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All private productive investment components decelerated, but particularly capital goods, which 
declined by almost 2% (see Table 5.2 and Chart 5.5). Under this heading, the contraction in the 
transport component was especially noteworthy (5.3% on average in 2008). This was reflected in 
a slight decline in investment in the services sector, which accounts for 90% of spending on trans-
port, while investment in machinery rose by just 1%, in line with the contraction in industry which 
accounts for 40% of demand in this segment. Lastly, private investment in non-residential con-
struction decelerated more moderately, sustained by the momentum in infrastructure investment 
projects undertaken by certain State-owned enterprises, while non-residential building declined 
significantly, as evidenced by developments in the number of approvals for this type of projects.
The corporate indebtedness ratio remained high and the debt burden rose (see Chart 6.9), dis-
couraging firms from taking on new investment projects. Declining corporate returns, seen in the 
... with a decline in capital 
goods spending, in particular in 
transport
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profit to productive capital stock ratio (defined using National Accounts variables), which in 2008 
continued on the declining path seen since 2004, and in the corporate profits reported to the 
Central Balance Sheet Office (CBSO), which fell sharply, also acted as a deterrent to investment.
The increase in gross operating profit and, in particular, the sharp decrease in corporate in-
come tax payments, following the latest tax reform, prompted growth in corporate saving in 
2008. This, together with the decline in the business investment ratio, led to a significant drop 
in corporate borrowing, to 7.5% of GDP, as opposed to a high of 11.1% in 2007.
For the first time since 1997, net external demand made a positive contribution to GDP growth 
in 2008 (1 pp, as opposed to a negative contribution of –0.8 pp a year earlier). This was due 
to the notable slowdown, in real terms, in imports of goods and services, which fell by 2.5% 
(after rising by 6.2% in 2007), as the rate of growth of exports moderated in 2008, rising by 
0.7%, in comparison with 4.9% a year earlier.
Goods exports were relatively dynamic, in real terms, in the first three quarters of 2008, but by 
year-end they had declined considerably, and continued to do so in the opening months of 
2009. Spanish exports, which grew by just 0.9% in the year as a whole, as opposed to 4.3% 
in 2007, thus reflected the impact of the growing weakness of world economic activity in 2008, 
and its sudden collapse in the last few months of the year. As a result of the globalisation of 
activity and trade, and in particular of the fragmentation of the production process, trade is 
playing an increasingly important role in the spread of the present financial and economic crisis 
(see Box 3.2).
Nevertheless, over the year as a whole, Spain’s world export share remained stable, in real 
terms, for the third consecutive year, as the gains in export share in the euro area offset the 
loss in share in the rest of the world (see Chart 5.7). The moderate growth in export prices 
could indicate that export firms, subject to internal cost pressures, may have had to cut their 
margins once more, in an increasingly competitive environment, so as to maintain their pres-
ence on the export markets.
The breakdown of real exports by product shows that the slowdown was felt across the 
board, but most particularly in durable goods, which bore the brunt of the contraction in 
sales of products such as automobiles to the developed countries, and in capital goods, hit 
by the poor performance of exports of transport equipment. Exports of intermediate indus-
trial products, boosted in 2007 by demand from the emerging economies, moderated con-
siderably in the second half of 2008, consistent with developments in industrial activity 
worldwide. Lastly, energy exports performed rather better, although they represent only a 
small proportion of the total, as do highly technologically intensive products (especially, air-
craft and pharmaceuticals) which, along with textiles, helped lift exports of non-durable con-
sumer goods. 
Services exports other than tourism rose by 4.6% in real terms, although this is a lower rate 
of growth than in the previous two years. In this case also the slowdown was concentrated 
in the second half of 2008, although it was much less intense than that seen in goods ex-
ports. In recent years, services have become more globalised, as technological advances 
have opened up new marketing possibilities and Spain’s big corporations have seized the 
opportunity to compete in different sectors. According to balance of payments data, con-
struction services, communications, royalties and services provided to companies were the 
key growth areas in 2008.
As business investment 
declined and saving rates rose, 
firms were able to cut their 
borrowing
3.2 EXTERNAL DEMAND
External demand made a 
positive contribution to growth 
in 2008, for the first time since 
the end of the 1990s 
Goods exports decelerated 
towards the end of 2008, but 
over the year as a whole the 
share in world markets was 
stable 
The export slowdown affected 
almost all products
Services exports also 
decelerated, although services 
other than tourism continued to 
post positive rates of growth 
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Tourism receipts fell in 2008 as a whole, but most particularly after the international financial 
crisis heightened in September. This was part of a worldwide pattern, exacerbated in the case 
of Spain by the adverse impact of the appreciation of the euro against the dollar and sterling 
on price competitiveness in comparison with other tourist destinations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. All this, along with the slowdown in activity in the EU countries, from where most of the 
tourists coming to Spain originate, brought about a decline of 2.6% in the number of visitors 
in 2008, in contrast to the growth of 2% in tourist numbers worldwide. Nevertheless, there are 
signs that the tourists visiting Spain come from an increasingly wide range of countries, and 
that the minority segments of the tourism market (such as city tourism) which, in addition, at-
tract visitors with higher spending power, are becoming relatively more stable. In the short 
term, tourist numbers cannot be expected to grow at the same pace as in the past, although 
this unfavourable outlook for the sector could be mitigated by Spanish nationals choosing to 
holiday in Spain rather than abroad.
The rate of growth of goods imports moderated as the year progressed, unlike that of exports, 
although similarly to the case of exports, the fall intensified in Q4 and has continued to do so 
in 2009. In 2008 as a whole, imports fell, by 2.7% in real terms, for the first time in 15 years, in 
comparison with growth of 4.8% in 2007, driven down by the loss of momentum in industrial 
activity and in final demand, which is highly dependent on imports, especially inputs for indus-
try and high-tech capital and consumer goods.
The decline in imports was particularly marked in capital goods (in machinery and, above all, 
in transport equipment), in consumer durables (especially automobiles), and, within industrial 
intermediate goods, in minerals and products for use in the manufacture of transport equip-
ment. By geographical area, it was concentrated, in real terms, on goods imports from within 
the EU, which fell by 7.4%, while goods imports from the rest of the world rose by 3.8%, al-
though they too fell in 2008 Q4. Worldwide, trade is declining at a faster pace than activity, and 
Spain proved no exception to this rule, as the decline in imports exceeded that which was to 
be expected in light of final demand. Thus, import penetration decreased as a proportion of 
final demand in 2008, interrupting the continued growth pattern of previous years.
Services imports also fell in 2008, after several years of significant growth. Tourism expenditure 
declined by 4.5% over the year as a whole, but, similarly to other variables, most intensely in 
Tourism receipts contracted 
sharply, against a backdrop of 
economic uncertainty and euro 
strength
The decline in imports, the first 
since 1993, intensified as the 
year progressed, ...
... resulting in a drop in import 
penetration as a proportion of 
final demand
Tourism expenditure fell in 2008, 
for the first time since 1993
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
 EURO AREA
 NON-EURO AREA (right-hand scale)
SPANISH EXPORT SHARES
In real terms
Goods
%
EXPORT SHARES AND IMPORT PENETRATION CHART 5.7
SOURCES: IMF, OECD, Eurostat, INE and Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
 EURO AREA
 NON-EURO AREA
GOODS IMPORT PENETRATION IN FINAL DEMAND
In real terms
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Q4. High economic uncertainty and the development of the fundamental determinants of tourism 
expenditure explain the behaviour of this component of household spending, which presents 
high income elasticity. The decline in imports of other services, which also heightened in the 
closing months of 2008, was due to royalty payments, insurance, and IT and communications 
services.
The economic slowdown that had begun in 2007 gradually intensified as the year progressed, 
gaining in strength as from 2008 Q4. Over the year as a whole, GDP growth, at 1.2%, was 
short of its potential rate, although this also decelerated, so that the output gap, which had 
grown throughout the expansionary phase, began to shrink in 2008 (see Chart 5.8).
4 Activity
As a result of the sharp 
slowdown in activity, the output 
gap narrowed considerably in 
2008, although it remained 
positive
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The deceleration in the rate of growth of the market economy, down 3.2 pp on the previous 
year at 0.7%, was much more pronounced than in GDP. By branch of activity, only the en-
ergy industry showed greater dynamism in 2008, while value added in agriculture and fisher-
ies declined substantially, with an average rate of growth of -0.6%, 3.6 pp below the 2007 
figure.
The fall in production was especially marked in the construction sector (–3.3%), which deceler-
ated sharply in the year, going from positive growth of 1.5% year-on-year in 2008 Q1 to a 
decline of 8% in Q4. As indicated in the section on national demand, this poor performance 
was primarily due to housing, while all other building and civil engineering components per-
formed somewhat better. The sharp drop in housing demand, the high stock of unsold proper-
ties and the increasing difficulties in accessing financing put a sharp brake on new residential 
investment projects. Moreover, worsening expectations regarding house prices deterred build-
ers, as the expected returns from new housing supply headed down. Non-residential building 
also decelerated over the year, as firms reined in their medium-term investment plans in light 
of the international economic crisis, the deteriorating economic outlook and tightening credit 
conditions.
Despite the positive performance of the energy sector, GVA gradually lost momentum in 
industry and energy in 2008, shrinking at an annual rate of 2%. This was due to the fall in 
demand for intermediate goods from the construction sector, exacerbated, as the year 
progressed, by the effect of the decline in consumer goods purchases by households and 
in capital goods purchases by companies. Moreover, the collapse in international trade in 
2008 Q4 prompted a cutback in export goods production. Accordingly, the decline in in-
dustrial activity became more pronounced as the year progressed, going from a virtually flat 
rate of growth year-on-year in Q1 to a negative rate of –4.7% in Q4. This decline was most 
marked in industries producing goods with lower (especially medium-low) technological 
content, while more advanced industries posted growth on 2007. In the energy sector, 
value added rose by around 2%, primarily as a result of greater momentum in gas distribu-
tion, while weak electricity demand led to modest growth of scarcely 1% in electricity gen-
eration.
Activity in the services sector as a whole decelerated sharply in 2008, growing at an average 
rate of 3.1%, on the back of the progressive deterioration in market services, whose GVA grew 
by 2.6% in the year (0.7% in Q4), as opposed to growth in excess of 4% in the three previous 
years. This loss of momentum was seen across the board, both in domestic market and ex-
port services, but most particularly in services connected with the automobile and tourism 
industries and in business services.
After 14 consecutive years of employment growth, at an annual average rate in excess of 3%, 
in 2008 employment fell by 0.6%, although the labour market deteriorated much more se-
verely in the second half of the year, shrinking at a rate of 3.1% in year-on-year terms in Q4 
(see Chart 5.9). The decline was worse in the market economy, where employment fell by 
1.2% on average in the year.
The adjustment in employment was much higher than that seen in economic activity due, 
among other factors analysed in Chapter 2 of this Report, to wages which rebounded sharply, 
both in nominal and real terms. The rate of growth of apparent labour productivity stood at 
1.8% although, as shown in the bottom-right panel in Chart 5.9, which presents an estimated 
breakdown, this increase was due to the sharp fall in employment, which lifted the capital-
employment ratio, with no gains visible in estimated total factor productivity.
All areas of activity lost 
momentum: construction 
declined sharply …
... and industry somewhat more 
moderately, …
... while market services, 
although recording positive 
growth, decelerated significantly 
in the year
5 The labour market
Jobs were destroyed in 2008, 
after a lengthy period of strong 
employment growth
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Construction bore the brunt of the adjustment: employment fell by slightly more than 10% 
over the year as a whole, with negative rates of change as from Q1 and a decline of more 
than 20% in Q4. In industry, despite the recovery seen in the first part of the year, employ-
ment fell by 1.2%, with extensive job destruction in Q4. In market services, employment rose 
by 1.9%, less than half the rate of growth seen in 2007, and with virtually flat growth by year-
end. Lastly, in agriculture, jobs were destroyed again, for the sixth consecutive year, and at a 
higher rate than in 2007. Nevertheless, non-market services offset part of this adverse per-
formance, growing at a steady rate of 2% throughout the year, very similar to the previous 
year.
The strong growth in productivity in the construction sector (8.3%) explains the bulk of the 
rebound in productivity in the economy overall, after a long period of decline. Productivity 
By branch of activity, the 
deterioration, although 
generalised, was particularly 
notable in construction
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growth was more modest in services and was even negative in industry, falling sharply in the 
first half of the year. 
The employment breakdown based on contract duration shows that employees with tempo-
rary contracts bore the brunt of job destruction, as their numbers fell by 8% in the year and by 
more than 12% in Q4. The number of employees with permanent contracts rose by 3%, al-
though this rate of growth slowed markedly in the year and was virtually flat at end-2008. The 
ratio of temporary to total employees thus stood at 29.3%, more than 2 pp below the 2007 
figure. This decline is primarily due to the cyclical pattern of temporary employment, which has 
borne the brunt of the adjustment. Thus, for example, on EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) 
data, 14.5% of employees with temporary contracts in 2008 Q3 were unemployed three 
months later, in comparison with 2% of employees with permanent contracts. Job destruction 
in the construction sector, where the proportion of temporary to total employees is very high 
and a third of workers with temporary contracts lost their jobs in the year, also contributed to 
this decline. Hirings of foreign workers continued to increase in 2008; however, the rate of 
growth was much lower than in 2007, and fell sharply as the year progressed, becoming virtu-
ally flat in 2008 Q4.
The labour force regained a certain degree of momentum, growing by 3% in the year, al-
though the rate of population growth moderated, from 1.8% in 2007 to 1.4% in 2008. This 
lower rate of growth was due to the slowdown in net migrant inflows, which although still 
high (some 450,000 persons over 16 years of age), reflected some reaction to the deterio-
ration in activity. Accordingly, the rebound in the labour force was due to the higher rise in 
the participation rate, which at 59.8% was up 0.9 pp on 2007 and in line with the growth 
seen in the years of strong job creation. This is due, primarily, to the growing numbers of 
Spanish women joining the labour market, whose participation rate rose by 1.4 pp (as op-
posed to 0.9 pp in 2007), partly as a reaction to growing unemployment among other 
groups (in fact the participation rate rose among women whose husbands were unem-
ployed). After declining in 2007, the participation rate among foreign nationals regained the 
momentum of previous years, rebounding by almost 1 pp, primarily as a result of the fe-
male segment.
Unemployment rose by more than 1.2 million (66.4%) in 2008, closing the year at more than 
3.2 million, with an unemployment rate of 13.9%, in sharp contrast to the all-time low of 8% a 
year earlier. The increase in unemployment was particularly marked among younger and less-
skilled workers, and among foreign workers whose unemployment rate rose by some 5 pp to 
17.5%. This sharp rise in unemployment continued in 2009 Q1; at end-March the unemploy-
ment rate stood at 17.4%, with the jobless total in excess of four million. The estimates avail-
able on the structural component of unemployment point to a more moderate increase in 
NAIRU than in the unemployment rate in 2008. For 2009, however, a bigger increase in struc-
tural unemployment, associated with a significant rise in long-term unemployment, cannot be 
ruled out.
Wage increases under collective bargaining agreements stood at 3.6% in 2008, 0.5 pp above 
the increase agreed for 2007, despite the progressive deterioration in the labour market in the 
year (see Chart 5.10). Nevertheless, wage rates mainly reflected the poor inflation performance 
in the first half of the year, but with no sign of a turndown in the new agreements signed in the 
closing months of the year, when inflation had begun to moderate and the labour market situ-
ation was significantly worse. Moreover, as inflation missed the 2% target set for end-2007 (by 
2.2 pp), the indexation clauses were activated, thus increasing wage pressure, with an impact 
of 1.1 pp on wages paid in 2008.
The decline in employment 
brought about a reduction in 
the ratio of temporary to total 
employees.
Despite the deterioration of the 
labour market, the rate of 
growth of the labour force 
quickened in 2008
The severity of the employment 
adjustment and the growth in 
the labour force led to a sharp 
rise in unemployment 
Wages rebounded both in 
nominal and real terms in 2008, 
showing scant sensitivity to the 
worsening economic climate
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These developments in collective bargaining agreements were reflected in QNA estimates of 
compensation per employee, which showed wage costs rebounding to 4.8% in the market 
economy, the biggest increase since the early 1990s. This represents virtually flat wage drift2 in 
2008, in the wake of the negative figures of previous years, related to the disappearance of the 
composition effects that were behind this negative wage drift. In real terms, labour costs borne 
by firms, using the GDP deflator of the market economy as a price index, rebounded sharply in 
2008 (see Chart 5.10), closing the gap with labour productivity seen in previous years.
For the consumer price index (CPI), 2008 was a year of two very distinct halves. In the first half 
of the year, inflation rose significantly, continuing in the pattern seen since the summer of 2007, 
reaching 5.3% in July. It then headed down even more pronouncedly, closing the year at 1.4%. 
This decline has continued in 2009 to date, so that by end-March the year-on-year rate of 
growth was negative at –0.1%, the lowest rate of inflation since 1952. Two key factors in this 
decline were the decreases in energy and food commodity prices, against a backdrop of ex-
treme economic weakness worldwide, and the decline in national, especially household, 
spending. This meant that companies had to adjust their prices, cutting their margins or 
searching for productivity gains to offset the impact of labour costs. Moreover, the effects of 
the shocks were more intense in Spain than in the euro area, so that the inflation differential 
(measured with the HICP), which had remained on average at around 1 pp since 1999, nar-
rowed significantly as from 2008 Q4. Since December it has been increasingly negative, stand-
ing at –0.7 pp at March 2009, the lowest level since the start of monetary union.
Inflation measured by the CPI rose by 1.3 pp over the year as a whole to 4.1%, the result, as 
indicated above, of two very different half-year periods. In the first half of the year, the price of 
crude oil on the international markets rose substantially: the price of Brent oil verged on $150 
per barrel in July, an all-time high in nominal terms. It headed down thereafter, closing the year 
at slightly more than $40 per barrel, and has then rebounded somewhat in 2009 to date. The 
6 Prices and costs
Inflation declined sharply as 
from mid-2008; this process 
has intensified in 2009 to date, 
with negative rates of change 
year-on-year
Inflation in 2008 reflected the 
fluctuations in the price of oil, ...
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2. Defined as the difference between the increase in wage settlements under collective bargaining, including the effect of 
the indexation clauses, and the increase in compensation per employee in QNA.
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euro exchange rate against the dollar, which appreciated when the price of oil rose and depre-
ciated when it fell, cushioned, to a certain extent, these fluctuations in the oil price when 
measured in euros. In comparison with the euro area, the higher spending on oil derivatives as 
a proportion of total household spending in Spain, and the lesser weight of excise duties on 
these products, mean that fluctuations in the oil price have a greater impact on prices in Spain 
than in the euro area. That explains, in part, the narrowing of the inflation differential with the 
euro area described above. The pass-through of oil price fluctuations to the prices of non-
energy products was moderate (in line with the econometric estimates available), although the 
rising prices of energy products, which helped keep inflation rates high in the first half of 2008, 
are partly responsible for the rebound in wage settlements in the year.
Inflation likewise reflects prices of foodstuffs, which rose on the international markets in 2007, 
prompting an increase in crop-growing worldwide. This, accompanied by generally favourable 
weather conditions, boosted global production and stock levels. In this setting, food commodity 
prices on the international markets have fallen substantially, especially since mid-2008, helping rein 
in the rate of growth of consumer food prices in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in the euro area.
In 2008 as a whole, services prices rose at a rate of 3.9%, very similar to that of previous years. 
However, these prices decelerated in the final stretch of 2008 and have continued to do so in 
2009 to date, pointing to an adjustment in prices and margins to the decline in household 
spending. Accordingly, by March 2009, the rate of growth of services prices had dropped to 
2.7%, narrowing the attendant differential with the euro area. The rate of increase of prices of 
non-energy industrial goods declined on average in 2008 to 0.3%, 0.4 pp below the 2007 fig-
ure. In 2009 the rate of change has decelerated even further, to –0.6% in March, substantially 
below the rate for the euro area. This intense price adjustment seems to be due to the contrac-
tion in demand, and possibly to the high competitive pressure in some markets (such as cloth-
ing and footwear) stemming from the growing weight of the new producer countries.
The GDP deflator rose by 3% in 2008, 2 pp below the previous year’s rate. The slowdown was 
most intense in the second half of the year, bringing the rate of change to 2.5% in 2008 Q4. 
All demand components decelerated in the final stretch of the year, in contrast to the more 
disparate earlier performance. Specifically, inflationary pressure in the commodities markets in 
... food prices …
... and the impact of recession
The GDP deflator decelerated in 
2008, especially in the second 
half of the year
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the first quarters was clearly discernible in the import and consumption deflators. The export 
deflator also rebounded in the first half of 2008. By contrast, the gross capital formation defla-
tor decelerated throughout the year, due, above all, to residential investment which reflected 
developments in house prices.
Despite the severe deterioration in the economic conditions, the rebound in compensation per 
employee exceeded the increase in apparent labour productivity, so that labour costs per unit 
of value added in the market economy accelerated.
The different price-competitiveness indices vis-à-vis the main developed countries continued 
to deteriorate in the year as a whole, although the depreciation of the euro and the generalised 
correction in price differentials prompted some degree of improvement as from the second half 
of the year. Vis-à-vis the euro area, the price-competitiveness indicators were similar, in gen-
eral, to the previous year’s, with the exception of those based on unit labour costs in manufac-
turing, which deteriorated, and those based on export prices, which improved markedly. By 
contrast, outside the euro area, the losses in price competitiveness were higher than in 2007, 
since the narrowing of price and cost differentials, which in some cases became negative, was 
more than offset by the appreciation of the euro in the year as a whole (see Chart 5.12).
Unit labour costs rebounded, 
as wages rose significantly, …
... prompting a loss of price-
competitiveness in 2008 as a 
whole, although this reversed in 
part in the second half of the 
year 
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As Spanish economic growth decelerated, net borrowing moderated, posting negative rates 
of change year-on-year in the second half of 2008 and in 2009 to date. The decline in the 
external deficit has been strengthened in recent months by the severity of the contraction in 
national demand, which drives down imports, and by the falling price of energy, which has led 
to a substantial reduction in the energy deficit.
Over the year as a whole, the nation’s net borrowing fell to 9.1% of GDP, 0.6 pp below 
the previous year’s figure, interrupting a persistent upward pattern. As indicated above, 
the correction became more intense as the year progressed: thus, net borrowing in 
2008 Q4 represented 2 pp of GDP, below the figure a year earlier, while the trade defi-
cit was more than 3 pp below the 2007 Q4 figure. Returning to the total for the year, 
the improvement in the external balance reflects the decline in the current account 
deficit, to 9.5% of GDP, as the surplus on capital transactions held steady at around 
0.5% of GDP (see Chart 5.13). In the year as a whole, the decline in the trade deficit 
(0.8 pp to 7.7% of GDP) offset the deterioration in the investment income balance and, 
to a lesser extent, in the current transfers balance. By geographical area, the correction 
focused on trade with the EU, as the deficit with the non-Community countries contin-
ued to grow, primarily reflecting the impact of the rebound in average annual commod-
ity prices.
7 Net borrowing of the 
nation and the capital 
account of the institutional 
sectors
The nation’s net borrowing fell, 
for the first time since 2002
REST OF THE WORLD ACCOUNT CHART 5.13
SOURCES: INE, Departamento de Aduanas and Banco de España.
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As in the previous year, the tourism surplus continued to decline as a percentage of GDP 
in 2008, although in this case tourism receipts and expenditure headed down, most 
notably in Q4. Non-tourism services continued to post positive growth rates in the year 
as a whole, but they also decelerated considerably as the year progressed, especially 
imports, prompting a correction of almost 0.3 pp in the attendant deficit, to 0.9% of 
GDP. 
The international financial crisis made access to international financing more difficult, espe-
cially on the capital markets. As a result, interest rates on funds raised abroad by the banks 
rose and there was a shift away from long-term issues and towards short-term instruments, 
including, notably, an increase in resource to the Eurosystem. In this setting, although the 
external debt of the Spanish economy remained at the high levels seen in 2007 (around 
80% of GDP), the investment income deficit as a proportion of GDP widened by 0.2 pp to 
2.9%, reflecting the increase in the negative balance associated with portfolio and other 
investment income, which the increase in the surplus on direct investment income failed to 
offset.
The tourism surplus continued 
to decline in 2008
The income deficit continued to 
grow, ...
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a. Gross national saving.
b. Gross capital formation.
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KEY CHANGES IN THE SECTORAL IMBALANCES BETWEEN SAVING AND INVESTMENT BOX 5.2
The nation’s net borrowing stood at 9.1% of GDP at end-2008, signi-
fying an interruption in the growth pattern of recent years (see Panel 
1). Although this correction amounted to only 0.6 pp of GDP over the 
year as a whole, it was more significant in H2, with a decline of 2 pp 
of GDP in Q4, and all the indications are that this decline intensified in 
the opening months of 2009. Moreover, this aggregate economic 
performance conceals important changes in the imbalances between 
saving and investment in each of the institutional sectors. Thus,  after 
five years of net borrowing, households returned to a position of net 
lending (0.6% of GDP), and net borrowing by non-financial corpora-
tions fell by more than 3.5 pp of GDP to 7.5%. However, while the 
private-sector balances improved, the imbalance between general 
government saving and investment deteriorated significantly, going 
from net lending in the period 2005-2007 to net borrowing of 3.8% of 
GDP.
These changes came about against a backdrop of declining saving 
and investment rates, based on relatively different contributions from 
the different economic sectors. Thus, the major slowdown in busi-
ness investment and the sharp adjustment in residential construction 
in 2008 gave rise to a decline in investment by households and non-
financial corporations. This passed through to total gross capital for-
mation, which declined as a proportion of GDP for the first time in the 
last decade (see Panel 2). However, general government gross capi-
tal formation continued to represent 3.9% of GDP, which is relatively 
high in comparison with other European countries.
National saving continued to decline in 2008, in line with the negative 
growth pattern of recent years (see Panel 3). Nevertheless, the break-
down by sector shows significant changes in comparison with previ-
ous years. The household saving rate, which had gradually dropped 
to10.2% of gross disposable income by 2007, rose to 13% at end-
2008, resulting in an increase of 2 pp as a percentage of GDP. Like-
wise non-financial corporations’ saving, which also rose by 2 pp of 
GDP, after declining in the previous three years, due, above all, to the 
increase in debt servicing payments. By contrast, general govern-
ment saving fell sharply (by more than 5.5 pp of GDP), more than 
offsetting the growth in private-sector saving.
These figures reflect some correction in households’ and non-
financial corporations’ net borrowing positions in 2008, although this 
was due, in part, to a transfer of funds from the public to the private 
sector. Among the possible channels for this transfer of funds (taxes, 
transfers, social contributions and benefits), the role of the automatic 
SOURCE: INE.
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KEY CHANGES IN THE SECTORAL IMBALANCES BETWEEN SAVING AND INVESTMENT (cont´d) BOX 5.2
stabilisers and of the expansionary fiscal measures adopted are par-
ticularly noteworthy. In this respect, the institutional sectors’ accounts 
show that increased social benefits and lower direct tax payments 
raised households’ disposable income by 1 pp of GDP in 2008 (see 
Panel 4). In the case of non-financial corporations, lower corporate 
income tax payments, due not only to regulatory amendments made 
before the onset of the financial crisis (such as the second part of the 
lower corporate income tax charge) but also to the decline in corpo-
rate earnings growth, signified an increase in income equivalent to 
1.7% of GDP. There were no significant changes in the effect of social 
contributions on agents’ income in 2008, as these were stable as a 
percentage of GDP.
In short, the institutional sectors’ accounts show that household and 
corporate imbalances began to adjust in 2008, as investment de-
clined and saving rates rose. The adverse impact on activity was 
cushioned by the behaviour of general government, which helped 
sustain disposable income in the private sector. The decline in the 
nation’s net borrowing, which can be expected to continue through 
2009 and 2010, had a balancing effect on this process. The latest 
Banco de España macroeconomic projections point to a decline in 
net borrowing up to 2010 of some 5 pp of GDP, due, as in 2008, to 
an adjustment in households’ and non-financial corporations’ spend-
ing, while it is estimated that the budget deficit will continue to grow 
throughout the projection period.
The deficit on net current transfers stood at 0.8% of GDP in 2008, an increase of 0.2 pp on 
2007, as expenditure rose moderately and receipts declined. The fall-off in migrants’ remit-
tances, in the wake of the sharp growth seen since the beginning of the decade, was more 
than offset by the increase in general government expenditure, related to the EU and to dona-
tions. For its part, the decline in receipts reflects the decrease in Community funds. The sur-
plus on capital transactions was steady as a percentage of GDP at 0.5%, interrupting the 
declining path of previous years. Capital transfer receipts from the EU rose slightly, in contrast 
to 2007. Overall, the positive balance on the general government’s current and capital transac-
tions with the EU fell significantly in 2008.
The decrease in net borrowing in the Spanish economy in 2008 was due to the decline in in-
vestment (down 1.7 pp of GDP to 29.6%), as the gross national saving rate continued to fall 
(by 1.1 pp of GDP to 20.5%) (see Chart 5.14). The aggregate pattern was due to a very dis-
parate performance by the public and private sectors. Thus in 2008, for the first time since 
2003, households recorded moderate net lending, as a result of the decline in residential in-
vestment and the substantial recovery in the saving rate, connected, to a certain extent, to the 
considerable fiscal stimulus applied (see Box 5.2). At the same time, net borrowing by non-
financial corporations fell in the year, as business investment moderated as the year progressed. 
By contrast, in the public sector, general government net borrowing rose in 2008, with a deficit 
of 3.8% of GDP, in comparison with the surplus of 2.2% of GDP a year earlier, reflecting the 
impact of the economic crisis and of the various expansionary measures approved in the year. 
The developments described for the different institutional sectors will foreseeably continue in 
2009, with a more substantial correction in the nation’s net borrowing, as increased net lend-
ing by households and non-financial corporations should outpace the growth of the budget 
deficit.
... as did the current transfers 
deficit, as the balance with the 
EU deteriorated, in contrast to 
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surplus on capital transactions
Net borrowing declined, 
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Financial developments in Spain
Financial developments in the Spanish economy during 2008 were largely influenced by the 
worsening international financial crisis and by the macroeconomic downturn in Spain and in 
the rest of the world (see Chapter 1 of this Report). Against this background, and in concert 
with the other European countries, the Spanish government adopted a series of measures to 
reinforce the financial system. It raised the deposit guarantee threshold to €100,000; it created 
a fund for the acquisition of high-quality financial assets (FAFA) channelled through auctions 
among potential interested banks; it agreed on the granting of State guarantees of which in-
termediaries could avail themselves in order to issue bonds, and it authorised the State pur-
chase of securities to shore up banks’ capital, although it has not used this latter option to 
date. ICO intermediation facilities were also notably reinforced with the aim of providing financ-
ing flows to specific agents, such as SMEs, which may have seen their access to regular 
channels more restricted. 
In this setting, private-sector financing conditions tightened continuously during the year, via 
two channels. First, the cost of funds increased both in the case of bank funding, since banks 
passed through to lending transactions the increase in the risk premia incorporated into non-
guaranteed money market rates, and in that of securities issuance (see left-hand panel of 
Chart 6.1). Conditions other than interest rates also became more demanding, and there was 
an observable reduction in maturities and an increase in the guarantees required. Further, 
lending standards also became tighter. The deterioration in the macroeconomic outlook and in 
borrowers’ solvency and, to a lesser extent, the drying up of the wholesale markets and the 
international trend towards less leverage account for the tightening of the credit supply.
During the closing months of the year the decline in interbank rates began to pass through to 
the cost of credit, although the tightening of the supply of loans continued and did not begin 
to show signs of moderation until early 2009.
Household and corporate debt slowed notably, not only owing to the above-mentioned supply 
factors but also in response to other factors operating on the demand side, such as the dete-
rioration in confidence and in future income expectations, greater uncertainty and the attend-
ant high costs, which checked applications for funds. In the case of business credit, which is 
the main component of the borrowed funds raised by the corporate sector, the decline in the 
growth rate was particularly marked in the industries linked to the real estate sector (construc-
tion and real estate development).
The slowdown in financing raised by the private sector contributed to the slight reduction in 
the ratios of debt to household and to corporate income, following the strong growth recorded 
during the upturn (see Chapter 2). Nonetheless, the associated interest burden continued in-
creasing in both sectors due to the rise in the average cost of liabilities.
Despite the diminished buoyancy of liabilities, net household wealth fell as a result of the de-
cline in financial asset values and, above all, of the fall in property prices. On Spanish Ministry 
of Housing figures, this fall began at the end of 2008 and has run into the current year.
The growing degree of financial pressure experienced by some private-sector segments was 
reflected in notable increases in the doubtful assets ratio, defined as the proportion of doubtful 
to total loans in the credit portfolio (see right-hand panel of Chart 6.1). In the case of loans to 
1 Introduction
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real international crisis
Private-sector financing 
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corporate debt more acute
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Private-sector doubtful assets 
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the construction and real estate services industries, this ratio rose to 5.7%, set against the 
sharp adjustment in the sector following its overdimensioning during the upturn (see Chapter 2).
Spanish credit institutions were less prone than those of other developed countries to the adverse 
effects associated with the direct impact of the turmoil that broke in the summer of 2007, since they 
were not exposed to toxic products and had no commitments to the structured vehicles invest-
ing in such assets. However, the strong rise in doubtful assets ratios accompanying the deteriora-
tion in the macroeconomic scenario has led to a decline in profits that has lessened the leeway 
available to institutions to absorb further asset impairments. Their capital ratios have held at com-
fortable levels, albeit in an environment in which their international competitors are addressing in-
tense deleveraging processes, accompanied in some cases by government capital injections.
Given the difficulties in resorting to international markets, banks notably reduced their volume 
of issues, meaning that these were negative in net terms for the year as a whole. In the open-
ing months of 2009, however, the primary markets have been discernibly more buoyant, this 
being linked in part to operations transacted with State backing.
Accordingly, financial institutions (excluding the Banco de España and institutional investors) con-
tributed to a much lesser extent than in previous years to channeling the Spanish economy’s 
external funding requirements. As this decline was not offset in full by net capital inflows via insti-
tutional investors and non-financial corporations or by the foreign resources raised by general 
government, a portion of the funds needed to finance the current-account deficit was, as in the 
previous year, covered by a reduction in the credit balance of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world. This reflected the foreign financing difficulties faced by other agents.
The macroeconomic downturn, along with the rise in the cost of debt, has translated into 
greater financial pressure on the private sector (especially the most indebted households 
and firms). These developments have been accompanied, moreover, by a decline in agents’ 
wealth. The prospect of the predominance of contractionary trends in the short term will 
likely continue contributing to weakening the financial position of households and firms over 
... prompting a fall in credit 
institutions’ profits, which has 
lessened the leeway available to 
absorb further asset 
impairments
There was a decline in fixed-
income issues and in external 
funds routed through financial 
institutions
The macroeconomic downturn 
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economy, and it will foreseeably 
continue to do so
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the coming quarters. However, the recent reduction in interbank market interest rates will 
tend to pass through to a sizeable portion of outstanding loans, given the prevalence in 
Spain of floating-rate operations, thereby easing the interest burden borne by private agents 
and thus countering, at least in part, the adverse effect arising from the recessionary envi-
ronment.
Persisting tensions on international financial markets may continue hampering the raising of 
funds abroad by the Spanish economy, although the fall in private-sector funding require-
ments, which has already begun and which will foreseeably continue, mitigates these risks to 
some extent, as does too the application of the financial system support measures adopted in 
the final quarter of the year. In any event, high private-sector debt and the weak macroeco-
nomic outlook will continue to stifle credit.
Spanish financial intermediaries have to date felt the effects of the financial crisis to a lesser 
extent than is the case in other financial systems, but they are not immune to the notable 
macroeconomic downturn. Accordingly, their financial position will be subject to greater pres-
sures over the coming quarters, while the room for manoeuvre they had to withstand these 
shocks will progressively lessen. Against this background, it is vital to preserve the soundness 
of the financial system, so that it should not check the recovery in Spain once the obstacles 
arising from the international financial crisis lift.
Households’ net financial transactions were slightly positive, in contrast to their net borrowing 
equivalent to 1.6% of GDP in 2007. This was the result of the marked decline both in asset 
and, especially, liability flows, which stood at 2.9% and at 2.7% of GDP, respectively (see 
Chart 6.2).
On the liabilities side, there was a sharp slowdown in financing raised by households, the 
year-on-year rate of change of which at end-2008 stood at 4% (compared with 12% the 
previous year). Loans for house purchases and lending for consumption and other pur-
poses trended similarly, growing over the year as a whole at rates of 5% and 4%, respec-
tively, around 8 pp and 7 pp below the related 2007 figures (see the left-hand panel of 
Chart 6.3).
According to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), the slowdown in credit was in response to the 
fall-off both in demand – prompted by the decline in consumer confidence, the fall in their 
wealth and poorer expectations about property prices – and in supply (see the right-hand 
panel of Chart 6.3). As indicated by the respondent Spanish banks, the worsening outlook for 
the economic situation in general (and for the housing market in particular) and the deteriora-
tion in consumer solvency were the main factors behind the tightening of standards for the 
approval of new loans to households last year. The problems of access to wholesale funding 
and their high cost also seem to have contributed, albeit to a lesser extent, to reducing the 
supply of funds. The contraction was similar in loans for house purchase and in lending for 
consumption and other purposes.
In the case of assets, the trends observed the previous year remained in place. Thus, against 
a backdrop of greater uncertainty and spurred by more attractive yields, much of household 
investment was concentrated in time deposits. These amounted to a sum equivalent to almost 
8% of GDP, to the detriment of holdings of sight deposits and of investment funds, for which 
negative flows were posted (see Chart 6.2).
2 Financial flows in the 
Spanish economy
2.1 HOUSEHOLDS
Household net borrowing 
declined, and a sharp slowdown 
in credit was discernible... 
... and, to a lesser extent, 
household financial investments 
fell
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Non-financial corporations’ net borrowing relative to GDP fell by 5 pp compared with 2007, as 
a result of the considerable slowdown in fixed-capital investment. Nonetheless, the sector’s 
net financial transactions continued to show a debit balance of 7% of GDP. The financing gap, 
which approximates the funds needed to cover the difference between the sector’s gross sav-
ing and gross capital formation plus foreign investment of a permanent nature, fell by a great-
er extent (8 pp), to around 10% of GDP, in line with the diminished dynamism of direct invest-
ment in the rest of the world.
Corporations’ liability flows fell substantially to 11% of GDP (against 26% in 2007). The decline 
was more or less across the board in terms of instruments. Specifically, the year-on-year rate 
of increase in the sector’s financing dropped significantly to stand at around 7% in December 
2008 (against 18% a year earlier). Bank credit, which is the main component here, showed 
a somewhat more marked slowdown, and its rate of expansion was marginally less than 7% 
at the close of last year, compared with 20% the previous year (see the left-hand panel of 
2.2 NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS
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Chart 6.3). This easing was discernible in all the productive sectors, but was much more pro-
nounced in the construction and real estate development branches, where the respective 
year-on-year growth rates were –1% and 4.8%, signifying declines of around 20 pp and 15 pp 
on 2007.
As in the case of households, the replies to the BLS indicate that the slowdown in credit was 
in response to a contraction both in demand and in supply (see the right-hand panel of Chart 6.3). 
The decline in applications for funds is due to the slowdown in investment in fixed capital and 
to the scant number of mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring operations. Mean-
time, the tightening of credit standards for new loans was brought on primarily by banks’ de-
teriorating expectations regarding the macroeconomic scenario and the particular circum-
stances of the various sectors and companies, and by the risks associated with the required 
collateral, and to a lesser extent by the problems of gaining access to funding on markets and 
the costs related to the level of capital. 
In terms of company size, diminished buoyancy in credit to small and medium-sized compa-
nies was witnessed in the closing months of 2008, apparently reflecting the more contraction-
ary behaviour of supply in loans to SMEs (see Box 6.1).
Companies’ financial investment also contracted significantly. In terms of four-quarter cumula-
tive flows, this variable accounted for 3.7% of GDP, compared with 13.5% in 2007 (see Chart 6.2). 
This decline was across the board in terms of instruments, but particularly marked in the case 
of equity acquisitions, in an environment not propitious to purchases of these instruments ow-
ing to high uncertainty, to financing difficulties and to sales by companies with greater pressure 
on their balance sheets.
For the first time since 2005, general government recorded net borrowing equivalent to 3.8% 
of GDP (see Chart 6.4). In the previous year there was a surplus of 2.2% of GDP, entailing a 
deterioration of around 6 pp. This result was the outcome of the change in the net central 
government position (which posted a deficit of 2.7% in 2008), the increase in the territorial 
government deficit and the slight reduction in Social Security net lending. The breakdown by 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CREDIT TO COMPANIES: BREAKDOWN BY SIZE BOX 6.1
As discussed in the main body of the text, credit to non-financial 
corporations, which retained its still-high buoyancy in 2007, slowed 
much more clearly during 2008 as a result of declines both in the 
supply of and demand for funds. This was consistent with the exist-
ence of a degree of cross-company heterogeneity. The increase in 
credit for construction and real estate development companies thus 
fell to a greater extent, which no doubt reflects the intensity of the 
correction in the activity of and outlook for these sectors. This box 
analyses the extent to which there are also divergences linked to 
company size. This aspect is significant insofar as the dependence 
on bank credit at small companies is usually greater than at large 
ones, owing to the fact that the former – in general – cannot resort to 
the financial markets as an alternative source of funds. However, in 
the information available on the loans granted by Spanish credit insti-
tutions, there is no segregation based on borrower size. Accordingly, 
other available statistics are used for this study, enabling the issue to 
be broached.
Firstly, the information contained in the central credit register (CCR) 
can be used to classify credit granted in terms of the company’s 
total volume of outstanding loans, a variable that can be taken as 
an approximation to company size. To this end, Panels 1 and 2 
show the growth rates of bank credit to companies, for two sectoral 
groupings (construction and real estate development, on one hand, 
and other activities, on the other).1 It can be seen how, in 2008, 
there was a strong and fairly generalised slowdown, though one 
sharper in the activities most closely linked to the real estate market 
and, under the other sectors, in transactions with companies with a 
lower volume of borrowed funds. In the first instance, and with the 
exception of companies with debt levels of less than €1 million, the 
increase in financing last year was virtually zero in all the groups 
considered. Nonetheless, in the remaining branches differences 
can be seen on the basis of outstanding loan balances, with still-
high growth being observed in the higher categories and very low 
growth in the lower ones, with the exception once again of the first 
category included in the panel.
Another source of useful information for analysing the differential be-
haviour of credit according to company size is that provided by new 
loans granted. This includes a breakdown based on whether the 
transactions are below or over €1 million. As Panel 3 shows, from 
2007 to mid-2008, the slowdown in credit to companies would have 
been essentially due to large-value loans (granted to a greater ex-
tent to large corporations), which began to decline in late 2007, 
while small-value transactions (associated essentially with credit to 
SMEs) held stable or fell only slightly. During the second half of last 
year there was a turnaround in this behaviour, with positive growth 
once again in large-value loans and notable declines in the rest, a 
trend which became more accentuated in the opening months of 
2009.
The divergences highlighted may be due to differences in the supply 
of or demand for funds by type of company. In this respect, the Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS), although it offers only qualitative information, 
may help draw a distinction between these two elements. To this 
end, Panels 4 and 5 offer two indicators which measure, respectively, 
changes in the supply of and demand for funds, both for small and 
medium-size enterprises and for large corporations. As can be seen, 
in the second half of 2007 (at the onset of the financial turmoil) the 
respondent institutions indicated a greater tightening of lending 
standards to large corporations during this period. Subsequently, 
however, no significant differences can be seen from one group to the 
other. In the case of the demand indicator, the related comparative 
trend shows less contractionary behaviour in SMEs’ applications for 
funds from mid-2007, but especially in 2008, whereby this factor 
would appear unable to explain the different behaviour of credit ob-
served recently.
Finally, the findings of a survey commissioned by the Banco de 
España and conducted between 18 March and 3 April 2009 us-
ing 1,385 Spanish companies of different sizes show that, in the 
six preceding months, the percentage of applicants who did not 
manage to obtain the funds requested fell in step with the size of 
the applicant (see Panel 6), indicating greater difficulty for SMEs 
to raise external funds. Nonetheless, this is probably a struc-
tural characteristic, derived from the greater risk entailed by 
lending to companies with a small volume of assets; accordingly, 
the absence of a point of comparison at some other moment in 
time restricts the scope of the possible conclusions. In any 
event, it can be inferred from the response to the question about 
the factors that explain why companies have not obtained all the 
funding they requested that a high proportion of the companies 
(around 60%) has detected a change in banks’ lending policy 
stance.
In sum, on the information available – and bearing in mind all the 
necessary reservations derived from its imperfect nature – it may be 
concluded that the slowdown in credit to companies seen since 
mid-2007 was initially and essentially due to the pattern of lending to 
large corporations. The reason for this would have been the lesser 
relative dynamism both of the demand for and the supply of funds. 
However, as the general downturn in the economy became increas-
ingly patent, credit institutions appear to have begun to reduce more 
markedly new loans to SMEs. According to the BLS, as it seems 
that this cannot be explained by the behaviour of demand, it may 
possibly reflect, at least in part, some greater degree of tightness in 
the requirements made of smaller companies in respect of new loan 
approvals.1. The rates of change are calculated controlling for the changes in category 
arising from the growth of debt.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CREDIT TO COMPANIES: BREAKDOWN BY SIZE (cont´d) BOX 6.1
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instrument shows that the funds needed were covered by an increase in securities issuance 
(both in the short and, in particular, the medium- and long-term segments) and a decline in the 
outstanding balance of deposits net of lending. This substantial deterioration in the general 
government budget balance has arisen from the impact of the automatic stabilisers in a reces-
sionary environment, from forgone revenue further to the real estate adjustment and from the 
discretionary measures adopted to boost the economy.
The downturn in general government financial saving largely countered the reduction in the 
funds required by households and corporations, as a result of which the Spanish economy’s 
net borrowing fell only slightly in relation to 2007, with the debit balance of its net financial 
transactions standing at 9.1% of GDP (see Table 6.1 and Chart 6.5).
Capital inflows mediated through financial institutions (excluding institutional investors and 
the Banco de España) fell substantially. Indeed, while credit institutions obtained funds 
equivalent to 3.3% of GDP (more than 1 pp up on 2007), other financial institutions (exclud-
ing institutional investors and the Banco de España), which had been the sector that had 
obtained most funds from the rest of the world since 2004, channelled net capital outflows 
valued at 1.8% of GDP (the previous year they raised resources equivalent to 5.8% of GDP). 
Institutional investors unwound lending positions vis-à-vis the rest of the world, contributing 
a volume of capital equivalent to 2.3% of GDP in net terms. Companies and general govern-
ment channelled foreign resources for amounts equivalent to 0.5% and 1.4% of GDP, re-
spectively. As a result of these developments, a portion of the funds needed to finance the 
current account deficit was covered, as was the case in the previous year, by the reduction 
in the external credit position of the Banco de España, which declined by 2.7% of GDP (see 
Chart 6.5).
2.4 INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN 
FINANCING OF THE SPANISH 
ECONOMY
The Spanish economy’s net 
borrowing was slightly lower 
than in 2007
The financial sector did not 
channel sufficient foreign saving 
to meet the economy’s 
borrowing requirements... 
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The volume of capital inflows amounted to 12% of GDP, 11 pp down on 2007, evidencing 
notable changes in their composition. Against a background of significant difficulties in issuing 
fixed-income securities, the net inflow of funds channelled through securities other than shares 
issued by domestic financial institutions was negative for an amount close to 4% of GDP, 
compared with a positive net inflow totalling more than 9% of GDP the previous year (see Table 6.1). 
In this setting, credit institutions raised financing abroad essentially through the interbank mar-
ket (including secured transactions), meaning that the funds obtained through this channel in 
net terms accounted for 6.7% of GDP, compared with 2.5% the previous year. Flows obtained 
through non-residents’ acquisitions of shares and other equity also fell slightly, contributing an 
amount close to 4% of GDP, in step with the slight decline in foreign direct investment in Spain, 
which also stood at around 4% of GDP.
Capital outflows also fell by 10 pp to 3% of GDP. As in the previous year, institutional 
investors unwound positions in net terms in the rest of the world both in fixed income 
... since the net inflow of funds 
through fixed-income issues 
declined
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and equities. In terms of instruments, the contraction was across the board, but espe-
cially significant in the case of shares and other equity (purchases of which fell by 7 pp 
to 1.9% of GDP). In line with this development, Spanish foreign direct investment fell off 
to 4.8% of GDP, having accounted for more than 9.6% in 2007.
Despite the fact that net capital inflows were positive, the net debit position of the Spanish 
economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world showed no significant changes, holding at around 80% 
of GDP, thanks to the favourable effects exerted on it by the changes observed in the prices of 
financial instruments, which were only partly countered by the adverse impact associated with 
the changes in the exchange rate.
However, the debit balance of 
the international investment 
position scarcely changed
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In the primary markets for negotiable securities, the net issuance by resident sectors totalled 
€148 billion, a year-on-year decline of 45% (see Table 6.2) and the first decline in this variable 
since 2001. Among the reasons behind this strong fall were the relatively unfavourable market 
setting, given the increase in uncertainty and the rise in issuance costs caused by the climb in 
risk premia, and lower private-sector net borrowing, stemming from the cuts in expenditure 
plans.
The net issuance of fixed-income instruments fell by 40% on 2007 to €133 billion. This decline 
was greater than that in the euro area, meaning that net placements in Spain accounted for 
12% of the volume issued in the area as a whole, compared with 22% the previous year.
As can be seen in Table 6.2, issues by financial institutions declined over the year as a whole 
by more than 64%, against a background of tightening financing conditions on wholesale 
markets, which was reflected – among other factors – in the considerable increase in credit 
risk premia. In particular, placements made directly by credit institutions resulted, for the first 
time since 2000, in net redemptions of €27 billion; conversely, those by other financial interme-
diaries remained buoyant (€107 billion), though down on previous years. In terms of instru-
ments, asset-backed bonds, as has been habitual in the past four years, accounted for more 
than 85% of supply, while the weight of uncovered bonds and preference shares fell. However, 
it should be stressed that the bulk of securitisations was purchased by the originators them-
selves, so that they might have at hand collateral with which to obtain financing in the Eurosys-
tem. For the second year running, there was a notable increase in transactions conducted by 
the foreign subsidiaries of financial institutions (€14 billion).
The net issue of fixed-income securities by non-financial corporations, either directly or through 
subsidiaries, marginally exceeded the figure of €2 billion in 2008, compared with €9 billion a 
3 Spanish financial 
markets
3.1 PRIMARY MARKETS
Net securities issuance declined
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year earlier. This development primarily reflects the decline in the supply of securities, through 
both resident and non-resident subsidiaries.
Unlike in recent years, the net supply of securities placed in circulation by general government 
increased substantially, in line with the rise in the sector’s net borrowing. The resulting amount 
was €52 billion, more than one-third of total net fixed-income placements for 2008. This may 
be attributed virtually in its entirety to the State, since funds raised by territorial government 
scarcely exceeded €1 billion. In terms of instruments, there was a significant issuance volume 
of both medium- and long-term bonds (€32 billion) and of Treasury bills (€19 billion), and there 
were two changes introduced into Treasury policy: currency-denominated issues, which had 
not been used since 2005, and six-month bill tenders.
Equity issues amounted to close to €15 billion, marking a considerable decline (68%) on the 
preceding year. Across the different sectors, and unlike in the past, there was a rise in capital 
increases by financial institutions, which amounted in net terms to €11 billion. This figure was 
somewhat lower than in 2007. Meanwhile, capital increases at non-financial corporations fell 
considerably (89%), although it should be borne in mind that the 2007 figure was influenced 
by a small number of large-volume one-off operations. In line with this contractionary behav-
iour, there were no initial public offerings during 2008. Mention should be made of the issuance 
of equity units by a savings bank, the first operation of this type to be undertaken.
Secondary market activity proved very uneven across the different segments (see Table 
6.3). Stock exchange share trading totalled €1.2 trillion, a year-on-year fall of over 25%. 
However, this is essentially due to the decline in share prices, since activity, measured by 
the number of securities traded or by the number of transactions made, increased by 
around 8% on 2007. In line with this development, derivatives trading posted a similar de-
cline to the spot market (26%), chiefly as a result of the fall in the evaluation of underlyings. 
Operations for the year in this segment were, once again, concentrated in IBEX 35-indexed 
contracts.
3.2 SECONDARY MARKET 
ACTIVITY
In nominal terms, secondary 
market activity evidenced great 
variability across its different 
segments
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In the public debt market there was a year-on-year decline in turnover of 12%, the outcome of 
the marked decline (of over 30%) in spot transactions and of the more moderate fall-off in both 
repo and sell and buy-back transactions, which continue to account for most activity, and in 
forward transactions.
Conversely, turnover on the AIAF market exceeded €2.4 trillion, entailing year-on-year growth 
of over 115%, with substantial increases in almost all instruments, especially in uncovered 
bonds and asset-backed bonds. In terms of transactions, the bulk of the increase in activity 
was centred on sell and buy-back transactions, including most notably those for which the 
counterparties were the Treasury (in the context of the management of its liquidity surpluses) 
and the Banco de España (within the framework of the financing granted by the Eurosystem 
to credit institutions).
After five years of price rises, there was a sharp fall in share prices accompanied by a marked 
rise in their implied volatility (see Chart 6.6). Over the year as a whole, the IBEX 35 posted a 
decline of 39.4%, lower than that of the Eurostoxx 50 of the euro area stock exchanges 
(44.2%) and similar to that of the US S&P 500 (38.5%). The year was marked by a downtrend 
3.3 SECONDARY MARKET PRICES
Share prices fell sharply, and there 
was a marked increase in volatility
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in values, which became sharper in specific episodes. This reflected both investors’ greater 
preference for low-risk assets and the deterioration in listed firms’ earnings-growth outlook. 
Volatility stood at very high levels in late September, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers. This subsequently fell, although it stood at levels higher than the historical average, which 
highlights the notable uncertainty over the future course of traded prices on the market.
The decline in prices was across the board, albeit with differing intensity. The biggest falls were 
in the sub-indices of basic materials, industry and construction (51%) and financial services 
and real estate (49%). The sectors showing the least adverse performance were those of con-
sumer goods (down 26%) and technology and telecommunications (down 29%).
The downtrend on stock exchange indices continued in the opening months of 2009, though 
a pick-up in prices was seen from mid-March. In early May, therefore, the IBEX 35 stood at a 
level similar to that at end-2008.
After rising moderately to July, short-term government debt yields subsequently fell notably, in 
step with the pronounced cuts in intervention rates. Long-term rates showed a similar profile, 
rising in the first half of the year and moving on a declining trend from August as a result of 
investors’ greater preference for safe, liquid securities and of the downward revisions in euro 
area growth and inflation forecasts. Accordingly, the interest rate on ten-year government 
bonds started at 4.4% in December 2007, peaked at 4.9% in July and thereafter moved on a 
declining path to end the year at 3.8%. In the second half of the year, yields on German debt 
declined to a greater extent than those on other euro area sovereign bonds, which meant that 
the spreads over the German bond increased notably, to 80 bp at the close of the year in the 
case of the corresponding Spanish bond and to over 120 bp as at mid-February 2009. None-
theless, spreads subsequently narrowed, to stand at around 70 bp in early May. As detailed in 
Box 6.2, the widening of sovereign spreads in the euro area is due to the increase in the price 
of risk, owing to factors linked to liquidity and, in certain cases, to the increase in credit risk. 
Against this background, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the long-term debt issued by Spain, 
Greece and Portugal in January 2009, and that of Ireland in March.
Lastly, financial and non-financial corporations’ CDS premia increased very sharply as a result 
of the prevailing greater uncertainty and the deterioration in the macroeconomic outlook. This 
rise was particularly notable from the end of the summer when, further to the above-men-
tioned events, intense risk re-pricing took place, taking CDS premia to all-time highs (see 
Chart 6.6). In line with other developed countries, financial corporations’ risk premia have, fol-
lowing the announcement and subsequently approval of the bank system support pro-
grammes, held at substantially lower levels than those of non-financial corporations, suggest-
ing that the market’s interpretation is that governments have assumed a sizeable portion of the 
credit risk of the main banks.
Coupled with the course of long-term interest rates, this led to a rise in the cost of financing 
for firms issuing in the fixed-income markets. However, in 2009 to date CDS premia have 
fallen, especially those of non-financial companies, although they remain at high levels.
During 2008 the activity of credit institutions slowed notably in response to the diminished 
dynamism of credit granted to the resident non-financial private sector. By contrast, the rate of 
change of loans to general government rose significantly, as did the portfolio of fixed-income 
assets held by institutions. Overall, total assets increased by 6% at the consolidated level, and 
by 9% at the individual level (see Table 6.4), figures clearly below those in recent years, but still 
outpacing the growth of nominal GDP.
Government debt yields rose to 
July, falling progressively 
thereafter to the end of the 
year...
...while credit risk premia rose 
strongly throughout the year
4 Spanish financial 
intermediaries
4.1 CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Credit institutions’ activity 
slowed notably
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 6. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
THE WIDENING OF EURO AREA SOVEREIGN DEBT SPREADS BOX 6.2
The yield spread of euro area countries’ sovereign debt over Ger-
man bonds, which traditionally have a lower cost, had moved in 
recent years in very limited ranges. During the summer of 2007, 
following the onset of the financial turmoil, the spreads began to 
widen, albeit very moderately. However, following the worsening 
of the international financial crisis in mid-September 2008, they 
increased most markedly (see Panels 1 and 2). In Spain, the 
spread between the yield on 10-year government bonds and that 
on the benchmark 10-year German bund widened to a level of 
around 120 bp, when at the close of 2007 it was scarcely 8 bp. In 
the other euro area members the trend was the same, although 
the scale of the change varied from one nation to another (in Ire-
land and Greece the spread was 260 bp, while in France it was 
around 60 bp), with the increase in the case of the securities is-
sued by the Spanish Treasury standing at an intermediate posi-
tion. In the subsequent months there was a widespread decline in 
these spreads. In early May the Spanish sovereign spread stood 
at around 70 bp. This box focuses on the analysis of the factors 
behind the widening of the spreads between December 2007 and 
February 2009.
In a setting such as the euro area, in which all issues are denominated 
in the same currency, the explanation for the yield spreads on sover-
eign debt lies in the compensation the markets demand for the differ-
ent levels of perceived credit risk and for the differences in the degree 
of liquidity of the securities.
Credit risk premia can be proxied using the price of CDSs on sover-
eign debt, which are instruments where one party (that buying pro-
tection) receives compensation from the counterparty in the event of 
default, late payment or other credit events attributable to the issuer 
of this debt, in exchange for payment of a regular income. In this 
respect, Panel 3 shows a high positive correlation between the 
changes in yield spreads and in CDS premia between December 
2007 and February 2009, suggesting that the changes in the level of 
credit risk and in the pricing thereof played a significant role in the 
setting of prices on bonds issued by the euro area member states 
during this period. Nonetheless, the points in the panel generally 
stand above the 45° line, denoting that liquidity-related factors may 
also have contributed to these developments. In particular, greater 
activity on the secondary markets for securities issued by the Ger-
man government may have benefited their relative valuation, in a 
setting in which investors’ preference for more liquid assets had in-
creased.
There are various factors that can explain the increase in credit 
risk perceived by the markets during the period under analysis. 
Firstly, the far-reaching deterioration in the growth outlook for the 
euro area economies in late 2008 tended to reduce these States’ 
tax-raising capacity, while current expenditure increased. Thus, 
GDP growth for 2009 and 2010 in most euro area members was 
projected by the European Commission to fall by between 2 pp 
and 3 pp in cumulative terms in the period from the autumn 2008 
forecasting exercise to the January 2009 interim exercise. In two 
countries the decline was clearly greater than for the rest: Greece 
(–4.2) and Ireland (–6.5), which are precisely those countries 
where sovereign debt spreads most widened between December 
2007 and February 2009. In addition, the fiscal measures that the 
various countries had started to adopt entailed a further increase 
in public spending and, by extension, a bigger increase in public 
debt.
Against this background, in January 2009 Standard & Poor’s down-
graded the debt rating of Greece (on 14 January, from A to A–), Spain 
(on 19 January, from AAA to AA+) and Portugal (on 21 January, from 
AA– to A+). In addition, Ireland was placed on the credit watch list 
and subsequently also saw its debt downgraded from AAA to AA+ on 
31 March.
In order to study in greater depth the link between the valuation of 
sovereign benchmarks and credit risk, Panel 4 relates yield spreads, 
in December 2007 (in red) and February 2009 (in blue), to the devia-
tion of the debt/GDP ratio vis-à-vis Germany forecast by the Euro-
pean Commission around the same dates for 2009 and 2010, re-
spectively.1 Generally, the changes in the projections of the debt/ 
GDP ratio were seen to be small (compared with the changes in 
Germany), except in the case of Ireland, which underwent a very 
marked rise that may help us understand the greater widening of this 
country’s spread at that time. In Spain the ratio also rose more, a 
development which may have likewise affected the relative valuation 
of the securities issued in our country during the period under 
study.
Panel 4 also shows how, as was to be expected, there is a positive 
relationship between risk levels (proxied by the debt/GDP ratio) and 
debt yield (in relative terms vis-à-vis Germany). It can further be seen 
that the slope of the fitted line increased between the two dates ex-
amined, suggesting that the widening of the yield spread between 
December 2007 and February 2009 may have been partly due to an 
increase in the price of risk or, what amounts to the same, to agents’ 
greater preference for safer assets.
The same panel also shows that in February 2009 the yield spreads 
of some countries deviated significantly from the fitted line. It should 
be borne in mind that the debt/GDP ratio approximates only par-
tially the credit risk perceived by the market in some cases. In par-
ticular, it does not reflect the member states’ exposure to the finan-
cial sector, which increased notably following the activation of bank 
bailouts. In this respect, Panel 5 shows how, following the approval 
of the first plans, the average risk premium on European sovereign 
debt in the CDS markets increased significantly in October 2008, 
drawing close to the level of the iTraxx financial index (which tracks 
the prices of the main European financial corporations’ derivatives). 
However, the premium fell from March, separating from this index. 
The changes in this indicator in the second half of 2008 and in the 
first two months of 2009 suggest that the markets considered that 
governments were taking on a sizable portion of the credit risk of 
the main banks. Thus, for instance, the Irish government temporar-
1. The respective European Commission forecasting exercises conducted in 
spring 2008 and January 2009 have been used.
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THE WIDENING OF EURO AREA SOVEREIGN DEBT SPREADS (cont´d) BOX 6.2
ily guaranteed all the liabilities of the six biggest banks (and subse-
quently nationalised one of them and recapitalised the rest with 
public funds). And this, combined with the fact that the weight of 
the Irish financial sector, in terms of GDP, is higher than in the other 
euro area members (see Panel 6)), might explain why the yield 
spread on Irish sovereign debt stood in February 2009 far above 
what its level of debt then forecast for 2010 would indicate (see 
Panel 4).
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Credit institutions did have some success in raising deposits from customers, helped by the 
attractive remuneration thereon and by savers’ search for safer investments. But funding dif-
ficulties on the wholesale markets obliged institutions to resort to the interbank market and to 
the loans granted by the Eurosystem, for an overall amount around 20% higher than that of 
the previous year. As a result, the net debit position obtained through this channel increased 
to 8.4% of total assets (from 7.6% at end-2007) and, within this position, the net loan from the 
Eurosystem accounted on average in December 2008 for 1.8% of total assets, compared with 
1.3% twelve months earlier.
Funding difficulties on the 
markets persisted, offset in part 
by alternative sources and by 
the public-sector support 
measures
LAUDIVIDNIDETADILOSNOC
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CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT
TABLE 6.4
SOURCE: Banco de España
a. Includes net assets with central banks.
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In 2009 to date, the reductions in interbank interest rates and the guarantees granted by the 
government should have provided for some recovery in institutions’ funding on the markets, 
while asset purchases by the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA) are also 
expected to have increased the resources available. Specifically, at the time of this Report 
going to press, the FAFA had already held four tenders, placing a volume of funds close to 
€20 billion, while 24 credit institutions had made State-backed issues for a total of €27.4 
billion.
Doubtful assets increased significantly and, as a percentage of total credit to other non-resi-
dent sectors, rose from 0.9% in December 2007 to 3.4% at the close of last year, with a no-
table increase being recorded in the dispersion across institutions. The increase was particu-
larly sharp in transactions with construction and real estate companies (see right-hand panel 
of Chart 6.1). Consequently, the coverage ratio (provisions divided by doubtful assets) fell from 
183% to 71%. The cuts in intervention interest rates during the second half of 2008 and early 
2009 should contribute to lessening the pace of losses due to asset impairment. However, this 
effect will no doubt be countered by the adverse impact stemming from the increase in unem-
ployment and by the reduction in the general provisions built up in previous years.
As a result of the competition in raising time deposits and of the reduction in sight deposits, 
the average cost of institutions’ liabilities over the course of the year increased to a greater 
extent than market interest rates (50 bp at the individual level and 57 bp at consolidated level, 
compared with a 36 bp rise in the three-month interbank interest rate). Nonetheless, the like-
wise bigger increase in the return on assets meant that net interest income as a proportion of 
total assets rose by around 10 bp in consolidated statements, and fell by only 2 bp in individ-
ual statements (see Table 6.4). This relatively positive result for net interest income was largely 
countered by the increase in write-downs and provisions, linked to the rise in doubtful assets, 
and to a lesser extent by the reduction in commissions received for securities services and for 
the marketing of investment funds, and by the decline in profits on financial transactions, so 
that institutions’ consolidated net profit contracted by 25% on the previous year. Even so, the 
return on capital held at over 10%.
With the decline in profits and the reduction in the doubtful assets coverage ratio, the leeway 
available for Spanish credit institutions to absorb further asset impairments has lessened. 
However, the solvency ratio increased during 2008 to 11.3%, due partly to the introduction of 
the new capital regulations (stemming from Basel II), but also to more profits being retained, to 
the lower growth of risk-weighted assets and to the issue of capital for a value close to €10 
billion. Compared with other financial systems, the position of Spanish institutions taken as a 
whole is sounder, though they are not immune either to developments on international markets 
in general, or to the weakness of the Spanish economy in particular. In this respect, on 28 
March the Banco de España assumed control of Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), a small in-
stitution, whose assets account for less than 1% of the system’s total.
In the collective investment industry, the decline in assets under management seen already the 
previous year steepened, chiefly as a result of high net redemptions in investment funds (IFs) 
(see Chart 6.7). Net redemptions were positive in all four quarters of 2008, and were extensive 
to all types of funds, including money market funds. Although the uncertainty over price devel-
opments in securities markets and the capital losses recorded no doubt had an impact on the 
withdrawal of funds by investors, the widespread nature of such withdrawals suggests that 
they were also influenced by the competition generated by the campaigns to capture bank 
deposits with very attractive yields, in a setting in which the coverage guaranteed by the De-
posit Guarantee Fund was raised to €100,000 per depositor/investor and institution.
The increase in doubtful 
assets...
... led to a fall in profits...
...and the leeway available to 
absorb further asset impairment 
has lessened
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Withdrawal of funds from 
collective investment 
companies...
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Insurance companies and pension funds (PFs) obtained positive but scant net resources. In 
the life-assurance branch, although premia grew by around 15%, claims (redemptions, mobi-
lisation, maturities and claims payments or agreed income) outpaced them, meaning that the 
net funds received scarcely increased.
In the venture capital segment, resources raised fell to half the figure obtained the previous 
year (€2,560 million against €5,131 million) and disinvestment fell by even more, owing to sell-
ing difficulties on financial markets. These developments, along with the problems in obtaining 
borrowed funds (which are greatly used in large-volume transactions), meant that the invest-
... and diminished activity too at 
insurance and venture capital 
companies
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ment of these institutions was limited to less than €3 billion (32% down on 2007), with a par-
ticularly sharp decline in large-value and leveraged operations.
The contraction in new funds raised was accompanied by significant declines in the value of 
portfolios. Money market funds showed an annual yield of 2.4%, but in other IFs and in PFs 
the change in value was on the negative side (–5% and –8%, respectively). Further, hedge 
funds posted significant capital losses (of around 10%) and real estate CIIs, although they 
achieved marginally positive profits at the close of 2008 (+0.7%), saw their asset valuations 
significantly revised in the opening months of 2009, resulting in negative year-on-year yields 
from January this year. Insurance companies also saw their results diminish in relation to the 
previous year (–10%), although their profitability and solvency ratios remained high.
In some CIIs, investor applications to withdraw funds meant that extraordinary measures had 
to be taken, such as the temporary suspension of redemptions and the winding up of the in-
stitutions. However, these situations affected only a small number of institutions (real estate 
funds and hedge funds) whose assets were relatively negligible in relation to the sectoral to-
tal.
Aggregate losses at Spanish CIIs were moderate, owing to their relatively conservative profile 
(see Chart 6.7). This conservative approach became more accentuated during 2008, with de-
clines in the relative weight of equities and of foreign assets in Spanish CIIs’ portfolios. Con-
versely, treasury positions and holdings of Spanish government debt increased.
As indicated, the slowdown in household debt initiated in 2006 intensified in 2008. As a result, 
its rate of increase stood somewhat below the related rate for household income, meaning 
that for the first time since the mid-90s, household indebtedness declined slightly, accounting 
for somewhat less than 130% of household gross disposable income (GDI) (see Chart 6.8).
Despite the reduction observed in the household debt ratio, the interest burden on the sector 
increased to 18% of its GDI, 0.6 pp above the 2007 figure, owing to the increase in interest 
payments as a result of the higher average cost of liabilities. This did not prevent household 
saving capacity, once financial expenses were stripped out, from increasing by almost 3 pp, 
essentially as a result of the notable recovery in gross saving.
On the estimates available of household net wealth, this variable fell to 950% of the sector’s 
income, around 100 pp below the 2007 figure. This is due to the reduction seen in the real 
estate and financial components, as a result of the fall in house and stock market prices. Ac-
cording to Spanish Housing Ministry statistics, the year-on-year growth of property stood at 
–3.2% in December 2008, compared with 4.8% in the same period of 2007. Nonetheless, as 
explained in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Report, the decline in the unit value of the stock of hous-
ing last year was probably greater and might – taking as a reference the INE date or for sec-
ond-hand houses – stand at around 10%.
As a result of the fall in asset prices and of the switching towards time deposits, the weight of 
liquid and lower-risk assets increased in the financial component of the household portfolio.
The sizable level of indebtedness attained, along with the fall in employment and the decline in 
the average cost of outstanding debt, has translated into an increase in the degree of financial 
pressure on households, especially the most indebted ones. The reflection of this has been a 
rise in the proportion of indebted households whose loans have now been considered as 
doubtful by banks (from 3.8% in December 2007 to 6.9% one year later), and an increase in 
Yields declined and difficulties 
arose in certain products whose 
relative weight is scant
5. The financial position 
of the non-financial private 
sector
5.1 HOUSEHOLDS
Household indebtedness fell, 
although the related interest 
burden increased
Household wealth fell, and in its 
financial component there was 
switching towards lower-risk 
assets
Financial pressure increased in 
some segments of the sector
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the sector’s bad debt ratio, which was more marked for loans for consumption and other pur-
poses than for loans for house purchase (rising to 5.2% in December 2008 for the former, 2.6 
pp up on 2007, while the latter increased by almost 1.7 pp to 2.4%) (see Chart 6.1).
According to the financial accounts of the Spanish economy, the weight of own funds in com-
panies’ liabilities fell by almost 8 pp in 2008 to 43%, a development linked essentially to the 
decline in stock market prices. Conversely, the proportion accounted for by loans granted by 
resident institutions increased by almost 4pp to over 25%, while that of foreign loans, a fund-
ing vehicle normally used by larger corporations, rose by somewhat over 1 pp. There was a 
slight increase in the relative weight of inter-company loans to 4% of the sector’s total balance 
sheet, thus curtailing the declining trend of the previous years.
External funds raised by non-financial corporations grew at a somewhat lower rate than their 
income, meaning that the sector’s debt ratio in relation to its income fell slightly (see Chart 6.9). 
5.2 NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS
The debt ratio of companies fell 
slightly, while the interest 
burden increased
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Nonetheless, the increase in the average cost of outstanding debt led to a further rise in the 
debt burden ratio to close to 30%, 3.7 pp above the 2007 figure. The return on capital (meas-
ured as the ratio of net ordinary profits to own funds) showed scant changes, since the income 
estimated by National Accounts continued to evidence notable dynamism, despite the reces-
sionary setting.
Conversely, the gross operating profits of the firms reporting to the Banco de España Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office’s quarterly survey (CBQ) – which, though it refers only to a sample 
of companies, bases its calculations directly on the companies’ income statements – fell by 
almost 6% in 2008 on a year earlier. Analysis of the activities best represented in the CBQ, 
which does not include the construction and real estate development sectors, highlights that 
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a. Interest-bearing borrowed funds.
b. Gross operating profit plus financial revenue.
c. Aggregate of all the firms reporting to the CBSO belonging to the groups Endesa, Iberdrola, Repsol and Telefónica. 
Adjusted for intra-group financing to avoid double counting.
d. Ordinary net profit (ONP), using National Accounts data = gross operating surplus + interest and dividends received - 
interest paid - fixed capital consumption.
e. Own funds valued at market prices.
f. Own funds calculated on the basis of the 1996 figure and cumulative flows since. 
g. Indicators estimated on the basis of CBSO annual and quarterly survey data. A value of more (less) than 100 indicates 
higher (lower) financial pressure than in the base year.
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the decline was particularly marked in the industrial branch (–24%). As a result, the ordinary 
return on own funds declined, while the percentage of companies for which this ratio was in 
negative territory increased. In line with the economic outlook for the coming months, analysts’ 
expectations about listed non-financial corporations’ earnings point to a considerable reduc-
tion in their growth rate in the short term, which would be in negative figures. Over a longer 
term, forecasts also point to a reduction – albeit a more moderate one – in the rate of increase 
of income generated.
The debt/income and debt burden ratios of the firms reporting to the CBQ increased, influ-
enced in part by the unfavourable course of business earnings. The overall trend of profitabil-
ity, debt and the debt burden translated into an increase in the indicators of financial pressure 
on investment and employment, which was particularly marked in the industrial sector.
The deterioration in the economic situation and the increase seen in financing costs over most 
of the year translated into a rise in the financial pressure on certain segments in the sector. 
These were particularly notable in construction and in real estate services, where the doubtful 
assets ratio climbed to 5.7%, more than 5 pp up on 2007 and far above the related rate for 
the other activities in the sector (1.9%). Along the same lines are the figures on the number of 
companies going bankrupt and the microeconomic information in the CBQ, which highlights a 
greater deterioration in companies in a less favourable financial position. Thus, for instance, 
while the debt burden for the median company increased by 2 pp in 2008, for companies with 
higher values for this ratio the increase was far greater (specifically, for companies in the 75th 
percentile the increase was more than 12 pp).
Financial pressure increased in 
some segments of the sector, 
especially in the construction 
and real estate services 
branches
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Banco de España management report for 2008
This chapter of the Annual Report, devoted to the management of the Banco de España, is an 
overall summary of the most notable aspects of the institution’s activity in 2008. Some of these 
aspects will be addressed in greater detail in the monographic reports published annually by 
various departments of the Bank (Banking Supervision, Balance of Payments, Complaints 
Service, Central Balance Sheet Data Office, Central Credit Register, Research Activities, Over-
sight of Payment Systems and Public Debt Market).
During 2008 the EU continued with the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, which has now 
been signed by 25 of the 27 Member States, the exceptions being Ireland and the Czech 
Republic. The Council’s aim is for the Treaty to come into force before the end of 2009.
At the request of the Slovak authorities, the European Central Bank (ECB) examined whether 
this Member State fulfilled the conditions necessary to adopt the euro, in a convergence report 
published on 7 May. On the basis of the convergence reports from the ECB and from the Com-
mission, and upon a proposal of the Commission, the Council decided on 20 June to abrogate 
the derogations of Slovakia, allowing it to adopt the euro on 1 January 2009.
With Slovakia, the number of Member States which have adopted the euro increased to 16 and 
the number of members of the ECB’s Governing Council to 22. The ECB’s Governing Council 
adopted a Decision on 18 December 2008 suspending the entry into force of the rotation system 
of its members’ voting rights until the number of NCB governors on the Council exceeds 18.
1 June 2008 marked the tenth anniversary of the creation of the ECB and the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks (ESCB). The ECB and the national central banks in the euro area cele-
brated this anniversary with various events.
As in previous years, in 2008 the Banco de España’s activity as a Eurosystem member was 
intense. The Governor participated in the regular meetings of the Governing Council and of the 
General Council of the ECB at which, among others, decisions on monetary policy were taken, 
as explained in detail in Chapters 1 and 4 of this Annual Report. Noteworthy this year was the 
high number of extraordinary meetings of the Governing Council held, via conference call, in 
2008 Q4 as a result of the financial crisis.
An extensive group of professionals from the Banco de España participated in the various 
committees, working groups and other Eurosystem bodies to prepare for and assist in the 
taking of decisions by the ECB’s governing bodies. In this area, the appointment of the Depu-
ty Governor of the Banco de España as chairman of the ECB’s International Relations Com-
mittee (IRC) is particularly noteworthy.
Together with a consolidated structure of committees and working groups, the task forces, which 
are created to perform tasks in a very specific area and with a limited time span, provide the sys-
tem with added flexibility. Accordingly, in response to the financial crisis, two high-level task forces 
(HLTF) were created, one on collateral and the other on financial crisis management. The Banco 
de España is represented on these task forces by the corresponding Director General.
The Bank participated in the Eurosystem macroeconomic forecasting exercises, and in the 
drafting of the report on public finances and of reports on structural issues, such as corporate 
1 Introduction
2 Activities of the Banco 
de España as a member 
of the Eurosystem
Slovakia adopted the euro on
1 January 2009
Tenth anniversary of the ECB 
and the ESCB
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finance in the euro area (sent to the European Parliament in 2008) and developments in the 
housing loans market in the euro area.
As a member of the ESCB, the Banco de España participated on the Banking Supervision 
Committee (BSC). As part of its task to monitor structural and conjunctural financial system 
developments, the BSC prepared two reports, one on banking structures and the other on 
banking sector stability. It also contributed to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review and to the 
Financial Stability Table of the Economic and Financial Committee (FST-EFC). Additionally, a 
series of more in-depth analyses of special interest was undertaken, including, most notably, 
papers on the “originate-to-distribute” banking model, developments in the covered bonds 
market and the review of banking sector practices in relation to liquidity stress testing and 
contingency plans.
As regards cooperation between central banks and supervisory authorities, the BSC devel-
oped, in cooperation with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), a com-
mon analytical framework for assessing the systemic implications of a crisis. Lastly, the joint 
initiative in collaboration with the Statistics Committee and the CEBS to harmonise statistical 
and prudential reporting requirements for institutions is also noteworthy.
During 2008 the staggered migration by country to TARGET2, the second generation TARGET 
payments system, was completed satisfactorily. TARGET remains a key feature for the integra-
tion of euro money markets and the development of the single monetary policy. With a single 
centralised technical platform and a single price structure, TARGET2 offers a broad range of 
basic services to its participants and a homogeneous set of functions to those systems that 
use it for settlement. Following the appropriate technical and legal developments by the Banco 
de España and the corresponding tests, the Spanish banking community satisfactorily mi-
grated to TARGET2 on 18 February (see Section 6.2).
As for the creation of the Single European Payments Area (SEPA), more than a year after it was 
launched the Banco de España has continued to strive to make a success of this initiative, 
which is key for the greater integration of retail payment markets in Europe. Thus, the Bank’s 
task within the framework of the Eurosystem and in Spain, centred on the assessment of the 
transition to the SEPA and on encouraging actions to make the migration easier.
In July, the Eurosystem decided to set up a new service to settle securities transactions in euro 
and other European Union currencies in central bank money (TARGET2-Securities), assigning 
the development and operation of this service to the central banks of Germany, Spain, France 
and Italy. The preparatory work, which began in 2006, continued throughout 2008, in close 
collaboration with the market. It was also decided to launch the CCBM2 project, a new system 
for management of the collateral provided by counterparties in Eurosystem refinancing opera-
tions.
In cooperation with the national central banks, the ECB continued to develop, compile and 
disseminate a wide range of statistics useful for monetary policy implementation in the euro 
area and for the various functions of the ESCB. In addition, in December, the ECB adopted the 
Regulation (EC) No 24/2009 concerning statistics on the assets and liabilities of financial vehi-
cle corporations engaged in securitisation transactions (ECB/2008/30), which will make more 
reliable statistics on these financial intermediaries available from 2010. The recast version of 
regulations concerning the balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector was also 
adopted through Regulation (EC) No 25/2009 (ECB/2008/32), which includes greater detail on 
credit and reporting on securitisations undertaken by credit institutions.
The staggered migration
by country to TARGET2
was completed
The Eurosystem decided to 
implement TARGET2-Securities
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In 2008, the Banco de España was responsible for producing a total of 885 million 50, 20 and 
5 euro banknotes, in compliance with Eurosystem banknote production agreements in a joint 
and decentralised framework. The banknotes were produced according to schedule and met 
all the quality requirements (see Section 6.3).
The Banco de España collaborated very actively with other Eurosystem members in the prep-
aration of the second series of euro banknotes, which will foreseeably be issued in the near 
future, and in the custody of the Eurosystem strategic stock. In this respect, the Banco de 
España played an important role in the organisation of international consignments of ban-
knotes.
As in previous years, the Bank was chosen to perform tests to measure the quality of ban-
knotes in circulation in the euro area countries, in collaboration with the central bank of the 
Netherlands.
For some years, one of the Bank’s key objectives has been to build its international presence 
and raise its international profile, to project an image of excellence that will facilitate dialogue 
with other central banks and supervisors, financial regulators and multilateral organisations in 
this area. The crisis that began in the summer of 2007 and that is affecting the financial stabil-
ity of all countries, to a greater or lesser degree, requires global solutions, underlining the im-
portance of an appropriate and smooth dialogue.
In general, the work of the international committees with global reach was highly influenced in 
2008 by the specific actions proposed in the Financial Stability Forum’s report, approved at the 
meeting of G7 ministers and central bank governors in April 2008, and, subsequently, by the 
action plan included in the declaration of the G20 summit held in Washington on 15 November. 
A commitment arose from this summit to improve cooperation and to work together to iden-
tify and implement the reforms necessary to improve the functioning and solvency of the 
world’s financial systems. In the European arena, in addition to these proposals and recom-
mendations, road maps were established by ECOFIN and a work programme was approved 
by EU Ministers within the Economic and Finance Committee, further conditioning the tasks of 
the international committees.
Activity in the sphere of the Eurosystem has already been referred to in Section 2 above, so 
this section focuses particularly on other European and international fora in which the Bank 
participates. It then goes on to mention bilateral relations, technical cooperation with other 
central banks, supervisory agencies and bank regulators, and international seminars and con-
ferences organised.
In the European Union, the Banco de España participated, as part of the Spanish delegation, 
in diverse Community working groups and committees.
As in previous years, the Governor took part, together with his European counterparts and 
economy and finance ministers, in the informal ECOFIN meetings, the first held in Ljubljana in 
March and the second in Nice in September, under the Slovenian and French presidencies, 
respectively. At these meetings, priority EU economic and financial matters were discussed, 
including most notably issues related to financial stability and supervision.
The Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), which prepares the meetings of the Council of 
Economy and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) in which the Deputy Governor participates, worked 
in 2008, firstly, on the regular review of the economic and financial situation, examining the 
The Banco de España 
produced 885 million euro 
banknotes
3 International activities
The work of the international 
committees was marked
by the need to reform the 
financial systems to improve 
their functioning and their 
solvency
3.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Banco de España 
participated in the work
of the EFC and the EPC
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stability and convergence programmes. The work on financial stability and European financial 
architecture continued, with specific monitoring of the road map drawn up by the ECOFIN in 
October 2007 in response to the financial crisis (including, inter alia, issues relating to financial 
transparency, asset valuation, the prudential framework for supervision and rating agencies). 
Furthermore, national financial support plans were coordinated and followed (including the 
review of deposit guarantee funds) and a European position was adopted at the G20 summit 
on international financial architecture. Also within the EFC, the Bank took part in ad hoc work-
ing groups on specific subjects, such the procyclicality of the financial system.
The working agenda of the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) placed particular emphasis on 
the analysis of the economic instruments available for meeting the targets set for energy and 
climate change, the methodological aspects of assessing countries’ progress in relation to the 
Lisbon Agenda, the quality of public finances and their long-term sustainability and the integra-
tion of these two aspects in the Community fiscal supervision framework. Adopting a conjunc-
tural perspective, the EPC focused on analysing developments in energy and food prices and 
on national and Community economic policy responses to the economic crisis.
The contributions made by the Bank in European financial supervision committees, particu-
larly the CEBS, are also noteworthy. In 2008, the activity of the CEBS was focused mainly on 
the following areas:
— Technical advice to the European Commission on own funds, the reduction of the 
areas open to national discretion in the new solvency regulations, analysis of su-
pervisory powers in Europe, liquidity, large exposures, transparency and the de-
velopment of common supervisory financial statements.
— Cooperation and convergence in supervisory practices.
— Work related to the financial turmoil, with surveys of its impact on European 
banks.
— Projects related to the implementation of the review of the Lamfalussy approach.
The Bank was also involved in the work of the Interim Working Committee on Financial Con-
glomerates, which reports to the CEBS and the CEIOPS (Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors) and which, in 2009, changed its name to the Joint 
Committee on Financial Conglomerates. One particularly noteworthy project, inter alia, in 2008 
was the beginning of the review of the Financial Conglomerates Directive. In addition, there 
has been a growing trend in Europe for analyses to be conducted jointly by the three level 3 
committees of European supervisors, that is, the above-mentioned CEIOPS and CEBS, on the 
one hand, and the CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators) on the other. Thus, 
for example, noteworthy among the work undertaken by these 3L3 committees are studies on 
the delegation of tasks and responsibilities among supervisors and the study on rating agen-
cies, corporate governance and the valuation of illiquid instruments.
A large part of the global international activity of the Banco de España revolves around the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the main nexus of cooperation between the world's 
central banks. In addition to regularly attending meetings of governors and the Annual Gen-
eral Meeting, the Bank played an active role on the Committee on the Global Economy, the 
Committee on the Global Financial System and the Markets Committee, and in the complex 
structure of working groups arising from such committees.
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The Bank also participated actively on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
directing some of its actions. This Committee piloted the work aimed at strengthening those 
elements of the new Capital Accord which, in view of the lessons drawn from the current situ-
ation, may be improved upon. In particular, proposals were developed to:
— Strengthen the capital requirements of certain complex financial products and 
instruments included in the trading portfolio.
— Bolster liquidity management standards.
— Improve institutions' risk management, emphasising, for instance, stress testing 
and the problems involved in valuing certain instruments.
— Enhance the quality of information that institutions supply to the market.
— Improve supervisory cooperation for international banks via the creation of col-
leges of supervisors.
— Shore up the macro-prudential approach to supervision.
This is also without forgetting the implementation of Basel II and the monitoring of its impact 
on capital requirements and its possible procyclicality. The work of the International Liaison 
Group, set up to foster dialogue with supervisors not included in the BCBS, on matters related 
to the exchange of information and supervisory coordination, should also be mentioned. Par-
ticularly noteworthy, among this group's work, are its analyses of risk-based supervision, the 
importance of adequate accounting provisions and microfinance.
The Bank was also involved in the work of the Joint Forum, which brings together banking, 
insurance and securities supervisors worldwide. Its agenda was also affected by the financial 
crisis, which has emphasised the growing degree of interconnection between the activities of 
the different financial sectors. Accordingly, the Joint Forum focused on preparing reports on 
issues at the epicentre of the financial crisis, such as risk concentration and customer suitabil-
ity in the retail sale of financial products and services, together with update of its previous 
papers on credit risk transfer and analysis of the degree of implementation of the principles for 
the supervision of financial conglomerates and the main areas in which these principles would 
benefit from being updated.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is another traditional catalyst of the Bank's global ac-
tivity. As has become customary, the Bank expended considerable effort preparing the brief-
ing notes for the Spanish representatives at this institution on the main matters discussed by 
the Executive Board. During 2008 the Bank paid particular attention to the reforms required 
for the Fund to adapt to the challenges posed by the financial crisis. These reforms were 
given a considerable boost after the G20 summit. Particularly noteworthy among the issues 
that received most attention in 2008 were: (i) the need to refine supervision of the Fund and, 
especially, to work in closer collaboration with the Financial Stability Forum and other multi-
lateral organisations; (ii) resources and the ability to provide financial assistance to member 
countries; and (iii) the review of financial instruments. The Bank also participated in discus-
sions on the customary Article IV reports, namely those relating to the countries of most inter-
est to Spain. Finally, opinions and comments were contributed on the main reports published 
by the Fund, the Report on World Economic Outlook and the Report on Global Financial 
Stability.
The Banco de España has 
played a very active role on the 
Basel Committee
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Remaining on the subject of the IMF, the Bank also took part in the meetings of the Interna-
tional Monetary and Financial Committee in the spring and in the autumn, on the occasion of 
the Annual Meeting. These meetings reviewed the global economic outlook and the key as-
pects of the institution's policy and governance, all of which require orientation from its mem-
bers at the highest level.
With regard to the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), which serves as the 
main forum for coordination of Latin American central banks, the Bank has participated ac-
tively in the meetings of governors, of the Alternates Committee and of the Audit Committee. 
In 2008 important matters for the Centre were addressed, such as the approval of internal 
rules governing the operation of the Reserve Fund and the election of the Director General for 
the five-year period running from 2009 to 2013. Furthermore, the Bank continued to collabo-
rate with the Centre's training activities, especially with the courses on operational risk, finan-
cial instruments and international financial reporting standards, and accounting and valuation 
of central bank financial instruments, and with the seminar on the application of XBRL. Lastly, 
the Bank played a leading role in a number of CEMLA's initiatives, for example, the organisa-
tion of the VIII Meeting on Central Banking Human Resources Management, the creation of 
information exchange systems for remittances, human resources and banknotes, and the 
work of the accounting, banknote and IT technical committees.
In 2008, collaboration with the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), 
to which all the entities in charge of banking supervision in the American continent belong, was 
also stepped up. The Bank, as an associate member since October 2006, participates ac-
tively in the Association’s governing bodies, training plans, working groups and other activities. 
In 2008 a meeting of the Association was held for the first time at the Banco de España, four 
seminars on subjects of shared interest were organised jointly and the Bank took part in the 
working groups on good consolidated supervision practices and operational risk and in the 
group that is to develop an information system on financial markets in the region.
In 2008 the Bank increased its collaboration with the main multilateral development banks (the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) and, at 
a bilateral level, with other central banks and bank supervisors, through high-level and techni-
cal meetings. The list of central banks and supervisors with which bilateral meetings were held 
in 2008 includes Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico and Russia. In the same vein, senior offi-
cials of the BIS, IMF and IDB visited the Banco de España. Also, as in previous years, the Bank 
was included in the Spanish delegations participating in the periodic meetings of the Paris 
Club and in OECD and EU working groups on export credit.
The Bank’s cooperation with and technical assistance given to other central banks and super-
visory and regulatory bodies, be it bilaterally or through joint projects with multilateral organisa-
tions, makes a decisive contribution to its external profile. The aim of this cooperation, which 
has grown continuously over recent years, is to increase the Bank’s presence and interna-
tional prestige through the transfer of knowledge and experience amassed by the Bank and its 
employees.
As has become customary, the core of the technical cooperation was the programme of 
courses and seminars for Latin America, where the Bank is on the way to becoming the 
benchmark for many central banks and bank supervisors. This cooperation, facilitated by the 
common language and culture, has stimulated continuous demand for technical cooperation, 
which rises year by year and takes the form of organising numerous study visits to Madrid, 
sending Bank experts to missions in situ and attending to almost constant consultations.
Collaboration with American 
supervisors was stepped up
Most of the technical 
cooperation was focused
on Latin America
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As for other geographical areas, such as the Mediterranean and eastern European countries, 
the Banco de España’s cooperation is mainly in conjunction with that of other central banks 
and supervisory agencies, for participation in joint projects, some of which are coordinated 
within the Eurosystem and financed by European Union funds. Noteworthy in 2008 was the 
Bank’s Internal Audit Department’s involvement in a TACIS III project (Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States) in collaboration with the Central Bank of Russia 
together with another eight central banks in the Eurosystem and the ECB.
Mention should also be made of the Bank’s ongoing collaboration with different multilateral 
organisations to provide technical assistance and, most especially, that channelled through 
CEMLA, ASBA, the Central American Monetary Council, the IMF, the World Bank and the BIS 
Financial Stability Institute. Likewise, collaboration with agencies responsible for securities 
markets, both in Spain and in Latin America, was stepped up.
Lastly, Billetaria, the international review on cash management published by the Bank in Span-
ish and English was presented in 2008 at the main international fora and has become estab-
lished as an important instrument for communication and collaboration among specialists in 
this field.
During 2008, the Banco de España continued its efforts to become an international bench-
mark in the organisation of high-level meetings and events designed to share and disseminate 
knowledge and experience in the most topical subjects in its areas of competence. With this 
purpose, it worked in collaboration with international agencies and intensified bilateral relations 
with other central banks of the G7 countries, the ESCB, Latin America and Asia. This type of 
activity contributes to establishing the Bank’s prestige abroad and to disseminating its central-
banking and financial-regulation know-how.
The most significant event in 2008 in this area was the celebration of the 50th anniversary of 
Spain joining the IMF and the World Bank. For this reason, in December the Banco de España 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance organised a conference entitled “Spain in the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: fifty years on” to mark the 50th anniversary 
of Spain’s membership of both institutions, attended by senior Spanish officials and senior of-
ficials of the IMF and the World Bank, along with academics and representatives of the bank-
ing industry and organisations linked to the IMF and the World Bank. The conference provided 
the opportunity to examine Spain’s relationship with both institutions over the last 50 years, to 
reflect on the changes experienced by them, to analyse the role they have played in the world 
economy over this period and to look at how future challenges, considering the present set-
ting, may be addressed.
Earlier, in April, a roundtable was held in Madrid on the World economic outlook: beyond finan-
cial turmoil. The main issues discussed were the impact of financial turmoil on the real econo-
my and global financial stability, economic policy responses, the outlook for emerging econo-
mies, analysis of global imbalances and the role of exchange rates in their adjustment. On the 
following day, the participants in the roundtable joined the wide-ranging panel of speakers, 
from universities, central banks, international financial institutions and the financial sector, at 
the seminar, jointly organised with the Reinventing the Bretton Woods Committee, entitled 
Bretton Woods II Under Stress? The seminar consisted of four sessions, covering: (i) the cur-
rent financial situation and its implications for Bretton Woods II; (ii) the market outlook; (iii) 
analysis of the resilience shown by emerging markets and whether this is permanent or transi-
tory; and (iv) sovereign wealth funds and their possible role as a stabilising factor of global 
imbalances.
3.2 CONFERENCES, MEETINGS 
AND SEMINARS ORGANISED BY 
THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
In December an international 
conference was organised
to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of Spain’s 
membership of the IMF
and the World Bank
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Within the framework of the 41st Annual Assembly of the Asian Development Bank, held in 
Madrid in May, and as part of the country day dedicated to Spain, the Banco de España and 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance organised a high-level seminar in which authori-
ties from central banks, multilateral organisations, universities and the financial sector partici-
pated. The seminar consisted of two successive sessions, the first on the role of the financial 
system in the moderation of growth in Asia, and the second on the restructuring of the banking 
system from the perspective of the Spanish experience.
A roundtable on Latin America at the crossroads: challenges, risks and outlook, whose par-
ticipants included senior officials from the World Bank and from some governments in the re-
gion, along with experts from the Spanish government, the financial sector and the Banco de 
España, was held at the Bank’s headquarters in June.
Lastly, the Bank hosted CEMLA’s VIII Meeting on Central Banking Human Resources Management, 
whose objective was to analyse the role of human resources as a promoter of central banks’ ef-
fectiveness and social responsibility. Representatives of most Latin American central banks and of 
Eurosystem central banks and certain international organisations attended the meeting.
In 2008 various departments of the Banco de España carried out analysis and research on the 
Spanish economy and its international environment, in order to give advice to the Bank’s gov-
erning bodies in relation to the performance of their functions.
In line with output in recent years, 38 Working Papers and 10 Occasional Papers were pub-
lished in 2008. Moreover, Banco de España staff published 45 papers in academic journals 
and specialised books, 35 of which in anonymously refereed journals.1
The research agenda of the Banco de España revolves around five major areas:
— Macroeconomic modelling and forecasting.
— Monetary policy and its transmission mechanisms.
— Financial stability.
— International economy.
— Spanish economy.
During 2008, more emphasis was placed, in all areas, on analysis of the macroeconomic and 
financial causes and consequences of the international crisis.
As regards macroeconomic modelling and forecasting, the dynamic, stochastic general equilibri-
um model of the Spanish economy and the rest of the euro area (BEMOD) was estimated and 
similar smaller scale models were developed which included financial restrictions or certain institu-
tional aspects of the Spanish labour market. The possibility of including financial variables in other 
short- and medium-term forecasting models, such as the Banco de España’s quarterly model and 
real- time forecasting models of economic activity in the euro area and in Spain, was also investi-
4 Economic analysis
and research
4.1 PRIORITY AREAS
OF ANALYSIS
The Bank’s avenues of research 
focused on the international 
financial crisis
1. The Banco de España’s Research Memorandum, 2008, available at www.bde.es, provides further information on 
these publications. It also describes in greater detail the other research activities carried out by the Banco de España 
during the year. 
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gated. Furthermore, available macroeconomic models were used to assess the effects on the 
Spanish economy of lower oil prices and government economic stimulus measures. During the 
second half of 2008, the third wave of the Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2008 was prepared 
and designed; the preliminary results of this survey will be available at the end of 2009.
The avenues of research on monetary policy and its transmission mechanisms continued to 
focus on analysis of the consequences of financial frictions for monetary policy transmission 
and the implications of price and wage rigidities and of the sources of oil price shocks for 
optimal monetary policy design.
Research in the area of financial stability and banking analysis was also mainly orientated at 
addressing aspects relating to the crisis. Thus, the role of the “originate-to-distribute” banking 
model was studied, on the basis of analysis of the determining factors of securitisation in 
Spain, the characteristics of the main relationships observed in the Spanish interbank market 
were described, the existence of the credit channel in Spain was explored and the use of 
stress tests in supervision was discussed. Also, research into the relationship between com-
petition and financial stability was extended and the role played by banks in the development 
of firms’ financial situation was analysed.
Research on the international economy was also influenced by the financial instability. In addi-
tion to the traditional lines of work, amidst new concerns about the global economy, other 
areas arose such as:
— Capital flows to emerging economies, including the role of remittances, financial 
vulnerabilities and the impact of commodity prices in Latin America, the financial 
and banking implications of capital flows in Asia and the impact of these flows for 
the transition to EMU in new EU Member States.
— A historical perspective of global financial turbulence, analysing structured finance 
and the consequences for emerging economies. There was also a paper on the 
exposure and external interdependence of the Spanish economy.
— Global imbalances and financial stability, in particular how they are linked to the 
globalisation process (possible scenarios for adjustment of imbalances, implica-
tions of the build-up of reserves and sovereign wealth funds on global stability, 
foreign investment, etc.).
— Foreign trade, also addressing more institutional and macroeconomic aspects.
— Breakdown of nominal interest rates in the euro area and in the United States into their 
three basic components: real risk-free rates, risk premium and inflation expectations.
— Analysis of the impact of various indicators of financial pressure (indebtedness, 
debt burden and profitability) on the investment decisions of non-financial corpo-
rations in the euro area.
— Decisive factors in national and cross-border bank acquisitions in the EU.
— International financial architecture: reform of the IMF and its implications for Spain, 
IMF financing facilities and their possible simplification, IMF policies and sovereign 
debt restructuring processes.
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Finally, as regards avenues of research on the Spanish economy, a broad set of topics relating 
to its structural characteristics were considered, such as the situation and quality of public fi-
nances, regional governments’ fiscal behaviour, the consequences of demographic changes 
(with special emphasis on migratory flows), productivity developments and the quality of the 
labour factor, the degree of competition and the functioning of the factor and product markets 
(in particular, the housing and labour markets), business financing and households’ financial 
situation, and the impact of regulatory and institutional changes.2 Decisions regarding the lo-
cation of Spanish firms’ direct investment abroad were analysed and progress was made with 
exploring the determinants of business investment and foreign trade.
The Banco de España’s connections with academia and the economic analysis and research 
units at other central banks and international institutions were maintained through the four 
traditional channels. First, the analysis and research produced by the Banco de España was 
presented and discussed at national and international seminars, congresses and academic 
conferences and published through the profession’s usual channels. Second, the Banco de 
España holds a number of regular seminars, in which members of the Spanish and interna-
tional academic community participate, including a weekly economic research seminar. It also 
organises national and international conferences, sometimes in collaboration with other or-
ganisations. In 2008, the Banco de España participated, in conjunction with other institutions, 
in the organisation of three international conferences: the 41st Annual Assembly of the Asian 
Development Bank; the European Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics (ES-
SIM), held in Roda de Bará (Tarragona); and the international conference held to mark the 50th 
anniversary of Spain’s membership of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
(see Section 3.2).
Third, the Banco de España continues to contribute to the research networks organised with-
in the Eurosystem for analysis of the euro area economy, such as, in 2007 and 2008, the Wage 
Dynamics Network and the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (organising a course given by 
Larry Christiano) and, in Latin America, within CEMLA. Since 2008, the Bank has also partici-
pated as a partner in a consortium of European universities and institutions aimed at develop-
ing the EFIGE (European Firms in the Global Economy) project, as part of the European Com-
mission’s 7th Framework Programme (FP7). The purpose of this project is to understand the 
interaction between globalisation and the European economy for EU firms. The regular visitor 
and external adviser programmes also continued; these promote projects that may be consid-
ered strategic in different areas of analysis and research.
Lastly, during 2008 the Banco de España launched its programme Excelencia en Educación e 
Investigación en Economía Monetaria, Financiera y Bancaria (Excellence in Teaching and Re-
search in Monetary, Financial and Banking Economics) which spans several years and envis-
ages subsidies for hiring lecturers and for research projects in a number of fields – macroeco-
nomics, monetary policy, finance and the financial system, financial regulation and supervision, 
and international economics – in Spanish universities and research centres.
As mentioned above, the three main channels for the dissemination and communication of the 
Banco de España’s research findings are the Working Paper and Occasional Paper series and 
the monthly Economic Bulletin which, along with regular articles on the economic situation, 
includes summaries of research conducted or under way. All these activities are included in the 
4.2 RELATIONS WITH ACADEMIA
4.3 DISSEMINATION AND 
COMMUNICATION
2. In relation to the financial situation of Spanish households, in 2007 the preliminary results of the Survey of Household 
Finances were published [see “Survey of household finances (EFF) 2005: methods, results and changes between 2002 
and 2005”, Economic Bulletin, January 2008, Banco de España]. 
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Economic Research Portal, a section on the Bank’s website, whose content was extended 
and enlarged in the year.
In order to continue to facilitate public access to the Banco de España’s bibliographical re-
sources, the Library implemented a plan to improve its services and the way in which these 
resources are kept. One of the first measures to be adopted under this plan is to incorporate, 
in a computerised file that may be accessed via the Internet, approximately 60,000 works that 
were previously catalogued only on index cards. This project was conducted, with external 
backing, throughout 2008 and is expected to be completed in 2009 Q4. In addition, an elec-
tronic edition was created of all the material on which Pedro Martínez Méndez was working 
prior to his death, relating to “The Labour Market from 1914 to 1925” and “The Treasury and 
the Banco de España: 1900-1936”. As a result, a CD-ROM entitled “Pedro Martínez Méndez. 
Unpublished works” was published and was presented to the public on 20 May 2008.
As at 31 December 2008, a total of 505 diverse institutions were subject to Banco de España 
supervision, of which 362 were credit institutions (see Table 7.1). The Bank is also responsible 
for supervising the activity of foreign credit institutions whose parent is a Spanish credit institu-
tion, within the confines of its role as supervisor on a consolidated basis.
The Banco de España’s ongoing supervision process relative to these institutions was affected 
in 2008 by the crisis that began in summer 2007. In consequence, the Bank’s actions in the 
year were largely aimed at carefully assessing the situation of Spanish banks in this new sce-
nario, and specific analyses of sector risks and of factors of fragility at institutions were stepped 
up considerably. The Bank also continued to conduct ordinary ongoing supervision, consisting 
of permanent monitoring backed up by a programme of on-site inspections. In terms of ac-
tual supervision, a total of 166 inspection visits were made in 2008, of which 48 were under 
way as at 31 December, as shown in the breakdown in Table 7.2.
The downward pattern of the data in Table 7.2 reflects, in addition to the above comments, the 
changes being introduced by the Banco de España in its ongoing supervision of institutions, 
aiming to achieve greater and more efficient supervision. The traditional on-site inspections, 
which are the only activities recorded in the above-mentioned table, have been increasingly 
accompanied by close, ongoing monitoring, prompted by the increase in the amount and 
quality of the periodic and management information reported by institutions. Moreover, use of 
the form of supervision known as “ongoing on-site monitoring” has become more widespread. 
This entails the permanent presence of inspection personnel in the institutions, combining 
analysis and checks; originally used in the two big Spanish banking groups, this form of mon-
itoring has recently been extended to include other institutions, on the basis of their size or 
complexity.
Ongoing monitoring, whether or not conducted on-site, now consumes a considerable portion 
of the supervisory resources available; these activities are not reflected in the inspection visits 
statistics.
In 2008, the Banco de España’s activities, within its supervisory functions, were strengthened 
in two areas.
First, relative to implementation of the Capital Accord, commonly known as Basel II. With 
the publication of Circular 3/2008 on determination and control of minimum own funds, in 
2008 the Banco de España completed the process of adapting banking regulations on 
solvency to the regulatory framework stemming from the new Capital Accord. For this pur-
The Bank’s Library commenced 
the computerisation of 60,000 
bibliographical references
5 Banking supervision 
and regulation
5.1 SUPERVISORY ACTIVITY
In total, 505 institutions are 
supervised by the Banco
de España
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pose, it assigned the necessary human and technical resources to the process of supervi-
sory validation of the advanced internal models for measuring risk, including the necessary 
collaboration with foreign supervisory authorities. It also published a guide setting out the 
criteria to be applied by credit institutions in their internal capital adequacy assessment 
processes and conducted a general pilot programme to assess the suitability of these 
processes.
Second, relative to international supervisory cooperation. In 2008, fluid collaboration with 
European, Latin American and North American supervisory bodies intensified, through the 
supervisory colleges. In this respect, the meetings organised by the Banco de España relat-
ing to the two big Spanish banking groups, and the Bank’s attendance, as the host country 
supervisor, at several meetings of colleges of foreign banking groups, are particularly note-
worthy.
In 2008, no particular precautionary measures were required in relation to the supervised insti-
tutions.
31.12.2008
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 362
Banks 66
Savings banks 46
Credit cooperatives 85
Branches of foreign credit institutions 89
Specialised credit institutions 75
Official credit institutions 1
OTHER 143
Mutual guarantee and reguarantee companies 25
Currency-exchange and money-transfer bureaux 62
Appraisal companies 56
TOTAL 505
INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA TABLE 7.1
INSPECTION VISITS
Completed Ongoing at 31 December
2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
7344088952196SNOITUTITSNITIDERC
022173253663sknaB
018112917111sknabsgnivaS
042188101Credit cooperatives
112761snoitutitsnitidercngieroffosehcnarB
112261UE:hcihwfO
698211211snoitutitsnitidercdesilaicepS
111161022221REHTO
Mutual guarantee and reguarantee companies 3 5 1 5 1 0
Currency-exchange and money-transfer bureaux 7 9 11 5 3 3
876882seinapmoclasiarppA
84556981174118LATOT
INSPECTION VISITS IN 2008 TABLE 7.2
2006
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In 2008, the Bank opened 14 sanctioning proceedings against institutions or individuals sub-
ject to  Banco de España supervision, and 33 against their directors or managers, to be 
conducted jointly with the aforesaid proceedings. Of this total, three cases were opened 
against appraisal companies and six against currency-exchange and money-transfer bu-
reaux. Proceedings were also opened against one institution and one individual for pursuit of 
activities reserved to credit institutions, and against one institution for pursuing currency-ex-
change and money-transfer bureaux activities without the necessary authorisation. A case 
was also opened against one individual and one legal person for acquisition of significant 
holdings in the capital of a credit institution without the necessary advance notice to the 
Banco de España.
In addition, three proceedings were opened for failure to comply with the ECB’s minimum re-
serve requirements.
These data are similar to those of previous years, both in terms of the number of cases and 
the types of supervised institutions and individuals subject to these proceedings.
In 2008, nine cases against supervised institutions were resolved and 42 cases against mem-
bers of their boards of directors or management. These resolutions involved imposition of: 12 
sanctions on institutions and 26 on directors, relating to very serious infringements; 26 sanc-
tions on institutions and 87 on directors, relating to serious infringements; and six sanctions on 
institutions for minor infringements, there being no provision in Spanish law for sanctions on 
directors in the event of minor infringements.
By type of institution, the sanctions were imposed on a bank, an appraisal company and 
seven currency-exchange and money-transfer bureaux.
Also in 2008, a case brought against a company and its director for pursuit of activities re-
served to credit institutions was resolved, with imposition of the corresponding sanction.
In addition, proceedings were brought to withdraw the authorisation granted to three curren-
cy-exchange bureaux, on account of their having relinquished such authorisation. Strictly 
speaking, such cases do not involve exercise of the Banco de España’s sanctioning power, 
but they do represent a form of control over supervised institutions, insofar as they enable 
entities which, for the reasons established by law, are liable to have their authorisation with-
drawn, to be prevented from forming part of the system.
As regards the nature of the infringements sanctioned in the year, in the proceedings brought 
against a bank and its directors, sanctions were imposed for a serious infringement, relating to 
failure to comply with accounting regulations and with rules on preparation of balance sheets 
and income and other financial statements that must necessarily be reported to the competent 
administrative authority.
In the case of proceedings brought against supervised institutions other than credit institu-
tions, the case against an appraisal company and its directors is noteworthy. Sanctions were 
imposed for a very serious infringement, relating to failure to comply with the requirements for 
authorisation, consisting in having the organisational resources and internal control measures 
necessary to conduct appraisal activities. The company was also sanctioned for serious in-
fringements, consisting, respectively, in issuing appraisal certificates and reports whose con-
tents were inconsistent with the data and evidence obtained in the appraisal activity or which 
departed, without expressly indicating as such, from the procedures, checks and instructions 
5.2 IMPOSING OF SANCTIONS
In 2008, 14 cases were opened 
against supervised institutions 
and 33 against their directors
In 2008, nine cases against 
supervised institutions and 42 
cases against their directors 
were resolved, with the 
imposition of 157 sanctions
Sanctions were imposed on a 
bank for failure to comply with 
accounting regulations … 
… and on an appraisal 
company and seven currency-
exchange and money-transfer 
bureaux
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envisaged in the applicable regulations, and in failing to report the necessary data to the 
Banco de España. A third serious infringement was also identified, relating to failure to comply 
with the sectoral regulations that require that appraisal companies must hold civil liability insur-
ance cover, an infringement for which the company had been sanctioned in the two previous 
years.
In the case of the currency-exchange and money-transfer bureaux, the infringements ana-
lysed in the proceedings opened may be grouped under three main headings: (i) failure to 
comply with the regulations governing the activity and organisation thereof, resulting in 
five very serious, eight serious and four minor infringements; (ii) failure to comply with the 
regulations on appropriate capitalisation, recording thereof and reporting to the Banco de 
España of accounting and activity data, resulting in five very serious, eight serious and two 
minor infringements; and (iii) failure to comply with the regulations on relations with cus-
tomers and with the public in general, resulting in five serious and one minor infringe-
ment.
Most of the sanctions imposed, within the range available, were in the form of fines. However, 
in some cases it was decided to opt for sanctions involving public or private reprimand, or 
disqualification from serving as a director, and, in the case of three foreign-currency bureaux, 
it was even deemed necessary to revoke the authorisation granted.   
As regards the organisational and disciplinary rules applicable to credit institutions and 
other financial intermediaries subject to Banco de España supervision, 2008 may be di-
vided into two distinct parts. The first half of the year saw completion of the transposition 
into the Spanish legal framework of the Community regulations on solvency (basically by 
means of the implementing regulations of Law 36/2007, of 16 November 2007), and on 
provision of financial services (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
whose incorporation into the Spanish legal framework prompted Law 47/2007, of 19 No-
vember 2007, which amended the Spanish Securities Market Law). In the second half of 
the year, and especially in the last quarter, regulatory activity focused, almost exclusively, 
on the design and implementation, within the framework of the concerted European ac-
tion plan of the euro area countries, of a series of regulatory measures aimed at preserving 
the stability of the European financial system in general, and of the Spanish financial sys-
tem in particular.
Regarding the first of these two periods, the following regulations are especially noteworthy:
— Royal Decree 216/2008, of 15 February 2008, on financial institutions’ own funds. 
This legislation implements Law 36/2007, of 16 November 2007, specifying the 
basic principles on which the new solvency regime for financial institutions deriv-
ing from the Basel II Accord is based.
— Banco de España Circular 3/2008, of 22 May 2008, on determination and control 
of minimum own funds. This Circular culminates development of the new legisla-
tion on own funds and supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, 
setting out all the technical specifications whose complexity and level of detail are 
inappropriate for inclusion in higher-ranking provisions.
— Banco de España Circular 5/2008, of 31 October 2008, on minimum own funds 
and other obligatory reporting of mutual guarantee companies, which culminates 
the development of the new solvency regime for MGCs.
5.3 REGULATORY CHANGES
The transposition of Community 
regulations on solvency and 
provision of financial services 
was completed
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— Royal Decree 217/2008, of 15 February 2008, on the legal regime of investment 
firms and other investment services entities. For the purposes of this section, this 
Royal Decree develops several rules on internal organisation and rules of conduct 
applicable to all institutions providing investment services, including, in particular, 
credit institutions.
Notable among the main regulatory changes seen in the final stretch of the year in connection 
with the stability of the financial system are:
— Royal Decree Law 6/2008, of 10 October 2008, creating the Fund for the Acqui-
sition of Financial Assets, with an initial allocation of funds of €30 billion, extend-
able to €50 billion.
— Royal Decree Law 7/2008, of 13 October 2008, on urgent economic and financial 
measures in relation to the concerted European action plan of the euro area coun-
tries, which authorised State guarantees of new lending transactions made by 
credit institutions resident in Spain.
— Royal Decree 1642/2008, of 10 October 2008, which set at €100,000 the guar-
anteed amounts under credit institutions’ deposit guarantee funds and investor 
compensation schemes.
Banco de España Circular 6/2008, of 26 November 2008, updated the credit institutions’ ac-
counting framework by amending Circular 4/2004, of 22 December 2004, on public and con-
fidential financial reporting rules and formats, to adapt it to the changes made both in Spanish 
mercantile legislation and in international financial reporting standards (IFRS).
Also in the year, Royal Decree 322/2008, of 29 February 2008, implementing Article 21 of Law 
44/2002, of 22 November 2002, on financial system reform measures, set out the legal frame-
work  for electronic money institutions (ELMIs), a new type of credit institution.
Lastly, a notable development in the EU regulatory framework was the Directive 2008/48/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 23 April 2008, on credit agreements for 
consumers. This Directive regulates these agreements at the Community level, aiming to con-
tribute to the development of an efficient internal market and to achieve appropriate consumer 
protection mechanisms; it must be transposed into the Spanish legal framework before 12 
May 2010.
Together with the consultation document on the new general chart of accounts, the Banco de 
España published a qualitative analysis of the impact of the measures proposed, in line with 
the commitment to make this practice more widespread in the design of regulatory measures. 
This analysis means that regulatory intervention may be based on market failures and includes 
cost and benefit considerations in policy preparation, from the initial design stages.
In this respect, the Banco de España collaborated actively with the CEBS in the pilot 
programme, headed by the European Commission, for introduction of this approach in 
European financial regulation, specifically in the review of the regime for large exposures. 
Given the success of this trial, the Commission decided to extend this approach to other 
regulatory initiatives, such as, for example, possible harmonisation of the areas open to 
national discretion, in the Capital Directive, an initiative in which the Bank also played an 
important part.
Circular 6/2008 updated
the accounting framework 
of institutions
5.4 FINANCIAL AND PRUDENTIAL 
INFORMATION
5.4.1 Analysis of the impact 
(cost-benefit) of financial 
regulation
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As a consequence of its supervisory and statistical functions, the Banco de España receives 
financial information from the institutions it supervises. The following paragraphs contain a 
summary of the main initiatives taken in 2008 affecting the information received or the way in 
which it is handled.
Publication of Circular 6/2008, of 22 December 2008, on public and confidential financial re-
porting rules and formats, signified a change in much of the accounting information that must 
be submitted by credit institutions, including the public financial statements. This entailed the 
need for a change in the language used (XBRL taxonomy: eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language) in these financial statements for exchange of information.
Approval of Circular 3/2008, of 22 May 2008, on determination and control of credit institu-
tions’ own funds signified the entry into force of the new statements required for control of 
credit institutions’ own funds. To facilitate receipt of this information, development in XBRL of 
the Spanish extension of the COREP (COmmon REPorting) taxonomy was completed. The 
information corresponding to June 2008 was received and processed for the first time in 
XBRL.
As a result of the publication of Circulars 3/2008 and 6/2008, electronic signatures became 
obligatory in certain statements, replacing autograph signatures. The process is based on in-
scription in the Register of Senior Officers of the authorisation for electronic signature, by 
means of a legal person certificate issued by the National Mint.
Also with a view to greater automation, Circular 6/2008 established that all documentation 
that was previously requested on paper (such as financial statements and actuarial studies) 
must be sent electronically. For this purpose, an IT project was begun, aiming to permit re-
ceipt by electronic means of all this information as from that corresponding to December 
2008.
Likewise, as a result of publication of Circular 5/2008, of 31 October 2008, on minimum own 
funds and other obligatory information for mutual guarantee companies, the statements for 
control that these requirements are met must also be received in XBRL, for which purpose a 
taxonomy had to be developed for them. The first information sent by this means is that cor-
responding to December 2008.
The Banco de España manages the Central Credit Register (CCR), which contains individual-
ised information on the credit exposure of reporting institutions (basically credit institutions) to 
their customers. This information is used by the institutions for granting and monitoring expo-
sure, and by the Banco de España, in conjunction with the data from credit institutions’ ac-
counting and own funds statements, for prudential supervision, maintaining the confidentiality 
of the individual data.
During 2008, growth in the number of exposures declared to the CCR slowed considerably, 
going from 33.5 million at end-2007 to 33.9 million at end-2008 (up 1.18%), while the total 
amount of these exposures rose slightly, from €3.6 trillion at December 2007 to €3.7 trillion at 
December 2008 (up 2.7%), and the total number of different borrowers remained virtually un-
changed on December 2007 at 17.6 million.
The CCR issued a total of 302.9 million automatic reports, in comparison with 291.2 million in 
2007 (an increase of just 3.8%), while, for the first time, there was a marked decrease in the 
number of requests for reports for new lending transactions, from 6.9 million in 2007 to 6.1 
5.4.2 Financial reporting
and XBRL
5.5 CENTRAL CREDIT REGISTER
Growth in the number
of registered exposures 
decelerated notably
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million in 2008 (a drop of 11.8%). In turn, requests for reports by borrowers rose from 117,000 
in 2007 to 132,900 in 2008 (up 13.9%).
As regards the quarterly exchange of information with the central credit registers managed by 
six other central banks of EU Member States (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and 
Portugal), to September 2008 the CCR received information on exposures of 3,905 Spanish 
legal persons (an increase of 14.28% on the same period a year earlier) recorded in the other 
central credit registers, amounting to €238,435 million (up 7.18%). In turn, the CCR sent to 
these registers information on 1,844 legal persons resident in the other six countries (up 
5.86%), relating to exposures amounting to €63,074 million (down 11.61%). During 2009, 
improvements in the frequency of these exchanges, and in their processing and scope, will be 
addressed.
Lastly, it should be highlighted that in 2008 the work began to grant borrowers access to their 
CCR reports via the Internet, to adapt to the provisions of Law 11/2007, of 22 June 2007, on 
electronic access to public services.
In the euro area, the implementation of monetary policy is carried out in a coordinated fashion 
by the European Central Bank and the national central banks; the former takes the monetary 
policy decisions, while the latter perform the liquidity providing/absorbing operations and deal 
with aspects relating to the provision of collateral with the credit institutions within their pur-
view. In 2008, the Eurosystem, in collaboration with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and the Swiss National Bank, also made liquidity injections in US dollars and Swiss francs.
Monetary policy operations in the Eurosystem as a whole grew in 2008, and especially in 2008 
Q4. As market liquidity virtually dried up, credit institutions had to apply to central banks for the 
financing they needed, and they did so in very large amounts. Against this backdrop, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank made changes in its tender procedure for liquidity injections in the Eu-
rosystem, adopting a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment. Thus, Spain’s share rose 
from €25,094 million in 2007 to €49,153 million in 2008. At the same time, the flow of funds 
between the Spanish banking system and institutions situated in other euro area countries 
changed direction: while in 2007, Spanish institutions received, on average, funds totalling 
€18,835 million, in 2008 they repaid funds totalling €18,621 million, signifying a complete 
turnaround in this flow of financing in 2008.
The Banco de España’s portfolio of euro-denominated fixed-income bonds recorded an aver-
age balance of €77,905 million in 2008, marginally higher than in 2007, while holdings of for-
eign currency denominated assets stood on average at €7,960 million, somewhat less than in 
2007, due to the exchange rate effect. As at 31 December 2008, manageable assets in euro, 
foreign currency and gold totalled €94,314 million.
Throughout 2008 the Banco de España continued to manage a portion of the ECB’s foreign 
reserves, managing, on average, a portfolio of $5,050 million.
As regards the Spanish large-value payment system, the main landmark in 2008 was the 
transformation of the Banco de España Settlement Service (SLBE) into TARGET2-Banco de 
España, the Spanish component of TARGET2. After much work, both by the Banco de Es-
paña and the Spanish banking community, on the necessary technical and legal adaptations 
and the corresponding trials, migration of the Spanish system to TARGET2, the European 
real-time gross settlement system in euro, was successfully completed on 18 February 
2008. 
The CCR started work on 
granting the public access to 
their data via the Internet
6 Operational functions
6.1 MANAGEMENT OF THE 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA’S ASSETS
The ECB made changes in its 
tender procedure to meet credit 
institutions’ demand for 
financing as market liquidity 
dried up
6.2 MANAGEMENT OF PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS
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TARGET2-Banco de España has worked fully satisfactorily, with no major incidents. In 2008 
the system processed more than 11 million transactions (down 8% on 2007), with a value of 
more than €93 trillion (down 4% on 2007). These decreases are due, on the one hand, to 
changes in the way in which certain transactions for ancillary systems are settled, and, on the 
other, to new functionalities available in TARGET2 that permit rationalisation of back-office 
tasks and more efficient liquidity management by credit institutions. 
With regard to retail payments, the Banco de España is developing the oversight of the Na-
tional Electronic Clearing System (SNCE), which is managed by Iberpay, a private company 
owned by the system participants. In 2008, the SNCE processed 1,510 million transactions, 
representing a rate of growth of 5%, similar to that seen in previous years, with a total value of 
almost €2 trillion, a slight decrease (1.7%) on 2007.
After several years of design and preparation, in 2008 the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) 
was effectively launched, allowing consumers, firms and other economic agents to make elec-
tronic payments in euro to any beneficiary in the European Union, subject to the same basic 
conditions and with the same rights and obligations, using one single bank account and a 
single set of payment instruments.
During 2008 the Banco de España continued to collaborate with and support the Spanish 
banking community in the necessary developments for successful transition to the SEPA in 
Spain. Thus, the Bank has offered to act as the representative and settlement agent, of all 
those institutions that have requested these services, in what is to date the only pan-European 
retail payment clearing house, thus enabling these institutions to access transactions in – and 
receive transactions from – any part of the euro area. Moreover, through its participation in the 
groups created to this effect, the Bank has contributed to the preparation of the Spanish bank-
ing community’s Action Plan for SEPA which sets out a schedule for the steps to be taken to 
encourage the migration of Spanish payment instruments.
In this respect, the Banco de España will continue to work with all interested parties in those 
areas in which issues have still to be resolved, encouraging competition and giving top priority 
to ensuring that the SEPA meets the needs and expectations of users, without entailing any 
deterioration in existing levels of service.
The Banco de España takes all the necessary measures to comply with its functions in this 
respect, controlling banknote circulation, ensuring that a safe and flexible supply of banknotes 
is available to meet demand and monitoring and controlling the integrity, quality and authentic-
ity of euro notes. The Bank also assumes its share of production of the euro banknotes need-
ed in the Eurosystem to meet the new demand for notes and to replace those that are dam-
aged and withdrawn from circulation.
As a result of the Eurosystem agreements for banknote production, in 2008 the Banco de 
España was responsible for producing a total of 885 million 50, 20 and 5 euro banknotes.
Over the year, the Bank delivered 2,567 million banknotes to credit institutions, 11.6% more 
than in 2007; in turn, 2,774 million banknotes were withdrawn from circulation, an annual in-
crease of 10.7%. It is important to note, in this respect, the large numbers of notes entering 
Spain from other euro area countries, basically as a result of tourism; this is one of the reasons 
behind the fact that the number of 10 and 20 euro notes received by the Banco de España 
exceeds the number of 10 and 20 euro notes it puts into circulation, resulting in what is known 
as “negative net issuance”.
TARGET2-Banco de España 
has worked fully satisfactorily
6.3 BANKNOTE MANAGEMENT
The upward trend seen in 
recent years in the distribution 
and withdrawal of banknotes 
continued
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The Bank is working on developing agreements with the private sector that will ease and im-
prove the system of custody and distribution of cash throughout Spain, endeavouring to en-
sure that operating efficiency and cost management targets may be met without impairing the 
quality and authenticity of the banknotes in circulation.
The number of banknotes processed, that is, counted, authenticated and checked, at the 
Banco de España amounted to 2,593 million, a minor increase on the previous year; of this 
total, around 40% were declared to be unfit to be returned to circulation. Damaged banknotes 
were destroyed and replaced by others (new or used banknotes) that complied with the strict 
quality standards set by the Eurosystem, to assure the legitimacy and quality of the notes in 
circulation. The Bank continues to invest in state-of-the-art technology for automatic banknote 
processing, counting, checking and control.
Regarding the Eurosystem’s Framework for euro banknote recycling, 2008 saw the com-
pletion of the process whereby credit institutions signed up to the General Clauses appli-
cable to the Banco de España ordinary cash service, which were published in the Official 
State Gazette (BOE) at end-2006. The Technical Applications for Cash, which develop 
these Clauses, were updated to include new statistical data on banknotes that credit insti-
tutions and other professional cash handlers have to send to the Banco de España. Also 
under the terms of the Framework, approval was granted for private banknote processing 
and recycling facilities to be opened, in Spain’s four main cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Seville 
and Valencia).
To comply with the task entrusted to it by the Treasury, in 2008 the Banco de España put coins 
worth 1,165 million into circulation and withdrew from circulation coins worth 266 million.
The measures adopted by the Spanish government within the framework of the lines of action 
established by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) of the European Union, 
aimed at encouraging financial institutions to lend to households and firms, included the crea-
tion, in October 2008, of a Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA), assigned to the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance and with an initial allocation of funds of €30 billion, extend-
able to €50 billion.
In accordance with the regulations for creation of the Fund, the Banco de España is responsi-
ble for implementing the transactions, acting as agent and custodian bank for the Fund. To 
perform this task with the urgency required, the Treasury Special Schemes Support Service 
was created in the Bank, within the Directorate General Operations, Markets and Payment 
Systems.
The Service’s work has three successive phases. First, organisation of auctions among credit 
institutions interested in obtaining financing; these institutions may submit competitive bids (in 
which case financing is awarded to those offering the highest interest rates) and non-com-
petitive bids (in which case priority is given to those that have made the most contribution to 
increasing lending to households and non-financial corporations). Second, settlement of the 
transactions for acquisition of the financial instruments that become part of the Fund’s assets. 
And third, administration and monitoring of the Fund’s portfolio created following the succes-
sive acquisition of assets.
Two auctions were held in 2008, the first involving repo transactions and the second purchase 
of held-to-maturity securities. The corresponding asset purchases were settled and the two 
portfolios created.
6.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE FUND 
FOR THE ACQUISITION OF 
FINANCIAL ASSETS (FAFA)
The Banco de España was 
charged with implementing
the FAFA created by the 
government
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The statistical function of the Banco de España is established in its Law of Autonomy and in the 
National Statistics Plan3. The Law of Autonomy provides4 that the Banco de España shall com-
pile and publish statistics relating to its functions and that it shall assist the ECB in the compila-
tion of the statistical information needed for the fulfilment of the ESCB’s functions. Since the 
creation of the Economic and Monetary Union, the tasks in connection with the ECB/ESCB 
have progressively increased the demand for resources dedicated to this function.
The main statistics compiled and disseminated by the Banco de España under the Law of 
Autonomy relate to financial institutions and markets and to interest rates, although the under-
lying information for some of the statistics included in these areas is drawn from other super-
visory agencies (the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and the Spanish 
Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP)). The statistics compiled and 
disseminated under the current PEN are the Balance of Payments and the International Invest-
ment Position, the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, the Survey of Household Fi-
nances, and Public Debt, according to the Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP). A significant part 
of these statistics broadly coincides with the requirements of the ESCB, being compiled using 
the information that all resident units are obliged to provide by law.
In addition, the Banco de España, through its Central Balance Sheet Data Office, collects, 
compiles and disseminates information on the balance sheet position and the results of non-
financial corporations, based on questionnaires completed voluntarily by the reporting firms 
and on the annual accounts filed by non-financial corporations at the Mercantile Registries.
All these statistics are published in the Boletín Estadístico, in monographic publications and on 
the Banco de España’s website.
Apart from compiling and disseminating the above-mentioned statistics, the Bank also uses 
statistics produced by other Spanish agencies and supervisors (INE, IGAE, ministries, CNMV, 
DGSFP, etc.) and by international organisations as a source for another area of statistical work 
that it makes available to its own analysts and to the general public. Moreover, Banco de Es-
paña representatives take an active part in international statistical fora (within the ESCB, the 
European Commission through Eurostat, the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet 
Data Offices, the IMF, BIS, OECD, etc.). The Bank also maintains databases that permit analy-
sis of the evolution of the variables for which data are collected.
During 2008 the statistics for which the Banco de España is responsible were updated, in accord-
ance with generally accepted quality levels, and the data were released on pre-announced dates, in 
accordance with the calendar published on the Banco de España’s website. Each of these updates 
incorporates the methodological improvements and changes reported in each of the publications.
The most notable elements of this work are mentioned below.
In the area of the monetary and financial statistics relating to the functions envisaged in the 
Law of Autonomy, the following stand out in 2008:
— Banco de España Circular 6/2008, of 26 November 2008, which amended the 
information to be sent by credit institutions, prompting the start of adaptation of 
the process of statistical compilation.
7 Statistics
7.1 THE STATISTICAL FUNCTION 
OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
7.2 MAIN CHANGES 
INTRODUCED IN 2008
7.2.1 Monetary and financial 
statistics
3. The National Statistics Plan is established every four years (the current Plan is for 2005-2008) by means of a royal 
decree, pursuant to Law 12/1989 on the Public Statistical Function. 4. Article 7.5.f).
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— As regards the sending of information to the ECB, work was conducted on the 
compilation of statistics on mutual funds that have to be sent to the ECB as from 
February 2009, with data as from December 2008. In addition, the information 
that must be sent, as from 2010, by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) on cred-
it and their securitisation transactions, and by securitisation SPEs on their own 
accounts, was extended, for which purpose the corresponding amendments 
were made in the ECB regulations.
— Work continued on the implementation of the Centralised Securities Data Base 
(CSDB), which was used for the first time to compile the mutual fund statistics.
— Against the backdrop of financial turmoil, work was conducted to help analyse 
and reflect in the EU’s statistical manuals the government aid granted to financial 
institutions, to ensure uniform recording of these transactions in the general gov-
ernment deficit and general government debt, and these transactions were re-
corded in the Spanish general government statistics.
The main changes made during 2008 are as follows:
— Work continued on adapting the information system currently used to compile the 
Balance of Payments to the changes that affected it in 2008 and to those that will 
affect it as from 2009: mainly the raising of the reporting threshold for cross-bor-
der transactions to €50,000 from 1 January 2008; the entry into operation of 
TARGET2 and of other systems for interconnecting euro area settlement systems; 
and the launch of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).
— The dissemination of the monthly Balance of Payments data was brought forward 
by 15 days; moreover, these data will now be revised quarterly rather than annu-
ally as before. This new dissemination and revision calendar enhances the degree 
of consistency between the Balance of Payments data, on the one hand, and the 
Financial Accounts and National Accounts data, on the other.
— The Direct Investment data drawn from the Investment Register kept by the Direc-
torate General for Trade and Investment of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Tourism were incorporated into the International Investment Position.
Most of the work carried out in 2008 was connected with the adaptation of the data-collection 
systems to the new general chart of accounts approved in 2007, with the additional aim of 
alleviating the reporting burden. Specifically, in collaboration with the Spanish Accounting and 
Audit Institute (ICAC), the Directorate General for Registrars and Notaries Public and the Span-
ish Mercantile and Property Registrars’ Association, the work on creation of the standard for-
mats for filing accounts adapted to the new general chart of accounts was completed. These 
formats, which were published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) of 28 January 2009, include 
an electronic version in XBRL, whose taxonomy was also developed in 2008. Also in this con-
nection, the Bank worked in close collaboration with the Mercantile Registries on preparation 
of the data-collection system to permit electronic filing in said Registries.
The questionnaires sent by the firms reporting to the annual database (which in 2008 again 
totalled more than 9,000 non-financial corporations) and to the quarterly database (more than 
1,000 firms) were also adapted to the new general chart of accounts. In both cases, the new 
questionnaires include fewer additional details on the official filing formats used by the report-
7.2.2 Balance of Payments
and International Investment 
Position statistics
The dissemination of Balance
of Payments data was brought 
forward by 15 days
7.2.3 Balance sheet position 
and results of non-financial 
corporations according to the 
Central Balance Sheet Data Office
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ing firms. Meanwhile, collaboration with the Spanish Mercantile Registries, pursuant to an 
agreement with the Spanish Registrars’ Association, allowed data to continue to be included 
on more than 500,000 firms.
At the international level, within the framework of the European Committee of Central Balance 
Sheet Data Offices, the Spanish Central Balance Sheet Data Office chaired the group that 
maintains the ERICA database of consolidated accounts of European groups, monitors the 
Europe-wide process for alleviation of the reporting burden and studies the quarterly data-
bases kept by the European central balance sheet data offices.
In 2008 work was undertaken to improve the infrastructure for collecting, exchanging and ac-
cessing the Banco de España’s statistical information. Part of this work has already been im-
plicitly or explicitly referred to above. This section covers the work with a special interest, 
specifically:
— New electronic forms for collection of information on cross-border transactions 
directly from firms and individuals were installed on the Banco de España’s web-
site. Others will be added until all the existing hard-copy forms are covered.
— The infrastructure was prepared for installation on the Banco de España’s website 
of a search system to make it easier to access the Bank’s statistical information.
The key feature of the year for the Claims Service was the significant growth in activity. In its 
work of attending to the users of products and services offered by financial institutions subject 
to Banco de España supervision, it recorded an increase of almost 30% in the number of 
complaints lodged by the public. The increase in enquiries made by users of financial services 
was even more noticeable, as the number of telephone enquiries rose by 76% and the number 
of on-line enquiries by 145%.
On 18 April 2008 the Virtual Office of the Claims Service came into operation, enabling the 
general public to make enquiries and lodge complaints without having to go in person to a 
branch of the Banco de España. This new form of access to the Service has been very well 
received, and is used more and more by the public, who may also track their complaints 
through the system.
Work continued on improving the presentation and content of the information provided, via the 
Annual Report of the Claims Service and the quarterly reports, identifying the issues that give 
rise to most complaints or doubts and presenting the principles of best practice drawn up by 
the Claims Service and which should govern institutions’ relations with their customers. For 
the first time, the 2008 Annual Report of the Claims Service included a comparative study of 
the different alternative dispute resolution systems in operation in Europe.
The Service’s external profile was raised in 2008, with an increased presence and increasingly 
active participation in international meetings on issues relating to the protection of financial 
consumers. Notable at the European level was its participation on the Steering Committee of 
FIN-NET, the European network for settling cross-border financial disputes out of court, of 
which Spain is a founder member. In October 2008, Madrid hosted one of the annual plenary 
meetings of FIN-NET members. The Claims Service also took part in “INFO 2008”, the Annual 
Conference of the International Network of Financial Services Ombudsman Schemes, held at 
end-September 2008 in New York, and in a Seminar on the Legal Aspects of Central Banking, 
organised by the Banque de France in early December.
7.3 OTHER WORK RELATING TO 
THE COLLECTION, MANAGEMENT 
AND DISSEMINATION OF 
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
8 Claims Service
The number of complaints 
received rose by 30%, 
telephone enquiries by 76% 
and on-line enquiries by 145%
Since April, the Virtual Office of 
the Claims Service enables 
complaints and enquiries to be 
handled on-line
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Technical cooperation was also stepped up, especially in the area of Latin America, notably 
with the organisation of the 2nd Course on Protection of the Financial Customer, held at the 
Banco de España’s headquarters in June 2008, in which representatives of consumer protec-
tion supervisors and agencies of numerous South American countries participated.
As a government agency, the Banco de España shares the obligation of accountability vis-à-
vis the general public, although in the case of the Bank a balance must be found between this 
obligation and the discretion required of it in its financial system supervisory duties. The com-
munication policy of the Banco de España has a twofold objective: to explain the functions and 
activities of the institution and to contribute to the confidence of citizens in the financial sys-
tem. External communication is necessary for the Banco de España to fulfil its functions under 
the Law of Autonomy and as a member of the ESCB.
The Banco de España’s relationship with the media focuses on enhancing knowledge of the 
institution’s activities among information professionals, since these are a key link in the mech-
anism for transmitting messages to the public. Hence in 2008 information sessions were or-
ganised to explain the workings of ECB funding to institutions, the behaviour of bad debts and 
the new features introduced by the solvency circular, within the journalist training programme 
commenced in 2004. Moreover, in order to publicise the work of the various departments of 
the Bank, informative meetings were organised to present the results of the government debt 
reports (in April) and of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office surveys (in November).
In addition to these regular meetings, mention should be made of the attention paid by the 
media in 2008 to other events such as the conference held in April to commemorate the XX 
Anniversary of the CEMFI, the presentation of the Financial Education Project undertaken 
jointly by the Banco de España and the National Securities Market Commission (in May) and 
the international conference entitled “Spain in the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank: 50 years on”, organised jointly in December by the Banco de España and the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Finance.
Also given wide media coverage was the award of the Bernácer prize (in May) and the King 
Juan Carlos economics prize (in December), as well as the presentation of the first FEDEA 
report on immigration (in October).
The complicated state of the international financial system prompted greater media interest in 
information relating to the Banco de España’s activities, with the consequent significantly high-
er demand for interviews by the media. Overall, representatives of the Bank gave around 30 
interviews (50% more than in the previous year). A considerable number of the interviews in 
2008 were given within the Bank’s branch network-based communication plan, the purpose 
of which is to acquaint local and regional media with the Banco de España’s activities. Under 
this plan, and continuing along the same lines followed in 2007, the report of the Claims Serv-
ice was presented simultaneously in Madrid and at the A Coruña, Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville 
and Valencia branches.
Nevertheless, as in previous years, the main channel for communicating the Bank’s viewpoint 
regarding the economic situation and the financial system was its regular publications, such as 
the Annual Report and the Economic Bulletin, and the public speeches made by its manage-
ment. In addition to the Governor’s regular appearances before Parliament (in June, to present 
the Annual Report, and in October, before the Parliamentary and Senate Budget Committees), 
the members of the Bank’s governing bodies participated in 30 national and international fora 
in 2008.
9 External 
communication
9.1 MEDIA RELATIONS
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The Banco de España’s commitment to providing reliable information to various target 
groups and to the general public makes its website a very important channel of direct com-
munication because of its efficiency and cost. The access statistics showed nearly 2.4 
million visitors in 2008, up 25% on the previous year. The number of pages viewed by users 
exceeded 22 million, up 34% with respect to the previous year. This figure includes ac-
cesses to the Bank Customer’s Portal, which amounted to nearly 2.5 million in the same 
period.
In line with the conclusions drawn from the study conducted in 2007 to ascertain the expecta-
tions and demands of the various target groups using this channel, the Banco de España 
began to revamp its website to include major improvements in technology, design, architec-
ture, ease of use and accessibility. The aim is to enable users to consult the information in it in 
a way more suited to their needs.
Separately from this overall reform, as part of the process of ongoing expansion and improve-
ment of page content and architecture of the Banco de España website, 84 improvement 
projects were conducted last year and progress was made in the translation of certain institu-
tional contents into English and into the co-official languages of the autonomous regions, to 
enable users to navigate in the Catalan, Galician, Valencian and Basque languages.
The Statistical Information Service responded to around 10,200 telephone and e-mail requests 
from the public in 2008. The most commonly requested information related to interest rates 
and exchange rates. Also, 6,361 inquiries were handled through the Bank Customer’s Portal 
and 29,557 by the Claims Service (25,389 through the call centre, which was reinforced in 
2008, and 4,168 via electronic channels) in regard to diverse aspects of the public’s dealings 
with banks.
In line with the Banco de España’s wish to make itself better known to different social groups, 
the Bank distributed 117,500 brochures and 4,000 units of assorted informative materials, as 
well as 12,000 units of informative and educational products of the Eurosystem and of the 
European Commission. These items were distributed by post and at suitable times such as 
during visits to the Madrid headquarters and the branch network by professionals, students, 
senior citizens and others, and at conferences held by the Bank.
Furthermore, members of the public downloaded from the website 5,500 copies of the Banco 
de España informative brochures mentioned above and 4,200 Eurosystem products, the latter 
including 640 downloads of an educational video produced by the Eurosystem.
The Bank, in line with its commitment to communicate with the public in the co-official lan-
guages, has a policy of multilingual presentation of the materials which, since they are ad-
dressed to the residents of regions with co-official languages, require translation.
The Financial Education Plan is a joint project of the National Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV) and the Banco de España within the framework of the integral financial education 
policy promoted by the government, the aim of which is to improve the level of knowledge of 
current and future users of financial services.
The Plan targets all population segments and will progressively cover all financial products and 
services. This Plan, the scope and characteristics of which are in line with the principles and 
recommendations of the OECD and the European Commission, aims to enlist the support of 
the competent governmental bodies and the various social and institutional agents.
9.2 INSTITUTIONAL 
COMMUNICATION PROGRAMME
9.2.1 Information to the public
Visits to the Bank’s website 
were up 25% on the previous 
year
9.2.2 Educational initiatives
The Bank, jointly with the 
CNMV, set in motion the 
Financial Education Plan
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It is a multi-year project which will last until 2012 and has various major objectives, the first of 
which is to launch a website concerned with financial education, which will be followed by 
other actions, such as the preparation of materials, their possible inclusion in the school cur-
riculum and specific actions targeted at certain population segments.
The services contract for the website has been awarded and is in the production phase, with 
the contents now having been finalised. Also, the finishing touches are being put to diverse 
campaigns targeted at young people, immigrants and senior citizens, based on the production 
of specific materials for each segment, which will be distributed via the channels considered 
most effective in each case.
During the second year of its life, the Virtual Classroom (an educational portal for young people 
designed to foster knowledge of the Banco de España and spread awareness of its mission to 
guarantee the stability of prices, payments and the financial system) became established as a 
learning tool for the educational community. This is clear from the fact that 360,000 portal 
pages were consulted by 93,700 visitors in 2008, up 20% on 2007.
The Competition for Schools organised by the Banco de España for upper-level secondary 
and middle-level vocational training students is an educational instrument which fosters the 
entrepreneurial spirit of students and has aroused growing interest among schools. The 2nd 
Competition for Schools, held in the 2007-2008 academic year, merited the participation of 
1,799 students from 228 schools, compared with 1,600 students from 193 teams in the first 
competition.
The 2nd Competition for Schools (dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the European Central 
Bank, the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem), in which 228 teams from 
public and private schools throughout Spain took part, was divided into a first general qualify-
ing round and a second round consisting of a written contribution based on the theme “The 
Banco de España and the Eurosystem: 10 years of stability”. The winner was the David Buján 
Secondary School located in Cambre (A Coruña). The prize of eight laptop computers was 
awarded on the school’s premises by the director of the Banco de España branch in A Coruña. 
Subsequently, the students in the team were presented with certificates by the Governor, who 
acted as the president of the panel of judges, in a ceremony held at the Banco de España’s 
headquarters in Madrid.
The Banco de España publishes the winning essays, issuing a bilingual edition when the 
school submits the contribution both in Spanish and in the relevant co-official language.
The 3rd Competition for Schools, currently under way, will be dedicated to the 10th anniver-
sary of the euro. 214 teams registered, made up of 1,716 students from all the Spanish au-
tonomous regions.
In 2008 the Bank began to develop an educational game targeted at upper primary school 
students and their teachers, which will be presented in a section of the website in June. Teach-
ers wishing to use it in their classes can ask to have material sent to them for use in the 2009-
2010 academic year.
The aim of the project is to introduce the Banco de España and the Eurosystem to students through 
the currency-issuance function, teaching them the features of banknotes in a game similar to Trivial 
Pursuits. The teams playing the game are faced with questions and problems the solution to which 
is generally numerical and requires a transaction in which banknotes change hands.
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In addition, as indicated in Section 4.2, the Bank initiated in 2008 a programme of educational 
excellence, the purpose of which is to finance teacher hiring and economic research projects.
In 2008, the Banco de España carried out communication activities as a member of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB). In addition to helping to define and implement the 
Eurosystem’s communication strategy through its participation in the Eurosystem and ESCB 
Communications Committee and to publishing ECB press releases and communications on 
its website, the Communication Department carried out various initiatives under the Eurosys-
tem communication plan, notably including the preparation of interactive educational materials 
and of a finance competition for upper secondary school students.
The Banco de España held a number of events to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the 
ECB and the ESCB. They began on 1 June 2008 and extended into the early weeks of 2009 
to link up with the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the euro.
As at 31 December 2008, the Banco de España employed a total of 2,730 staff, with scarce-
ly no change with respect to a year earlier (the monthly average number of serving personnel 
was 2,727).
The proportion of females continued its upward trend of the last few years. This was so both at 
overall level, where females accounted for 37% of total staff, and among management posts, where 
they represented 36.3%. It is particularly significant that females account for 45% of staff aged be-
low 45 years, so the future outlook for gender balance in the Bank’s staff is highly positive.
Internal mobility was another notable feature of human resources management. In absolute 
terms, there were 322 movements, representing 12% of average permanent staff, up 77% on 
2007. These figures include both transfers between departments and changes of duties and 
responsibilities.
In order to boost the level of skills of professionals being incorporated into working life, in 2008 
it was decided to commence training programmes designed for grant-holders and specialised 
work experience contract holders at the Bank.
In the area of in-house training, the work of previous years was continued and, moreover, the 
Bank’s educational capabilities were expanded through the inclusion of new training courses with 
such titles as “Enhanced team management” and “Advanced course on derivatives”. Moreover, 
greater efforts were made in the training of employees attending to the general public at branch-
es. Training courses were attended by approximately 28% more employees in 2008 than in the 
previous year and, notably, also by 29 members of other national central banks. The number of 
hours of training given increased by 2.3% to 43.5 hours per employee.
The collective labour agreement signed in 2008 represented a milestone in labour relations, 
since an agreement covering three years (2008, 2009 and 2010) was reached in advance. This 
will ensure the stability necessary for the Bank to carry out its functions in the current eco-
nomic situation. The main points include further advances in the reconciliation of personal and 
professional life through additional new measures such as more flexible working hours and the 
extension of paid leave for the parents of children aged below 12.
Furthermore, work continued on projects aimed at making it easier for employees to carry out 
human resources management processes via the Intranet. These processes were made more 
efficient through the simplification of procedures.
9.2.3 Institutional relations with 
the European Central Bank
10 Internal organisation 
and administration
10.1 HUMAN RESOURCES AND 
ORGANISATION
The Bank’s total staff numbers 
2,730
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During 2008 the Bank continued its ambitious programme to renovate facilities and adapt 
buildings, both at central headquarters and at branches and recreation centres, which has 
been under way for the last few years.
At the Cibeles complex work began on the restoration and cleaning of the inner façades of the 
old building, which, along with the third and final phase of restoration of the zinc roofing under 
way during the year, will complete in 2009 the refurbishing work undertaken to regenerate the 
“skin” of this valuable building.
In the interior of the buildings of this complex, the renovation, updating and extension of the 
security facilities was completed and work commenced on the first stage of implementation of 
the Electrical Integration Master Plan, an ambitious multiyear programme to update and im-
prove all the electrical facilities of the complex, enhancing the security, reliability and quality of 
the power supply.
Also, the new integral maintenance contract for the facilities of the Cibeles complex came into 
force at the beginning of the year. This was the solution adopted by the Bank to reorganise and 
rationalise the numerous partial contracts existing up till then and, as a result, improve effi-
ciency and reduce costs.
Work was carried out at the Alcalá 522 complex to improve the fire prevention capability by 
creating sectors isolated from fire and smoke. The finishing touches were put to the refurbish-
ing work on the outdoor facilities and large brick façades of the complex.
As to the branches, work is under way to improve the fire prevention systems, the renovation 
of the general facilities has been commenced in accordance with the priorities of a multiyear 
programme based on the technical audit conducted in previous years, and the maintenance 
contracts have been restructured, rationalised and their efficiency improved. As an aid in this 
work, reference was made to the specific technical conditions of each building. Further, 2008 
saw the completion of the project to build garages for armoured cars in all the branches where 
it was materially possible.
The enactment in 2007 of Law 11/2007 on electronic access to public services, which recog-
nises the right of citizens to use electronic media to deal with public authorities and obliges 
government agencies to take steps to ensure their services are available electronically by 31 
December 2009, provided the decisive thrust for the electronic administration and document 
management system initiatives of the Banco de España.
In January 2008 the project entitled “Functional extension of Banco de España corporate 
document management” was started up. Its aim is “to conduct a study to define the solutions 
required for applying electronic administration at the Banco de España and to implement 
document management in the processes by which the Bank deals with the public. This project 
constitutes the general framework within which the Bank will adapt to Law 11/2007 through 
the integration of electronic administration processes and services in corporate document 
management systems. An implementation plan setting out various projects and lines of action 
was prepared and a list of 76 administrative procedures directly affected by the application of 
Law 11/2007 was drawn up.
2008 was marked by considerable activity, as evidenced by the number of projects (86) and 
by the 2,174 requests for work received and the 2,096 resolved by the various units of the 
Information Systems and Processes Department.
10.2 ADMINISTRATION AND 
PROPERTIES
10.3 CORPORATE DOCUMENT 
MANAGEMENT
10.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
AND PROCESSES
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Particularly notable were the projects relating to Europe and the Eurosystem, among which 
were the following:
— The inclusion of the Spanish financial system in the “SEPA for citizens” in January 
meant that the Bank’s entire transfers system had to be adapted to the new file 
formats, transactions and requirements.
— The inclusion of the Bank in TARGET2 called for major changes in the Bank’s set-
tlement system.
In 2008 major efforts were made to increase the Bank’s part in the main IT projects currently 
under way in the Eurosystem and to establish the Bank as a supplier of IT services to the 
other central banks. As a result of this effort, the Bank is now going to participate actively in 
the development and construction of two projects:
— TARGET2-Securities: The Banco de España was assigned the design and devel-
opment of the lifecycle management module, LCMM (of the securities settlement 
service to central securities depositories and to their participants), and it was 
designated a member of the IT Security Committee.
— CCBM2 (collateral management by central banks): The Bank is responsible for 
developing the repo modules and the tests to be performed on the new system 
for the provision of collateralised credit by Eurosystem central banks.
Similarly, work was undertaken with a view to achieving in 2009 a notable role in major Eu-
rosystem projects such as:
— MOP (Market Operations Platform), currently in the preliminary analysis phase.
— ESI (Eurosystem Single Interface), a platform to establish access from the financial 
system to the services provided by the Eurosystem, the preparation phase of 
which is being coordinated by the Banco de España together with the European 
Central Bank.
— IAM (Identity and Access Management), access security services for internal and 
external users of the Eurosystem, divided into four subprojects. The Bank partici-
pates actively in two subprojects aimed at defining functional requirements and 
the architecture document.
The programmes for reorganising user application systems were given a strong boost in 2008. 
Given their complexity, they cannot be dealt with in a single year:
— The reorganisation of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office (new technology 
platform for the processing of information on the Spanish non-financial sector, in 
which the website communication channel and the analytical systems for con-
ducting studies are strengthened) was finalised in 2008. Nevertheless, the sys-
tems put into operation will have to be monitored and fine-tuned in 2009.
— The implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Directorate General Banking Su-
pervision (field applications for on-site use in credit institutions, and full develop-
ment of the Integrated Supervisory Activity Management System, denoted by the 
Work progressed apace
on the main IT projects of the 
Eurosystem
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Spanish acronym SIGAS, which serves as a common framework for the work of 
the whole Directorate General) and the optimisation of the processes of the Direc-
torate General Banking Regulation, based on the process optimisation plan pre-
pared in 2005 (creation of three new applications and the modification of others, 
similarly strengthening the collection of information from the public and the man-
agement of administrative procedures via the website), progressed notably in 
2008, although the large number of projects involved means that their develop-
ment and implementation will have to continue in the coming years.
— The adaptation of the IT systems to the new regulatory provisions (Basel II and 
accounting regulations), where work continued on the progressive implementa-
tion of the XBRL standard, was concluded.
The capacity of the Bank’s two central computers was increased in accordance with the plans 
established in this respect. This was necessary to meet the demand for processing power 
from the new software developments (implementation of TARGET2, migration of a new data-
base technology, new accounting, etc).
The growing complexity of communications networks requires constant change in the related 
infrastructure. In 2008 the work carried out on connectivity with external networks was as 
 follows:
— Interconnection with the existing network between the central banks of Germany, 
France and Italy. This enabled full integration of the local hardware assigned to the 
TARGET2-Securities project with that of the other three national central banks 
involved.
— Creation of two new communication channels for access to the corporate appli-
cations from other networks: the Banco de España’s new private network for 
access to institutions and the connection with the administrative Intranet of the 
Ministry for Public Administration.
— Direct connectivity to the Internet of the Alcalá 48 building, so that it acts as a back-
up in the event of contingencies at the Alcalá 522 building. This project also aimed 
at allowing Internet users to access functions of Banco de España corporate appli-
cations by robust, secure mechanisms with the electronic signature function.
Work also continued in 2008 on improvements to the new application development and imple-
mentation infrastructure. This work is making it possible to use new technologies and graphic 
environments and is enabling integration and sharing of processes between the different plat-
forms used by the Banco de España and by the Eurosystem as a whole.
In 2008 approximately 50% of the banks work posts migrated to Office 2007 and, within the 
hardware renewal plan, 1,115 computers, monitors and printers were replaced.
The user helpdesk, which year after year continues attending to an ever-increasing number of 
calls and incidents with a high level of user satisfaction, was supplemented by a specialised 
assistance service with continuous operating hours.
In regard to business continuity, Internal Circular 5/2008 was approved and the 2008 test plan 
was executed. On the total of 20 days of testing, 121 processes were tested and resumption 
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of activity was observed in 118 of them. The Bank participated in the drafting of a common 
framework for Eurosystem business continuity, expected to be approved soon, and in the 
national business continuity plan of the financial sector, approved in November.
In 2008 the rules formally establishing the operational risk management system were ap-
proved and the process of implementation was completed. Hence this system is now operat-
ing and covers all areas and functions of the Bank.
Given the numerous changes in the accounting criteria of the Bank since it joined the European 
System of Central Banks, Internal Circular 9/2008 was approved to establish the new accounting 
system of the Bank and define its objectives, the characteristics of the accounting information, 
basic accounting policies, recognition criteria, valuation rules and the new chart of accounts. As 
regards the new information system which will manage the accounting system, its development 
has practically been completed and it will foreseeably be implemented in March 2009.
During the year the cost accounting system was refined to improve the cost allocation criteria and 
thus determine more accurately the cost of the various functions carried out by the Bank. All this 
was done within the framework of the common cost methodology used in the Eurosystem.
As regards the Bank’s international presence, its influence in the areas of NCB accounting and 
operational risk was strengthened through the organisation of courses and seminars in these 
fields. Also, the Bank was active in the implementation of operational risk methodology in the 
Eurosystem and co-chaired, along with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Interna-
tional Working Group on Operational Risk, of which more than 30 central banks throughout 
the world are now members.
Internal circular 3/2007 on public procurement rules of the Banco de España, and other sup-
plementary internal rules, came into force on 1 January 2008.
The new rules are in line with the practices of Eurosystem central banks and ensure that pro-
curement procedures comply with the principles of competition, equal treatment, non-dis-
crimination, mutual recognition, proportionality, transparency and public dissemination.
In 2008 the Central Procurement Services started the centralised processing of tenders, es-
tablishing procedures to call for expressions of interest and to amend and extend contracts. In 
conjunction with the Legal Department, new schedules of specific requirements were devel-
oped for the procurement of construction work, goods and services. Also, active cooperation 
was provided to other departments of the Bank to enable the new rules to be implemented 
efficiently and effectively.
The procedures for procurement of construction work, goods and services were made public 
in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the national press and on the Banco de Es-
paña website. The procurement section recently included in the Bank’s website deals with the 
contractor profile and includes Internal Circular 3/2007 and the sub-sections “Procurements 
put out to tender”, “Contracts awarded” and “Other information of interest”. The schedule of 
special requirements and technical specifications of the procurement projects are available for 
consultation and downloading in pdf format. There is an electronic mailbox to which enquiries 
may be sent and which has received a large number of queries during the year.
During the year the Central Procurement Services participated in the activities of the Eurosys-
tem Procurement Coordination Office, assisting in the preparation of the first set of accepted 
10.5 CONTROL, BUDGET
AND ACCOUNTING
Implementation of the 
operational risk management 
system was completed
10.6 CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 
SERVICES
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good practices in procurement. The Eurosystem Procurement Coordination Office developed 
a joint procurement plan for 2009 and four working groups were formed to consider future joint 
procurement. The Banco de España is participating in a joint procurement project and in the 
four working groups.
According to the Statute approved by Internal Circular 4/2007 of 20 July 2007, the aim of in-
ternal auditing is to evaluate the efficacy, sufficiency and suitability of all the systems and pro-
cedures established for the management and control of risks.
The internal audit function is performed by the Internal Audit Department, which reports di-
rectly to the Governor. In addition, the Internal Audit Department must afford the Audit Com-
mittee of the Governing Council all such assistance as it may request and provide it with any 
information it may need.
The Internal Audit Department and its audit staff shall adhere to the principles of objectivity, 
impartiality, confidentiality and absence of conflict of interests, and act in keeping with the 
principles, standards and procedures laid down in the Internal Audit Manual approved by Or-
dinance 7/2008 of 15 February 2007.
The Internal Audit Department’s audit activity is specified in an Annual Plan approved by the 
Governor and reported to the Executive Commission. In accordance with the 2008 plan, the 
Internal Audit Department carried out the following main audits: annual accounts of the Banco 
de España; the report envisaged in Law 44/2002 on financial system reform measures; secu-
rity of automated information systems; counting of the strategic reserves deposited by the 
ECB; ancillary deposit system; Central Credit Register of the Banco de España; maintenance 
and construction; General Archive of the Banco de España; library of the Banco de España; 
second series of euro-denominated banknotes; centralised securities database; management 
of foreign reserves of the European Central Bank; maintenance and operations of information 
technology systems infrastructure; operations of TARGET2 and of the Tenerife, Las Palmas, 
Badajoz, Ceuta, Seville, Murcia and Palma branches. Also, it monitored the recommendations 
of the specific audits of the Banco de España and of those common to the ESCB.
10.7 INTERNAL AUDIT
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
2008
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1 Introduction
The annual accounts of the Banco de España (“the Bank”) comprise the balance sheet, the 
profit and loss account and the notes on the accounts, as established by Article 29.1 of its 
internal rules, approved by a Resolution of the Governing Council of 28 March 2000 (Official 
State Gazette (BOE) of 6 April 2000). Pursuant to the provisions of that article, the accounts 
have been prepared in accordance with the accounting guidelines and instructions of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB)1 established under Article 26.4 of the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) relating to harmonisation of Eurosystem accounting princi-
ples and practices. In the cases not regulated by Eurosystem accounting legislation, the Ban-
co de España applies its internal policies based on generally accepted accounting principles 
adapted to the special characteristics of the operations and functions of a central bank.
In accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 and 32 of its internal rules, the Bank’s annual 
accounts have been audited by the Internal Audit Department and analysed and examined by 
the Audit Committee appointed for the purpose by the Bank’s Governing Council. The ac-
counts have also been audited by independent external auditors, as stipulated by Article 29 of 
the Bank’s internal rules and Article 27 of the Statute of the ESCB.
Under the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco 
de España, it is for the government, upon proposal by the Minister of Economy and Finance, 
to approve the Bank’s balance sheet and accounts for the year, which will be sent to Parlia-
ment (Cortes Generales) for informational purposes. The Governing Council of the Bank, un-
der the provisions of Article 21.g) of the aforementioned Law, is responsible for formulating the 
Bank’s annual accounts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures are expressed in millions of euro. Those relating to 
2007 are presented solely for comparison with 2008. For this purpose, it should be noted that 
the 2007 information relating to the Banco de España’s held-to-maturity securities portfolio 
and to some unallocated items has been reorganised, as described in the related notes on the 
annual accounts. Due to rounding, on occasions the totals included in the balance sheet, 
profit and loss account and notes on the annual accounts may not equal the sum of the indi-
vidual figures.
This document presents the accounts for the year 2008. Section 2 includes the balance sheet 
and profit and loss account at 31.12.08. Section 3 contains the notes on the accounts, with 
the accounting policies that have served as a framework for their formulation and explanatory 
notes on the most important aspects of the balance sheet and profit and loss account. Section 
4, in compliance with Article 4.2 of the Law of Autonomy, details the contributions made to the 
Deposit Guarantee Funds and the loans and transactions agreed on other than an arm’s-
length basis or which in any other way entail a loss of profit or losses for the Bank, giving esti-
mates of those amounts.
Finally, Annexes 1 and 2 include the reports of the external auditors and of the Bank’s Audit 
Committee on the annual accounts presented in the preceding sections.
1. Guideline of the European Central Bank of 10 November 2006 on the legal framework for accounting and financial 
reporting in the ESCB (ECB/2006/16), as amended.
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NOTE NUMBER 2008 2007
ASSETS
27.441,592.726,51selbaviecerdlogdnadloG1
54.894,737.873,8ycnerrucngierofnidetanimonedstnediseraeraorue-nonnosmialC2
46.98576.7682MFIehtmorfselbavieceR1.2
2.2 Balances with banks and security investments, external loans 
and other external assets
3 7,511.06 6,908.81
3 Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 4 8,940.60 2,579.16
68.379,410.929,2oruenidetanimonedstnediseraeraorue-nonnosmialC4
68.379,410.929,25snaoldnastnemtsevniseitiruces,sknabhtiwsecnalaB1.4
——IIMRErednuytilicaftidercehtmorfgnisirasmialC2.4
5 Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy
15.373,1707.675,296oruenidetanimonedsnoitarepo
98.742,7509.861,22snoitarepognicnaniferniaM1.5
44.321,4155.482,07snoitarepognicnanifermret-regnoL2.5
——snoitarepoesrevergninut-eniF3.5
——snoitarepoesreverlarutcurtS4.5
5.5 Marginal lending facility 63,00 —
81.252.06sllacnigramotdetalerstiderC6.5
6 Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro 7 2.15 1.91
15.696,9649.309,578oruenidetanimonedstnediseraeraoruefoseitiruceS7
83.238,529.842,59oruenidetanimonedtbedtnemnrevoglareneG8
88.687,488.687,401smialcmetsysoruE-artnI9
17.73417.734BCEnitseretnignitapicitraP1.9
81.943,481.943,4sevreserngierofforefsnartehtottnelaviuqesmialC2.9
——metsysoruEehtnihtiwsetonknaboruefonoitacollaehtotdetalersmialcteN3.9
——)ten(metsysoruEehtnihtiwsmialcrehtO4.9
10 Items in course of settlement 0.77 0.85
11 Other assets 4,592.75 3,340.39
39.92258.53211stessadexifelbignatnidnaelbignaT1.11
93.1575.9421stessalaicnanifrehtO2.11
83.30168.02631secnereffidnoitaulaverstnemurtsniteehsecnalab-ffO3.11
90.597,162.034,241sesnepxediaperpdnaslaurccA4.11
11.5 Sundry 15 1,256.21 1,160.59
TOTAL ASSETS 208,987.73 175,228.63
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2008 EUR m
2 Balance sheet and profit and loss account
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NOTE NUMBER 2008 2007
LIABILITIES
59.216,7661.810,6761noitalucricnisetonknaB1
2 Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary
97.023,2529.413,4571oruenidetanimonedsnoitarepoycilop
54.723,8330.631,42)metsysevresermuminimehtgnirevoc(stnuoccatnerruC1.2
2.2 Deposit facility 30,106.40 215.00
2.3 Fixed-term deposits — 13,775.00
——snoitarepoesrevergninut-eniF4.2
43.394.27sllacnigramotdetalerstisopeD5.2
3 Other liabilities to euro area credit institutions denominated in euro — —
4 Debt certificates issued — —
06.553,0295.445,02oruenidetanimonedstnediseraeraoruerehtootsetilibaiL5
53.030,8125.077,8181tnemnrevoglareneG1.5
52.523,270.477,191seitilibailrehtO2.5
89.75172.27102oruenidetanimonedstnediseraeraorue-nonotseitilibaiL6
42.174.1ycnerrucngierofnidetanimonedstnediseraeraorueotseitilibaiL7
30.71158.17ycnerrucngierofnidetanimonedstnediseraeraorue-nonotseitilibaiL8
30.71158.1712seitilibailrehtodnasecnalab,stisopeD1.8
——IIMRErednuytilicaftidercehtmorfgnisiraseitilibaiL2.8
29.02321.03322FMIehtybdetacollasthgirgniwardlaicepsfotrapretnuoC9
05.141,1277.640,2432seitilibailmetsysoruE-artnI01
10.1 Net liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem 7,125.42 17,903.61
98.732,353.129,43)ten(metsysoruEehtnihtiwseitilibailrehtO2.01
98.93246.64242tnemelttesfoesruocnismetI11
12 Other liabilities 491.58 578.85
——52secnereffidnoitaulaverstnemurtsniteehs-ecnalab-ffO1.21
23.39261.02262ecnavdanidetcellocemocnidnaslaurccA2.21
12.3 Sundry 27 271.42 285.53
13 Provisions 28 4,847.66 4,005.81
90.173,415.118,592stnuoccanoitaulaveR41
15 Capital and reserves 2,000.00 2,000.00
15.1 Capital 30 1,000.00 1,000.00
00.000,100.000,113sevreseR2.51
89.400,291.090,223raeyehtroftiforP61
TOTAL LIABILITIES 208,987.73 175,228.63
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2008 (cont'd) EUR m
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NOTE NUMBER 2008 2007
1 Interest income 1 6,207.26 5,060.38
2 Interest expense 2 2,873.86 2,177.94
3 Net interest income (1 – 2) 3,333.41 2,882.43
91.547,126.8013snoitarepolaicnanifmorfgnisirasessol/sniagdesilaeR4
44.92531.614snoitisopdnastessalaicnanifnosnwod-etirW5
65.886,199.9135sksirecirpdnaetaregnahcxengierofrofsnoisivorpmorf/otrefsnarT6
7 -227.50 -472.81
90.9133.32emocnisnoissimmocdnaseeF8
72.740.11esnepxesnoissimmocdnaseeF9
10 28.1192.216)9–8(snoissimmocdnaseefmorfemocniteN
86.917.4417stseretnignitapicitrapdnaserahsytiuqemorfemocnI11
52.7365.486-8emocniyratenomfogniloopfotluserteN21
59.22-53.4-9sessoldnaemocnirehtO31
14 24.544,299.375,2)31+21+11+01+7+3(EMOCNITENLATOT
15 Staff costs 10 223.63 211.10
89.31108.23111sesnepxeevitartsinimdA61
21.0253.3221stessadexifelbignatnidnaelbignatfonoitaicerpeD71
59.0780.5631secivresnoitcudorpetonknaB81
19 Other expenses 2.28 2.35
20 94.81451.744)91+81+71+61+51(SESNEPXEGNITAREPOLATOT
59.1256.6341snoisivorpdnasdnufrehtootsnoitiddadnasrefsnarT12
22 89.400,291.090,251)12–02–41(RAEYEHTROFTIFORP
Net result of financial operations, write-downs and risk provisions (4 – 5 – 6)
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2008 EUR m
Countersigned by
The Governor,
MIGUEL FERNÁNDEZ ORDÓÑEZ
The Comptroller,
ANTONIO ROSAS
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The following accounting principles have been applied in formulating the annual accounts: 
economic reality and transparency, going concern, prudence, recognition of post-balance-
sheet events, materiality, the accruals principle, and consistency and comparability.
The accounts have been prepared on a historical cost basis, modified as necessary to include 
market valuation of trading-book securities, gold and the foreign currency position. Futures shall 
be valued daily at market price and significant participating interests at underlying book value.
Transactions in assets and liabilities are generally recorded on the settlement date, except that 
forward transactions in foreign currencies are booked at the spot settlement date. If a period-
end falls between the trade date and the spot settlement date, both spot and forward transac-
tions are recognised at the trade date.
The specific valuation criteria applied to the various assets and liabilities were the following:
Gold is recorded at acquisition cost,2 which is determined by the cash amount paid in the 
transaction including any related expense.
The cost of sales is obtained by applying the daily net average cost method. In the event that 
the cash to be paid or received is specified in a currency other than the euro, it is translated 
into euro at the mid-market exchange rate two business days before the settlement date.
On the last day of each month, gold stocks are valued at the market price in euro per troy 
ounce of fine gold. Unrealised gains or losses (except for unrealised losses at year-end) are 
reflected in an adjustment account and credited or debited, respectively, to a revaluation or 
expense account.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss account and 
the average book value is modified. Such losses are considered irreversible in subsequent 
revaluations.
Sales of gold against foreign currency under repurchase agreements are recorded as off-bal-
ance-sheet items, with no effect on the balance sheet. The foreign currency received by way 
of consideration is recorded on the assets side, with the obligation to repay it being recorded 
simultaneously on the liabilities side. Possible differences arising between gold delivered spot 
and that received forward are recorded as if there had been an independent outright sale or 
purchase at the time of maturity of the transaction.
Spot purchases or sales of foreign currencies are recorded at the settlement date, affecting the 
foreign currency position from that date. Gains and losses on the spot sale of foreign currencies are 
similarly considered to be realised from the settlement date. Meanwhile, foreign exchange forward 
purchase and sale transactions shall be recognised in off-balance-sheet accounts at the spot date 
of the transaction, affecting the foreign currency position as at that date. The gain or loss on the 
3.1 Accounting policies
1 BASIC PRINCIPLES
2 BASIS OF ACCOUNTING
Gold
Foreign currencies
3 Notes on the accounts
2. As at 31/12/1998 its acquisition cost was adjusted to the market price then prevailing and the unrealised gains were 
credited to revaluation accounts. These gains are subsequently credited to profit and loss when the asset is sold or, al-
ternatively, they are used to offset unrealised losses.
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transaction shall also be considered to be realised on that date. If a period-end falls between the 
trade date and the spot settlement date, the transactions have to be recognised at the trade date.
Purchases are recorded at acquisition cost in euro. Purchases and sales of foreign currencies 
against euro are valued at the exchange rate agreed in the transaction. When foreign currencies 
are bought and sold against other foreign currencies, the euro valuation is at the mid-market 
exchange rate of the currency sold on the trade date. Transactions in a foreign currency that do 
not modify the overall position therein have no effect on the book value of such position.
The cost in euro of foreign currency sold is calculated using the daily net average cost method.
Accrued interest denominated in foreign currency is recorded on a daily basis using the mid-
market rate on each day. If the rate on the relevant day is not available, the latest mid-market 
rate available shall be applied. Accrued interest receivable or payable denominated in foreign 
currency shall form part of the foreign currency position.
Foreign currencies are revalued monthly to market price. This revaluation is performed without 
netting unrealised gains against unrealised losses on the various currencies. Unrealised gains 
and losses (with the exception of unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected in adjustment 
accounts and credited or debited, respectively, to revaluation and expense accounts.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss account for the 
year, in which case they affect the average cost of the currency in question. Such losses are 
considered irreversible in subsequent revaluations.
The criteria applied are the same as those indicated in the preceding section for foreign cur-
rencies.
SDRs and the net position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are valued at the year-end 
SDR market exchange rate by the same methods used for other currencies.
The Banco de España holds two separate securities portfolios: a trading portfolio and a held-
to-maturity portfolio.
In both cases, the securities are recorded initially at acquisition cost, which is determined by 
the cash amount paid, less any accrued gross coupon.
The cost of securities sold or redeemed is determined by the average book value of the secu-
rity in question. The securities in the held-to-maturity portfolio may not be sold except in ex-
ceptional circumstances and with the authorisation of the Operations Committee.
Trading portfolio securities are revalued monthly to market price. This revaluation is carried out 
without any netting of unrealised gains and losses on different security codes. Unrealised gains and 
losses (with the exception of unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected in adjustment accounts 
and credited or debited, respectively, to revaluation and expense accounts. Unrealised losses exist-
ing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss account. Their amount is credited directly 
to the securities account, and the average book value – and therefore the internal rate of return – of 
the security code concerned is modified. These unrealised losses are considered irreversible.
Securities within the held-to-maturity portfolio are not subject to any periodic valuation, except 
for recognition, where applicable, of loss of value due to impairment of the issuer.
Foreign banknotes
Special drawing rights (SDRs)
Securities
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Any premiums, discounts and coupons that have accrued but are not due are recorded in ac-
cruals accounts, using the internal rate of return of each security code for their calculation. 
These accruals are recorded daily.
The above references to acquisition cost and market prices shall, in relation to securities de-
nominated in foreign currency, be understood to refer to the currency concerned, these 
amounts being translated into euro, as stipulated in the “Foreign currencies” section.
Reverse repurchase agreements involving securities are recorded on the assets side of the 
balance sheet as collateralised outward loans for the amount of the loan. Securities ac-
quired under reverse repurchase agreements are not revalued or included in the securities 
portfolio.
Repurchase agreements involving securities are recorded on the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet as an inward deposit collateralised by securities, the balancing entry of which is the cash 
received. Securities sold under this type of agreement remain on the Bank’s balance sheet and 
are treated as if they had remained part of the portfolio from which they were sold. Repurchase 
agreements involving securities denominated in foreign currencies have no effect on the aver-
age cost of the currency position.
In direct loans of securities, repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements conducted simul-
taneously are accounted for separately, each being recorded according to the valuation rules 
set forth in the preceding two paragraphs.
Automated security loans (contracts empowering a depository of securities to lend them to a 
third party in overnight transactions, subject to certain contractual limitations) are not recorded 
in the balance sheet. The only item accounted for is the income, which is recorded in the 
profit and loss account. Transactions outstanding at year-end are recorded off-balance 
sheet.
Where there is any reasonable doubt about the recovery of an asset, it is recorded in a sepa-
rate account and the relevant provision set aside.
These are valued at their nominal amount.
In accordance with the Guideline of the European Central Bank of 10 November 2006 on the 
legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central 
Banks (ECB/2006/16), they are valued at nominal amount (see Notes 9 and 28 to the balance 
sheet and Note 5 to the profit and loss account).
Shares and participating interests in national and/or international institutions, including the 
participating interest in the European Central Bank (ECB), are valued at cost. The participating 
interest in Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Sistemas Finan-
cieros S.A. is valued at its underlying book value.
Fixed assets are generally valued initially at cost, defined as the amount of the monetary dis-
bursements made or committed to, including any costs directly attributable to bringing the 
asset to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the intended 
manner, such as transport, installation, professional fees for legal services, non-refundable 
taxes and the fair value of other consideration given.
Repurchase agreements involving 
securities
Doubtful debtors
Loans to financial institutions and 
balances with EU central banks
Loans to the State
Shares and participating interests
Tangible and intangible fixed 
assets
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Trade discounts and those for defects in assets received are recorded as a reduction in the 
cost of the related assets. Cash discounts and those for late delivery are recorded in the 
profit and loss account under other income or, where appropriate, as a reduction in expenses, 
and do not affect the acquisition cost of the asset purchased.
Fixed assets are deemed not to include those assets which, although meeting the condi-
tions to be classed as such (i.e. they are non-financial assets owned by the Bank that are 
intended be used for a period exceeding 12 months and contribute directly or indirectly to 
fulfilling its objectives and/or to the probable generation of income in the future and, in ad-
dition, their cost can be reliably assessed), do not generally exceed the amount of €600 
(€6,000 in the case of buildings, structures and plant in buildings), although there may be 
exceptions.
Only extensions, replacements, rehabilitations and improvements that exceed €6,000 are 
capitalised, provided also that the elements replaced can be removed from the balance sheet 
or that they are fully depreciated.
Computer applications developed specifically for the Banco de España the cost of which does 
not exceed €300,000 are recorded directly as expenses and are not eligible for subsequent 
capitalisation.
After initial recognition, fixed assets are valued at acquisition cost less accumulated deprecia-
tion or amortisation and any impairment losses.
The acquisition cost of a fixed asset, net of its residual value, is depreciated or amortised sys-
tematically during its useful life on a straight-line monthly basis from the month following that 
in which it was recognised in the accounts. Generally, all depreciable/amortisable fixed assets 
are estimated to have a residual value of zero unless there is a deep, liquid market for assets 
similar to the one whose residual value may be received. Land, the art collection, artistic herit-
age and fixed assets under construction are not depreciated.
The depreciation/amortisation rates and estimated useful lives applied to the various fixed as-
sets in 2008 were as follows:
Depreciation
/Amortisation
Rate (%)
Useful life (years)
052serutcurtsdnasgnidliuB
524krownoitavoneR
0101sgnidliubnitnalP
502sgnidliubnitnalpdetaler-ytiruceS
0101sgnittifdnaerutinruF
Office machines for the handling of banknotes and coins 10 10
502senihcamecifforehtO
452tnempiuqeretupmoC
Transport equipment. Cars and motor bikes 25 4
0101sesubdnaskcurT.tnempiuqetropsnarT
0101seirarbiL
502stessadexifelbignatrehtO
502snoitacilpparetupmoC
sraeyforebmuN—ytreporplairtsudnI
of exclusive use
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An asset is impaired when its book value exceeds the recoverable value. In this case, and only 
if the amounts are significant, an impairment loss is recognised by simultaneously reducing the 
item’s book value and modifying its depreciable/amortisable base.
The ECB and the national central banks (NCBs), which together comprise the Eurosystem, 
have issued euro banknotes since 1 January 2002.3 The total value of euro banknotes in cir-
culation is recorded by allocating to each Eurosystem NCB, on the last working day of each 
month, an amount based on the banknote allocation key.4
The ECB has been allocated a share of 8% of the total value of euro banknotes in circulation, 
whereas the remaining 92% has been allocated to the NCBs and divided amongst them ac-
cording to their weightings in the capital key of the ECB. The share of banknotes allocated to 
each NCB is disclosed under the balance sheet liability item “Banknotes in circulation”.
The difference between the value of the euro banknotes allocated to each NCB in accordance 
with the banknote allocation key and the value of the euro banknotes that it actually puts into 
circulation also gives rise to remunerated intra-Eurosystem balances. These claims or liabili-
ties, which incur interest,5 are disclosed under the item “Intra-Eurosystem.— Net claims/liabil-
ities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem” (see “Intra-Eurosystem 
balances” in this section on accounting policies).
From 2002 until 2007, the intra-Eurosystem balances arising from the allocation of euro ban-
knotes were adjusted in order to avoid significant changes in the relative income positions of 
the NCBs that initially formed part of the Eurosystem as compared with previous years. The 
adjustments are effected by taking into account the differences between the average value of 
banknotes in circulation of each NCB in the specified reference period6 and the average value 
of banknotes that would have been allocated to them during that period under the ECB’s 
capital key. The adjustments were progressively reduced in annual stages until the end of 
2007. However, this mechanism has also been applied in the case of new Member States 
adopting the euro so as to calculate the offset amount corresponding to each of them under 
the aforementioned calculation method. This amount is gradually reduced over a six-year pe-
riod, being held unchanged during each financial year.
The interest income and expense on intra-Eurosystem balances relating to banknote allocation 
is cleared through the accounts of the ECB and is disclosed under “Net interest income” in the 
profit and loss account.
In accordance with the ECB Decision of 17 November 2005 (ECB/2005/11) on the distribution 
of the income of the ECB on euro banknotes in circulation to the national central banks (NCBs) 
of the participating Member States, this income arising from the 8% share of euro banknotes 
allocated to the ECB belongs to the NCBs and shall be distributed to them annually. This Deci-
sion stipulates however that the ECB’s Governing Council may decide before the end of the 
financial year to transfer part or all of this income to an ECB provision for foreign exchange 
rate, interest rate and gold price risks. The ECB Governing Council may also decide before the 
end of the financial year not to distribute part or all of this income if it expects that the ECB will 
Banknotes in circulation
3. Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 December 2001 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2001/1 5), OJ L 
337, 20.12.2001, as amended. 4. The banknote allocation key is that which results from applying 92% to the Eurosys-
tem subscribed capital key. 5. Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 December 2001 on the allocation of mon-
etary income of the national central banks of participating Member States from the financial year 2002 to 2007, inclusive 
(ECB/2001/16), OJ L 337, 20.12.2001, as amended. 6. The reference period taken has a duration of 24 months and it 
begins 30 months prior to the euro cash changeover date.
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incur a loss or that its net profit for that year may be less than the amount of seigniorage in-
come on its euro banknotes in circulation. Finally, the distribution of this income may be re-
duced in accordance with any decision by the ECB’s Governing Council in respect of ex-
penses incurred by the ECB in connection with the issue and handling of euro banknotes.
Intra-Eurosystem balances arise from the Banco de España’s participating interest in the ECB, claims 
equivalent to the reserves transferred to the ECB and the net balance resulting from the transfers 
issued and received by TARGET27 among the national central banks of the ESCB, including the 
ECB. They also arise from the balances vis-à-vis the ECB resulting from allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem, from the outcome of the contribution and allocation of monetary income and 
from the positions vis-à-vis the ECB owing to the deferral of sundry receipts and payments.
In the case of TARGET2 operations, the resulting balance is included as an asset or liability, as ap-
propriate, under the item “Other claims/liabilities within the Eurosystem (net)”. Intra-ESCB balances 
arising from the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem are included, depending on their 
net amount, as an asset or liability under “Net claim/liability related to the allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem” (see “Banknotes in circulation” in this section on accounting policies).
Income and expenses are recognised in the period in which they accrue.
Realised gains and realised and unrealised losses are taken to the profit and loss account. To 
calculate the acquisition cost of items sold, the average cost method is used for securities and 
the daily net average cost method is used for foreign currencies and gold. In the case of unre-
alised losses on any item at year-end, its average cost is reduced to the end-of-year market 
price and/or exchange rate.
Unrealised gains are not recognised as income, but are transferred to a revaluation account.
Unrealised losses are taken to the profit and loss account if they exceed previous revaluation 
gains recorded in the corresponding revaluation account, and are not reversed in subsequent 
years against new unrealised gains. Unrealised losses in any one security or currency or in gold 
are not netted against unrealised gains in other securities or currencies.
Premiums or discounts on purchased securities are calculated and shown as reductions of or 
additions to interest income and accrued over the remaining life of the securities concerned, 
together with the accrued coupons, according to the internal rate of return method.
The Pension Scheme for Bank employees is of the defined-contribution type. The Pension 
Fund is external and closed-end. Contributions made by the Banco de España on behalf of 
the employees who, having joined the Bank after 1/2/1986, are eligible to and do participate 
in the Scheme, are established at 7.5% of the so-called “regulating salary”, consisting of the 
salary items determined in the Scheme Rules. The amounts contributed by the Bank are rec-
ognised as a current expense in the year to which they relate.
Foreign exchange forward currency positions, which comprise transactions and forward legs 
of foreign exchange swaps, are included in the net foreign currency positions in order to cal-
culate foreign exchange gains and losses.
Intra-Eurosystem balances
Recognition of income and 
expenses
Pension Scheme
Off-balance-sheet positions8
7. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. 8. The net position under foreign 
exchange forward transactions and swaps, and the foreign-exchange gains and losses generated by such position are 
shown in the balance sheet in item 11.3 on the assets side or item 12.1 on the liabilities side, depending on their sign.
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As a general rule, profits and losses arising from off-balance-sheet positions are recognised 
and treated in a similar manner to those arising from on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities. 
Specifically, in application of the economic approach, the gains and losses on positions in in-
terest rate futures are considered to be realised at the time when they are settled net each day. 
In the case of futures denominated in foreign currency, such settlements shall affect the foreign 
currency position on the day on which they take place.
Assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect events that occur between the annual balance 
sheet date and the date on which the Governing Council formulates the financial statements if 
such events materially affect the asset-liability position.
In view of the nature of the Banco de España, it is considered that the publication of a state-
ment of cash flows would not provide any significant additional information to the users of the 
financial statements.
The Banco de España’s gold holdings amount to €5,627.29 million, consisting of 9.054 million 
troy ounces9 of fine gold valued at €621.54 per ounce. The value of these holdings is €482.57 
million more than in 2007, as a result of the rise in the market price (at end-2007 the price per 
ounce was €568.24).
This item has three components:
a) The position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the reserve tranche. This 
is the euro equivalent of the SDRs relating to the foreign currencies assigned to 
the IMF due to Spain’s initial quota and successive increases in it and due to the 
net financing granted to the IMF.
b) Special drawing rights (allocations). These represent the euro equivalent of the 
successive allocations of this currency by the IMF. The changes in allocations are 
mainly due to loan agreement transactions with third countries and to interest 
receipts or payments resulting from positions vis-à-vis the IMF.
c)  Other claims on the IMF. These reflect the amount that the Banco de España has 
provided to the IMF as a contribution to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity. This fund is used to finance low-interest loans to the poorest countries. The 
Banco de España has undertaken to contribute a maximum of SDR 425 million 
to this fund.
The breakdown in 2007 and 2008 is as follows:
Post-balance-sheet events
Other matters
3.2 Notes on the balance 
sheet
1 GOLD AND GOLD 
RECEIVABLES
2 CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED IN 
FOREIGN CURRENCY.— 
RECEIVABLES FROM THE IMF
9. One troy ounce is equal to 31.1035 grams.
Type of asset 2008 2007 Change
85.94200.71285.664noitisopehcnartevreseR
Special drawing rights (allocation) 160.10 250.74 -90.64
90.91119.12199.042FMIehtnosmialcrehtO
30.87246.98576.768LATOT
EUR m
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The overall amount of claims on the IMF increased by €278.03 million with respect to the bal-
ance at end-2007.
The increase in the reserve tranche position account (€249.58 million) is basically due to the 
Banco de España’s net contributions to the IMF for loans to third countries (Turkey, Pakistan, 
Latvia and Ukrania). Of this increase, €236.57 million related to the net increase in amounts 
denominated in foreign currencies and the remaining €13.01 million to the change in market 
foreign exchange rates between the two years. Spain’s IMF quota was not changed in 2008, 
remaining at SDR3,048.90 million.
The decrease of 90.64 million in the special drawings rights (allocation) account was due to the 
fall in the amounts denominated in foreign currency (€95.10 million), offset partly (€4.46 million) 
by the change in market foreign exchange rates between the two years.
The increase in the “Other claims on the IMF” account (€119.09 million) is due to the Banco de 
España’s contributions to the IMF’s PRGF III programme. Of this increase, €112.37 million re-
lated to the net increase in amounts denominated in foreign currencies and the remaining 
€6.72 million to the change in market foreign exchange rates between the two years.
SDRs are valued at the year-end market rate, calculated by the ECB for all the Eurosystem 
national central banks, of €1= SDR 0.905141. The SDR is defined in terms of a basket of cur-
rencies. Its value is determined as the weighted sum of the exchange rates of four major cur-
rencies: the US dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound sterling. The interest rate, which is 
updated weekly, remained between 0.82% and 3.50% during the year.
This item includes current accounts, deposits, debt security investments in the trading and 
held-to-maturity portfolios and other claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign 
currency. The held-to-maturity portfolio consists of fixed-income securities with fixed maturity 
which the Banco de España intends to hold to maturity.
In accordance with the ECB Guideline of 11 December 2008 (ECB/2008/21), the Banco de 
España included in this item as at 31 December 2008 its held-to-maturity portfolio of securities 
representing claims on non-euro area residents in foreign currency, which until that date had 
been classified in asset item 11.2 “Other financial assets”. The 2007 figures have been ad-
justed to reflect the reclassification of this portfolio. 
The total amount as at 31 December 2008 was €7,511.06 million, with the following breakdown:
As at 31 December 2008, 99.94% of these assets were denominated in US dollars. The 
equivalent value in euro of this US dollar amount was transferred to the balance sheet at the 
year-end market exchange rate (€1= USD 1.3917).
3 CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED IN 
FOREIGN CURRENCY.— 
BALANCES WITH BANKS AND 
SECURITY INVESTMENTS, 
EXTERNAL LOANS AND OTHER 
EXTERNAL ASSETS
Type of asset 2008 2007 Change
Deposits 95.69 492.29 -396.60
Security investments 7,413.75 6,416.22 997.53
     Trading portfolio 3,374.09 2,667.19 706.91
     Held-to-maturity portfolio 4,039.65 3,749.03 290.63
13.113.026.1rehtO
TOTAL 7,511.06 6,908.81 602.25
EUR m
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The increase in the balance of this item (€602.25 million) was due to the net effect of the fac-
tors listed in the following table:
This balance sheet item may include current accounts, balances with banks and security in-
vestments. As at 31 December 2008, US dollar denominated deposits at monetary financial 
institutions equivalent to €718.55 million were held. The year-end balance also includes a 
claim arising from reverse operations with Eurosystem counterparties amounting to €8,222.03 
million in connection with the US dollar Term Auction Facility. Under this program, US dollars 
were provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB by means of a temporary reciprocal cur-
rency arrangement (swap line) with the aim of offering short-term US dollar funding to Eurosys-
tem counterparties. The ECB simultaneously entered into back-to-back swap transactions 
with NCBs that have adopted the euro, which used the resulting funds to conduct dollar liquid-
ity-providing operations with the Eurosystem counterparties in the form of repos and received 
euro-denominated securities from them as collateral. These back-to-back swap transactions 
between the ECB and the Eurosystem NCBs give rise to intra-Eurosystem balances reported 
under “Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net)”.
Included here is the balance of current accounts at correspondents and trading and held-to-
maturity portfolio securities denominated in euro. The held-to-maturity portfolio consists of 
fixed-income securities with fixed maturity which the Banco de España intends to hold to ma-
turity.
In accordance with ECB Guideline of 11 December 2008 (ECB/2008/21), the Banco de Es-
paña included under this heading as at 31 December 2008 its held-to-maturity portfolio of 
securities representing claims on non-euro area residents in euro, which until that date had 
been classified in asset item 11.2 “Other financial assets”. The 2007 figures have been ad-
justed to reflect the reclassification of this portfolio. The breakdown is as follows:
Of the total of this heading (€2,929.01 million), substantially all (€2,818.37 million) relates to 
fixed-income securities included in the held-to-maturity portfolio, which, however, decreased 
by €1,561.20 million with respect to the balance as at 31.12.2007. The securities included in 
4 CLAIMS ON EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED IN 
FOREIGN CURRENCY
5 CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED IN 
EURO.—BALANCES WITH BANKS, 
SECURITY INVESTMENTS AND 
LOANS
Reason for change Amount
90.97tnemtsevniteN
58.904rebmeceD13tasasetaregnahcxetekramnisegnahC
83.29rebmeceD13tasasecirptekramseitirucesnisegnahC
27.02elbaviecertseretnideurccA
Other 0.21
TOTAL 602.25
EUR m
Type of asset 2008 2007 Change
43.0-65.022.0sknabhtiwsecnalaB
25.440,2-03.379,487.829,2stnemtsevniytiruceS
23.384-37.39514.011oiloftropgnidarT
        Held-to-maturity portfolio 2,818.37 4,379.57 -1,561.20
68.440,2-68.379,410.929,2LATOT
EUR m
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
the trading portfolio are securities issued in euro by international agencies (European Invest-
ment Bank) and their balance decreased in 2008 by €483.32 with respect to the previous 
year.
This item includes the amount of the euro-denominated lending to euro area credit institutions 
through which monetary policy is implemented. The breakdown by type of transaction is as 
follows:
Throughout the whole of 2008, against a background of money market tensions in the euro 
area, the ECB conducted liquidity-providing operations of various maturities to meet the ad-
ditional liquidity demands and hold short-term interest rates near to the minimum bid rate on 
main refinancing operations.
The balance of this item as at 31 December 2008 exceeds that of 2007 by 29.71%. The aver-
age daily balance of the financing granted during the year increased by 119.50% (€56,946.04 
million in 2008, against €25,943.00 million in 2007). 
36.52% of the annual average balance of daily financing was extended through “Main refi-
nancing operations” and another 63.23% was granted under “Longer-term refinancing opera-
tions”, which represents a very significant increase with respect to the previous year. Only 
0.25% of this balance was financed through other instruments.
These operations play a pivotal role in achieving the aims of steering interest rate, managing 
market liquidity and signalling the monetary policy stance. They are executed through liquidity-
providing reverse transactions with a weekly frequency and a maturity of one week, normally 
by means of standard tenders. Nevertheless, from October 2008, the operations are con-
ducted at fixed rate with allotment of the total amount bid.
The balance of this item as at 31.12.2008 was €22,168.90 million. This was €35,078.98 mil-
lion less that at 31.12.2007. The average amount of financing granted via these operations, 
however, increased from €18,267.70 million in 2007 to €20,794.04 million in 2008, for the 
reasons stated above.
These operations aim to provide counterparties with additional longer-term refinancing. They 
are executed through liquidity-providing reverse transactions with a monthly frequency and a 
maturity of three months, normally by means of standard tenders. However, to improve liquid-
ity provision in the Eurosystem in 2008, these regular main longer-term refinancing operations 
were accompanied by other supplementary longer-term refinancing operations with maturities 
of three and six months, as well as by financing operations with special maturities equal to the 
6 LENDING TO EURO AREA 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS RELATED 
TO MONETARY POLICY 
OPERATIONS DENOMINATED IN 
EURO
a. Main refinancing operations
b. Longer-term refinancing 
operations
Type of operation 2008 2007 Change
89.870,53-98.742,7509.861,22snoitarepognicnaniferniaM
Longer-term refinancing operations 70,284.55 14,123.44 56,161.11
———snoitarepoesrevergninut-eniF
———snoitarepoesreverlarutcurtS
00,36—00,36ytilicafgnidnellanigraM
70.8581.252.06sllacnigramotdetalerstiderC
02.302,1215.373,1707.675,29LATOT
EUR m
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
reserve maintenance period. From October 2008 these operations are also being conducted 
at fixed rate with allocation of the whole amount bid.
The balance of this item of €70,284.55 million as at 31 December 2008 was €56,161.11 mil-
lion higher than in the previous year. Similarly, its average balance rose from €7,643.75 million 
to €36,009.21. This increase was for the reasons explained above.
The purpose of these operations is to smooth the effects on interest rates caused by unex-
pected market fluctuations. Owing to their nature, their frequency is not standardised.
Their balance at end-2008 was zero, as it was at the previous year-end, although eight fine-
tuning reverse operations took place in the Eurosystem during the year. Financing was ob-
tained by Spanish credit institutions in all of them. The average balance of these operations in 
2008 was €64.47 million (€27.50 million in 2007)
These are reverse open-market transactions through standard tenders to enable the Eurosys-
tem to adjust its structural liquidity position vis-à-vis the financial sector.
The end-2008 balance was zero, as it was at the previous year-end. No structural reverse 
operations took place during the year.
Counterparties may use the marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from national 
central banks at a pre-specified interest rate against eligible assets. This interest rate is penal-
ised with respect to the intervention rate set in the weekly tenders or in main refinancing op-
erations.
The balance at the end of 2008 was €63.00 million. There were many of these operations dur-
ing the year for the aforementioned reasons and, as a result, the average balance increased 
significantly from €0.16 million in 2007 to €67.50 million in 2008.
Under Eurosystem rules for monetary policy management, all operations providing liquidity to 
the banking system must be backed by adequate underlying assets accepted by the system as 
eligible for use as collateral. If, after daily valuation, the market value of the assets used as loan 
collateral has fallen below the lower trigger point set for each security, the counterparty must 
provide additional assets or cash (see Note 17). If the market value of the underlying assets, 
following their revaluation, exceeds the amount of the financing obtained from the national cen-
tral bank plus the variation margin, the counterparty may withdraw an amount of underlying 
assets equal to that excess (or receive this difference as a cash payment in its account).
In the national central banks that make margin calls by debiting or crediting the accounts of 
credit institutions, as is the case for the Banco de España, these debits or credits are the bal-
ancing entries of the asset-side or liability-side accounts reflecting the changes in these mar-
gins. These balance sheet accounts are remunerated at the interest rate applied in main refi-
nancing operations.
As at 31.12.2008 this item had a balance of €60.25 million, up €58.07 million with respect to 
the previous year.
This item includes claims on credit institutions unrelated to monetary policy operations. Its bal-
ance of €2.15 million as at 31.12.2008, which includes the amount of the correspondent ac-
counts in euro with euro area credit institutions, is €0.24 million higher than in 2007.
c. Fine-tuning reverse 
operations
d. Structural reverse operations
e. Marginal lending facility
f. Credits related to margin calls
7 OTHER CLAIMS ON EURO 
AREA CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO
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This item includes that part of the Bank’s trading and held-to-maturity portfolio which consists 
of euro-denominated fixed-income securities issued by euro area residents. The held-to-ma-
turity portfolio consists of securities with fixed or determinable payments and a fixed maturity 
which the Banco de España intends to hold until maturity. In accordance with ECB Guideline 
of 11 December 2008 (ECB/2008/21), the Banco de España included in this item as at 31 
December 2008 its held-to-maturity portfolio of euro-denominated securities issued by euro 
area residents, which until that date had been classified in asset item 11.2 “Other financial as-
sets”. The 2007 figures have been adjusted to enable comparison with 2008. The breakdown 
of this item is as follows:
The balance of this item as at 31 December 2008 was €75,903.94 million, of which 55.72% 
relate to trading portfolio securities and the remainder (44.28%) to held-to-maturity securi-
ties.
Overall, these securities increased by €6,207.42 million in 2008. It was, however, trading se-
curities which underwent an increase, of €12,951.87 million, whereas held-to-maturity securi-
ties decreased by €6,744.45 million.
Specifically, the changes were for the reasons reflected in the following table:
It should be noted that all purchases of debt issued by general government are in the second-
ary market, none being direct subscriptions of security issues.
This item includes loans which, by virtue of their respective laws of creation, were granted to 
the State prior to the entry into force of Law 21/1993 of 29 of December 1993 on the State 
budget for 1994. Initially they were to be repaid at their nominal amount on a straight-line basis 
over twenty-five years by means of yearly payments as from 1999, inclusive, in accordance 
with transitional provision seven of the aforementioned law. However, on 26 March 2007 an 
agreement was entered into with the central government, represented by the Director General 
of the Treasury and Financial Policy by delegation of the Minister of Economy and Finance, to 
bring forward the repayment schedule of these loans, such that they mature in full by 2015 at 
8 SECURITIES OF EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED IN 
EURO
9 GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
DEBT DENOMINATED IN EURO
Security investments 2008 2007 Change
Trading portfolio 42,293.25 29,341.38 12,951.87
54.447,6-41.553,0496.016,33oiloftropytirutam-ot-dleH
TOTAL 75,903.94 69,696.51 6,207.42
EUR m
Reason for change Trading portfolio
Held-to maturity 
portfolio
Total
Net purchase of securities 12,136.12 -6,779.18 5,356.93
Unrealised gains at year-end (a) 811.57 — 811.57
Unrealised losses at year-end (a) -15.88 — -15.88
Accrued implicit interest 20.06 34.74 54.80
24.702,654.447,6-78.159,21LATOT
EUR m
a.    As stated in Section 3.1  "Accounting policies", the held-to-maturity portfolio is not valued periodically.
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the latest and the Treasury can request early repayment of all or part of them. Loans repaid 
early are paid by the Treasury at the cash amount of their market value at the time.
Under that agreement, in 2008 two instalments of the Law 3/1983 loan (that of the reporting 
year and the last outstanding instalment of the original repayment schedule) and the instal-
ments of the other two loans corresponding to the reporting year were paid.
The outstanding nominal balance as at 31 December 2008 of the loans granted to the State 
amounted to €5,248.92 million, broken down as follows:
The change was solely due to yearly repayments on the above-mentioned loans, as set out 
above. The amounts are shown in the above table.
This heading includes the amounts of the following items:
As at 31 December 2008 this item totalled €437.71 million. This total amount is divided into 
two components: participating interest in capital and participating interest in equity excluding 
capital. Regarding the first of these components, the capital subscribed and paid by the Ban-
co de España amounted to €434.92 million, which is equal to a share of 7.5498% in such 
capital. This percentage is that corresponding to the Banco de España in accordance with the 
capital key established using European Commission data on the basis of Spain’s population 
and GDP relative to those of the total ESCB countries. The second component (participating 
interest in ECB equity excluding capital) amounted at that date to €2.79 million, which is the 
amount of the cost paid due to the adjustments to the ECB capital key.
Pursuant to Article 28 of the ESCB Statute, the ESCB national central banks are the sole sub-
scribers to the capital of the ECB. Subscriptions depend on the participating interests fixed in 
accordance with Article 29 of the ESCB Statute, which must be adjusted every five years or 
10 INTRA-EUROSYSTEM 
BALANCES
a. Participating interest in the 
ECB
2008 2007 Change
Treasury. Law 3/1983 special account 1,366.76 1,562.01 -195.25
Treasury. Law 4/1990 special account 3,473.99 3,821.39 -347.40
Treasury. Credits arising from subscription for 
participating interests, contributions and quotas in 
international agencies 
408.17 448.99 -40.82
74.385-83.238,529.842,5LATOT
EUR m
egnahC70028002tessafoepyT
—17.73417.734BCEehtnitseretnignitapicitraP
Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserve 
assets to the ECB 
4,349.18 4,349.18
—
Net claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes within the Eurosystem — — —
Other claims within the Eurosystem (net) — — —
—88.687,488.687,4LATOT
EUR m
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whenever new Member States join the European Union and their NCBs thus join the ESCB. A 
noteworthy post-balance-sheet event was the second five-yearly change in the capital keys on 
1 January 2009. Based on the Council Decision of 15 July 2003 on the statistical data to be 
used for the determination of the key for subscription of the capital of the European Central 
Bank, the capital key of the Banco de España was increased from 7.5498% to 8.3040%.
These represent ECB’s debt to the Banco de España arising from the transfer of foreign re-
serve assets to the ECB. The claims equivalent to the transferred reserves are denominated in 
euro at a value fixed from the time of their transfer. They are remunerated at the latest available 
marginal rate for the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations, reduced by 15% to reflect a 
zero return on the gold component. Their end-2008 balance amounted to €4,349.18 million, 
the same as in the previous year. A noteworthy post-balance-sheet event was that, due to the 
increase in the Banco de España’s share of the ECB capital key on 1 January 2009, an addi-
tional contribution of foreign reserve assets was made to the ECB for the equivalent of €434.47 
million, as a result of which the balance this year rose to €4,783.65 million.
In accordance with Eurosystem rules, since the accounts making up this item have a net 
credit balance, this information is presented on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
In accordance with Eurosystem rules, since the accounts making up this item have a net 
credit balance, this information is presented on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
The balance of this item amounted to €235.85 million at end-2008, of which €531.91 million 
related to cost and €296.07 to accumulated depreciation.
The breakdown of this item into its components, together with their accumulated depreciation, 
is as follows:
b. Claims equivalent to the 
transfer of foreign reserve assets 
to the ECB
c. Net claims related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem
d. Other claims within the 
Eurosystem (net)
11 TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE 
FIXED ASSETS
2008 2007 Change
56.9165.92412.944STESSADEXIFELBIGNAT
Land and unbuilt plots 5.35 5.35 0.00
Buildings, structures and renovation work 103.11 99.28 3.83
Plant in buildings 146.91 137.70 9.21
47.142.3389.43sgnittifdnaerutinruF
Office machines other than computer equipment 43.54 43.10 0.44
65.302.1577.45tnempiuqeretupmoC
15.0-60.945.8tnempiuqetropsnarT
55.032.987.9seirarbiL
84.062.347.3stessadexifelbignatrehtO
53.041.8394.83egatirehcitsitradnanoitcelloctrA
23.781.0415.74STESSADEXIFELBIGNATNI
23.731.0454.74snoitacilpparetupmoC
00.060.060.0ytreporplairtsudnI
24.0-26.5391.53SSERGORPNISTESSADEXIF
Buildings, plant in buildings and other structures 
under construction 
28.81 30.91 -2.11
Computer applications under development 5.50 4.31 1.19
05.004.098.0ssergorpnistessadexifrehtO
55.6263.50519.135LATOT
EUR m
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The increase in fixed assets in 2008 basically arose from investment in fire detection and fire-
extinction facilities in Madrid buildings and in the refurbishment of those buildings.10 Also note-
worthy was the increase in investments in computer hardware and in the development of 
certain software.
On 31 December 2008 the Banco de España reclassified its held-to-maturity porfolio securi-
ties from this heading to the items which, up to then, had been used for trading securities, i.e. 
A.2 “Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency”, A.3 “Claims on euro 
area residents denominated in foreign currency”, A.4 “Claims on non-euro area residents de-
nominated in euro” and A.7 “Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro”, depend-
ing on the residence of the issuer and on the currency of denomination. This reclassification 
was carried out on a harmonised basis in the Eurosystem, in accordance with the ECB Guide-
line of 11 December 2008 (ECB/2008/21).
This item includes €49.57 million of financial investments relating basically to the Banco de 
España’s participating interests in the Bank for International Settlements and Bolsas y Merca-
dos Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Sistemas Financieros, S.A. The decrease of 
€1.82 million in these financial assets was due to the decrease in the underlying book value of 
the shares of the latter.
This item includes the amount of the net debtor position arising from foreign-exchange forward 
and swap transactions valued at the exchange rates prevailing at the end of the year. When 
the position is a creditor one, it is recorded under the same heading in liability item 12.1. Its 
balance of €620.86 million as at end-2008 is the net value of the swap transactions outstand-
ing at that date. This includes the outstanding swaps with the ECB under the US dollar Term 
Auction Facility programme with the Federal Reserve. It also includes the outstanding swaps 
at year-end with the ECB and with the financial institutions arising under the cooperation 
agreement to provide liquidity in Swiss francs. Under this agreement, the National Bank of 
Switzerland provided Swiss francs to the ECB by means of swaps against euro. The ECB si-
multaneously entered into back-to-back swap transactions with Eurosystem NCBs which 
12 OTHER FINANCIAL ASSETS
13 OFF-BALANCE-SHEET 
INSTRUMENTS REVALUATION 
DIFFERENCES
Accumulated depreciation or amortisation 2008 2007 Change
02.61-11.742-03.362-STESSADEXIFELBIGNAT
Buildings, structures and renovation work -30.60 -28.24 -2.37
48.4-78.901-17.411-sgnidliubnitnalP
83.1-42.02-26.12-sgnittifdnaerutinruF
Office machines other than computer equipment -37.72 -36.30 -1.42
59.4-08.73-57.24-tnempiuqeretupmoC
04.0-82.5-86.5-tnempiuqetropsnarT
05.0-95.6-90.7-seirarbiL
43.0-97.2-31.3-stessadexifelbignatrehtO
44.4-23.82-67.23-STESSADEXIFELBIGNATNI
44.4-72.82-17.23-snoitacilpparetupmoC
—50.0-50.0-ytreporplairtsudnI
46.02-34.572-70.692-LATOT
EUR m
10. The refurbishment of buildings is accounted for as an addition to fixed assets if it meets the criteria set out in Section 
3.1 “Accounting policies” in regard to tangible and intangible fixed assets.
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used the resulting funds to conduct Swiss franc liquidity-providing operations with the Eu-
rosystem counterparties in the form of swaps. These back-to-back swap transactions be-
tween the ECB and the Eurosystem NCBs resulted in intra-Eurosystem balances reported 
under “Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net)”.
The main components of this item, the balance of which amounts to €2,430.26 million, are as 
follows:
As can be seen from the foregoing table, the most significant accounts are accrued interest aris-
ing from securities acquisitions and accrued coupon interest receivable denominated in euro 
arising from the trading portfolio (€856.59 million) and from the held-to-maturity portfolio (€771.59 
million). There was also a significant increase in the accrued interest receivable on loans collat-
eralised by securities, due to the larger volume of transactions outstanding at year-end.
The most significant components of this item, which totals €1,256.21 million, are the transfer 
to the Treasury on 29 December 2008 of €1,053.82 million, equivalent to 70% of 80% of the 
Bank’s distributable profits earned to 30 September 2008 (see Note 15 on the profit and loss 
account), which was €72.61 million higher than in the previous year, and the home loans and 
repayable advances granted to Bank employees, the balance of which, at €189.10 million, 
was up by €22.04 million.
14 ACCRUALS AND PREPAID 
EXPENSES
15 OTHER ASSETS. SUNDRY
2008 2007 Change
ACCRUED INTEREST ARISING FROM 
SECURITIES ACQUISITIONS AND 
ACCRUED COUPON INTEREST 
RECEIVABLE
1,680.49 1,455.54 224.94
91.78312.68404.378oiloftropgnidarT
Denominated in foreign currency 16.81 22.86 -6.05
42.39353.36495.658oruenidetanimoneD
52.261-33.96980.708oiloftropytirutam-ot-dleH
Denominated in foreign currency 35.49 33.12 2.37
26.461-12.63995.177oruenidetanimoneD
OTHER ACCRUED INTEREST RECEIVABLE 
743.57 323.00 420.57
On forward foreign exchange transactions — — —
———spawsnO
On deposits and other assets denominated 
in foreign currency 
12.38 28.12 -15.74
On claims equivalent to the transfer of 
foreign reserves to the ECB 
151.70 147.34 4.35
On other intra-Eurosystem claims arising 
from TARGET transactions 
— 1.19 -1.19
On exceptional liquiduty-providing operations 18.25 1.80 16.45
On loans collateralised by securities 544.62 101.69 442.94
32.62-68.2436.61rehtO
ACCRUED COMMISSIONS RECEIVABLE 
AND PREPAID EXPENSES
1.81 12.28 -10.47
ACCRUED DIVIDENDS RECEIVABLE 4.40 4.26 0.13
81.53690.597,162.034,2LATOT
EUR m
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The balance of banknotes in circulation (€76,018.16 million) represents the Banco de España’s 
share in the total euro banknotes in circulation (see “Banknotes in circulation” in Section 3.1—
Accounting policies) according to the Eurosystem euro banknote allocation key (9.9660%11 of 
the total issue by all the central banks) after deducting those corresponding to the ECB (8% of 
the total). This balance was €8,405.20 million higher than in the previous year because of the 
greater volume of euro banknotes in circulation in the Eurosystem.
The overall balance of the different types of deposit held by credit institutions with the Banco 
de España amounted to €54,314.92 million at end-2008, €1,994.14 million more than in the 
previous year. This higher balance was due to the increase in the deposit facility, offset in part 
by the decrease in the balances of the “Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve sys-
tem)” and “Fixed-term deposits” items.
The breakdown is as follows:
The first component, which includes the different types of current accounts held by credit in-
stitutions at the Banco de España, in which they maintain the minimum reserves required for 
monetary policy implementation purposes, underwent a decrease of €14,191.41 million. How-
ever, if the average balance of these accounts is analysed, there was an increase from 
€20,355.55 million in 2007 to €24,009.94 million in 2008.
The item “Deposit facility”, which includes overnight deposits remunerated at a fixed interest 
rate, increased significantly from €215.00 million in 2007 to €30,106.40 million in 2008. An 
increase was also seen in the average balance of these deposits over the year (which rose 
from €28.87 million to €6,777.25 million). The greater use of this facility by institutions was due 
to the tensions in the money market in 2008.
As regards fixed-term deposits, there was no balance as at 31 December 2008, while that at 
end-2007 was €13,775.00 million. These deposits are related to the ECB’s decision to con-
duct liquidity absorbing operations to hold short-term money market interest rates at a level 
near the minimum bid rate on Eurosystem main refinancing operations. They are thus fine-tun-
ing operations that take the form of deposits. Spanish institutions participated in these liquid-
ity withdrawals in the seventeen operations conducted by the Eurosystem in 2008.
Also included in this item are the deposits placed by credit institutions in relation to fine-tuning 
reverse operations and deposits related to margin calls. As at 31.12.2008, institutions’ bal-
ances of deposits related to margin calls amounted to €72.49 million (€3.34 million in 2007).
16 BANKNOTES IN CIRCULATION
17 LIABILITIES TO EURO AREA 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS RELATED 
egnahC70028002ytilibailfoepyT
Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve 
system)
24,136.03 38,327.45 -14,191.41
04.198,9200.51204.601,03ytilicaftisopeD
Fixed-term deposits — 13,775.00 -13,775.00
Fine-tuning reverse operations — — —
Deposits related to margin calls 72.49 3.34 69.15
41.499,197.023,2529.413,45LATOT
EUR m
11. Following the five-yearly revision of the Eurosystem national central banks’ share of the ECB capital key and the ac-
cession of Slovakia to the Eurosystem on 1 January 2009, the banknote allocation key is 10.9465%.
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This item includes the deposits held by general government with the Banco de España. The 
outstanding balance at year-end was €18,770.52 million, which breaks down as follows:
The increase in the balance of this item (€740.17 million) was basically due to the rise in bal-
ances held by the Treasury, regional (autonomous) governments, other government agencies 
and similar bodies, while the balance of Social Security funds declined.
Included here are the current accounts of financial institutions other than credit institutions, 
such as the Deposit Guarantee Funds, other financial intermediaries associated with securities 
markets settlement, other intermediaries in the debt book-entry market, etc., as well as the 
current accounts of non-administrative public and autonomous agencies of the State, the cur-
rent accounts of employees and pensioners and other accounts of legal entities classified in 
“Other resident non-financial sectors”.
The balance at end-2008 was €1,774.07 million, and its decrease of €551.18 million with re-
spect to end-2007 was basically due to the decrease in the balances of the current accounts 
of State agencies (€552.55 million).
This item includes basically the euro-denominated accounts held by international organisa-
tions, non-Eurosystem monetary authorities and central banks to which reserve management 
services are provided. Its balance of €172.27 million was €14.30 million higher than in the 
previous year.
This item basically includes the foreign-currency balances of non-euro area central banks and col-
lateralised inward deposits recorded in respect of reverse transactions conducted under repur-
chase agreements. The year-end balance of the first of these components amounted to €71.85 
million (€37.89 million more than at end-2007), while collateralised inward deposits recorded in 
respect of reverse transactions conducted under repurchase agreements had a balance of zero 
(€83.07 million at 31.12.2007). Overall, the total balance of this item decreased by €45.18 million.
This item of €330.12 million shows the amount of the special drawing rights allocated to Spain 
by the IMF in proportion to its quota. The total amount of this item increased by €9.20 million 
with respect to the previous year, due to the variation in the exchange rate.
18 LIABILITIES TO OTHER EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS DENOMINATED 
IN EURO.—GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT
19 LIABILITIES TO OTHER EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS DENOMINATED 
IN EURO.—OTHER LIABILITIES
20 LIABILITIES TO NON-EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS DENOMINATED 
IN EURO
21 LIABILITIES TO NON-EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS DENOMINATED 
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY.— 
DEPOSITS, BALANCES AND 
OTHER LIABILITIES
22 COUNTERPART OF SPECIAL 
DRAWING RIGHTS ALLOCATED BY 
THE IMF
Change
80.398,205.391,485.680,7)etatS(tnemnrevoglartneC
Treasury current account 4,501.72 164.79
Other central government agencies 
and similar bodies 
2,584.86 4,028.71
16.722,163.35679.088,1tnemnrevoglairotirreT
Regional (autonomous) 
governments, administrative 
agencies and similar bodies 
1,875.53 648.41
59.444.5tnemnrevoglacoL
25.083,3-94.381,3189.208,9sdnufytiruceslaicoS
Social Security System 8,939.17 11,215.36
41.869,118.368rehtO
71.04753.030,8125.077,81LATOT
2008 2007
EUR m
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This item, which as at 31 December 2008 had a balance of €42,046.77 million, comprises the 
following:
This account, the balance of which amounted to €7,125.42 million at end-2008, consists of 
the claims and liabilities of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the Eurosystem in relation to the 
allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem (see “Banknotes in circulation” and “Intra-
Eurosystem balances” in the section on accounting policies).
Its decrease relative to 2007 (€10,778.19 million) was due to the decrease in banknotes put 
into circulation by the Banco de España in 2008 (down from €85,516.56 million at 31.12.07 to 
€83,143.58 million at end-2008 (-2.8%) as compared with the increase in the Eurosystem as 
a whole (12.7%), which gave rise to the aforementioned decrease in these accounts.
The balance of €34,921.35 million as at 31 December 2008 represents the sum of three com-
ponents: 1) the position of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the transfers 
issued and received through TARGET2 by the ESCB national central banks, including the 
ECB, plus the balances held with Eurosystem central banks through correspondent accounts; 
2) the position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the pooling and allocation of monetary income 
within the Eurosystem pending settlement (see “Net result of pooling of monetary income” in 
Note 8 on the profit and loss account); and 3) the Banco de España’s position vis-à-vis the 
ECB in respect of any amounts receivable or refundable, basically in respect of the seigniorage 
income relating to euro banknotes issued by the ECB.
Regarding the first component, the year-end net transfers via TARGET2 had a credit balance 
of €34,988.89 million, while the correspondent accounts showed a debit balance of €0.15 
million. The remuneration of the Banco de España’s debit position vis-à-vis the ECB is calcu-
lated daily at the marginal interest rate on Eurosystem main refinancing operations.
The second component, i.e. the position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the pooling and an-
nual allocation of monetary income among the Eurosystem national central banks, had a cred-
it balance of €63.22 million at end-2008.
Finally, in regard to the position vis-à-vis the ECB relating to the distribution of income arising 
from the seigniorage of euro banknotes issued on its behalf by the NCBs, following approval 
of the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 November 2005 on the distribution of the 
income of the European Central Bank on euro banknotes in circulation to the national central 
banks of the participating Member States (ECB/2005/11), the income on euro banknotes in 
circulation earned in each financial year is distributed by the ECB on the second working day 
of the following year, although the ECB Governing Council may decide before the end of the 
financial year not to distribute all or part of this income (see “Banknotes in circulation” in Sec-
tion 3.1.2). This year the ECB Governing Council decided to retain part of the 2008 banknote 
seigniorage income in order to increase the provision for foreign exchange rate, interest rate 
and gold price risks set up in 2005. The rest was allocated among the Eurosystem central 
banks according to their respective keys, the Banco de España being allocated €130.60 
million.
Included here are various accounts which as at 31.12.2008 were in the course of settlement, 
such as transfer instructions pending execution and transfers sent to deposit institutions yet to 
be reimbursed. In 2008 various accounts previously recorded under “Other liabilities. Sundry” 
were included in this item since, in view of their nature, it was considered more appropriate to 
classify them here. The amount relating to 2007 which was reclassified was €30.14 million.
23 INTRA-EUROSYSTEM 
LIABILITIES
a. Net liabilities related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem
b. Other liabilities within the 
Eurosystem (net)
24 ITEMS IN COURSE OF 
SETTLEMENT
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Of the total balance of this item (€246.64 million) at year-end, €214.87 million correspond to 
transfers ordered by credit institutions pending payment at year-end, and €30.90 million relate 
to transfers received on 31 December 2008 by the Sistema Nacional de Compensación Elec-
trónica (National Electronic Clearing System) that have been settled and are pending payment.
The increase of €6.75 million in this item with respect to the previous year is due to the rise in 
the balance of the aforementioned accounts (the first by €29.90 million and the second by 
€7.07 million), partly offset by the lower year-end balance of other liability transactions pending 
payment.
This item includes the amount of the net creditor position arising from foreign-exchange for-
ward and swap transactions valued at the exchange rates prevailing at the end of the year. 
When the position is a debtor one, as in 2008, it is recorded under the same heading in asset 
item 11.3 (see Note 13 on the balance sheet).
This item includes interest accrued but not yet paid, expenses accrued but not yet paid and 
deferred income.
As at 31 December 2008, its balance amounted to €220.16 million, the main component be-
ing interest accrued but not yet paid (€211.85 million). The decrease in 2008 (€74.42 million) 
mainly resulted from the lower interest incurred on intra-Eurosystem accounts relating to the 
adjustment of banknotes in circulation, interest incurred on minimum reserves and interest 
incurred on Social Security accounts, partly offset by the increase in interest incurred on intra-
Eurosystem accounts relating to TARGET2 transactions and on swaps arranged within the 
framework of exceptional liquidity-providing transactions in foreign currencies.
This includes other liabilities not classifiable above.
As at 31 December 2008 the balance of this item amounted to €271.42 million and its main 
component was the “Banco de España employee social welfare scheme (Mutualidad de em-
pleados).—Contributions payable” (€161.78 million). The most significant change was the de-
crease of €38.11 million in this debt to the employee social welfare scheme.
With the exception of country-risk provisions, which are presented in the balance sheet as 
reductions of the value of the assets concerned, provisions are recorded under this item, with 
the following breakdown:
25 OFF-BALANCE-SHEET 
INSTRUMENTS REVALUATION 
DIFFERENCES
26 LIABILITY ACCRUAL 
ACCOUNTS AND INCOME 
COLLECTED IN ADVANCE
27 OTHER LIABILITIES. SUNDRY
28 PROVISIONS
2008 2007 Change
For exchange rate and interest rate risks 3,103.92 2,421.95 681.97
For early repayment of special loans 967.75 1,393.21 -425.45
For counterparty risks in Eurosystem monetary 
policy operations
621.35 — 621.35
For exchange of withdrawn peseta banknotes 37.13 61.83 -24.71
For early and regular retirement 39.05 50.31 -11.25
For death and retirement assistance 70.26 68.88 1.38
For sundry liabilities and charges 8.21 9.65 -1.44
58.14818.500,466.748,4LATOT
EUR m
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The most important provision is that “For exchange rate and interest rate risks”. It was created 
by a resolution of the Executive Commission of 26 January 1999 to cover exchange rate risks 
affecting the external reserves of the Banco de España. Subsequently, on 14 April 2004 the 
Executive Commission resolved to extend the purpose of this provision to include the coverage 
of interest rate risk. The balance of this provision as at 31 December 2008 amounted to €3,103.92 
million, which was €681.97 more than in 2007 (see Note 5 on the profit and loss account).
The balance of this provision is revised annually based on the Banco de España’s valuation of 
its exposure to the aforementioned risks by value-at-risk methodology. This review takes into 
account, in addition to that valuation, a number of factors, including the estimated profit for the 
coming year, the envisaged behaviour of risk assets and any others deemed to be worthy of 
consideration under the circumstances.
The agreement in 2007 with the Spanish State government whereby the Treasury can ask to 
repay a portion or all of these loans early, paying a cash amount equal to their market value 
instead of their nominal amount, led the Banco de España to set up in that year a provision for 
losses due to early repayment of special loans, so as to cover the possible losses that may 
arise from early repayment of these loans (recorded in asset item 8; see Note 9). The balance 
of this provision was set at the difference between the nominal amount and the current market 
value of the loans. As at 31.12.2008, its balance amounted to €967.75 million.
In accordance with the general accounting principle of prudence, the ECB Governing Council 
considered it appropriate to establish a buffer totalling €5,736.00 million against counterparty 
risks in monetary policy operations. In accordance to Article 32.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, 
this buffer will be funded among all the national central banks of participating Member States 
in proportion to their subscribed capital key shares in the ECB prevailing in 2008. As a result, 
a provision for €621.35 million equivalent to 10.8324% of the total provision was created.
Finally, there were decreases in the provision recorded for exchange of peseta banknotes 
withdrawn from circulation (€24.71 million) and in the provision for payments to early and 
regular retirees (€11.25 million), as a result of the use of these provisions for their intended 
purpose.
This item includes the revaluations arising from unrealised gains on financial assets and liabili-
ties. The breakdown is as follows:
29 REVALUATION ACCOUNTS
Type of account Change
85.28482.492,458.677,4DLOG
FOREIGN CURRENCY 44.94 0.02 44.91
47.41942.5589.969SEITIRUCES
Issued in foreign currency by non-euro 
area residents 
143.85 43.61 100.24
Issued in euro by non-euro area 
residents
2.93 — 2.93
Issued in euro by euro area residents 823.20 11.62 811.57
28.1-65.1247.91REHTO
14.044,190.173,415.118,5LATOT
2008 2007
 EUR m
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The revaluation accounts increased by €1,440.41 million in 2008. The main change was in 
securities revaluation accounts (€914.74 million), specifically in euro-denominated securities 
issued by euro-area residents, which increased by €811.57 million as a result of the change in 
the price of trading portfolio securities due to interest rate movements. Unrealised gains on 
gold increased by €482.58 million as a result of the rise in its market price. The unrealised 
gains on foreign currencies increased by €44.91 million, basically due to the appreciation of 
the US dollar against the euro.
As at 31 December 2008 the capital of the Banco de España amounted to €1,000 million, 
with no change in the year. Of this amount, €1.37 million were constituted pursuant to 
Decree-Law 18/1962 of 7 June 1962 and €998.63 million as a capital increase carried out 
in 2006. This capital increase resulted from the approval by the Council of Ministers on 28 
July 2006 of the proposal submitted by the Governing Council of the Banco de España in 
application of Law 192/1964 that a portion of the 2005 profits, which were retained as 
permitted by the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 29 July 2005 and by Royal De-
cree 1198/2005 on the regime governing the payment of Banco de España profits into 
the Treasury, be used to increase capital at the Bank within the limits authorised by the 
thirty-eighth additional provision of Law 30/2005 of 29 December 2005 on the State 
budget for 2006, i.e. until the capital of the Banco de España reaches the figure of €1,000 
million.
As at 31 December 2008 the reserves of the Banco de España amounted to €1,000 million, 
with no change in the year. Included in this item is, first, the amount of capital, reserves and 
profits that arose in 1973 when the now-defunct Spanish Foreign Currency Institute was in-
cluded in the Banco de España (€3.17 million) and, second, the portion of 2005 and 2006 
profit taken to reserves, authorised by the Council of Ministers on 28 July 2006 (€496.83 mil-
lion) and 29 June 2007 (€500 million), respectively, in application of the legal provisions cited 
in the previous note.
The net profit for 2008, after deducting the transfer to the Beneficent Social Fund (€21.11 mil-
lion), amounted to €2,090.19 million, up 4.25% on 2007. Of this amount, €1,053.82 million 
was paid to the Treasury on 29 December 2008, in accordance with Royal Decree 2059/2008 
of 12 December 2008.
During the year, the following amounts were also paid to the Treasury out of 2007 profits:
a) On 03.03.08, €823.28 million, which, together with the payment in November 
2007, amounted to 90% of the €2,004.98 million of distributable profit for that 
year.
b) On 13.08.08, once the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the year 
2007 had been approved by the Council of Ministers, €200.50 million, represent-
ing the rest of the distributable profit for that year.
The details of the various components of the profit for 2008 and the reasons for the chang-
es in them with respect to 2007 are given in Section 3.3 below on the profit and loss ac-
count.
This item includes income from interest accrued on the main assets of the Banco de España. 
The breakdown in 2008 and 2007 is as follows:
30 CAPITAL
31 RESERVES
32 PROFIT FOR THE YEAR
3.3 Notes on the profit 
and loss account
1 INTEREST INCOME
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Interest income increased by €1,146.89 million in 2008 with respect to 2007. This increase 
was a result of rises of €1,145.20 million in the return on euro-denominated investments and 
of €1.69 million in income from foreign-currency investments.
Of the €447.24 million of interest on foreign-currency investments, €278.83 million arose from 
investments in fixed-income securities denominated in US dollars and €168.41 million from 
deposits and other assets. The interest earned on this portfolio denominated in US dollars 
decreased by €44.90 million, while that earned on deposits and other assets rose by €46.59 
million. The average return on foreign-currency investments was 3.1%, compared with 4.8% 
in 2007.
Euro-denominated interest income (€5,760.02 million) arose basically from the securities 
portfolios (€3,071.12 million, an increase of 444.95 million), monetary policy operations 
(€2,529.06 million, up €1,452.30 million) and intra-Eurosystem balances (€157.60 million, 
down €752.40 million). The changes in the balances of the latter two headings were due, 
first, to the greater funding requirements of the banking system, and, second, to the fact 
that external funding had to be largely replaced by monetary policy loans, in both cases 
as a result of the financial turmoil in the interbank money market. The overall effect of 
these changes was an increase of €1,145.20 million in euro-denominated interest income, 
due to the increase in average investments (€137,902.22 million in 2008, against 
€118,105.76 million in 2007) and in average return, which was up from 3.9% in 2007 to 
4.1% in 2008.
This item includes interest expenditure on the liabilities listed below, as follows:2 INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest income
2008 2007 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 447.24 445.55 1.69 14,352.23 3.1
2.491.755,609.44-37.32338.872seitiruceS
Deposits and other assets 168.41 121.83 46.59 7,795.03 2.1
1.422.209,73102.541,128.416,420.067,5ORUE
0.430.464,6759.44471.626,221.170,3seitiruceS
Monetary policy operations 2,529.06 1,076.76 1,452.30 56,946.04 4.4
Intra-Eurosystem accounts 157.60 910.00 -752.40 4,492.15 3.5
Claims equivalent to the transfer of 
foreign reserves to the ECB
151.70 147.34 4.35 4,349.18 3.4
Other claims within the Eurosystem 
(net)
5.91 762.66 -756.75 142.98 4.1
——53.098.142.2stessarehtO
TOTAL 6,207.26 5,060.38 1,146.89 152,254.45 4.0
Average yield 
in 2008
Average
investment in 
2008
EUR m and %
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Interest expenses increased by €695.91 million in 2008, with a rise of €696.37 million in those 
relating to euro-denominated liabilities and a fall of €0.46 million in those relating to liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies.
The interest expenses denominated in euro (€2,792.28 million) included most notably €975.33 
million relating to the remuneration of minimum reserves, €606.46 million of remuneration of 
general government deposits, €510.19 million of remuneration of intra-Eurosystem balances 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes, and €457.24 million of remuneration of other intra-
Eurosystem balances (TARGET2).
Of the increase of €696.37 million in interest expenses denominated in euro, €434.46 million 
relate to the remuneration of other intra-Eurosystem balances, since during most of 2008 the 
Banco de España had a credit position vis-à-vis the ESCB (basically because the banking 
system was replaced by the sources of funding referred to in the previous section), €191.90 
million relate to the higher remuneration of the deposit facility, €163.78 million relate to the 
higher remuneration of minimum reserves and €109.32 million relate to the remuneration of 
general government deposits, offset by a smaller interest burden (€214.22 million) from ban-
knote adjustment, as a result of the decline in the banknotes put into circulation by the Banco 
de España.
Basically, the increase in interest expenses for funding denominated in euro was due to the 
higher average balance to be remunerated (up from €53,133.12 million in 2007 to €71,555.45 
million in 2008), partly offset by the slight fall in average cost (down from 3.9% in 2007 to 3.8% 
in 2008).
Of the interest expenses denominated in foreign currencies (€81.57 million), €71.49 million 
relate to swap, forward and other transactions and €10.08 million to other liabilities, the 
increase in the former (€8.54 million) being practically offset by decline in the latter (€9.01 mil-
lion).
Interest expense
2008 2007 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 81.57 82.04 -0.46 3,907.08 2.1
Swap, forward and other 
transactions
71.49 62.95 8.54 3,534.59 2.0
Other liabilities 10.08 19.09 -9.01 372.49 2.7
8.354.555,1773.69619.590,282.297,2ORUE
Remuneration of minimum 
reserves
975.33 811.55 163.78 24,009.96 4.0
Deposit facility 192.70 0.80 191.90 6,777.25 2.8
Fixed-term deposits 40.40 32.26 8.13 989.08 4.0
General government deposits 606.46 497.14 109.32 16,231.66 3.7
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities-Net 
liabilities related to allocation of 
euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem
510.19 724.41 -214.22 12,232.78 4.1
Other liabilities within the 
Eurosystem (net)
457.24 22.78 434.46 11,314.72 4.0
Other liabilities denominated
in euro 
9.96 6.96 3.00 — —
7.345.264,5719.59649.771,268.378,2LATOT
Average cost
in 2008
Average
financing in 
2008
EUR m and %
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This item includes the profits and losses arising from dealing in financial assets. In 2008 the net 
gains in this connection amounted to €108.62 million, arising from the following sources:
The largest change with respect to the previous year was due to the sale of gold in 2007, as a 
result of which the gains in this connection decreased by €1,748.16 million in 2008. Most 
noteworthy among the other changes was the higher price gains on securities denominated in 
US dollars, which rose by €75.19 million, and on the sale of securities issued by euro-area 
residents in euro (€39.10 million).
This item includes the loss arising in the currency position derived from the exchange rate 
depreciation, as well as that arising from depreciation of securities prices, for that portion that 
cannot be offset by unrealised gains from previous years. The breakdown in 2008 and 2007 is 
as follows:
Unrealised losses in 2008 amounted to €16.13 million, substantially all of which related to in-
vestments in securities of euro-area residents denominated in euro (€15.88 million). Unrealised 
losses decreased by €513.31 million with respect to 2007, basically due to lower unrealised 
exchange rate losses on foreign currency (€429.59 million), specifically because of the ab-
sence of unrealised losses on US dollars (€413.92 million) and SDR (€15.75 million). For their 
part, unrealised losses on euro-denominated securities decreased by €83.27 million, basically 
those relating to securities issued by euro-area residents (€81.33 million).
This includes, first, the transfer of €16.13 million from the provision for foreign exchange 
rate and price risks to cover the losses recorded at end-2008 and, second, the transfer 
of €698.11 million to this provision to cover the estimated foreign exchange rate and 
price risks associated with the financial positions subject to such risks, in accordance 
3 REALISED GAINS/LOSSES 
ARISING FROM FINANCIAL 
OPERATIONS
4 UNREALISED LOSSES ON 
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND 
POSITIONS
5 TRANSFERS TO/FROM 
PROVISIONS FOR FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE RATE AND PRICE 
RISKS
2008 2007 Change
76.576,1-46.947,179.37YCNERRUCNGIEROF
61.847,1-12.847,140.0dlogfoelaS
Sale of foreign currency (exchange gains) -0.91 -2.84 1.93
Sale of securities (price losses) 78.29 3.11 75.19
16.4-61.154.3-sessol/sniagrehtO
01.9354.4-56.43ORUE
Sale of securities (price losses) 34.65 -4.45 39.10
75.636,1-91.547,126.801LATOT
EUR m
2008 2007 Change
40.034-92.03452.0YCNERRUCNGIEROF
Foreign currency (exchange rate losses) 0.19 429.78 -429.59
44.0-15.060.0)sessolecirp(seitiruceS
72.38-51.9988.51ORUE
72.38-51.9988.51)sessolecirp(seitiruceS
13.315-44.92531.61LATOT
EUR m
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 ANNUAL REPORT, 2008 ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
with the Executive Commission resolution of 12 February 2009. These movements rep-
resented a net increase of €681.97 million in transfers to/from provisions with respect to 
2007.
Further, this item also includes the transfer to/from the provision for losses arising from early 
repayment of special loans, which showed a positive change of €2,050.55 million. This was 
because in 2007 transfers of €1,688.56 to this provision were recorded, whereas in 2008 there 
were recoveries of €361.98 million as a result of the adjustment derived from changes in the 
market value of these assets.
This basically includes income and expenses arising from fees and commissions for bank-
ing services and the like (transfers, handling of cheques, custody and administration of 
securities, settlement service for securities transactions, etc.). It may be broken down as 
follows:
Net fee and commission income in 2008 (12.29 million) was only €0.47 million more than in 
2007, due to the increase in fees received for securities transactions (€2.58 million) and to the 
start-up of the single shared platform (TARGET2), which earned net income of €2.19 million, 
partly offset by the drop in fees collected from institutions belonging to the Banco de España 
Settlement System (€4.06 million).
This item includes the participating interest of the Banco de España in the profit of the ECB 
and the dividends on other shares and participating interests.
In 2008 the ECB Governing Council decided to retain part of the banknote seigniorage income 
in order to increase the provision for foreign exchange rate, interest rate and gold price risks. 
The rest was allocated among the Eurosystem central banks according to their respective 
keys, the Banco de España being allocated €130.60 million. Also included are €11.47 million 
of dividends from the investment in Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mer-
cados y Sistemas Financieros, SA (BME) and €2.64 million from the investment in interna-
tional organisations (Bank for International Payments). The amount recorded in 2008 was 
€135.03 million higher than in 2007, basically because the ECB did not distribute banknote 
seigniorage income in 2007.
The amount of each Eurosystem NCB’s monetary income is determined by calculating 
the annual income generated by the earmarkable assets held against the liability base. 
The liability base consists of the following items: banknotes in circulation; liabilities to 
credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro; net intra-
Eurosystem liabilities resulting from TARGET2 transactions whenever they have a credit 
balance; and net intra-Eurosystem liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem. Any interest paid on liabilities included within the liability base is to 
be deducted from the monetary income to be pooled. The earmarkable assets include the 
6 NET INCOME FROM FEES AND 
COMMISSIONS
7 INCOME FROM EQUITY 
SHARES AND PARTICIPATING 
INTERESTS
8 NET RESULT OF POOLING OF 
MONETARY INCOME
Income Expenses
2008 2007 Change 2008 2007 Change
Foreign operations 0.09 0.12 -0.04 3.02 3.42 -0.40
Domestic operations 23.24 18.96 4.28 8.02 3.85 4.17
77.372.740.1142.490.9133.32LATOT
EUR m
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following items: lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy opera-
tions; intra-Eurosystem claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserve assets to the 
ECB; net intra-Eurosystem claims resulting from TARGET2 transactions, whenever they 
have a debit balance; net intra-Eurosystem claims related to the allocation of euro ban-
knotes in the Eurosystem; and a limited amount of each NCB’s gold holdings, in propor-
tion to its capital key. Gold is considered to generate no income. If the value of a NCB’s 
earmarkable assets exceeds or is less than the value of its liability base, the difference will 
be offset by applying to it the most recent marginal interest rate on main refinancing op-
erations.
The monetary income pooled by the Eurosystem is to be allocated among NCBs according to 
the ECB subscribed capital key. The difference between the monetary income pooled by the 
Banco de España in 2008, amounting to €3,044.72 million, and that reallocated to it, amount-
ing to €2,981.73 million, is equivalent to a net contribution of €62.99 million. To this net contri-
bution should be added €0.23 million for the Banco de España’s share of the losses on Eu-
rosystem monetary policy operations. Compared with 2007, there was a negative net change 
of €100.47 million in these results.
In accordance with the principle of prudence, the ECB Governing Council considered it ap-
propriate to set up a provision of €5,736.00 million for counterparty risk in monetary policy 
operations. Pursuant to Article 32.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, this provision must be financed 
with a charge to all Eurosystem banks in proportion to their share of the subscribed capital of 
the ECB according to the capital keys in force in 2008. As a result of this, the Banco de Es-
paña set aside a provision of €621.35 million, equivalent to 10.8324% of the total provision 
recorded.
This includes the income and losses that cannot be included in other items, along with other 
diverse income of an exceptional nature. It may be broken down as follows:
As can be seen, this item shows a net loss which is €18.60 million smaller than in 2007, basi-
cally due to the extraordinary gains arising from the adjustment to the allocation of expenses 
under the IMF Special Contingency Account (SCA)-1 for Liberia (€11.26 million) and to the 
cancellation of provisions for housing loan repayments and for furniture and building fire self-
insurance in accordance with the Executive Commission resolution of 30.12.2008, amounting 
to €4.65 million.
This item includes the headings “Wages and salaries ”, “Contributions to pension scheme” and 
“Other staff welfare expenses”.
The breakdown of changes by component is as follows:
9 OTHER INCOME AND LOSSES
10 STAFF COSTS
2008 2007 Change
85.4181.267.61tiforpyranidroartxE
Employee social welfare scheme -21.99 -25.76 3.78
52.036.088.0yrdnuS
06.8159.22-53.4-LATOT
EUR m
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This balance increased from €211.10 in 2007 to €223.63 million in 2008, a rise of €12.53 mil-
lion (5.9%), as a result of: a) economic improvements included in the Collective Agreement for 
2008, estimated at €5.95 million (2.82%); b) higher expenses derived from the financial crisis 
and from the extraordinary processing of banknotes, which was achieved by stepping up se-
condments, temporary hires and overtime, for an amount of €1.36 million (0.64%); c) an in-
crease in Social Security contributions and supplementary medical care fees (€1.4 million or 
0.66%); d) increase in death and retirement assistance (€1.46 million or 0.69%); and e) a 
number of factors of varying nature (wage increases for years of service, wage drift due to 
promotions, tax prepayments on account of compensation in kind, changes in staff structure, 
etc.)
The following table sets out the changes in permanent and temporary staff, in terms of average 
number of employees:
As at 31 December 2008, the Bank’s total staff numbered 2,731 employees, eleven more 
than at the same date of the previous year, as a result of the increase in the number of tem-
porary hires for the aforementioned reasons. Most noteworthy as regards staff composition 
by gender was the increase of 27 in the number of women, which, together with the decrease 
of 16 in the number of men, meant that women now account for 37% of the Bank’s total 
staff.
This item includes expenses arising from the purchase of current assets and of diverse serv-
ices received during the year, as follows:
11 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
2008 2007 Change (%)
AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 2,727.2 2,718.6 8.6 0.3
7.0-2.71-3.506,21.885,2ffatstnenamreP1
1.13.619.744,11.464,1ffatslaireganaM
9.1-8.71-3.8296.019ffatsevitartsinimdA
9.6-8.51-2.9224.312rehtO
8.228.523.3111.931ffatsyraropmeT2
7.914.211.365.57ffatslaireganaM
4.029.88.347.25ffatsevitartsinimdA
1.075.44.69.01rehtO
2008 2007 Change (%)
Gross staff costs 224.32 211.72 12.60 6.0
Wages and salaries 169.77 161.30 8.48 5.3
6.297.095.0383.13ytiruceSlaicoS
Staff welfare expenses 17.64 14.71 2.93 19.9
Contributions to pension scheme 5.53 5.12 0.41 8.0
Reversal of staff costs due to 
capitalisation of computer 
applications
-0.69 -0.62 -0.06 10.3
9.535.2101.11236.322LATOT
EUR m and %
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The structure of this item was changed in 2008, and the 2007 data were reclassified accordingly.
The above table shows that in 2008 the most significant administrative expenses were exter-
nal services (€74.05 million), mainly IT services (€50.53 million) and rental and maintenance 
(€34.75 million), composed mainly of property rental and maintenance (€16.98 million) and 
hardware and software rental and maintenance (€13.13 million).
The net increase in goods and services expenses in 2008 (€18.82 million) resulted from the 
updating of the prices of contracts currently in force and from the higher expenditure in certain 
areas, most notably in external services (€14.15 million) relating to both information technology 
(€5.99 million) and to the development and operation of the TARGET2 platform (€4.09 million).
“Sundry operating expenses” include €132,014.74 (including VAT) relating to the fees of the 
external auditors Deloitte, S.L. for the 2008 audits of the Bank’s annual accounts and of cer-
tain aspects of the Bank’s management of European Central Bank reserves. In 2008 no serv-
ices were received from or amounts paid to other firms in the group.
Included here is the expense of the estimated depreciation of the Bank’s fixed assets, which 
breaks down as follows:
This amount (€65.08 million) corresponds to payments made by the Banco de España to 
purchase banknotes from the National Mint. The decrease with respect to 2007 (€5.87 million) 
12 DEPRECIATION OF FIXED 
ASSETS
13 BANKNOTE PRODUCTION 
SERVICES
2008 2007 Change %
Gross administrative expenses 135.90 116.15 19.75 17.0
Rental and maintenance 34.75 31.81 2.94 9.3
Materials and supplies 10.80 10.25 0.55 5.4
External services 74.05 59.90 14.15 23.6
Training, promotion and selection 3.36 2.86 0.50 17.5
Sundry operating expenses 12.94 11.33 1.61 14.2
Reversal of administrative expenses due 
to capitalisation of computer 
applications
-3.10 -2.17 -0.93 43.1
5.6128.8189.31108.231LATOT
EUR m and %
2008 2007 Change %
Depreciation of buildings, structures and 
renovation work 
2.21 1.67 0.53 31.8
Depreciation of plant in buildings 5.63 4.10 1.53 37.3
Depreciation of furniture and fittings 1.75 1.54 0.21 13.5
Depreciation of office machines other than 
computer equipment 
1.44 1.41 0.03 2.3
Depreciation of computer equipment 6.23 6.18 0.04 0.7
Depreciation of transport equipment 0.92 1.05 -0.14 -12.9
Depreciation of libraries 0.50 0.48 0.02 4.4
Depreciation of other tangible fixed assets 0.29 0.26 0.03 10.5
Amortisation of intangible fixed assets 4.40 3.42 0.97 28.5
1.6142.321.0253.32LATOT
EUR m and %
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was due to the lower unit price of the banknotes purchased, partly offset by the higher volume 
of those purchased by the Bank in the year.
The net balance of transfers and applications to other funds and provisions in 2008 amounted 
to €36.65 million, compared with €21.95 million in 2007. This change (€14.71 million) resulted, 
firstly, from the transfer in 2008 to the provision for death and retirement assistance stipulated 
in Article 190 of the Banco de España Conditions of Employment amounting to €12.53 million, 
as a consequence of the change in the calculation and accounting procedures, as compared 
with the reversal of €1.10 million from the provision in 2007 and, secondly, the larger transfer 
to the Beneficient-Social Fund (€21.11 million in 2008 against €20.25 million in 2007).
The Banco de España, because of the nature of its activity, is not an institution with a high 
environmental risk. In 2008 it was not considered necessary to record any provision for envi-
ronmental liabilities and charges.
Pursuant to Article 1.1.b) of Royal Decree 2059/2008 of 12 December 2008, the Banco de 
España must pay into the Treasury, on the first working day of March 2009, 90% of the profits 
earned and recorded up to 31 December of the previous year, less the amount paid on 29 
December of the previous year, in accordance with the single transitional provision of the 
aforementioned royal decree.
Given the financial crisis currently besetting the markets, at the close of the September ac-
counts it was considered that the final result for the year might be affected by certain factors. 
This made it advisable to apply the provisions of Article 1.1.a) of the aforementioned royal 
decree whereby the “payment agreement must take into account the foreseeable perform-
ance of profits until the end of the year”. Specifically, it was decided to apply very prudent 
criteria in setting the amount to be paid, allowing for the possibility that the result at the end of 
the year might be negatively affected, among other causes, by the high financial market volatil-
ity, which might lead to significant valuation losses (many of the markets in which prices are 
determined are not liquid, which could affect the valuation of certain securities) due to the pos-
sible need to participate in establishing a provision for counterparty risk in Eurosystem mone-
tary policy operations, and by the fact that the Banco de España’s decision to increase its 
holdings of US dollars may have heightened exchange risk with respect to the calculation 
made when the provision for this risk was recorded last year.
Specifically, to determine the amount of profit to be retained, various factors were considered, in-
cluding VaR derived from financial risk, the possible effects of credit risk and the illiquidity of some 
markets, both for the proprietary portfolio and for the monetary policy collateral provided by the 
Banco de España and by the Eurosystem as a whole. However, given the difficulties encountered in 
gauging possible market behaviour and the illiquidity of certain assets, it was considered advisable 
to establish a simple system for determining the amount to be retained as a safeguard against the 
possible negative performance of the Banco de España. Consequently, the advance payment of 
70% of profits to the Treasury was calculated on the basis of 80% of the profits recorded as at 30 
September 2008 and, accordingly, the amount to be paid in on 29 December was €1,053.82.
Once the year had ended, and taking into account that the provisional profits amounted to 
€2,090.19 million and that 90% of the profits was €1,881.17 million, a payment of €827.35 
million was made to the Treasury on 2 March 2009.
In application of Royal Decree 2059/2008, the payments to the Treasury of 2008 profit are as 
follows:
14 TRANSFERS AND ADDITIONS 
TO OTHER FUNDS AND 
PROVISIONS
15 PROFIT FOR THE YEAR
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The following table shows the changes in the reporting year, which, in addition to the account-
ing profit, include the net gains not recognised as income in the profit and loss account, the 
variation in the coverage of exchange and interest rate risks and the effect on the balance 
sheet of the appropriation of profit for the year.
The changes reflected in this table have been explained above in the notes on the balance 
sheet and profit and loss account that refer to provisions (Note 28 on the balance sheet), re-
valuation accounts (Note 29 on the balance sheet), capital (Note 30 on the balance sheet), 
reserves (Note 31 on the balance sheet) and profit for the year (Note 32 on the balance sheet 
and Note 15 on the profit and loss account).
3.4 Changes in capital, 
reserves, provisions and 
revaluation accounts
91.090,28002roftiforplatoT1
2  Payments to the Treasury
On 29.12.2008.  70% of 80% of profit as at 30.09.2008 1,053.82
On 2.3.2009. Difference between the above amount and 90% of profit 
as at 31.12.2008
827.35
3  Profit payable to the Treasury
20.902stnuocca8002ehtfolavorppafoetadtA
EUR m
Capital Reserves
Revaluation
accounts
Undistibuted
profit
Provisions Total
A) 2008 OPENING BALANCE 1,000.00 1,000.00 4,371.09 1,023.77 4,005.81 11,400.67
1.  UNRECOGNISED NET GAINS IN PROFIT AND 
LOSS
14.044,114.044,1
In gold 85.28485.284
19.4419.44ycnerrucngierofnI
47.41947.419seitirucesnI
Other 28.1-28.1-
2.  2008 PROFIT 2,090.19 2,090.19
3.  CHANGE IN PROVISIONS 841.85 841.85
95.770,2-95.770,2-TIFORPFONOITAIPORPPA.4
87.320,1-87.320,1-tiforp7002foyrusaerTehtottnemyaP
28.350,1-28.350,1-tiforp8002foyrusaerTehtottnemyaP
B) CHANGES IN THE YEAR. B = 1+2+3+4 — — 1,440.41 12.60 841.85 2,294.86
C) 2008 CLOSING BALANCE. C = A + B 1,000.00 1,000.00 5,811.51 1,036.37 4,847.66 13,695.54
EUR m
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The contribution of the Banco de España to the Deposit Guarantee Funds is regulated by Ar-
ticle 3 of Royal Decree 18/1982, according to the wording established by additional provision 
seven of Royal Legislative Decree 12/1995 of 28 December 1995 and Royal Decree 2606/1996 
of 20 December 1996, which implemented the legal regime for such funds.
The aforementioned Royal Decree established that the Deposit Guarantee Funds may only 
exceptionally “be supplemented by contributions from the Banco de España, the amount of 
which shall be fixed by Law”. In 2008 the Banco de España made no contributions whatso-
ever to these Funds.
The table below shows the loans outstanding in 2008 with interest rates below the reference 
rates used, in order to estimate the loss of profit for the year pursuant to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de España.
Included under “Net State debt” is the average balance during the year, on a daily basis, of the 
special loans granted to the State before 1994 less the deposits held by the Treasury with the 
Banco de España, when there is a net balance in favour of the latter.
The reference rate used to estimate the loss of profit in all the loans is the daily average of the 
marginal interest rate on main refinancing operations conducted during the year.
On 26 March 2007 an agreement was entered into with the State government to bring forward the 
repayment schedule of the loans granted to the State prior to the entry into force of Law 21/1993 
of 29 December 1993 on the State Budget for 1994 (Law 3/1983 loan, Law 4/1990 loan and cred-
its arising from subscription for participating interests, contributions and quotas in international 
agencies), such that they all reach final maturity by 2015 at the latest and the Treasury can request 
early repayment of part or all of these facilities, paying on the due date the effective market price 
instead of the nominal amount. Under this agreement, in 2008 payment was received of two instal-
ments of the first of the aforementioned facilities (that for the reporting year and the last outstanding 
instalment of the original repayment schedule), along with the reporting year instalments of the 
other two facilities, the repayment date of all of them being brought forward from 31 December to 
30 April. In accordance with the foregoing, on 30 April 2008 the Treasury paid to the Banco de Es-
paña the amount of €519,997,110.10, the effective market price of the debt repaid on that date.
4.1 Contributions made 
by the Bank to the Deposit 
Guarantee Funds
4.2 Loss of profit
4.3 Other transactions
4 Specific information required by Article 4.2 of the Law of Autonomy 
of the Banco de España of 1 June 1994
Type of credit/loan
Estimated
average
balance in 2008
Interest rate 
received
Reference
interest rate
Estimated
loss of profit
70.86140.4—30.461,4tbedetatSteN
Housing loans and repayable 
advances to employees 
178.24 1.07 4.04 5.31
Housing loans 133.03 1.33 4.04 3.62
Repayable advances 35.89 — 4.04 1.45
Employee loans 9.32 1.50 4.04 0.24
73.37140.470.172.243,4LATOT
EUR m and %
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ANNEXES
1 Report of the external auditors
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We, the undersigned, Ángel Luis López Roa, Jesús Leguina Villa and Ana María Sánchez Tru-
jillo, are members of the Governing Council of the Banco de España and of the Audit Commit-
tee appointed by the Governing Council. In accordance with Article 29 of the Internal Rules of 
the Banco de España, we were given the task of reviewing the accounts of the Institution for 
the year 2008.
As required by the aforementioned precept, the Audit Committee has analysed the operations 
of the Banco de España. This examination basically involved: 1) studying the annual accounts 
of the Banco de España for the year 2008, prepared by the Directorate General Services of the 
Banco de España; 2) studying the audit of the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the 
Banco de España for 2008, conducted by the Internal Audit Department; 3) studying the 
documentation requested by the members of this Committee from the independent external 
auditors; 4) interviewing the persons responsible for the independent external audit, for the 
Internal Audit Department and for the Control, Budget and Accounting Department; and 5) 
making proposals for the modification, correction or clarification of various matters, all of which 
have been satisfactorily incorporated in the annual accounts by the Control, Budget and Ac-
counting Department.
The basic conclusion of our report is that from the analysis carried out of the examination and 
accounting procedures, of the accounting records and of the internal controls in place, it can 
be inferred that the annual accounts for the year 2008 give a true and fair view of the net worth 
and financial position of the Banco de España.
Madrid, 7 May 2009.
2 Report of the Audit Committee
JESÚS LEGUINA VILLAÁNGEL LUIS LÓPEZ ROAANA MARÍA SÁNCHEZ TRUJILLO
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